


UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LIBRARIES







Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015



SOUTHERN Historical Society Papers

NEW SERIES—NUMBER II
WHOLE NUMBER XL



SEPTEMBER, 1915

PUBLICATION COMMITTEE

W. GORDON McCABE

GEORGE L. CHRISTIAN

ARCHER ANDERSON

SECRETARY

JAMES POWER SMITH

2120 STUART AVENUE

RICHMOND, VA.

WM. ELLIS JONES' SONS, INC.
PRINTERS,
RICHMOND, VA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I. Poem. James Barron Hope.	I
II. Living Confederate Principles. Address by Lloyd T. Everett, Washington, D. C.	2
III. The Campaign of Chancellorsville. Colonel David Gregg McIntosh.	44
IV. The Forged Letter of General Lee. Professor Charles A. Graves.	101
V. Stonewall Jackson. Address of Hon. Wm. A. Anderson...	149
VI. Stonewall Jackson in Campaign of 1862. Paper of Hon. Alexander R. Boteler.	162
VII. The Confederate States Navy Yard at Charlotte, N. C., 1862-1865. Miss Violet Alexander.	184
VIII. The Battle of Fredericksburg. General Alfred M. Scales...	193
IX. Second Manassas. Captain James Mercer Garnett.	225
X. The Character and Services of the Confederate Soldier. Captain John Lamb.	230
XI. Hon. Judah P. Benjamin. Rabbi Calish.	240
XII. Hon. Judah P. Benjamin. Judge George L. Christian.	244
XIII. Gettysburg. Dr. R. H. McKim.	253
XIV. The Merrimac and the Monitor. Captain W. C. Whittle, C. S. N.	301
XV. Letter of Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, to Captain Fred. Colston.	305
XVI. The South is American. Joshua W. Caldwell in The Arena.	307

XVII.	Speech of Judge Reagan.....	312
XVIII.	Lecky on the South.....	315
XIX.	Losses in the War between the States. Dr. C. H. Tibault, Surgeon-General, U. C. V.....	316
XIX.	Dr. Andrews on General Lee.....	320
XX.	Appendix.....	322
XIX.	Books.....	326

8504
25

Southern Historical Society Papers.

NEW SERIES. Richmond, Va., Sept., 1915. VOLUME II.

THE IDEAL HISTORIAN OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC.

By JAMES BARRON HOPE.

In the future some historian shall come forth both
strong and wise—
With a love of the Republic, and the truth before
his eyes!
He will show the subtle causes of the War be-
tween the States,
He will go back in his studies far beyond our
Modern dates;
He will trace out hostile ideas, as the miner does
the lodes;
He will show the Union riven, and the picture
will deplore;
He will show it reunited and made stronger than
before;
Slow and patient, fair and truthful, must the com-
ing teacher be,
To show how the knife was sharpened, that was
ground to prune the tree;
He will hold the Scales of Justice; he will meas-
ure praise and blame,
And the South will stand the verdict, and will
stand it without shame!

LIVING CONFEDERATE PRINCIPLES:

A Heritage for All Time.

(An address delivered by Lloyd T. Everett, of Washington Camp, No. 305, S. C. V., at the reception by the Camp to the Confederate veterans of Washington, D. C., and vicinity, February 10, 1914. Revised.)

Copyright 1915, by Lloyd T. Everett.

Mr. Commandant, Mr. Toastmaster, Veterans and Comrades:

We often hear it said that the glory of the Confederate soldier is imperishable and immortal; that his valor and devotion to duty have won for him a name and a fame that shall never die.

That is true. History shows us no equal to the splendid blend of physical and moral courage and long sustained fortitude of the half starved legions of Lee—certainly no superior. And while, to use a homely phrase, every tub must stand upon its own bottom; while each man must win for himself, by his own worth, his standing in the community, yet I prize as a priceless treasure the proud fact that I am the son of a Confederate soldier. Nor is this merely a matter of pride or of accidental honor to me. It is a very real incentive to look well to my own course and conduct in order that I may hand on untarnished the shining legacy that was bequeathed to me.

“Duty is the sublimest word in the English Language” is a maxim that has been widely credited to our peerless Lee, although incorrectly so according to respectable authority. (1) But, in any event, the sentiment is well worthy of General Lee, whose

own life, public and private, was a superb illustration of the truth of the sublime epigram. And so, unswerving and unfaltering devotion to duty is the glorious heritage which we Sons of Confederate Veterans, *as sons of Confederate veterans*, have acquired by reason of our lineage.

But it is not of the courage, valor and endurance of the Confederate soldier that I wish particularly to speak on this occasion. Those cardinal virtues of Dixie's defenders have been extolled a thousand times over by tongues more fluent than mine. Nor is it my purpose to vindicate the course of the peoples of the Southern States in asserting, and striving at all costs to maintain their independence under the exigencies of the particular crisis of 1860-61. The world is already coming to know, as we have always known, that we need no such vindication—that our open record is its own vindication.

No: it is another phase of what we may call the Confederate subject which I wish here to discuss; a phase which, it seems to me, has been too little featured and, I fear, too little recognized, even by our own chroniclers and advocates. And yet, to my mind, upon the general recognition of it depends the true progress of our own people; nay, of free government, and hence of civilization itself. And that phase or aspect of the general subject is this: *The absolute soundness of the principles upon which the Southern Confederacy was bottomed*; not merely the rightfulness of our stand for political independence under the peculiar circumstances of that time, but the everlasting verity of the political and institutional ideals underlying our action; ideals vital and essential to all ages and climes as a goal toward which to press, if the world is to have true *liberty with progress*.

For our Confederate war—our second war for independence. Stonewall Jackson called it (2)—was not a mere abortive revolution. We of the Southern States stood for great and fundamental principles of government; principles that meant, *and that still mean* much for the advancement of free institutions and of human happiness.

And, just as the valor of the Confederate soldier and the untold heroism of the Confederate woman are immortal, so, with

this larger view of the subject in mind, I take a theme for consideration here, and name it

LIVING CONFEDERATE PRINCIPLES: *a Heritage for all Time.*

The present is a time of peace and good will, of broad and tolerant sentiment, of generous breadth of view; in a word, it is an era of good feeling between the various sections of these United States.

**An Era of
Good Feeling**

Just now there is rolling past us the semi-centenary of the War for Southern Independence—the “Civil War”—the War between the States or the sections—the “War of the Rebellion” (whether by the North or the South, we need not here inquire)—call it what one will, everyone knows to what we here refer; that mighty clash of arms which to many of us is still most commonly referred to as, simply, The War. On every hand, to judge from the newspapers, are daily evidences of amity and cordiality between the Grey and the Blue; of honor accorded brave men by brave men. And in July, 1913, at Gettysburg, there was formally and finally buried—let us see, was it the twenty-seventh time, or the hundred and twenty-seventh time, since the war with Spain?—“the last vestige of sectionalism.” And when I see and hear all this, I am glad. For then I may claim the right to a respectful hearing on my chosen theme, even though certain views I hold regarding The War, its causes, its conduct and its consequences, may differ widely from those prevalent in the North, and even from those sometimes found in the South.

Nor is this era of good feeling confined to America. Just now a son of Virginia and of a Confederate veteran sits in the White House, and a grandson of Virginia is the premier of the cabinet. From these two men of Southern stock now at the helm of the ship of state, has gone forth to all the world the message from this mighty nation, Peace on earth, good will to men; not good will to men on earth from God in Heaven, as on that Christmas morn nineteen centuries ago, but peace on earth

from men to men—in truth, a clarion call from a strong nation to the other nations of the earth, strong and weak alike; a call to these other nations to recognize as never before the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God, as it is sometimes expressed. Under the Bryan Peace plan, if adopted, a long step forward will have been taken toward that happy era when “they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.” (3)

This means a turning from the forum of force to the rule of reason; a substitution of calm argument or impartial arbitration for the dread arbitrament of war. Yea, veterans and descendants of the Grey, it means a turning from the principles and practices of Lincoln and the North; it means the coming triumph of the underlying principles of the Confederate States of America.

I know that it is often said that the Southern States appealed to the sword, in their controversy with the Northern States. I am here to challenge that allegation; to absolutely deny its truth. And I can prove my contention from the record, and prove it to the verge of demonstration. That record shows that the South did not choose the arbitrament of the sword; it does show that *she resorted to secession as the last hope of* PEACE WITH HONOR.

**The
Confederacy's
PEACEABLE
Appeal**

Ours is pre-eminently a race of peace and progress through the channels of self-government. The history of our ancestors for a thousand years and more will sustain the truth of this claim. True, it is a history of internecine war, often, but largely so because it is the life story of men, and of many generations of men, who prized peace and order so highly that they were ever ready, if need be, to fight for it. Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Petition of Right, the Revolution of 1688, the Act of Settlement—these are some of the monuments that mark the achievements of this orderly yet militant race. And these men laid the corner-stone of their structure in local self-government, as the truest safeguard for an oppressed minority, and

thus the surest bulwark for political liberty itself. Yes, local self-government, or home rule, is of the very warp and woof of our institutions.

These salutary political principles, these racial characteristics, were transplanted also to the kindly soil of the New World when a greater Britain was planted here.

It was in support of these principles that our Revolutionary sires protested against the unconstitutional stamp acts and similar taxation measures of England oppressive of the American minority, in the efforts of the mother country to recuperate for the expenses of the French and Indian war. At first, they sought a peaceable remedy in the form of remonstrances, resolutions and the like. When they found that these availed them not, they then reluctantly accepted the gauge of battle flung in their faces by their haughty oppressors across the seas. Even after actual war was raging, these American patriots of British stock still indulged the fatuous dream of an unbroken British union, and sought to wage their fight under the British crown and, as nearly as possible, under the British flag. (4) As himself afterward declared, George Washington, when he took command of the rebel forces under authority from the Continental Congress, "abhorred the idea of independence." (5)

But the logic of events soon brought forth the instrument officially entitled "The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America." (6) (And, by the way, Declaration is written with a big D, united States with a little u and a capital S.)

**The Consent
of the
Governed** This immortal declaration laid down the fundamental doctrine that:

"Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

This, our first war for independence, was successful. About

the close of it these thirteen independent republics formed a closer union among themselves, under what was known as the Articles of Confederation. This becoming unsatisfactory after a very few years, most of the constituent States seceded (which at the time was denounced by a few as unconstitutional and a breach of faith—7), and these seceding States, eleven in number, formed a new union under the federal constitution that was framed in 1787 and went into operation between these eleven States March 4, 1789. Afterward the two remaining States of the old union, North Carolina and Rhode Island, also acceded to the new instrument.

As is well known, this new union was regarded with great jealousy, and scrutinized very closely by a number of the Continental fathers, the immortal Patrick Henry, the firebrand of the Revolution, and George Mason, author of the great Bill of Rights of Virginia, among the number. As just seen, political independence from the despotic central power of Britain had been gained by the assertion and maintenance of the right to change oppressive governments. But this struggle was won by force of arms and at the cost of much bloodshed; and the principle of the right to alter oppressive governments thus asserted in the Declaration of Independence might be construed, it was feared, to mean merely the right of revolution, and so the people of some of the United States, if thereafter oppressed by the central government to be created under the new constitution, might be left the right of separation, in self-defense, only by force of arms. And thus we would have progressed no whither in our supposed upward and onward march in the path of just and orderly self-government. Wherefore, several of the States—Virginia, New York and Rhode Island—in acceding to the new constitution, expressly reserved the right to peaceably withdraw or secede, should they thereafter find it necessary to their happiness to do so. (8)

This was an important advance in self-government, and a further safeguard for the minority. The protection of the minority, be it remembered, was a primary object in the framing of the federal constitution, as stated at the time by James Madison, who is called the Father of the Constitution.

**Minority
Protection**

In the Virginian convention that ratified the constitution of the United States, delegate James Madison declared: (9)

"But, on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbulence, violence and abuse of power by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions which, in republics, have more frequently than any other cause produced despotism. . . . If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and what are the sources of that diversity of sentiment which pervades its [sic] inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear that the same causes may terminate here in the same fatal effects which they produced in those republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against."

Madison advocated the adoption of the constitution as affording the needed protection to the minority.

Remember that: the constitution of the United States was framed and adopted, the union of the States thereunder was formed, for the *peaceable* protection of the *minority* against the oppressions of the majority. And mark this: it was proposed by some to embody in the constitution a power to coerce States that might refuse to obey the laws of Congress. Madison (still the father of the constitution) said that this would mean war; and the proposal was voted down. (10)

**Coercion
voted down
in the Consti-
tutional Con-
vention**

Well, time went on. Sectional differences and jealousies speedily developed between the Southern and the Northern States. Under Jefferson, a Southern President, the great trans-Mississippi territory of Louisiana was bought from Napoleon, in 1803; and thereby the area of the United States was approximately doubled. New England thought that this would strengthen the South at the expense of the North. Accordingly, New England threatened secession. (11)

New England was at this time a commercial or sea-faring country, and had as yet few manufactures. The Embargo law of Jefferson's second administration was unpopular in this sea-trading New England, and again loud mutterings of secessionist

purposes were heard up there. (12) The State of Louisiana was admitted in 1812, despite the celebrated threat of Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, on the floor of Congress in 1811, that such admission of a new Southern State from a part of the Louisiana purchase would constitute adequate cause for secession by some of the Northern States, "amicably if they can, violently if they must." (13)

But conditions soon changed. The war of 1812 cut us off from Europe, whence we had theretofore obtained most of our manufactured goods; and New England, her sea-trade interrupted by the war, with commendable energy and enterprise now began to manufacture. During this war the famous Hartford Convention, of New England, met, with a large sized list toward secession. (14) After the war New England and the North generally began to find the union a good thing for them; it furnished a free market—the Southern States—for buying the manufacturers' raw materials; it furnished a "protected" market—still largely the Southern States—for selling the manufactured goods.

But New England and the rest of the North were still painfully jealous of new Southern and Western or South-western States. They opposed the admission of Missouri, 1819, and now first raised seriously the question of Negro slavery as a sectional issue. Thomas Jefferson was himself, like many other Southerners, in favor of the abolition of slavery; a *peaceable* abolition. But he could see further into the future than could most men. So now, when this Missouri-slavery issue was raised by New England and the North, for the purpose of keeping the new lands of the West for themselves as against the South, the aged Jefferson wrote that it roused him as a fire-bell in the night, and portended a disastrous sectional struggle. (15)

But to return to the tariff. The tariff question, as a serious sectional issue, first came to a head about 1830. Having once gotten hold of the nursing bottle of "protection," so called, in 1816 and 1820, New England and the North cried ever for more. The tariff of 1820 was followed by that of 1824, and that in

**A Fire-bell
in the Night**

turn by the "tariff of abominations" in 1828. These were sectional measures, and the South felt herself being oppressed and impoverished by the combined Northern and North-western majority. The tariff act of 1832 was of the same stripe as its predecessors. Out of this situation came the Nullification crisis of 1830-33.

Early in 1830 occurred the memorable debate in the Senate of the United States between Robert Y. Hayne, of South Carolina, and Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts. Just three years later, early in 1833, a similar debate took place between the same Mr. Webster on one side and, on the other side, Hayne's successor in the Senate, the immortal John C. Calhoun. Hayne and Calhoun were the champions of the South in the pending sectional controversy; Webster, of the North. In these debates Webster is said to have "shotted every gun" that was fired for the North in the great War of thirty years later. (16) If this be so, careful attention is due to this Titans' war, this battle of the forensic giants, and to the great constitutional and institutional arguments then advanced.

The immediate issue was the tariff. The Southern States, and especially South Carolina, contended that the existing tariff laws were devised for *protccting* Northern manufacturers, and so imposed a sectional burden upon the agricultural South; they contended, further, that there was no warrant for anything more than a *revenue* tariff; that a tariff for "protection," as it is called, was utterly unconstitutional.

Whether the South was correct on these two points; viz: the injurious effects of a "protective" tariff at that time, upon the South, and the unconstitutionality of such a tariff—with these two questions we are not here concerned. But from this starting point the debates ranged out and covered other two questions which do here concern us. And these are: first, How are disputed questions of constitutionality, arising between States, or groups of States, in the union, to be determined?; second, The nature of the union, whether a union of States as States, or of the American people in one aggregate mass. To take these up briefly, in inverse order to that just given:

Calhoun introduced in the Senate a series of resolutions, three in number, which are well worth the careful study of every student of republican institutions, every lover of human freedom. These resolutions recited (17) the strictly federal character, under the constitution of 1787-89, of the union of American States; with the resultant right, to the States, "of judging, in the last resort, as to the extent of the powers delegated" to the central government and, consequently, of those reserved to the several States, and that action by the central government based upon the contrary assumption must inevitably tend to undue consolidation and to "the loss of liberty itself."

Webster vehemently attacked these resolutions. His argument may be thus epitomized, largely in his own words: (18)

"We the People" How can any man get over the words of the preamble to the constitution itself, "*We the people* of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this constitution"?; that these words forbid the turning of the instrument into a mere compact between sovereign States; that, in framing and putting into operation the constitution of the United States, "a change had been made from a *confederacy* of States to a different system, . . . a *constitution* for a *national* government"; that "accession, as a word applied to political associations, implies coming into a league treaty or *confedcracy*, by one hitherto a stranger to it"; that, "in establishing the present government," (i. e., the government of the United States as it stood in Webster's time) the "people of the United States . . . do not say that they *accde* to a *lcaguc*, but they declare that they *ordain* and *cstablish* a *constitution*, . . . some of them employing the . . . words 'assented to' and 'adopted,' but all of them 'ratifying'"; that "the constitution of the United States is *not* a league, confederacy or *compact* between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacities"; that "THE NATURAL CONVERSE OF ACCESSION IS SECESSION."

Note the several test words here: *confedcracy*, *constitution*, *national*, *compact* and ACCEDE.

As to every one of them Webster was wrong, as may be

shown from the debates and official documents accompanying and preceding the framing and adoption of the federal constitution. We have not the time to examine fully into all these test words here; for a fairly full compilation or tabulation of the data bearing on them, see the subjoined note. (19) To one or two of these words let us devote a few sentences.

First, then, as to the phrase, "We the people of the United States." The preamble to the federal constitution does use this expression. But Article VII of the instrument itself provides that "The ratification of the conventions of nine *States* shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution BETWEEN THE STATES so ratifying the same." Mark you these most significant words, *between the States*. It is not provided that the ratification of this constitution by a prescribed majority of the whole people of the then existing United States under the Articles of Confederation shall establish it over the whole people of all those United States (a provision that would have been an utter nullity, for stubborn historical reasons), but that its ratification by a certain number of the States shall establish it between—not over, but BETWEEN those particular States, and none others, unless and until such others shall also ratify, each for itself.

Bearing in mind this Article VII of the federal constitution, the preamble becomes plain. A cardinal canon of construction is, that if possible all the parts of a written instrument shall be so construed as to be harmonious with each other. The "people of the United States," then, here means the people (or, peoples) of those several distinct States which may elect to establish the proposed constitution *between* themselves. And indeed, this constitution of 1787, and the union under it, first went into effect between eleven of the States, only, as we have remarked above; North Carolina and Rhode Island remaining separate and independent republics until, after President Washington's inauguration, they chose, each for itself, to come into the new union or confederacy.

So we see that Mr. Webster's centralist construction of the word or phrase, "the people," as used in the constitution, falls to the ground.

But again, Webster denies that the States *acceded* to the constitution; and mark well his daring and all-important admission, that "*the natural converse of accession is secession.*"

Now, it so happens that this word *accede*, or its derivative *accession*, which he thus spurns, is found, in the very sense which he denies to it, over and over again in the debates of those who framed and adopted the constitution, and at least once in the course of the official documents pertaining to its adoption; over and over again, I say, or some forty times, by actual count, either certainly or probably in this sense, and more than twenty times unquestionably so. To give but three instances here:

James Madison said, in the Virginian convention of 1788 that debated and, by a close majority, ratified the system for Virginia: (20) "Suppose eight States only should ratify, and Virginia should propose certain alterations as the previous condition of her *accession*." In the North Carolina State convention Governor Johnston said: (21) "We are not to *form* a constitution, but to say whether we [i. e., the people of North Carolina] shall *adopt* a constitution to which ten States have already *acceded*." And the ratifying convention of New York (of which Alexander Hamilton was a member) prepared by unanimous order a circular letter containing this language: (22) "Our attachment to our sister States, and the confidence we repose in them can not be more forcibly demonstrated than by *acceding* to a government which many of us think very imperfect."

Webster was right; "secession is the converse of accession." Moreover, as we have seen above, (23) at least three States, Virginia, Rhode Island and New York, in their formal acts of ratification of the federal constitution, expressly and explicitly reserved this right of secession or peaceable withdrawal; a fact *now* well known and *now* generally acknowledged, by South and North alike.

But, another question asked in those debates of the early 'thirties was, as stated above, *How shall disputed questions of constitutional rights and powers be decided?* By the federal Supreme Court, said Webster, so as to bind even sovereign States, and in all cases.

"No," said South Carolina, in substance, speaking through Hayne and Calhoun; "the constitution of the United States empowers the federal Supreme Court to decide only 'all cases *in law and equity* arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made . . . under their authority.'" That is the language of the constitution: "all cases in law and equity." And questions of sovereignty, argued South Carolina, come not within the scope of cases in law and equity, which are limited, by the well known common-law use of the term, to an altogether different class of cases. The historical correctness of this contention of South Carolina's is supported by James Madison in his journal of the constitutional convention. Madison, the reporter, says of himself, the delegate: (24)

"James Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the federal supreme court generally to cases arising under the constitution, and whether it ought not to be *limited to cases of a judiciary nature*." (The contention of Hayne and Calhoun, exactly.) "The right of expounding the constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that department."

"The [pending] motion of Dr. Johnson was agreed to *nem. con.*, it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a judiciary nature." As if to clinch the matter beyond a peradventure, the words "in law and equity" were afterward inserted into the jurisdiction clause here discussed.

(Just a word here as to the man here quoted as authority, James Madison of Virginia, "father of the constitution." From the standpoint of a constitutional constructionist, Madison's career was somewhat that of a pendulum. Rather centralistic at the time of the general convention of 1787 that framed the constitution and submitted it to the States for ratification or rejection—certainly moderately so, as disclosed by his own utterances, from time to time, in the debates of that convention, a very few years later he became Jefferson's own right-hand man in opposing the radically centralistic trend of the Adams ad-

ministration; in his old age, and at the time of the Nullification crisis which we are now discussing, he seems to have reverted toward his earlier position. As a centralist, then, at the time he took part in and reported the debates of the general constitutional convention of 1787, whatever Madison noted down of a contrary tendency is deserving of special attention and weight.)

But if not the federal supreme court, then what tribunal, inquired Webster and the North, is to decide these disputed questions of sovereignty and of constitutional powers? The answer was ready to hand: Not to the federal supreme court, itself but a component part of the created central government, where three men (a majority of a quorum of the court), and they political appointees, may have the deciding voice, must a sovereign creator State submit questions affecting her sovereign powers. She herself will decide it pending an appeal, in the true spirit of Magna Charta, to the judgment of her peers, her sister sovereign creator States in general convention assembled. This contention had had the support of Thomas Jefferson in 1821, as quoted by Hayne: (35) "It is a fatal heresy to suppose that either our State governments are superior to the federal, or the federal to the State; neither is authorized literally to decide what belongs to itself, or its co-partner in government, in differences between their different sets of public servants; the appeal is to neither, but to their employers *peaceably* assembled by their representatives in convention." More than twenty years before this utterance Jefferson had embodied this same principle in his draft of the famous Kentucky Resolutions. (26) Again, Jefferson wrote, (27) "This *peaceable* and legitimate resource, a general convention of the States, to which we are in the habit of implicit obedience, *superseding all appeal to force*, and being always within our reach, shows a precious principle of self-preservation in our composition . . ."

Mark this: Jefferson says that in this plan of a general convention of the States to decide such mooted questions of constitutional construction and governmental powers, is found a *peaceable settlement* of vexing political and sectional problems. This was precisely Carolina's plea in 1830-33.

Right or wrong, thundered President Jackson, these federal laws must be obeyed unless and until repealed by the same power (Congress) that enacted them, or unless and until declared unconstitutional by the federal supreme court; and if not voluntarily obeyed, then obedience shall be enforced by the fratricidal sword. To like effect argued Webster. You have the right, said he, to resist laws deemed oppressive, if you so please—but it is the right of revolution, no more; justifiable only if successful, and if not successful, subject to the dread penalties of high treason.

Ours is a constitutional remedy, Hayne replied, *and a peaceable one.* (a)

**Power versus
Liberty**

The right of revolution exists independently of the constitution. That instrument expressly declares that all powers not delegated to the central government remains to the several States, or the people; that is, to the people of those several States. This power of deciding the constitutionality or the unconstitutionality of laws of Congress, being not given in the constitution either to Congress or to the federal supreme court, remains to the several States. Ours is a peaceable remedy—unless you of the North force on us the issue of war. And only if honor with peace within the union be found no longer possible, then will we exercise that other peaceable remedy of secession or withdrawal from the partnership of States in order that, like Abraham and Lot of old, we may dwell apart in peace, rather than remain together in dissension. And if you, like George III, still pursue us with hostile intent and the sword be drawn, then upon you of the North, not upon us, must the awful responsibility rest.

For answer to this plea of peace by South Carolina, Jackson, Webster and the North passed the Force Bill, as it was called, of 1833; a bill providing for the enforcement of the tariff laws, if need be, by force of arms. But at the same time, in view of South Carolina's determined front, and signs of growing support for her from other Southern States, Jackson and Congress passed, also, the Clay Compromise bill scaling down the tariff to meet Carolina's demands.

So ended the matter for the time. The sword was threatened but not drawn, and South Carolina's *peaceable* remedy for an oppressed sectional minority prevailed. And mark this: State nullification or State veto, as here preached by Hayne and Calhoun and practiced by their native State, was a qualified nullification only, a fact too often entirely overlooked; an interposition of the State's sovereignty pending an appeal to a three-fourths decision of the confederated States in general convention. It was, in effect, a federal referendum. (b) It was strictly conservative of true constitutional principles. For, let us repeat, a prime object of the federal constitution was the *protection of the rights of the minority*.

This struggle of the early 'thirties of the nineteenth century was, as Calhoun averred at the time, (28) a contest between *power*, or the North, and *liberty*, or the South. Calhoun drew a close parallel between that contest and that other of 1776, with Northern unjust taxation of the South in 1833 bearing a marked analogy to the British unjust taxation of the American colonies in 1776.

That both of these contentions of South Carolina (i. e., qualified nullification, with secession as a reserve) were sound,

**The Great
Confounder of
the Constitu-
tion.**

historically and constitutionally sound, we have just seen. That the contrary contention of Webster was unsound, unconstitutional and unhistorical, must necessarily follow. Daniel Webster has been called the "Expounder of the

Constitution." (29) I respectfully submit that great "Confounder of the Constitution" would be a more fitting title. His admirer and biographer, and a successor to him in the federal Senate from Massachusetts, Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, says of Webster's argument here, (30) "The weak places in his armor were historical in their nature." Of Webster on a somewhat similar occasion the same writer says, (31) "But the speech is strongly partisan and exhibits the disposition of an advocate to fit the constitution to his particular case." Likewise, Webster's apologist, von Holst, discussing this very debate with Calhoun, sadly confesses (32) that, "To his and his country's harm, the

advocate in him always spoke loudly in the reasoning of the statesman."

Yes; Daniel Webster was a great lawyer, an able advocate, a magnificent orator. But as a constitutional student he was superficial. The close of his speech known as "Webster's reply to Hayne" is a burst of splendid oratory, and is known and quoted far and wide. Only less eloquent, far more sound, is the little known peroration to Hayne's rejoinder, which should be called "Hayne's reply to Webster." Mr. Webster said: (33)

"While the union lasts we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that, in my day at least, that curtain may not rise. God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind. When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feud, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a

A Means

Inseparable

from the End

Sought?

stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured—bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as, *What is all this worth?* nor those other words of delusion and folly, *Liberty first, and union afterwards*; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart—*Liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable!*"

Grand, glorious—rhetorically; but it is not logic—nor yet history. According to Webster, the perpetuity of the then existing American union was essential to the continued enjoyment of liberty. But the Declaration of Independence, mindful of the rise and fall of nations and the ever recurring changes in gov-

ernments, tells us that all governments are but means to an end, and that end the securing of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that here, as in any other case, when a particular means fails to effect the end in view, it should be discarded for some other means. Forgetful, too, was Webster of Washington's language in his revered Farewell Address, wherein he denominates the union under the constitution of 1787-9 an "experiment," and warns against "*geographical* discriminations" as "causes which may disturb our union." To like effect to this last, as seen above, spoke Jefferson on "the Missouri question"; but these solemn admonitions, of Washington and of Jefferson, Webster and, after him, Lincoln, heeded not.

Thus Mr. Webster in 1833, for union at any cost, when those whom he opposed themselves opposed the tariff laws which, by means of "geographical discriminations," favored his own New England and the North. To far different effect had he spoken some seventeen years before when, a member of the House of Representatives from New Hampshire, he voiced New England's fierce opposition to the then raging war with old England and to the pending enlistment bill for carrying on that war: (34) "I use not the tone of intimidation or menace," thundered young Representative Webster, "but I forewarn you of consequences. . . . I beseech you, by the best hopes of your country's prosperity—by your regard for the *preservation of her government and her union*—that you abandon your system of restrictions—that you abandon it at once and abandon it forever."

But to return to the Great Debate of 1830. Said Gen. Hayne in reply to Webster's "reply": (35)

"The gentleman has made an eloquent appeal to our hearts in favor of union. Sir, I cordially respond to that appeal. I will yield to no gentleman here in sincere attachment to the union; but it is a union founded
Freedom on the constitution, and not such a union as
before Union that gentleman would give us, that is dear to my heart. If this is to become one great 'consolidated government,' swallowing up the rights of the States, and the liberties of the

citizen, 'riding over the plundered ploughmen and beggared yeomanry,' the union will not be worth preserving. Sir, it is because South Carolina loves the union, and would preserve it forever, that she is opposing now, while there is hope, those usurpations of the federal government which, once established, will, sooner or later, tear this union into fragments.

"The gentleman is for marching under a banner, studded all over with stars, and bearing the inscription, Liberty and Union. I had thought, sir, the gentleman would have borne a standard, displaying in its ample folds a brilliant sun, extending its golden rays from the center to the extremities, in the brightness of whose beams the 'little stars hide their diminished heads.' Ours, sir, is the banner of the constitution; the twenty-four stars are there, in all their undiminished lustre; on it is inscribed, Liberty—the constitution—union. We offer up our fervent prayers to the Father of all Mercies that it may continue to wave, for ages yet to come, over a free, a happy, and a united people."

Hayne has been criticised as having violated a cardinal rule of oratory and having attempted to equal Webster's peroration in his own. (36) But another view may be urged. The ablest generals—such as Lee, Jackson and Napoleon—are often those who, on occasions, transgress fundamental canons of strategy; success as a result being their only justification. Hayne, at once orator, patriot and logician, both felt the power of Webster's closing plea and its glowing imagery as it would appeal to men, and perceived its basic fallacy as applied. He proceeded, boldly and deliberately, to borrow his great antagonist's own figure of speech and turn it against him. In the brief space of the closing four sentences of the peroration just quoted, Hayne reproduces in outline the picture drawn so fully and so masterfully by Webster, dissects it, suggests a more fitting one to accord with his opponent's expressed principles, appropriates the original as properly illustrating his own position, and ends with the "fervent" and pertinent invocation that it may long be suffered to remain the true emblem of a people *free* and *happy* as well as united.

Hayne's peroration is not so elaborate or ornate as Webster's; nor was it meant to be. But it is perfect in itself. The keen, logical criticism, blended with the quiet, delicate sarcasm conveyed in the reference to the "brilliant sun" and the "little stars," is exquisite; the true application of Webster's stellar picture is simple and effective. After the "fire, the wind, and the earthquake" of Webster's mighty finish it comes—as a still small voice.

And so the South triumphed with and through this remedy of peaceable protection for a sectional minority. The North, thus baffled, next resorted to a wily flank move.

The next great sectional crisis (after the preliminary and premonitory one of 1850) came nearly a third of a century later. In the crisis just discussed, involving the Nullification clash of 1830-33, the tariff was the bone of contention. In this second crisis, Negro slavery in the territories was the occasion, not the cause as is imagined by many who should know better.

What was the actual source of this "free-soil" or "anti-slavery" crusade of the North? An aroused moral sense, say some. Fanaticism, say others. Partly each of these, but not exclusively or chiefly either or both, say I.

Mark well this fact: In the debates in Congress on the tariff dispute of 1833. John Quincy Adams, ex-President of the United States and then a member of the House of Representatives, uttered this significant remark from the floor of the House: (37) "But protection might be extended in different forms to different interests. . . . In the Southern and South-western portion of the union, there exists a certain interest [by which Adams meant Negro slavery] which enjoys under the constitution and the laws of the United States an especial protection, peculiar to itself" (i. e., return of fugitive slaves escaping from one State into another). He referred to the slaves in the Southern States as "machinery," and added, "If they [the Southern States] must withdraw protection from the free white labor of the North [the "protection" of a high tariff, Adams meant], then it ought to be withdrawn from the machinery of the South."

Ah—here we have the milk in the cocoanut; or perhaps it would be appropriate to say, the African in the fuel heap. In the framing of the federal constitution, the North and the South—rather, New England and the far Southern States—arranged a *quid pro quo*, (38) by which the shipping interests of New England obtained control, and permanent control, of commercial regulations by a mere majority vote, instead of a two-thirds vote, in the Congress, and the South (together with the slave-importing shippers of this same New England) defeated the possibility of prohibition of the continued importation of Negroes, temporarily, or for some nineteen years. And now, her darling of sectional customs “protection” in danger from South Carolina’s firm stand, New England, through John Quincy Adams as her spokesman, gave warning, in 1833, that tariff “protection,” although not guaranteed by the constitution, and slavery protection, which was expressly guaranteed by that instrument, must be held as twin special interests, to stand or fall together.

In this light, then, these remarks of Adams, of Massachusetts, should be carefully marked and constantly borne in mind in connection with the subsequent growth and course of anti-Southern agitation, under the guise of an anti-slavery crusade, from the time—this time of South Carolina’s Nullification stand and the resultant tariff reduction of 1833—that a definite check was placed upon high tariff, North-favoring legislation. And this is the same Mr. Adams who shortly thereafter began to make his declining years renowned by pouring into the House of Representatives at Washington his broadsides of “anti-slavery” or anti-Southern petitions.

Finally, a new party was formed, with its primary object, as professed, the exclusion of the South with her constitution-guaranteed property from the common territories that had been acquired by the common blood and the common treasure of the South and the North. And, significantly, early in its history, or as soon (1860) as it had acquired material growth and substantial prestige, (39) this new political party, already thus avowedly sectional in its principles, made a sectional “protective”

tariff one of its demands. And when it had elected a President (by a sectional and a minority popular vote, be it remembered) and so caused a disruption of the union of States, "protection" was a primary means employed to support the war that followed—a war of aggression and conquest waged by this party to secure both its own continued supremacy and the new consolidated and un-American union of force in place of the pristine confederated union of choice which itself had done so much to destroy; a war in which Negro emancipation *in parts of the Southern States* was incidentally proclaimed *as a military measure*, the thirteenth amendment coming later to extend and validate this unconstitutional proceeding. "Un-American union of force," I said; we must remember that widespread opposition to the war of conquest against the South manifested itself in the North, and that the myriads of immigrants from centralist, "blood-and-iron" Germany had much to do with turning the scale in the North in support of Lincoln's and Seward's war. (c) In these aliens there had arisen "a new king which knew not Joseph," who had no inconvenient recollections of '76 to hold him in check. (Note: The foregoing was originally written *before* the outbreak of the European war of 1914, much of the responsibility for which must be laid to the charge of this same "blood-and-iron" nation.)

This so-called free-soil movement were more accurately styled a white-soil movement. For hand in hand with the efforts to keep Negro slaves out of the new States and territories of the North and the West, went drastic anti-free-Negro laws in those regions as well as in the older Northern States. (These laws are to be found discussed most illuminatingly in Ewing's *Legal and Historical Status of the Dred Scott Decision*, chapter iv. See, also, *Northern Rebellion and Southern Secession*, by the same author, page 113.) The Negro, slave or free, was not wanted in the North and West. Long since had Jefferson, the honest abolitionist, pointed out that, (40) "The passage of slaves from one State to another would not make a slave of a single human being who would not be so without it. So their diffusion over a greater surface would make them individually happier

and proportionally facilitate the accomplishment of their emancipation by dividing the burden on a greater number of coadjutors." This warning, like those other warnings of Jefferson and Washington above mentioned, of course went unheeded by the Negro-exclusionists of the North and North-west.

Nullification, or State veto subject to federal referendum, was practicable in 1833; practicable and successful. In 1860-61

it was not practicable, because a State could not

**Abraham and
Lot Again**

exercise her veto power out in the common territories, where the sectional, Northern party that had just been elected to power threatened

anti-Southern legislation. Hence, when peace with honor was no longer possible within the union of States, the Southern States turned to the only possible peaceable alternative, secession, or complete withdrawal from that inter-State compact of government already so flagrantly violated, in act and in promise of further acts to come, by their Northern sisters.

That the voice and efforts, the counsels and measures of the Southland were still for peace, the record abundantly proves.

Sturdy little South Carolina, faithful to the spirit of her departed Hayne and Calhoun, was the first State to withdraw. On her invitation, delegates from five other of the "cotton States" that followed her in withdrawing, and later those from a sixth, Texas, met her own delegates in a Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, February 4, 1861. By this Congress was framed the provisional constitution of the Confederate States of America. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was chosen provisional President of the new union.

On February 15, 1861, before the arrival of Mr. Davis at Montgomery to take the oath of office, the Congress passed a resolution providing, (41) "that a commission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect as early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the government of the United States, for the purpose of negotiating *friendly* relations between that government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments, upon principles of right, justice, equity and good faith."

Truly, as Mr. Stephens, of Georgia, one of the delegates to this Montgomery Congress, says in his history of the United States, (42) these "were not such men as revolutions or civil commotions usually bring to the surface. . . . Their object was not to tear down, so much as it was to build up with the greater security and permanency." And we may add that they meant to build up, if so permitted, peaceably.

In this spirit of amity and justice, the first act of the Louisiana State convention, after passing the ordinance of secession, was to adopt, unanimously, a resolution recognizing the right to free navigation of the Mississippi river (which flows down from the Northern States of the great inland basin and empties into the sea within the confines of Louisiana), and further recognizing the right of egress and ingress at that river's mouth and looking to the guaranteeing of these rights. (43)

President Davis' inaugural address, delivered February 18, 1861, breathed the same spirit of friendship toward our brothers of the North. He said, in part: (44)

"Our present political position has been achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the *American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed*, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established. The declared purpose of the compact of the union from which we have withdrawn was to "establish justice, *insure domestic tranquility*, (d) provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity;" and when, in the judgment of the sovereign States composing this Confederation, it has been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, a *peaceful appeal* to the ballot box declared that, so far as they are concerned, the government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be 'inalienable.' . . .

**Our
President's
Inaugural**

"Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to form this Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each State its government has remained; so that the rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, *anxious to cultivate peace* and commence with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. . . .

"An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of commodities required in every manufacturing country, *our true policy is peace*, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. . . . If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us *peaceably* to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause."

Nor did our President content himself with mere *words* of peace. He promptly acted on the resolution of Congress above cited, and appointed three commissioners from our government to the government of the United States. "These commissioners," says Mr. Stephens, (45) "were clothed with plenary powers to open negotiations for the settlement of all matters of joint property, forts, arsenals, arms or property of any other kind within the limits of the Confederate States, and all joint liabilities with their former associates, upon principles of right, justice, equity and good faith."

Let me ask, Could anything have been fairer?

These commissioners promptly proceeded on their way. A

**Southern
Olive
Branches**

few days after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln at Washington they formally notified his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, that "the President, Congress and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution" of pending questions between the two governments. The full history of these negotiations makes mighty interesting reading. But it is too long a story to be rehearsed in detail here. (46) Suffice it to say that it was through no fault of these commissioners, or of the people and government they represented, that their mission of peace and good will to their late allies of the North came to nought.

South Carolina, shortly after her secession in December, 1860, had taken like steps looking to peace, by sending a commission to negotiate with Buchanan's administration relative to former United States property within her limits. (47)

Yet another effort for peace was made from a Southern official quarter in those portentous, ominous months following the sectional victory at the polls in November, 1860. The provisional Confederate constitution mentioned above was framed and adopted by what were called the seven Cotton States. The border Southern States were yet within the old union, hoping against hope for continued union, peace and justice. Among these border States was Virginia, the oldest, the most powerful of them all. By unanimous vote of her Legislature all the States of the union were invited to send commissioners to a conference, to devise some plan for preserving harmony and constitutional union. (48)

This conference met in Washington, February 4, 1861, the very day on which the Congress of the seceded Cotton States assembled in Montgomery. It adjourned February 27. Significantly enough, in view of our present argument, this conference at Washington was called the *Peace Congress*. The demands or suggestions of the South in this Peace Congress were only that constitutional obligations should be observed by all parties; nay, that certain concessions to the North would be agreed to, by means of constitutional amendment, if only the constitution, as thus amended, might be obeyed. This did not suit the commissioners from the Northern States, as was bluntly stated by one

of them, then and there, Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, who was slated for a portfolio in Lincoln's cabinet, and therefore spoke at least quasi et cathedra. So the Peace Congress proved of no avail. (e)

We find a similar situation in the Congress of the United States at its regular session that winter. Of the condition there Mr. Pollard says, in his book, *The Lost Cause*, (49) "It is remarkable that of all the compromises proposed in this Congress for preserving the peace of the country, none came from Northern men; they came from the South and were defeated by the North."

Well might the Southern leaders have adopted for their own the language of the Psalmist, "I am for peace: but when I speak, they are for war." (50)

It was by virtue of this impossible condition arising within the old union that Southern States, cotton and border, one by one, found it necessary to withdraw from that union—which was effected so far as possible, in every instance, *peaceably*. They had not only the historical, constitutional right to do this, as every real student of constitutional history, South and North, now admit; they had, further, let us here repeat, the general assertion of the Declaration of Independence, governing all like cases, to support them. As pointed out by President Davis, in the above quotation from his inaugural, a prime object in establishing the constitution of the United States and the federative government thereunder, was to "insure domestic tranquility." The existing form of government under this constitution having "become destructive of this end," so far as concerned the Southern States, the peoples of these States now moved to peaceably alter the form of government.

And, seldom remembered though it be now, there were at that time many in the North who believed that these Southern peoples had the inalienable right thus peaceably to withdraw. For instance, the New York Tribune itself, organ though it was of the aggressive anti-Southern party of that time, declared in November and December, 1860, after Lincoln's election, as follows: (51)

"We hold with Jefferson to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious, and if the Cotton States shall become satisfied that they can do better out of the union than in it, we insist on letting them *go in peace*. The right to secede may be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless, and we do not see how one party can have a right to do what another party has the right to prevent. Whenever a considerable section of our union shall deliberately decide to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in. *We hope never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets.* . . . If ever seven or eight States send agents to Washington to say, 'We want to go out of the union,' we shall feel constrained by our devotion to human liberty to say, 'Let them go!' And we do not see how we could take the other side, without coming in direct conflict with those rights of man which we hold paramount to all political arrangements, however convenient and advantageous."

Not such men as *revolutions* generally bring to the front, said Stephens, of the Confederate leaders. True. For be it remembered that these men represented, officially represented, long existent and independent republics, already fully organized. The formation of a league or confederacy between these republics was but an incident, an arrangement of convenience, as pointed out by Mr. Davis in his inaugural address. How, then, could States, republics, independent nations, be said to revolt or rebel? A people or a faction rebels against a superior; *not* against an equal or an inferior. Therefore, a creator State of inherently sovereign powers could not possibly rebel against either the creature central government of strictly limited and delegated powers, or against co-equal, confederate States. This being so, and Southern individuals acting only as citizens of their respective States, there could be no treason in their conduct.

Why was Jefferson Davis, although long held a prisoner after the war, never brought to trial on the charge of high trea-

son for which he was indicted? It is said (though I am not at this time prepared to vouch for the accuracy of the report) that a solemn warning was sounded forth from the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that to push such a charge against our fallen leader would be to fool with a combination boomerang and back-action buzz-saw. Be that as it may, we know that Mr. Davis, after long imprisonment, was released on bail (Horace Greeley himself being a bondsman), and the indictment was never tried.

Yes, the course of the Southern peoples was the only course consistent with *peace and honor*. Alas! they were ahead of their times; and, like all those who, in any age or
Ahead of the cline, dare to be ahead of their day and genera-
Times tion, they have been made to suffer for their temerity. As Charles Mackay, the poet says.

“That man is thought a knave or fool,
 Or bigot plotting crime,
 Who, for the advancement of his race,
 Is *wiser than his time*.”

Civilization takes but one step forward at a time; then pauses and rests before the next step. The Southern people of the period of 1789-1861, in the very vanguard of this slowly advancing civilization, acted on the principle that the same rule should govern in the intercourse between nations and people as between individuals; and that rule the golden rule. But they were wiser than their time. Let me explain.

Some three centuries before this the civilized, Christian (?) nations of Europe saw nothing wrong in kidnapping the defenseless heathens of Afric sands and selling them into bondage far from their native haunts. They justified such practice on the grounds alike of expediency and morals. It would bring the heathen under the benign influences of Christianity, and at the same time cause wealth to flow into the ready pockets of their

benignant captors. So the over-sea slave trade went merrily on for the space of several hundreds of years. Then laggard civilization took a step forward, and said that this was all wrong. The African trade, or the theft and forcible importation of Negroes was abolished, and the Southern States took a hand with the rest in abolishing it. Meantime, civilization was preparing to take another step forward—to supplement the cessation of slave importation with the abolition of slavery itself. Owing to local causes some communities were more forward in this movement than were others. The situation in the Southern States was thus sensed by Jefferson: (52) “The cession of that kind of property [slaves], for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle which would not cost me a second thought if in that way a general emancipation and expatriation could be effected; and gradually with due sacrifice I think it might be, but as it is we have the wolf by the ears and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go. Justice is in the one scale and self-preservation in the other.” Too, it should be added, slavery remained profitable in the South longer than in some other communities, and Southerners were but human. But the reform was moving forward everywhere, and was bound to triumph in the end. *It ought to have been allowed to triumph peaceably.* Out of the differences in local conditions, in this and in other matters, arose the fierce controversies between the Southern and the Northern States of the American union.

When the contention had waxed so hot that peaceful union was no longer possible, then the Southern States proposed a peaceable separation. The North said, No; we will force you back. The South said, No; that is all wrong. The Declaration of Independence, the letter and the spirit of the constitution, advancing civilization itself, all proclaim in trumpet tones that it is just as wrong for one nation, State or group of States to conquer another *vi et armis* and to force upon it a government it does not desire, as it is for one man to steal another man and sell him into bondage, or for a nation now (as was formerly done) to deny to its citizens the right of voluntary expatriation.

So spoke the South, wiser than her time. The North, not so wise, essayed to enslave whole States and peoples. For this is what a forcible union of one-time sovereign States means.

It is not within the scope of this address to follow the course of that memorable struggle. From the day of Thermopylæ down, to battle for home and native land against the invader and the despoiler has ever called forth the utmost valor and exertion of patriots. The Southern soldiery came of an adventurous, frontier stock. Southrons generally could ride and shoot; and in this war they fought to repel the invader. The result was the Confederate warrior, since that time the synonym for all that is best and bravest in war. The fame of the Confederate soldier is deathless; his glory as eternal as the stars. Starvation, not numbers, overwhelmed him after four years of heroic endurance and brilliant feats of arms. The Crucial Banner of the South sank without a stain upon it, save only the lifeblood of thousands of its martyr defenders.

In this course of invasion and conquest, in which she was finally successful, did the North, let me ask, really "save the union," as she professed to do? NO, she did not—from the very nature of the thing, she could not. The union of the fathers, of the constitution of 1787-89, was a union of choice, of peace. That original union was and is forever gone, as between the South and the North. It was *ipso facto* destroyed by the withdrawal from it of the Southern States. And, like Humpty Dumpty when he fell from the wall, or like the late Mr. Morgan's scrambled eggs, all the king's horses and all the king's men could never (forcibly) put it together again. A union, indeed, a new, diverse, blood red union of force was created and pinned together by bayonets; *the* union was not, and could not, be *saved*, though it might be *restored* by the free consent, once more, of all the parties to the original union.

And further, the success of the Southern Confederacy would not have meant the destruction of the American union. By the victory of the revolted colonies in 1776-83, the immemorial union of English-speaking peoples was severed; *but only as to these*

colonies; the rest of the English-speaking union, known as the British Empire, continues to live, and to live truly stronger and better from the lesson that was well learned when one part of that union was lost through the blunders of sectional aggression.

Not for one moment do I question the honesty and patriotism of the brave soldiers in blue who, I cheerfully admit, sincerely believed that they were fighting for the union of the fathers—although many of them allowed themselves to be swept along into this belief. But I do say this, that they, as well as we, were victims of their own Juggernaut; that their plea for a forcible American union was of the same essence with the plea, in 1776, for a forcible British union; it was the plea of Old World and world-old imperialism, and *a plea which will justify every war of invasion and conquest* that has ever stained history's pages.

But the objection is sometimes made that the South's success would have meant the Latin-Americanization of the Southern States; that, the principle of peaceable secession, once established, all union between the different States would have been no more than a rope of sand, and we would speedily have degenerated into a parcel of petty, mutually jealous republics—perhaps dictatorships. *The history of our race refutes the suggestion.*

For some two thousand years the Anglo-Saxon and the Celt have wrought out, link by link, on the anvil of hard experience and dogged experimentation, the everlasting principles of self-government. The success of the Confederate States of America would have turned out another and a stronger link, would have marked another glorious step forward in the laborious progress of Liberty and Self-government. Ours is a patient race, no less than a progressing one, and the successful termination of our second War for Independence could never have changed that bent of mind and habit of action that stand behind the following assertion in the Declaration of Independence:

“Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long es-

**What Might
(and should)
Have Been**

tablished should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

After the triumph of our first War of Secession more than three-quarters of a century passed, during which this right of secession, as now reinforced by constitutional provisions, was often asserted, before it was actually resorted to. There is no reason to think that a second successful application of this drastic remedy, and under a like strong provocation, would have cut us adrift from our previous caution and long-suffering.

Again, it is argued that there would have been constant causes for friction and even bloodshed arising between the Confederate States of America and their neighbors to the north, the United States of America. Well, would that sort of bloodshed have been any bloodier than the four years of it that was suffered in imposing the union's yoke upon the Southern States? But, after all, are we so sure that those two powers, once they had started together in the pathway of peace, would have been unable to continue side by side in amity? Despite strong provocation at times we manage, nearly all of the time, to preserve the peace even with storm-rocked Mexico. And we are about to celebrate a century of peace with those ancient enemies of ours, now our British and Canadian friends, although during the whole of that period they have formed our entire northern land boundary, and although "another Mississippi" (the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence) flows from our territory through theirs to the sea.

Another objection, or theory: That, after all, it is better for the South that the War should have ended as it did. No, a thousand times no: first and foremost, because evil should never be done that good may come of it and because Appomattox put back a half-century or more the hand of progress on the dial plate of civilization; second and secondarily, because the history of the fifty years succeeding the War is a record of legislation hostile to the material interests of the Southern portion of what is called a reunited country. Under the first of these two heads

we may add, that not only was progress thus retarded, but that a new and dangerous element has been introduced into the body politic—the spirit of evasion of the fundamental law. If you doubt it, see how certain provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution have become practically a dead letter, and by well-nigh universal consent. This fourteenth amendment is one of the “War amendments,” as they are called.

But Fate, we hear it said, had decreed the downfall of the Southern Confederacy. The very stars in their courses, we are told, fought against the South, even as they fought against Sisera of yore. That assertion I shall not here stop to dispute, beyond remarking that the final outcome of the War was extremely doubtful until within less than eight months of Gen. Lee’s surrender—probably so, that is, until Atlanta fell a few weeks before the date of the Presidential election of 1864 in the United States. But—what is meant by “the stars in their courses”?

Come with me, on a clear, moonless night, and scan that part of the heavens that encircles the Pole star and in which the entire course of a given star is above the horizon. Watch with me some bright stellar sun which, having left the zenith, gradually descends the western sky, appears to stand still awhile at the extreme westernmost point, then swings slowly but surely eastward again on the return sweep around the pole, yet still descending until it reaches the nadir, whence it gradually ascends again as it swings ever on toward the east. Other stars, farther south, not thus visible throughout their entire orbits, appear to the eye of the observer to set, and are blotted out of sight a long while before they rise again.

Yes, the stars indeed march resistlessly on in their courses; but *those courses are in circles.*

There are signs in the political heavens that Dixie’s guiding star, her glorious constellation the Southern Cross of battle, which set blood red at Appomattox, is now appearing in the east, a pure, glistening white, the day-star of hope and happiness for the South-land and for the world.

The Confederate Day-Star

To explain, and to drop the figure. Certain great world tendencies, in the forward march of civilized mankind, are found in diverse yet complementary pairs; first one, then the other, predominating in alternate, pulsating cycles. Broadly speaking, the nineteenth century was an era of the predominance of the centripetal power in government, the ascendancy of the central political authority. The triumph of militant French democracy in the revolution of 1789 quickly merged into the imperial despotism of Napoleon, the erstwhile republican conqueror; this was succeeded by the return of the Bourbons to power. Just at this time our Latin neighbors to the south, not yet schooled for true liberty, broke away from enervated Spain; but we must remember that it was only the joining of hands of the United States and Britain, and the resultant raising of that shield of the Western World, the Monroe Doctrine, that checked the reactionist "Holy Alliance" of continental Europe in its project of forcible recovery of these revolted Spanish colonies—so, at least, it is supposed. The Second French Republic, born out of due time in the abortive convulsions of 1848, was speedily swallowed up by the Second Empire, which eventually gave place to the Third (and semi-monarchical) Republic. The great revolutionary upheavals of 1848 throughout Europe were generally suppressed. Within the next few years Kossuth and the cause of Hungarian independence went down before the imperial Hapsburgs; Poland in vain sought to regain her lost nationality; the former independent or autonomous principalities and electorates of Germany became welded into the modern German Empire with the ruthless Bismarck at the helm.

In the face of this ominous reaction in the Old World, the glorious ensign of confederated Southern independence was raised aloft in our own stormy sky. The dragon teeth of overweening, un-American imperialism sown by Webster thirty years before, bore their rich harvest of armed cohorts from the North, and the Southern Confederacy, latest and most promising of Freedom's growing family of happy nations, was swept from the face of the earth. And, significantly enough, in the midst of our struggle for independence, it was the fleet of autocratic

Russia, inveterate foe to liberty, that wintered in New York harbor to lend moral support to the cause of Northern aggression and conquest, as against the threatened aid of more enlightened England to the cause of the South (53)—England, always the well-wisher of a weaker people fighting for freedom, except only when she herself happens to be the oppressor—England, who at a later time crushed down the liberty-loving Boers in a war in many particulars most strikingly like the war on the Confederacy.

But now, thank God, the trend amongst progressive and, at heart, liberty-loving peoples is, once more, away from imperialism and forcible union. For, under imperialism and forcible union, there is no adequate protection for a *sectional minority*; remember that. Imperialism and forcible union are, in their workings, robbery of the right of local self-government which is the alpha and omega of political liberty. From about the close of the nineteenth century on, what do we see? The waning of the centripetal force in government, the waxing of the centrifugal. In the world-old strife between Liberty and Power, Liberty begins again to prevail, in the renewed recognition of the saving principle of Home Rule and the rights of the minority.

We ourselves in 1898 helped Cuba in her stand for freedom. Five years later we aided and abetted Panama in her secession from the United States—of Colombia. We thereby officially and governmentally recognized (whether with due regard to our duty toward Colombia, we need not here inquire), solemnly recognized, that the interests and desires of the whole are not always paramount to the rights of a part; yea, even though the territorial integrity of the United States—of Colombia was thereby sacrificed. Shortly thereafter we see Norway resolutely sunder the bonds of union with her homogeneous sister, Sweden. And the wayward, weaker sister (with about the same proportion of area and population of the whole Scandinavian union as the South had of the whole American union) is in this instance allowed to go in peace, just as certain in the North were fair enough and brave enough to advocate, but vainly, be done with us in 1861. And later still we see something like secession from secession, in the case of Ulster and Ireland.

Even in the matter of amending the federal constitution, behold Senator LaFollette's "gateway amendment," by which a minority is empowered to propose amendments. A similar provision was made fifty years before in the constitution of the Confederate States of America; (54) a most decided improvement, in favor of the rights of the minority, over the cumbersome and reactionary provision of the federal constitution requiring a two-thirds majority even to propose amendment for consideration by the amending power.

These, I submit, are no fanciful comparisons, no imaginary parallels. No matter what may be all the details, all the motives, in each case, on the whole we may confidently affirm that through it all runs a larger sense than before of the rights of the weaker; of the beauties and blessings of peace; of the folly, and worse, of war. The Hague tribunal and the Bryan peace treaties are further witnesses to this auspicious change. To come nearer home: an acquaintance of mine, a gentleman from California, remarked casually, in the course of a conversation with me, that among the people of the Pacific coast there was quite a good deal of talk to the effect that they have their own interests and are quite capable of maintaining a separate political existence; although, he added, there is among them, too, a strong attachment to the union. Just how these two things are reconciled, or to be reconciled he did not say. And (another coincidence) much of the differences, if such we may style them, between the Pacific States and the East, like the former controversies between South and North, arise from a race question growing out of the presence in their midst of an alien, dark-skinned race..

So we see the tardily turning tide of national and international ideals and tendencies at last following the once overwhelmed, never really lost, current of Confederate principles. And the South, the ever faithful South, of later times we find revering her leaders of the earlier and darker periods, for "there is life in the old land yet."

**Our Past Ex=
emplars Our
Future Guides**

We find the South, near half a century after Appomattox, risen phoenix like from the ashes of War and Reconstruction and pushing forward in all fields of endeavor. Agriculture, commerce, manufactures, education, literature, good roads, adjustment of her race problem without undue outside interference (hence, as more of a sociological, less of a partisan, sectional question)—in all these the peoples of the Southern States were making splendid progress and were rapidly recovering the lost ground in political leadership. But, in the midst of all this it was that, by separate but similar acts, three Southern States, for themselves and for the South at large, linked the present with the past for the future in a way most significant.

In the first decade of the twentieth century the South placed among the officially designated immortals of the several United States in Statuary Hall at the Capitol building in Washington city the effigies of John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, and Robert E. Lee of Virginia, and on the sterling plate service of the battleship Mississippi the likeness of Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Kentucky. There they remained, fitly typifying the South's own contribution to the cause of true Liberty as against over-weening Power, her chosen champions of the two phases of constitutional home rule through State sovereignty, viz: Nullification or State veto subject to federal referendum, and Secession or resumption of full powers by the State; and only when these are scorned by her oppressors and all constitutional redress denied, then the stainless sword of defensive war. (f)

Calhoun, Davis, Lee—men with private lives as spotless as their political principles are true, exemplars of the Southland's past, guides for her future.

Yes, our constellation was only obscured, it did not really set at Appomattox; the Southern Cross of Minority Rights, Home Rule and Arbitration once more flames in the morning sky, and it shall shine more and more unto the perfect day, if the South—America—the world, is to have *true progress with peace*.

ADDENDUM.

A few months after the original preparation and delivery of the above address, the Confederate monument at Arlington was unveiled, June 4, 1914. (Why was this not done one day earlier, President Davis' birthday?) This monument—a memorial both to the heroic Confederate dead and to the equally heroic women of the South who raised it—is a masterpiece of the great sculptor, Ezekiel, himself one of our boy heroes of the cadet corps at New Market. The female figure surmounting the pedestal and personifying the Southland holds in one hand the laurel wreath for her martyr dead—some of whom, below her, are pictured as when in life and rallying to her defense. In the other hand she holds a pruning hook, and beside her stands a plow ready for the furrow; the whole fitly typifying the genius of the Confederacy—Peace, so far as possible, (55) and Progress.

President Wilson accepted the monument on behalf of the federal government. Secretary Bryan was an honored guest on the platform—two apostles of amity and justice among the nations of the earth. By this monument the Confederate States of America speak their message of peace to these our rulers, and through them to the world.

By their fruits ye shall know them: (56) the Southern Confederacy, like murdered Abel of old, through its "more excellent sacrifice . . . being dead yet speaketh." (57)

LLOYD T. EVERETT,
BALLSTON, VA.

NOTES.

(a) We here briefly epitomize the substance of the respective arguments of Hayne and Webster on this point. For their own language *in extenso* see the contemporaneous publication, Gales & Seaton's Register of Debates in Congress.

(b) See the author's article, *Federal Initiative and Referendum*, South Atlantic Quarterly for October, 1912.

(c) See the article, "The War Day by Day," the Washington Herald,

March 13, 1914, where we are told that the appointment of the German, Gen. Franz Sigel, early in 1864, to command in western Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley had been made by Lincoln "in pursuance of his earnest wish to recognize in every way possible the great aid Gen. Sigel's countrymen were giving the government in the prosecution of the war. Lincoln, in homely phrase, had said that he ought to 'take care of the Germans.' Gen. Sigel's appointment was directly due to this purpose of the President's. An election was approaching and the German vote was important."

(d) Here and elsewhere, in quotations found in this article, the emphasis is our own.

(e) See this more fully discussed in A. H. Stephens' History of the United States, pp. 590 et seq.

(f) "Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience and the aid of my fellow-citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native State, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword."—Gen. Robert E. Lee to the Convention of Virginia, April, 1861, in accepting the command of the military forces of the State to defend her against the impending invasion: Rev. J. Wm. Jones' Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee (1906), 135.

(1) The purported letter of Gen. Lee containing the expression is found in Dr. J. Wm. Jones' *Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of Gen. Robt. E. Lee*, 1875, p. 133. Capt. James Power Smith, of the Southern Historical Society, advises me that Professor Graves, of the University of Virginia, has examined the question in an Address before the Bar Association of Virginia, and reached the conclusion that the letter was not written by General Lee; also, that the Publishing Committee of the Society concurs in this conclusion.—L. T. E.

(2) Gen. Jackson's farewell address to the "Stonewall Brigade," Oct. 4, 1861: John Esten Cooke's "Stonewall Jackson: A Military Biography," 1876, p. 856.

(3) The Bible, Isaiah ii, 4.

(4) "It is related that the flag which was raised at Cambridge, January 2, 1776, by Washington, was composed of thirteen red and white stripes, with the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew emblazoned on the blue canton in place of the stars."—Brown & Strauss' Dictionary of American Politics, article "Flag of the United States."

(5) A. H. Stephens' Hist. U. S., 225.

(6) Revised Statutes of the United States, 1878, copy of the Declaration of Independence, certified by Ferdinand Jefferson, official custodian, or "Keeper of the Rolls at the Department of State."

(7) See, for instance, action of the Convention of North Carolina which refused to accede to the federal constitution of 1787, adopting by a large majority a resolution recommending to the Legislature to pass similar impost laws to those to be passed by the Congress under the constitution "and appropriate the money arising therefrom to the use of Congress"; i. e., thus refusing to recognize the secession of the ratifying States from the old Confederation. Vol. 4 Elliot's Debates, p. 251.

(8) Sec 1 Elliot's Debates, 327, 327-9, 334-5; A. H. Stephens' Hist. U. S., 339-40, 347-50, 358-61.

- (9) 3 Elliot, 87. (10) 5 ib., 127-8, 140.
- (11) Vol. 3 McMaster's Hist. People of the U. S., 42; 2 Hy. Adams' Hist. U. S., 160 et seq.; Powell's Nullification and Secession in the U. S., chap. 3. (12) 3 McMaster, chap. 19; 4 Hy. Adams, 407, 431.
- (13) "Congressional Speeches of Josiah Quincy," edited by his son, Edmund Quincy (1874), 196.
- (14) See a host of authorities, including A. H. Stephens' Hist. U. S., 419.
- (15) Jefferson to Holmes, April 22, 1820, "The Writings of Thos. Jefferson" (1829), vol. 4, pp. 323-4; also, in "Jefferson's Complete Works," vol. 7, 159, as cited in Stephens' Hist. U. S., 431.
- (16) Quoted from memory; author or origin not now recalled.
- (17) Jenkins' Calhoun, 248-9.
- (18) See the writer's monograph, "A Titans' War," chap. 34.
- (19) *Accede*, some 58 times in Elliot's Debates; *compact* or *contract*, over 30 times, *ibid.*; *confederacy*, *confederated republic*, *federal* (under the new constitution, or in the federal convention of 1787), some 50 times, *ib.*; *constitution* (as applied to the Articles of Confederation, or as distinguished therefrom), about 27 times, *ib.*; *nation*, *national*, applied to both old Confederation and new constitution, in all over 60 times, *ib.* The above summary is rather ultra conservative in its approximation of the numbers of times these several terms are found in Elliot's Debates.
- (20) Elliot, vol. 2, 165. (21) *Ibid.*, vol. 4, 183. (22) *Ib.*, vol. 327.
- (23) *Supra*, note 8.
- (24) 5 Elliot, 483.
- (25) "A Titans' War," chap. 15.
- (26) Stephens' U. S., 937-39.
- (27) Vol. 8, "Writings of Thos. Jefferson" (1897), 22-3.
- (28) Jenkins' Calhoun, 300.
- (29) Brown & Strauss' Dictionary of American Politics, 153, article, "Expounder of the Constitution."
- (30) H. C. Lodge's Life of Daniel Webster, 171. (31) *Ibid.*, 225-6.
- (32) Von Holst on the Constitution of the United States, vol. 1, p. 496.
- (33) See, *inter al.*, "The Speeches of Daniel Webster" (Tefft), 438.
- (34) Annals of Congress, 1813-14, vol. 1, 949-50.
- (35) "A Titans' War," chap. 15; Vol. 6, Gale & Seaton's Register of Debates in Congress, part 1, abt. p. 92.
- (36) Theo. D. Jervy's Robert Y. Hayne and His Times, 260.
- (37) Register of Debates in Congress, vol. 9, 1612 et seq.
- (38) 4 Elliot, 285.
- (39) Brown & Strauss' Dictionary of American Politics, p. 344, article, "Republican Party."
- (40) As quoted in Stephens' Hist. U. S., 432. (41) *Ibid.*, 602; Messages & Papers of the Confederacy, vol. 1, p. 55.
- (42) Stephens' Hist. U. S., 598.

(43) Official Journal Louisiana Convention of 1861, No. 3 of the ordinances and resolutions passed.

(44) Vol. 1, Messages & Papers of the Confederacy, 32-4.

(45) Stephens' Hist. U. S., 604. (46) Ibid., 607-9 and Appendix N; also, Messages & Papers of the Confederacy, vol. 1, 63 et seq. and 82 et. seq. (Messages of President Davis to Congress, April 29, 1861, and May 8, 1861.)

(47) Stephens' Hist. U. S., 604. (48) Ibid., 589; E. A. Pollard's "The Lost Cause," 94.

(49) "The Lost Cause," 93.

(50) The Bible, Psalm cxx, 7.

(51) As quoted in "The Lost Cause," 84-5.

(52) "The Writings of Thomas Jefferson" (18-29), vol. 4, 324.

(53) See, inter alia, "A Russian Alliance," editorial in Harper's

(54) Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States of America,

(55) The Bible, Romans xii, 18.

(56) Ibid., Matthew vii, 20.

(57) Ibid., Hebrews xi, 4.

THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

By DAVID GREGG McINTOSH

Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A.

The Chancellorsville campaign was altogether the most remarkable conducted by General Lee. While it occupied less than a week in point of time, it included a series of engagements, a number of which might be classed as battles. Some of these were fought independently by detached bodies, on fields widely separated, but all controlled and inspired by one master mind.

Gettysburg was simply a square stand up fight; a race, in the first place between two hostile forces, each bent on concentration before the other; then a clash, ending with a magnificent assault which failed. And so it was at Fredericksburg, a face to face fight, the Confederates entrenched, and the Federals making the assaults, with disastrous results. Fredericksburg was largely an artillery battle and so was Gettysburg, but Chancellorsville was distinctly a battle of small arms, fought in dense forests, where open spaces could rarely be found for artillery, and where it was impossible for infantry to preserve its alignment. Night attacks alternated with those by day, and were productive of panics and confusion. The odds appeared to be first on one side and then on the other, and again to be evenly balanced. The campaign presented on the whole a greater variety of situations, and more spectacular features than any in which the army of Northern Virginia was ever engaged.

The battle of Chancellorsville was probably the most difficult of all General Lee's battles, at the same time it was his greatest success. At no time if we except the closing chapter of the war, did he have to face such overwhelming odds. After the battle of Fredericksburg he was reluctantly compelled to detach Longstreet and two of his best divisions, and send them

south of Richmond, beyond his reach. Having to protect a front of over twenty miles he only learned that Hooker was moving, and was crossing the Rapidan, when he was already upon his flank. At the same time, Sedgwick, with two army corps and a third in reserve, was crossing the Rappahannock in his front. If he moved to meet Hooker, Sedgwick had the road open to Richmond and could destroy his communications. Stoneman, with a cavalry force three times as large as Stuart, was already on the way to destroy the railroads in his rear. The situation was full of peril and might well appall the stoutest heart. That General Lee was able to meet it successfully proved him to be a master in the art of war, and made it his greatest triumph. In the midst of his first success, when Hooker had been routed at Chancellorsville and Lee was preparing to follow him, Sedgwick suddenly appeared in his rear, and he found himself between the two. It was a stroke of genius to hold Hooker at bay and turn upon Sedgwick, while Early in turn took Sedgwick in rear, and the positions of the combatants became reversed. This unique situation is believed to be without a precedent, and is only approached by what occurred at Lodz in December, 1914, during the present war, where a Russian army was hemmed in between two German columns and a fourth column, this time Russian, appeared upon the German flank.

The unusual conditions which developed in this short campaign called for the exercise of all the best qualities which belong to a Captain in war. They afforded, as no other battlefield did, the opportunity for the display of Lee's masterfulness in grappling with new and unexpected emergencies, while they exhibited at the same time his wonderful poise, and his fighting tenacity, and his heroic courage. It has been said that General Lee won through the mistakes of his enemy, but it is only the wise Captain who can see and profit by the mistakes of an enemy, and it might be added perhaps with more truth, that General Lee won in spite of the mistakes of those under him.

While a great deal has been written about this battle, it is believed to be less generally understood than any battle of the Civil War. The official reports on both sides are full of incon-

gruities. Official reports it may be said, as a rule, are unsatisfactory, and often fail to furnish the information which would prove most useful in fixing localities and estimating the effect of a given movement. It is a usual failing to exaggerate the effect of minor actions, and to minimize serious errors. It is only by comparisons of reports on both sides that an approximate estimate can be arrived at. But any account of so intricate a battle as that of Chancellorsville, covering so wide an area, and involving so many changes of position, with few landmarks to determine them, can only be general and must necessarily be imperfect. Individual prowess is hidden in the fog of battle, and organized units lose their identity. It is said that Victor Hugo spent three months studying the battlefield of Waterloo; and the house is still shown which he occupied while writing up his account of that battle. But it may be doubted if with all this preparation, the brilliant author did not draw upon his imagination to supplement what he saw and what he heard.

Notwithstanding the writer was in Jackson's flanking column and participated in the battle of May 3d, the movements of the two armies from April 30th to May 5th, and the relative location of the different battlefields were always shrouded in more or less obscurity. A visit to these fields a few years since enabled him to realize more fully the trying situations which General Lee had to meet, as well as the immense difficulties which General Hooker overcame in his initial movement, and the opportunities which he afterwards threw away. The interest thus stimulated led him to again go over many of the official reports and war maps, and to read more or less of the literature published on the subject, including Colonel Henderson's graphic account, and the elaborate compilation of Captain Bigelow, and for his own satisfaction he has at leisure moments filled up the following sketch.

Before attempting however, any account of the campaign, it will be interesting to glance briefly at the situation of the two armies, the obstacles to be overcome by either, in any offensive movement, and the considerations which were brought to bear upon the two commanding Generals.

When little more than a month after the disaster of Fredericksburg, Mr. Lincoln entrusted the command of the army to General Hooker, he was anxious that the advance should be resumed with the least possible delay. The hopes which he entertained from the time the Federal army was in sight of the capitol of the Confederacy in June, 1862, had been continually frustrated; sentiment throughout the North was becoming exceedingly impatient; the time of enlistment of a portion of the troops in service was about to expire; desertions in the army were alarmingly frequent, and everything combined to make an early movement desirable. General Hooker was not a favorite of Halleck's, the Commander-in-Chief at Washington, but he was selected by Mr. Lincoln to head the army of the Potomac because of his energetic character and his fighting qualities. He had served creditably in the Mexican War, gone through the Peninsula campaign with McClellan as a division commander, and was in charge of one of the three grand divisions of the army under Burnside. Impetuous in disposition and outspoken by nature, he was wont to give expression to his opinion of his fellow officers including his superior in rank, and it was on this account that the very day preceding his appointment, General Burnside had prepared an order, subject to the approval of the President, dismissing him from the service. This, however, was diplomatically ignored by the two men when the transfer of the command was made: General Burnside in general orders, upon his taking leave asked the army, "to give to the brave and skillful General who has so long been identified with its organization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial support, etc." While General Hooker in taking command says, he only "gives expression to the feeling of this army when he conveys to its late commanding General the most cordial good wishes for his future, etc." And adds, "in equipment, intelligence and valor, the enemy is our inferior, let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him."

Mr. Lincoln in bestowing the appointment wrote: "What I now ask of you is military success * * * ; and now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance. go forward and gain us victories."

The army of the Potomac had been much disheartened by the disastrous repulse met with in the previous December, and its discipline suffered in several respects; among others, in the easy intercourse and familiarity which was established between the opposing pickets of the two armies.

General Hooker set himself energetically at work to repair the *morale* of the army and to plan at once an offensive campaign. While his proneness to criticism did not commend him to all his fellow officers, the touch of a strong hand was instantly felt, and renewed confidence was inspired throughout the ranks. General Sickles bears testimony to the fact that when General Hooker rode with him along the lines on the morning of the eventful second of May, he was cheered to the echo, and received everywhere by the troops with the greatest enthusiasm.

The improved discipline introduced by General Hooker, not only had an inspiring effect upon his own men, but it was soon manifested in curtailing the information which was in the habit of leaking through to the other side. Secretiveness became a prime characteristic of headquarters. Not even the staff were admitted to the full confidence of the General, and it is said that they, as well as the enemy, were often deceived as to the real character of projected movements. When General Hooker took command the army was disposed in the neighborhood of Falmouth on the Stafford Heights on the north side of the Rappahannock, and along the line of the railroad running to Aquia. On either side were infantry outposts, and beyond these a strong cordon of cavalry, and no communication was permitted outside these lines.

On the 18th of February, three weeks after Hooker assumed command, General Lee wrote Mr. Davis, that General Hooker appeared to be abandoning his present position between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and a large portion of his army to be descending the Potomac, but whether its destination was beyond Hampton Roads to Suffolk, or into North Carolina, he could not ascertain. Two days later he wrote, the enemy appeared still in his front in large numbers. While Lee was always of opinion that Hooker's effort would be to cross the

river above Fredericksburg, the reports that reached him were confused and contradictory. Accordingly, early in February he directed a reconnoitering party of Wickham's cavalry to cross the Rappahannock at the United States ford, descend the left bank, and find out the enemy's position. The river was at swimming point, and when the party had proceeded a few miles the enemy was discovered in force, compelling them to return empty handed. Subsequently General Fitz Lee was ordered with his brigade from Culpepper Court House to break through the outposts and ascertain what lay behind. With his accustomed dash he penetrated the lines some miles beyond Hartwood Church, and after capturing a considerable number of prisoners, brought them off in the face of a large body of the enemy, and the Confederate commander was assured of the fact of Hooker's presence and how his army lay.

General Hooker also set about reorganizing his army, and among other changes discarded the formation of the infantry into three grand divisions, retaining the corps formation as the unit. The reason assigned by him for the change, was that the grand division was cumbrous and unwieldy to handle. The army was thus made to consist of seven corps, each under its corps commander. Whether the change was judicious has given rise to a diversity of opinion. In the following spring, it may be said General Grant reduced the number of army corps, and the army was consolidated into three corps, making a corps about equal to the old grand division.

General Hooker's first demonstration was against the Confederate cavalry at Culpepper Court House, which General Averill about the middle of March, with three thousand sabres, was directed to attack and disperse, by crossing the river at Kelly's ford. Averill was provided with four days' rations, but after a sharp fight with Fitz Lee half way between the river and Brandy Station he retired, to the great disgust and disappointment of Hooker. What should ultimately be the real line of attack was with General Hooker a matter of great solicitude. Burnside had already made an attack in front, and the result of that effort was not such as to invite a repetition. The passage of the river at

some point below Fredericksburg with the aid of gunboats, seizing Bowling Green and the railroad, and throwing General Lee off his direct communications with Richmond was much considered. Brigadier General Warren, chief topographical engineer, reported that to cross the river so as to gain the heights below Lee's entrenchments, required the secret movement of pontoon trains and artillery for more than twenty miles over roads which were impassable, and that the first available point below Skinker's Neck would require one thousand feet of bridging, which in his judgment made a movement by that flank impracticable. The same authority looked upon a crossing immediately above Fredericksburg as scarcely more promising. He described the river as narrowing at Beck's Island two miles and a half above Fredericksburg, the bluffs a hundred and fifty feet in height on either side, "coming in close to the river, with steep wooded slopes cut by ravines, and difficult of approach."

The first favorable conditions for approach which presented themselves to him were found at Banks' ford about six miles above by the road, though owing to a bend in the river only three miles from Fredericksburg on the south side. The river at the time of the report was not fordable, and he found it protected on the opposite side by several lines of intrenchments rising from the water's edge and constructed with traverses, as a protection against artillery fire. Being well guarded he considered its surprise impossible. The next point examined by Warren was the United States ford, seven miles above Banks' ford, where he reported finding long lines of infantry with battery epaulments, and an ample force in support and the river not fordable.

Just above the United States ford the river forks, the Northern branch retaining the name Rappahannock and the Southern branch being known as the Rapidan. The most considerable ford on the northern branch is called Kelly's, which is about four miles from Rappahannock Station, a point on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, now called Remington. From Kelly's ford, roads ran westerly to Brandy Station and Culpepper, and southeasterly to Germanna and Ely's fords on the Rapidan, the latter passing through Richardsville direct to Chancellorsville, and the former intersecting the plank road from

Orange Court House to Fredericksburg at the Wilderness Tavern, five miles west of Chancellorsville. After looking over all the ground, Warren, who was a most capable engineer, inclined to a move along the route just indicated, as least likely to attract attention. He thought, "that the passage of two streams, not fordable, and having a width of two to three hundred feet at such a long distance from our base by a flank movement with many pontoons and artillery trains, over roads almost impracticable, seemed so unlikely as to give the enemy no concern." Hooker took Warren's advice, and in a letter to Mr. Lincoln of April 11th, he communicated his purpose, adding "that he was apprehensive the enemy would retire the moment he should cross the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus escape being seriously crippled, etc."

Accordingly, he gave orders to Stoneman in command of the cavalry to begin the advance on the 13th of April, expecting to make feints of crossing the river at Fredericksburg and below, at the same time; and as soon as Stoneman had fallen upon Lee's communications, he would make his real move by the right. But the extraordinary rains and consequent floods which prevailed for ten days rendered the first attempt abortive. Stoneman was unable to move, to Hooker's great chagrin. On the 21st he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, "the weather appears to continue averse to the execution of my plans as first formed, but if these do not admit of speedy solution I feel that I must modify them to conform to the condition of things as they are. I was attached to the movement as first projected, as it promised unusual success, but if it fails I will project a movement which I trust will secure us success but not to so great an extent, and one, on the execution of which I shall be able to give personal supervision." What was meant by the latter expression has never been explained. In the movement which began a week later when the weather had cleared, the plan as originally designated was pursued, and it does not appear that so much of it as contemplated the interruption of General Lee's communications was departed from by him, or by his chief of cavalry. But before following the movement let us observe the situation on the other side.

After the battle of Fredericksburg the proximity of his opponent required General Lee to maintain a defensive line about twenty-five miles in length. His army consisted of two corps, the first commanded by Longstreet, and the second by Jackson, each corps consisting of four divisions. Longstreet's corps occupied the range of hills back of Fredericksburg, extending from the river to what was known as Hamilton's Crossing, a station on the railroad about six miles from Fredericksburg, where the range of hills is broken. It also held Banks' and the United States' fords. Above the latter the crossings were watched by cavalry. Jackson's corps occupied a position extending down the river from Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal. His headquarters were at the Corbin House, Moss Neck; and when spring approached at the Yerby House in rear of Hamilton's crossing. General Lee's headquarters were about three miles south of Fredericksburg. The only material change in the organization of Lee's army was in the artillery, which was reorganized into battalions, consisting usually of four batteries each. Separate batteries were no longer attached to infantry brigades, but the battalion under field officers was attached to infantry divisions. The cavalry of the army commanded by Stuart, consisted of two small brigades, one under Fitz Lee at Culpepper Court House, where were Stuart's headquarters, and the other under W. H. F. Lee; Hampton having been sent to the rear to recruit his brigade.

In the latter part of January Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps was withdrawn from the front and moved to Salem Church, a point on the plank road about four miles from Fredericksburg, afterwards the scene of a fierce battle, and some intrenchments were thrown up designed to form a rallying point in case the troops on the river front should be compelled to abandon that line.

When the news reached Richmond that Burnside's corps had embarked for Fortress Monroe, it excited much apprehension, as being the forerunner of a movement against that place from the south side of James River. The apprehension was increased by reports of other similar movements, and it led finally to the

detachment of two divisions, Hood's and Pickett's under Longstreet, to guard Richmond against an attack from that quarter. It does not appear from the official correspondence on the Federal side that any serious movement of that sort was in fact contemplated, but General Longstreet as well as the authorities in Richmond were obsessed with that idea.

It is evident from the correspondence of the period that General Lee parted with his two divisions with reluctance. On the 16th of February he wrote the President that he had received the dispatch of the Secretary of War, conveying his, the President's wishes, and that he had accordingly directed Hood to march to Hanover Junction, and that Longstreet was directed to move Pickett on to Richmond. The letter indicates that Lee was meditating an offensive himself as soon as conditions became favorable.

On the 16th of March General Lee wrote Longstreet, referring to the removal of Burnside's corps and its expected appearance south of James River; that from present appearances it was fair to presume he would be called on to engage the enemy first on the Rappahannock, and he wished him to be prepared to return the troops recently detached to that point when it became necessary. On the 17th, Longstreet replied, "I shall be ready to join you" with Hood's division at any moment, and trust to your being able to hold the force in your front in check until I can join you." On the 19th, Longstreet wrote, "It seems to me a matter of prime necessity to keep the enemy out of North Carolina in order that we may draw all the supplies there, and if we give him ground at all, it would be better to do so from the Rappahannock. It is right as you say, to concentrate and crush him; but will it be better to concentrate on his grand army, than on his detachments, and then make a grand concentration on the grand army? If we draw off from the front of his grand army, we ought to be able to crush rapidly his detachments, and at the same time hold the grand army in check as far as South Anna at least, particularly while the roads are so very bad, then concentrate on the grand army and dispose of that." In pursuance of this idea he applied to Lee for another

division of his corps, to which Lee replied, "If this army is further weakened, we must retire to the line of the Annas', and trust to a battle near Richmond for the defence of the capitol. * * * Unless therefore, a retrograde movement becomes necessary, I deem it advantageous to keep the enemy at a distance, and trust to striking him on his line of advance."

On April 27th General Lee writing Mr. Davis and thanking him for the steps taken to reinforce the cavalry and increase the army supplies, says, that he had written General Longstreet to expedite his operations in North Carolina, as he might be obliged to call him back at any moment.

On the 29th Mr. Davis addressing the Secretary of War and transmitting a dispatch from General Lee says, "The demand which was looked for has come and requires prompt attention. This (alluding to Lee's dispatch) of course involves rapid and immediate movement of troops and supplies, to enable General Lee to meet the enemy and sustain himself in whatever position it may be necessary to assume." When Longstreet was ordered to move he delayed doing so, on the ground that to move at once would lose the supplies and the transportation he had gathered. When the battle of Chancellorsville came off he was still south of Richmond.

One is tempted to ask why General Lee did not use more energetic measures in dealing with the administration, and with his subordinates. But General Lee was always the opposite of being aggressive in his attitude to the Government, and forbearing to those under him. For Mr. Davis, personally, he entertained the most profound respect, and their relations were always most cordial. To him as the nominal Commander-in-Chief he seems to have always accorded a gracious deference. In the matter of army supplies, he stated his wants to the heads of departments in plain terms, but there was not sufficient energy in the departments to make these wishes effective. Had he been a Napoleon instead of a Lee, the Star of Destiny for the South may have changed its course. But as he was fighting for Constitutional liberty, the subordination of the military to civic authority was with him supreme.

In the game of War which now went on between the opposing leaders, General Hooker was confused by contradictory reports as to the strength of Lee's army, and the size of the detachments which left it. On the other hand various reports came to Lee as to Hooker's designs, and these were sometimes supported by feints which had the appearance of being serious moves. On the 22d of April a second demonstration was made by Hooker below Fredericksburg, and a crossing effected from Port Conway in canvas boats, but after the capture of a wagon train and a few prisoners, the expedition came to an end amidst a deluge of rain. While the feints on the lower Rappahannock did not deceive General Lee, it appears that the movement projected by the cavalry under Stoneman did, for he wrote to Stuart on the 25th of April of his apprehensions that Stoneman would cross the Blue Ridge, in which event he, Stuart, was to plunge into the rear of the Federal army and cut their line of communication.

On the 25th of April after it had rained for ten days, the skies cleared, the mud began to dry, and the hour for Hooker's advance arrived. Orders were issued on the 26th, which directed with great precision how the respective movements should be made. The 11th and 12th corps under Howard and Slocum were directed to march from their encampments in the order named at sunrise on the 27th, and to reach Kelly's ford by 4 P. M. on the 28th, without discovering themselves to the enemy. Meade's corps by a different route was to reach the same vicinity at the same hour. Two divisions of the 2d corps under Couch were also to move to Bank's ford, excepting a brigade and battery which was to take position at the United States ford; the remainder being held in reserve. The troops were provided with eight days' rations, five of which were to be carried in the men's haversacks, and three in their knapsacks, a supply of beef for five days to be taken along on the hoof. In addition each man was to carry sixty rounds of ammunition, and eighty more were to be carried chiefly on pack mules. While this arrangement added to the mobility of the army, it may be doubted whether that advantage was not over-balanced by the fatigue endured by

the men carrying a load estimated to weigh between forty-five and sixty pounds.

As soon as this movement was well under way, Sedgwick was directed to have the 1st and 6th corps in position to cross the river below Fredericksburg at 3:30 A. M. on the 29th. When the crossing was completed, Sedgwick was expected to secure the Telegraph road as the direct route to Richmond, and also the River road which ran for some miles parallel to the river, and turning south at Hamilton's Crossing led to Bowling Green. The 3rd corps under Sickles, after making a demonstration with Sedgwick, was to join the right wing under Hooker. Gibbon with a division was to remain at Falmouth. The cavalry under Stoneman in two columns with 7,600 sabres and 12 guns was directed to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and proceeding, one column towards Gordonsville, and the other in the direction of Hanover Junction, to unite after destroying the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, and intercept the retreat of Lee's army. Pleasanton's division was to remain and move with the army. The plan was well conceived. As soon as Bank's ford was open the two wings of the army would be drawn near together, and Butterfield as Chief of Staff at Falmouth, with telegraphic communication, was to transmit orders quickly between the two wings.

Carrying out the program, at 3 A. M. on the 29th, Devin's cavalry brigade crossed in the vicinity of Kelly's ford and made straight for Germanna and Ely's fords on the Rapidan, covering the right and left flanks of the infantry. The Confederate pickets at Kelly's ford were captured during the evening of the 28th, and at 10 P. M. canvas boats having arrived from Washington, the troops began crossing. Stuart, who was at Culpeper Court House, was at once apprised, but he was in ignorance of the extent of the movement, and sent forward a regiment of W. H. F. Lee's brigade from Brandy Station for observation. Early during the day of the 29th, he telegraphed General Lee that Howard had crossed at Kelly's ford with a division of about 14,000 men, six pieces of artillery, and some cavalry. The crossing of the three corps meantime proceeded steadily and

was completed shortly after noon. The 11th and 12th corps took the road to Germanna ford, and the 5th corps that to Ely's ford. Germanna ford on the Rapidan is distant from Kelly's on the Rappahannock about nine miles, and Ely's is distant about fourteen miles. The only opposition encountered by the Federal troops was from the 15th Virginia cavalry on the way to Germanna ford. At that point a small Confederate force was engaged in the construction of a bridge over the river to facilitate communication between Stuart at Culpepper and the army. This detachment and the picket on outpost were cleverly captured, only a handful escaping to Wilderness Tavern. Stuart says in his report that the couriers sent by him to Ely's and Germanna fords to notify the forces there of the enemy's advance were captured and hence the surprise, but it seems the Federals were already in possession at Germanna before the couriers were dispatched. It was not until the afternoon that learning from his pickets of the large force about Madden, he assembled his two brigades and pierced the column, taking prisoners from the different Federal corps. The river at Germanna ford was between three and four feet in depth. The foremost of the troops to arrive waded across, hanging their cartridge boxes and haversacks on their fixed bayonets, but the bridge which was soon rebuilt furnished passage for the bulk of the two corps. The leading corps, the 12th, completed its passage by 11 P. M., and before midnight the 11th was well under way. After crossing the two corps went into camp on the south side of the river.

At Ely's ford the river was equally deep and running with a swift current. General Meade is said to have hesitated and sent to Slocum for instructions, and the latter replied, his men were fording through swift water breast deep, and that the 5th corps must cross without further delay. No serious opposition was encountered, and this corps also went into bivouac for the night on the south side.

General Meade's first object was to clear the ground in his front, and open communication with General Couch on the north side of the river, who with the 2d corps had been directed to march to the United States ford. The squadrons of cavalry sent

out by him surrounded and captured in the early morning a Confederate outpost, and proceeded, one in the direction of Chancellorsville, the other towards the United States ford. The former met little resistance, but the latter reported that after driving the enemy several miles, they were found drawn up in line of battle, which caused General Meade to direct a division under Sykes to proceed to United States ford. Pausing on Hunting Run to learn the effect of Sykes' move, he received word from Devin that the road to Chancellorsville was open, and he resumed the march, reaching Chancellorsville at 11 A. M., April 30th, distant from Fredericksburg ten miles.

Chancellorsville appears to have been the Mecca of the Union army. It was undoubtedly so regarded by General Hooker. We made it our Mecca, when the writer with some friends on a certain day in the last of August, 1911, drew rein before the only house in sight, and asked permission to water our horses, and eat our luncheon under the shade in the yard. The house, which is of brick, must have been a pretentious one in its day for that locality.

We did not enter, as the ladies who came to the door reported members of the family sick with a low fever, but the building which had been injured by fire is now restored, and presents the same appearance as it did in 1863. We took our luncheon on the steps of the porch, just by the tall pillar against which General Hooker was leaning on the 3d of May when the pillar was struck by a shot and the General injured by the concussion; and as we drank the steaming hot tea prepared for us by the fair equestrienne of the party, we faced the plain and battlefield of Chancellorsville. The open plain in front just across the road looking south appears smaller than it did in 1863, and is more overgrown with bushes, but on all sides is fringed by the same woods. Far off to the South and beyond the range of vision is Wellford's or Catherine Furnace. A little to the west but not so far, although obscured by trees, is Hazel Grove, while around to the right and a short distance south of the road is Fairview where there was an old burying ground. The road immediately in our front is the old turnpike, but usually

at this point called the Plank road. A hundred and fifty yards to the east of us and where the forest begins, the road forks, the turnpike keeping the straight course, and the Plank road bending to the south, the two coming together again at Tabernacle Church, about four and a half miles distant. Where they first diverge they are intersected by the road from Ely's ford on which the old corduroys laid by the army are still to be seen. A half mile back of us the Ely's ford road is intersected at Chandler's house by a road called the Mineral Spring road running northerly to the River road at a point below the United States ford. From Chandler's house a woods road also communicates with the Plank road west of Chancellor's house. These roads give Chancellorsville a strategic importance which otherwise it would not possess. Going west the Plank road diverges again to the south from the turnpike at Dowdall's Tavern about two miles distant, following the line of the watershed between the Rapidan and the Mattaponi. On the north side of the turnpike beyond Dowdall's is a little chapel called Wilderness Church, and some miles beyond that is the Wilderness Tavern. The road from Germanna ford crosses the turnpike and runs to the Plank road, the two being a mile and a half apart at that point. Beyond the Germanna road running southerly from the turnpike to Todd's tavern is a well known road called the Brock road. Most interesting by far however, of all these localities is the sequestered spot about three-quarters of a mile westerly just beyond the ravine in front of Fairview, and a little to the north side of the road, where a modest pedestal and block of stone mark the spot where Jackson fell. Illustrious shade! No one can approach the spot without being awed by the consciousness that here the very genius of war fell a merciless victim to fate, and that the very passion which made him glorious and great proved his own destruction. All nature seems to stand by in mute reverence. Not a sound escapes through all the wide forest. Not the note of a bird, or the whisper of an insect; the very atmosphere itself seems laden with its heaviness, and the silence of death is all pervading.

When General Mahone learned that his outposts at Ger-

Germana ford had been captured, and that those escaping were collected at Wilderness Tavern, he directed the latter to report to Chancellorsville, at which point Anderson was assembling his division. At 6 A. M., a few hours before the arrival of Meade, Anderson under orders retired two brigades, Wright's and Posey's by the Plank road, and Mahone by the turnpike, to the vicinity of Zion Church, where a defensive position was selected and the work of entrenching begun. Mahone's brigade was established north of the turnpike, Posey's between the turnpike and the Plank road, and Wright's between the Plank road and an unfinished railroad to the south. During this operation the Federal cavalry made a bold attack upon Mahone's rear guard upon reaching some open ground, but met with a decided repulse by the 12th Virginia infantry.

From Germana ford Slocum with his two corps resumed the march on the morning of the 30th between 6 and 7 A. M. Colonel Owen with two squadrons of cavalry was directed by Fitz Lee at 3 A. M. to move forward from Locust Grove on the turnpike, get in front of and delay the enemy as far as possible, and report his information to General Lee. He moved to Wilderness Tavern and sent a scouting party towards Germana and Ely's fords. Some of these bearing information back to Fitz Lee were captured, and some reported that they were unable to communicate with the Confederate infantry who were falling back, and the Federals were already at Chancellorsville. Owen moved first towards Chancellorsville, and finding a strong force in his front turned south towards Todd's tavern. The courier sent by him with dispatches to General Lee, escaping the Federal cavalry at Chancellorsville, and making a detour to the south, reached General Lee about noon, which was the first intelligence he had that day from the Rapidan.

Upon the appearance of Slocum in the vicinity of Wilderness tavern, the Federal cavalry covering the right of his leading division had a sharp brush with Stuart's cavalry, commanded by him in person, which required the support of Federal infantry: thereupon Stuart retired intending to swing around by Spottsylvania Court House and join General Lee. Slocum con-

tinued his march without further interruption, crossing the turnpike to the Plank road, and moving on that road easterly to the vicinity of Chancellorsville, the head of the 12th corps reaching that place about 2 P. M., while Howard, with the 11th corps, halted at Dowdall's tavern.

Hooker now had three army corps assembled at Chancellorsville, and another under Couch approaching by the United States ford road, while Sickles was ready to move and join him at a moment's notice. His plans had worked out well. His leading corps had marched near forty miles and occupied the coveted ground with scarcely a show of resistance. He was greatly elated, and had good reason to be proud of his success. When one considers how well the movement was guarded, the difficult character of the roads, and the passage of the two fords over the Rapidan, with the long tortuous hills on the southern side and the sticky red clay characteristic of Orange County, it must be admitted to have been a remarkable feat, and merited the verdict generally given at the time, that it was a brilliant success, and that he had clearly outmanouvered Lee. Having succeeded thus far Hooker believed he commanded the situation. It admitted of great possibilities, but if he saw them, he was not disposed to depart from his original program. He was now on the ground which Grant had to fight for in the succeeding year, with the difference that then Grant was east of Lee, and now Hooker was west of Lee. From Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court House is less than eight miles in an air line, with connecting roads either by Todd's tavern or by Aldrich and Piney Branch Church. From the Plank road where Slócum struck it to Todd's tavern over the Brock road is a little over four miles, and about the same distance from Todd's tavern to Spottsylvania Court House, which is a little east of south from Chancellorsville. As General Lee was in ignorance of how Hooker had disposed his forces, and so late as the afternoon of the 1st inquired of Stuart where the 11th and 12th corps were, stating that the prisoners taken were from Meade's corps only, it is difficult to see any good reason why Hooker should not have continued his movement and made Spottsylvania his objective instead of Chan-

cellorsville. He would then have been out of the wilderness in the open country, and directly upon General Lee's communications, and the latter been between Sedgwick and Hooker. General Hooker however, was persuaded that the position of Chancellorsville commanded the situation, and from his headquarters at Falmouth at 2:15 P. M., he issued an order that no advance should be made from Chancellorsville until the 2d, 3d, 5th, 11th and 12th corps were all concentrated at that place. General Hooker said afterwards to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "I knew I could not cross the river in the presence of Lee's army, if he was informed of my movement. The great difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I apprehended no serious trouble after I had crossed."

Had Hooker accompanied his leading column, or arrived at Chancellorsville at the same time, he might have felt the enthusiasm of General Meade, when the latter is said to have exclaimed to Slocum, "Hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's flank, and he doesn't know it. You take the Plank road towards Fredericksburg, and I take the pike, or vice versa, and we will get out of this wilderness." Hooker was at Falmouth and joined the army during the afternoon. In general orders he announced to the army, his heartfelt satisfaction over the operations of the last three days, which he said "had determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his entrenchments and give us battle on our own ground where certain destruction awaits him."

Two divisions of Couch's corps arrived during the night crossing at United States ford, and Sickles with his corps by 9. A. M. next morning.

The seven corps of General Hooker's army at this time according to the official reports embraced 133,868 officers and men as its effective strength present for duty. Deducting the provost guard, artillery reserve and absent cavalry under Stoneman, there was left about 122,000. Sedgwick had his own corps and Reynold's amounting to 40,575, and Gibbon's division estimated at 5,500 would give Sedgwick 46,000 men, and Hooker 76,000.

Let us now see what preparation General Lee was making,

and whether he would ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his entrenchments and give battle. General Hooker thought he had him clearly beaten, and it appeared he had won the first point in the game. On the morning of the 29th General Lee received a message from General Jackson, through his Aide de Camp, Captain James Power Smith, that the enemy under cover of a heavy fog were discovered crossing the river below Deep Run. In communicating the fact to the authorities at Richmond, he said the force was large and appeared to be in earnest, and he wished all troops not required south of James River to be sent in his direction. Later in the morning, he heard through Stuart of the passage of the Rappahannock by Howard's corps at Kelly's ford. As if he were apprehensive of a move towards Gordonsville, he recommended Longstreet's division to be sent to him, and any other available troops to that point. Jackson's corps was at once moved to the left to occupy the space between the Massaponax River and Deep Run, connecting there with Anderson's division. General Jackson proposed to Lee to attack Sedgwick, and General Lee seems to have given his consent, provided Jackson thought he could do so successfully. The project however was abandoned. When it is remembered that the heavy guns on Stafford's Heights swept all the river plain back to the hills on the south side, of which Jackson had experience on the 13th of December, 1862, and that the same thing was then discussed, but given up, it is not likely the plan was very seriously considered.

Late in the afternoon of the 29th, Lee received through couriers the information that the Federal army was crossing the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's fords. The Federal columns had apparently interrupted communication with Stuart, and General Lee up to this time was in doubt whether Howard's corps which he last heard from at Kelly's ford was not headed for Gordonsville.

Stuart after skirmishing with the Federal advance had retired to Todd's tavern, where his cavalry rested. He was proceeding with a small escort to communicate with General Lee by a road running in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House, when he fell in with the Sixth New York cavalry, which had

advanced from Chancellorsville to that point, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which Stuart was compelled to call up some of his reserve, and in which Colonel McVickar, of the Sixth New York, fell mortally wounded.

The situation was becoming tense. If the enemy desired battle, General Lee was ready to give it: but if they were moving on his communications it would then seem there was nothing to do but to retire. There was much discussion among Confederate officers as to Hooker's intentions. General Lee was convinced however, that Hooker would never uncover Washington, and no matter what his inclinations might be, if he were left to indulge them, he was not at liberty to hazard such a stake. He wisely divined therefore that Hooker's objective must be Chancellorsville, and he prepared to meet him on that ground.

Anderson's three brigades were now facing three full Federal army corps. To meet the situation, General Lee directed McLaws to leave a brigade of his division to hold the lines immediately in rear of Fredericksburg, and to move with his remaining three brigades to reinforce Anderson. General Jackson was directed to leave a division of his corps to hold the lines in Sedgwick's front, and with the remainder of the corps to join Anderson at Tabernacle Church and take command of all the forces at that point.

One of the cavalry brigades under Fitz Lee was directed to keep in touch with Hooker's army and supply information; the other under Stuart was to keep in touch with Lee's army, and cover its movements. Longstreet at the same time, was ordered to move to Richmond to effect a junction with Lee.

Having concenetrated his five corps, Hooker on the morning of May 1st ordered an advance; Meade with two divisions Griffin's and Humphrey's on the river road, Sykes on the turnpike, and Slocum on the Plank road. It does not appear from the wording of the order whether it was intended as an attack upon any force it might encounter, or whether it was to take up a new defensive position.

At the same time he directed Sedgwick to advance in full force at one o'clock and threaten an attack, "making the demon-

stration as serious as can be without an actual attack." This indicated that Hooker was not aware of Lee's having already transferred the bulk of his army from Fredericksburg to the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. The demonstration was intended to prevent that very thing. As Hooker had surprised Lee by his concentration at Chancellorsville, so Lee now surprised Hooker by his concentration at Zion and Tabernacle Churches.

When Jackson ahead of his troops reached Tabernacle Church he ordered the intrenching to stop, and to prepare to advance. He was a thorough believer in the military principle which reckons the advantage on the side of the attacking party. As soon as the troops could be formed the movement began in two columns, McLaws with four brigades on the turnpike, followed by Wilcox with his brigade from Banks' ford, and Perry with his brigade from opposite Falmouth. On the Plank road, Rodes' and Hill's divisions, with the brigades of Wright and Posey, were led by Jackson in person. McLaws' skirmishers ran almost immediately into the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, which was thrown back upon the head of Sykes' division, which in turn drove back the Confederate skirmishers, and advanced to a ridge with open ground in front, about two miles and a half from Chancellorsville, and about one mile from Zion Church. Sykes deployed his division across the turnpike at right angles to it, holding one brigade in reserve. McLaws deploying with greater front, overlapped Sykes on both flanks, and sent word to Jackson suggesting an attack on Sykes' right from the Plank road. Jackson directed him to hold his position. Meantime a sharp engagement ensued. Sykes had advanced more rapidly along the pike than had Meade upon his left or Slocum upon his right, and failing to get in touch with either he reported the situation to Hooker, when the latter sent him word to retire, sending also Couch with a division and some artillery to his support. Sykes however began retiring before the order reached him. Couch it seems was reluctant to abandon the movement, and delayed the execution of the order until he could report that he thought the advanced position a good one and should be held, but the pe-

remptory order was then given to retire. Later in the afternoon Hooker sent word to Couch to hold the position until five o'clock, extend his skirmishers on either flank, and that Slocum would hold a position on the Plank road equally advanced, but Couch replied the order was too late as he was then in full retreat. During the afternoon McLaws was directed by Jackson to press on up the turnpike towards Chancellorsville. He with three brigades of Hill's division, moving across from the Plank road struck the turnpike half a mile in advance of McLaws and engaged Hancock who was covering Sykes' retirement, and pressed him back to within a short distance of Chancellorsville.

Couch was undoubtedly right in thinking the position gained by Sykes was a good one and should be held. Sykes had advanced about two miles and a half from Chancellorsville leaving the worst of the wilderness behind him, and reached a very considerable clearing extending across the pike in the direction of the river, with open ground mostly high, and admirably suited for the use of artillery and the deployment of large bodies of troops. But as so often happens, Hooker was not impressed with the value of time. His troops did not get under way until between ten and eleven o'clock, when Sykes might just as easily have occupied the ground three or four hours earlier, and had time to select his position, and throw out feelers for Humphreys and Griffin on his left, and Slocum on his right. Couch did not hesitate to express his indignation at being required to surrender the advantages of the advanced position and fight a defensive battle, in a "nest of thickets."

On the Confederate side Anderson, who was reinforced by Ramseur's brigade, succeeded in forcing back Slocum's line to a point beyond Aldrich's house, where an opportunity was presented for the use of artillery, and a brisk duel ensued between the opposing artillery. While this was in progress Slocum received orders to retire. On the retreat Slocum was vigorously pressed by Rodes' division and Posey's brigade, and his column was thrown into some disorder, but finally regained its original position without serious loss. Posey's advance was retarded by the Great Meadow Swamp forming the head of Mott's Run, but

after passing through the swamp, he pressed forward until he was met by a number of Slocum's guns placed in position at the junction of the Plank road and the turnpike, just east of Chancellor's house, and disposed so as to command both approaches. The balance of Slocum's guns were placed on the heights of Fairview west of Chancellorsville and facing south.

Wright's brigade leaving the Plank road and bearing to the left, was directed to get upon the enemy's right flank and rear. Wright followed the line of an unfinished railroad, to the Furnace road, and the latter to the Furnace, which he reached at half past four P. M. Here he found Stuart who informed him the Federals occupied the woods to the north of the Furnace. Wright deployed two of his regiments and advanced through the forest until he came in contact with a portion of Williams' division, which he forced back to the farm house. Stuart sent to his support a section of horse artillery, but these drawing fire from a greater number at Fairview and at Hazel Grove, and night coming on, he withdrew. During the night Fitz Lee who with his brigade was a mile and a half further west on the Brock road, had a slight engagement with an infantry regiment sent out from Howard's corps a mile distant on the turnpike.

The 5th corps which moved on the river road reached a point within sight of Banks' ford when it received orders to turn back, which were executed without question or delay. Sedgwick's order to advance at one, was not received by him until after 4 P. M. He began a demonstration at six, Hooker in the meantime sending an order to countermand it.

Thus ended the operations of May 1st, with Hooker occupying the lines he held the night before. The prestige of his first success was gone. Up to the moment of his arrival at Chancellorsville, his movements were characterized by the greatest energy and dispatch, but from that time there was a manifest lack of character and decision. Whether his failure to follow up the movement which was so auspiciously begun, was owing to chagrin and disappointment in not hearing as he seems to have expected from Sedgwick, or whether his resolution became "sicklied o'er" by the memory of Mr. Lincoln's admonition against

rashness, it would be hard to say. But his attitude of mind was quickly betrayed to the staff and corps commanders. At 2 P. M. he sent Butterfield the following telegram, "From character of information, have suspended attack. The enemy may attack me. * * * I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout and attack if he can succeed." The most charitable construction to put on the message is, that Hooker was staggered by the unexpected resistance he encountered, and that he lost his nerve. When he testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War he said, "As soon as Couch's division and Sickles' corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose in the first instance, of drawing the enemy away from Bank's ford, which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the left wing of the army." When asked by the Committee what action was taken on the first day, he replied, "I went out to attack the enemy." There is no doubt that General Hooker had firmly persuaded himself that there was but one thing left for Lee to do, and that was to get away. When he succeeded in getting Lee out of his entrenchments, he did not believe it possible that the latter would turn and fight. When he discovered upon ordering an advance that Lee was in heavy force in his front, and assuming the offensive, it completely upset him, and broke up all his calculations. It was in this frame of mind, that he "suspended the attack." He was still confident however, that Lee would not fight, as shown by the events of the subsequent day. He clung to the belief that his success in turning Lee's flank, left him no alternative but to retire, which would be impossible by reason of Stoneman's raid in his rear. He concluded therefore to "sit tight," and act on the defensive. At 4:20 P. M., he issued an order to his corps commanders to establish their commands on the lines assigned them, and put them in a condition of defense without a moment's delay.

During the afternoon and night Meade's corps was placed along the Mineral Spring road north of Chandler's house, and stretching to a bend in the river just above Scott's dam. This was a strong defensive position, the left of the line resting on

the river, and a small creek running parallel with its front the entire distance. It was impossible to turn it, as General Lee readily discovered, and its approaches were such as to make it difficult to attack in front. From Chandler's house, Couch's corps occupied a line nearly at right angles to Meade's, and ran southerly across the turnpike a full quarter of a mile east of the Chancellor house bending westwardly to the Plank road, Slocum's corps connected with Couch's, and swung to the south and west in a half circle, the lines of the two corps having the shape of a huge bowl or kettle, with Meade's corps as the handle. The rim of this bowl touched the turnpike again about a mile west of the Chancellor house, and included all the open ground in its front, together with Fairview to the west. Fairview commanded Chancellor's and the open ground in its front, as well as the pike both east and west, and when Jackson made his attack on the afternoon of the 2d, as well as the following morning, it proved of great advantage to the Federal artillery. Birney's division of Sickles' corps formed a connecting link between Slocum's and Howard's corps. Beginning at a point on Slocum's line which formed the most southerly part of the bowl, it ran with a wider curve northwardly to the neighborhood of Dowdall's tavern on the pike, a full mile from Slocum's right, and skirting the edge of Hazel Grove, which was destined to play a most important part in the coming battle. The balance of Sickles' corps was massed in the neighborhood of the Chandler house. Howard's corps extended westwardly from Dowdall's tavern along the turnpike by the Wilderness Church and by Talley's, a little upwards of a mile, the extreme right being refused at right angles to the pike, and its extremity covered by two field pieces placed in small redoubts looking west. Almost the entire front of the line was protected by earthworks, and covered by a thick growth of small scrubby oak and pine interspersed with vines.

In view of the surprise which the Federals suffered on the 2d, it must be said in justice to General Hooker, that on the afternoon of the 1st, he directed that the right of Slocum's line should fall back and rest at a saw mill on Hunting Run. Hunt-

ing Run was a stream heading near Dowdall's tavern and running due north, but it was alleged that the saw mill was not locatable. Slocum and Howard are both said to have protested vigorously against a further refusal of the right wing, holding that the forest was impenetrable to troops, except by the roads, and it was consequently decided not to change their positions, but to strengthen them with breastworks and abatis.

Had General Lee chosen to remain behind his works and await an attack, it is difficult to speculate as to what would have been the outcome. But Lee believed that this was one of the occasions, "when the best defense is to attack." The question was where and how. His first inclination was to assault Hooker's left, which as we have seen swung off to the river, and covered the United States ford. To have commanded that ford would have meant Hooker's destruction, and General Jackson had that in mind when he was making his attack upon the other flank. But an examination of the ground by Lee's engineers pronounced an attack upon Meade's front impracticable, and the alternative was an attack at some other point.

It must have been an anxious hour when Lee and Jackson consulted over the situation. The story is now familiar of Fitz Lee's announcement that Hooker's right was unprotected by cavalry, and that the extremity of Howard's line "hung in the air." It came as an illumination. Maps were sought for, and the subject of roads eagerly investigated. Happily it was discovered that from Welford's Furnace, where Wright had been engaged during the afternoon, a narrow woods road recently opened led through the forest by a circuitous route to the Brock road, which in turn communicated with the plank and turnpike roads at a point beyond and west of Howard's right. It was midnight when the plans of Lee and Jackson were concluded, and it was determined the latter should lead the flanking column, while Lee would hold the front. When Lee asked Jackson what force he would require, the latter is said to have replied, he must have all of his three divisions, and when Lee said, "What will that leave to me," Jackson replied by pointing to McLaws and Anderson, to which Lee generously assented. The three divi-

sions of Jackson's present were Hill's, Rodes' and Colston's, Early having been left at Fredericksburg. Hill's division consisted of six brigades, Rodes' of five, and Colston's of four. The two divisions remaining with Lee, excepting Wilcox's brigade which had been returned to Bank's ford, and Barksdale's brigade which was left at Fredericksburg with Early, numbered a little less than 13,000 infantry. Jackson took with him 88 pieces of artillery of the 2d corps, and 14 of the 1st corps. General Lee retained with his force 24 pieces, which were probably all that could be brought into play, the remaining artillery being held in reserve.

As a preliminary move General Lee withdrew his right, and Wofford's brigade was shifted to the left. Wright's brigade was withdrawn from the Furnace, and it, and Posey's put in position across the Plank road. These operations consumed most of the night. The work of felling timber and constructing breastworks was actively prosecuted on both sides. The pickets of the opposing armies were within speaking distance of each other, and throughout the night the forest resounded with the noise of chopping axes and falling trees. This work upon Hooker's part must have been a secret satisfaction to Lee, as it gave assurance that Hooker would remain behind his works while Jackson was on his way.

The march was to have begun at 4 o'clock A. M., but it was half past five when Colquitt's brigade of Rodes' division moving up the Plank road from Aldrich's debouched on the Furnace road in rear of the Confederate line and took the lead. The 2d Virginia Cavalry preceded the infantry, while the 1st, 5th, and part of the 3d Virginia were disposed on the right flank and rear of the column. The horse artillery accompanying the cavalry amounted to ten pieces. Colston's division followed Rodes' and was succeeded by Hill's, each with its artillery contingent, ordinance trains, and ambulances. The main trains were directed to move by roads further to the south towards Todd's tavern. As soon as Jackson's move was under way, a strong line of skirmishers was sent out from McLaw's front, and an artillery fusilade was opened which had the effect of causing an

immediate response, and assuring Lee of Hooker's continued presence.

The intense energy of General Jackson's nature was never more in evidence than on this march. He knew well the hazardous character of the undertaking, and he felt the responsibility which the confidence of his chief had reposed in him. Usually at the head of the column, he passed it occasionally in review to see that the men were up and to urge it forward. Celerity and secrecy were the orders of the day. But he understood too well the limits of endurance to overtax his men, and as the day grew warm and the air close in the dense thickets through which the winding road ran, a halt of ten minutes was ordered every hour. Soon after the march began a serious situation developed near the Furnace, where the road turned south passing over an open space where the column could be seen from Hazel Grove. This drew fire from a couple of guns soon to be followed by others. The infantry were promptly shunted off to the left to go through the woods, and the guns hurried past without a thought of returning the fire. General Jackson was not to be diverted for a moment from the great object he had in view, and directing a regiment of Colquitt's brigade to be detached and guard the flank of the column, he ordered it to press forward. As the morning progressed the situation at the Furnace became more serious. Berdan's sharpshooters were ordered forward, followed by Hayman's brigade, and the Georgia regiment became seriously involved, and Anderson was compelled to send Posey's brigade to its support. Graham's Federal brigade was ordered up by Birney in support of Hayman, and Sickles ordered Whipple's division to be in supporting distance, while Wright's brigade was started to the support of Posey. So grave did the situation appear for a time that Archer's and Thomas' brigades were turned back for the protection of the trains. A sharp encounter took place between the 23d Georgia and Berdan's sharpshooters, in which about forty of the former were captured. While retreating the 23d Georgia was followed up by Hayman's and Graham's brigades, but these fell under a heavy fire from Posey's brigade and Brooke's battery, which effectually checked their advance until the last of the trains had gone by.

It is astonishing to learn from the official reports, that the movement was perceived from its beginning; and known to Birney and to the three corps commanders on that front, as well as to General Hooker. As early as nine o'clock Birney informed Hooker by couriers that a column of the enemy with guns and trains and ambulances was moving across his front to the right. In consequence at 9:30 Hooker directed Howard to examine the ground upon his flank in case an attack should be made from that quarter, "and be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances." Howard was also directed to advance his pickets for the purpose of observation as far as was safe to obtain timely information of any approach; at the same time he sent word through Butterfield to Sedgwick to attack in his front if there was any reasonable expectation of success, leaving it to his discretion. About 11 A. M. Sickles received several reports from Birney that a column of the enemy was moving across his front, and with Hooker's approval he joined Birney at Hazel Grove. Sickles seems to have been impressed by the movement, and reporting it to Hooker, proposed to launch his whole corps against the column, inviting Howard and Slocum to join in the attack if Hooker approved. Hooker's reply was to advance cautiously with two divisions, Birney's and Whipple's, and harrass the movement as much as possible. More remarkable still, at 10:50 A. M., Howard sent the following dispatch to Hooker from General Deven's headquarters at Talley's, "We can observe a column of infantry moving westward on a road parallel with this on the ridge about a mile and a half to two miles south of this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west." What these "measures" amounted to, does not appear, except that signal stations were established at Dowdall's tavern and on the extreme right, and some of the reserve artillery placed so as to face west. Later in the day Sickles again sent word to Hooker that he could break the enemy's column, but bearing in mind Hooker's warning to move cautiously he wished support from Slocum and Howard of what he proposed to do. Howard replied he had no troops to spare, and Slocum referred the matter to Hooker. About 4 P. M. Pleasanton's cavalry was

ordered from Chancellorsville to co-operate with Sickles who had previously moved forward, and Howard was directed to send a brigade to Sickles' support.

While Jackson's movement was thus generally known to the other side, they were fully persuaded it meant a retreat, and the turning to the south at the Furnace gave the impression that the move was in the direction of Gordonsville. It is claimed that several reconnaissances were made by Devens in his front, and that these discovered a body of hostile skirmishers at the distance of a couple of miles, but their reports made no difference and were regarded as idle stories. In Hamlin's history of the battle of Chancellorsville, it is stated that the officer of the day reported to Devens and to Howard, that a large force of the enemy was passing to his rear, when he was rebuked for his statement and warned not to bring on a panic; that returning to the picket line and renewing his report, he was called a coward and ordered to his regiment. Major Rice of the 153d Pennsylvania in command of the picket line at 2:45, sent a dispatch to Von Gilsa, commanding a brigade on the extreme right, saying "a large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God's sake make disposition to receive him." When this was taken to Howard, he treated it with scorn, and replied no force could penetrate the outlying thickets. So confident was Hooker that the enemy were now "ingloriously flying," that at 2:30 P. M., he sent out a circular to his corps commanders directing them to replenish supplies of forage, provisions and ammunition, so as to be ready to start in pursuit early in the morning, and at 4:10 he telegraphed Sedgwick through Butterfield to capture Fredericksburg and everything in it and vigorously pursue the enemy. "We know he is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles' divisions are among them." His amazement and dismay can scarcely be conceived, when at 6:30 an aide stepping into the road from the porch of the Chancellor house where they were sitting, and looking westward toward the sound of cannonading, called attention to the fugitives crowding the turnpike, and learned from them the story, that the whole Rebel army had broken loose upon the flank and rear of the Federal line.

A letter written by General Lee to Mr. Davis during this time says that he was then swinging around to his left to come up in the enemy's rear and that he had no expectation that Longstreet would be in time to aid in the contest at that point: General Lee during the day was making demonstrations on his front, which were especially vigorous about three o'clock.

When the 2d Virginia cavalry leading the column emerged from the Brock road upon the Plank road, it turned to the right and moved along it about three-quarters of a mile to where it is intersected by the Germanna ford road. One squadron proceeding a little farther met with a cavalry picket, which it dislodged and pursued for a short distance. The officer returning reported that he had gotten a view of the right of the Federal line. Upon General Jackson's coming up, he and Fitz Lee proceeded to the high ground on Burton's farm to reconnoitre. A short distance to the north stretched along the turnpike could be seen the line of Federal intrenchments with abatis in front, arms stacked, and groups of soldiers scattered about in apparent abandon. Jackson's expectation had been to reach the enemy's rear by the Plank road, but he now saw that this would bring him obliquely across their front, and it was evident that to reach their rear he would have to extend his turning movement to the turnpike. He accordingly directed Rodes to resume his march to the pike and there wait orders. Fitz Lee was directed to engage the attention of a body of Federal cavalry in the neighborhood of the plank road, and the Stonewall brigade under Paxton with two batteries of Alexander's battalion was sent to Hickman's on the plank road to support him if necessary. When Jackson joined Rodes on the pike, the head of the column was turned to the right, and moved along the turnpike a short distance to the neighborhood of Lockett's, where preparations were made for attack. The formation was in three lines, perpendicular to the turnpike, extending about a mile on either side. Jackson must have anticipated finding the enemy some distance away from the pike, otherwise he would not have extended his flanks so far. Owing to the density of the woods and the extent of his front, the deployment consumed much time. The hour and

a half lost at the start would now have been invaluable. Four brigades of Rodes' division, Colquitt's, Doles', O'Neill's and Iverson's running from right to left in the order named, constituted the first line, which was covered with sharpshooters deployed as skirmishers about 400 yards to the front. Colston's division except Paxton's brigade which had been detached, formed the second line, Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division took the place of Paxton and formed in support of Colquitt, overlapping it by a regiment. On the left of the first and second lines, a regiment of Iverson's brigade was formed as flankers, with skirmishers on its left. Hill's division formed the third line. Three of his brigades were deployed, and the others followed in column of route. The 2d Virginia cavalry was on the left of the infantry, and was directed when the advance commenced to take and hold the road leading to Ely's ford. The artillery took the lead, but were shortly relieved by the artillery of Rodes' division. The force present with Jackson of all arms was estimated at 26,500 officers and men. Particular directions had been given for preserving quiet throughout the march, and every brigade was now directed how to act and move, always keeping the road as a guide. Jackson's purpose was, when he approached within reach of Chancellorsville to direct a part of his force upon Chandler's so as to take Chancellorsville and Fairview in rear, and cut off Hooker from the fords on the river, and doubtless that was the reason for his sweeping so far to the north.

It must have been near six o'clock, when the alignment being completed, Jackson inquired of Rodes if he was ready. Rodes replied he was, and giving the order to Major Blackford in command of the skirmishers, the latter moved forward and in a few minutes struck the Federal pickets. The latter like startled hares, broke for their reserves, who with a feeling of perfect security were about to get their evening meal. The surprise was complete. A bolt from the sky would not have startled Von Gilsa's men half so much as the musket shots in the thicket, and the sight of their flying comrades, followed by a straggling line of skirmishers, and then by a solid wall of gray, forcing

their way through the timber and bearing down upon them like an irresistible avalanche. There was no stemming such a tide. The two guns fired a round or two, and efforts were made by the infantry here and there to form, and make some show for a fight. But the shock was too great; the sense of utter helplessness was too apparent. The resistance offered was speedily beaten down. There was nothing left but to lay down their arms and surrender, or flee. They threw them away, and fled. Arms, knapsacks, clothing, equipage, everything, was thrown aside and left behind. The camp was in wild confusion. Men lost their heads in terror, the road and the woods on both sides were filled with men, horses and cattle, in one mad flight. The rebel yells added terror to the situation, and the two guns moving abreast of the line of battle and firing alternately into the fleeing mass, completed the panic. Rodes' line swept forward driving the mass before it, but no line with so wide a front could advance rapidly through such a forest. The high ground at Talley's, five-eighths of a mile distant, which overlooked the neighborhood was the first vantage point which Jackson aimed at. This place was protected by redoubts and a battery of guns. But the panic which began with Von Gilsa's brigade had spread through the division, and the resistance offered at Talley's, was scarcely more than was encountered at the first onset. The battery was captured without its having fired a shot, and the infantry were swept along with the fleeing mass.

Beyond Talley's is a stretch of forest extending to the open space around Dowdall's tavern. The tavern is located on high ground just beyond the intersection of the plank road with the turnpike, and is surrounded by undulating fields which slope to the south and west to the margin of a small stream. These fields were occupied by Bushbeck's brigade, about 1,500 strong, of Steinwehr's division. The open space on the north side of the road had been occupied by Barlow's brigade of the same division, but had during the forenoon been ordered to the support of Sickles beyond Hazel Grove. A battery was posted on the high ground at the tavern, where Bushbeck's infantry occu-

pied rifle pits looking south. Another line of rifle pits had been constructed at right angles to the latter running across the pike between the church and the woods to the east, and on these rifle pits facing west Bushbeck rallied his men to meet the coming storm. A number of guns constituting the reserve artillery were also in position on this line. Schurz's division was encamped on some ground north and northwest of Dowdall's called Hawkins' farm. Two regiments were thrown out still further to the west of the road leading to Ely's ford. The remainder of the division was located west of the church, and a battery of guns bore directly upon the intersection of the two roads. From where Rodes first struck Von Gilsa's brigade to Dowdall's is a mile and a quarter. On reaching the opening which revealed the latter position, Rodes paused a moment for his men to take breath and to straighten his lines. During the pause Colston's men in the second line pressed to the front and when the command was given, both lines dashed forward together, and with redoubled force threw themselves upon Schurz and Bushbeck. Although the resistance was stout the contest was too unequal to last long, and the victorious Confederates soon swept away everything in their path. Weidrich commanding the battery on the hill, says he was unable to use his guns with effect because his front was filled with their own men. Dilger's guns at the intersection of the roads was said by Schurz to have done good service. Bushbeck offered a determined resistance, his loss being 255 in killed and wounded, including three regimental commanders killed. When Schurz learned of the situation he made an effort to throw some of his regiments into line at right angles with the pike west of the Church. Failing to make good his position, he fell back on Bushbeck and attempted a rally of his men there. It soon became evident that the Federals were not only outnumbered but outflanked, and Schurz drew off such of his men as he could gather up by the Bullock road in the direction of Chandler's house. Bushbeck withdrew to the heights at Fairview. The accounts of the battle thus far by those engaged are naturally conflicting. Colonel Von Gilsa commanding the 1st Federal brigade, reports that when his skirmishers

were driven in, his whole line was at once engaged furiously, but his brigade stood coolly and bravely, firing three times, until he was outflanked, when he *fell back, expecting* to rally behind the second line formed by the third division, but that he could not find the second line as it was abandoned before he reached it. General McLean, commanding the 2d brigade, says the two pieces of artillery with Von Gilsa's brigade fired but a few times, and then broke down the road in rear of the rifle pits: that the 75th Ohio was wheeled into column to the right and deployed, but the attack was so impetuous, the regiments in his front at once broke in great confusion, interfering with its deployment, but still it was able to form and deliver its fire until ordered to face about. General Devens commanding the division says that while it has been suggested that the 1st division was to some extent surprised, he felt it his duty to say, in riding down the entire line he found no officers or men out of their assigned positions, and all prepared to meet the attack: that the skirmishers along both brigade fronts behaved with great resolution, keeping the enemy back as long as could be expected, and that notwithstanding the confusion in which the division was forced to relinquish its first position, he thought a second line might have been formed within the lines of General Schurz had his division been able to maintain its position. Schurz in his report speaks of the difficulties of the position in changing fronts, and says he was hemmed in by a variety of obstacles in front and dense pine brush in rear, and the "command had hardly been given when almost the whole of McLean's brigade mixed up with a number of Von Gilsa's men came rushing down the road from General Deven's headquarters in wild confusion, and the battery of the 1st division broke in on his right at a full run: that the whole line deployed on the old turnpike facing south was rolled up and swept away in a moment." The panic which began with Deven's division and spread through Howard's corps carried demoralization into adjoining commands, and swept some of these into the general stampede. A small force of Confederate infantry running up against the Federal force in the neighborhood of Hazel Grove were repulshed by the guns

stationed there, but not before they had carried off a mule train of ammunition, and thrown into disorder Berry's park of artillery which with fugitives from the 11th corps, rushed through Williams' division carrying part of that organization with it and adding to the general confusion. The chief of artillery of Berry's division describing it says, "As we passed General Hooker's headquarters a scene burst upon us which God grant may never be seen again in the Federal army of the United States. The 11th corps had been routed and were fleeing to the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the roads, its sides and the skirts of the field; and it appeared that no two or one company could be found together. Aghast and terror stricken, heads bare, and panting for breath, they pleaded like infants at the mother's breast that we should let them pass to the rear unhindered." Berry who was near the Chandler house with two of his brigades when the fugitives from Howard's corps began surging in, was ordered by Hooker to cover the rear of the 11th corps, and he proceeded at double quick with Hayes' brigade of the 2d corps to endeavor to stem the tide and cover the retreat.

General Rodes in his report says the movement was slightly delayed because the order to advance was not promptly extended to the skirmishers, but when put in motion, the line rushed forward sweeping everything before it, and pressing on to Talley's carried the works there, capturing five guns: that so complete was the success, and such the surprise of the enemy that scarcely any organized resistance was met with after the first volley was fired: that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion, leaving the field strewn with arms, accoutrements, clothing, caissons and field pieces in every direction.

When the works at Dowdall's had been taken, General Jackson directed the pursuit to be pressed. Beyond on all sides was the forest again, the ground descending gradually for some distance to a feeble stream, and then ascending to the heights of Fairview, with gulleys and ravines interspersed. At a point between Dowdall's and the stream on the Plank road, Slocum's right had rested before Williams' division had been called to

the assistance of Sickles, and Williams had constructed substantial works of logs and earth across the road at this point facing westerly. Had these works been manned by Williams' troops, when Rodes reached them they would have formed the most formidable obstacle the Confederates had yet met with, but fortunately for them they were unoccupied.

Rodes had not pushed his way much, if any, beyond this point, when the increasing confusion of his long line now mixed up with that of Colston, and the approach of night caused him to order a halt and request Jackson to send forward Hill to take his place. This was immediately done, and Jackson with increasing eagerness urged the pursuit. Rodes had reported that he discovered nothing in the road in his front between him and Fairview, and everything promised complete success. Up to that time, the forces at Fairview had consisted of but two brigades. But Williams' division had now been recalled and was seeking to occupy its old lines. Williams says on reaching the vicinity of Fairview he found it swarming with fugitives of the 11th corps, and moving Ruger's and Knipe's brigades by the flank, at a double quick along the line south of the Plank road, he faced them to the front and pushed forward into the woods, directing Knipe to reoccupy his original works. It was these troops which now presented an unexpected obstacle to Rodes' and Hill's continued advance. As they came to the front Lane's and Pender's brigades deployed on either side of the road, Lane on the right and Pender on the left. McGowan subsequently formed on Lane's right and Archer on Lane. While this was going on Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery had two or three guns run forward on the road half a mile beyond Dowdall's and open fire on Fairview. This drew from the guns in position there a return fire which raked the Plank road and shelled the woods on either side. Hill's brigades not in the act of deploying were now moving along the road en route, the infantry on the left, the artillery on the right. The effect of this fire was for a few moments demoralizing to the artillery horses and drivers, and the infantry were compelled to dodge into the woods. Lane complained to Hill that the effect of the Confed-

erate fire was interrupting the movement of his own troops, whereupon Hill had it stopped and that from the Federal guns died out also. By this time it was full dark. General Jackson however was determined to press on, and not for a moment did he think of allowing a halt with victory seemingly in his grasp. "Press on," was his command to Lane, and while the latter had his skirmishers out and his lines ready to advance, Jackson impatient of delay, rode forward in advance to satisfy himself of the exact situation. It was when returning to his lines with a small escort composed of some of his staff and a few couriers, that they were mistaken for the enemy and received a volley of musketry from their friends. The volley killed several of the group and wounded others, among them General Jackson, as it proved fatally. With much difficulty he was borne on a litter to the rear. General Hill who was nearby assumed command. Fearing the effect upon the troops, he directed that the news of the disaster should not be made known, but as the sad litter was borne along the road, the news quickly spread of the loss which had befallen the army. The nemesis of fate which now threw its shadow over the fortunes of the Confederacy was not content with one victim. Hill had scarcely taken command when a similar accident befell him. Bursts of musketry with occasional cannonading were now springing up in every direction. No one could tell friend from foe. The 18th North Carolina was beginning its advance on the north side of the road directed toward a battery in its front, when General Hill and staff to avoid the fire which at the moment was sweeping down the road, dashed into the woods in front of the regiment, and the latter mistaking them for Federal cavalry fired several rounds before the mistake was discovered. General Hill was disabled, and the command then devolved by right on Rodes. Rodes says that he received a message from Hill to that effect. A staff officer of Hill's rode in haste to Stuart who had joined Fitz Lee at Ely's ford, bearing an urgent message for him to come and take command, and Stuart says that Hill formally turned over the command to him. It was an awkward situation, and might have proved embarrassing, but Rodes was a true

patriot as well as a good soldier, and he gracefully acquiesced. General Stuart was a great favorite with the army, and it was thought he could best restore the confidence suffered from Jackson's loss. Any further attack for the night was abandoned.

While General Jackson's movement and attack had been a great success in the way of surprise, and the rout of the 11th corps with the capture of a number of guns and prisoners had been complete, the result was on the whole disappointing. The heights at Fairview still frowned upon the Confederates and time was now given to reinforce and strengthen these. Another hour of daylight would undoubtedly have swept Jackson into Chancellorsville with as little resistance as he had encountered up to the time when night overtook him. When Lane drew back his right wing, Ruger reoccupied his old position, but Knipe in making an effort to do the same thing came in contact with Lane's left, and in the darkness this led to much confusion and several collisions. The 128th Pennsylvania regiment which blundered into his lines was made captive along with its Colonel. Williams finding he could not reoccupy his old works on the Plank road, now took up a new line through the woods in front of the ravine near Fairview connecting with the left of Berry's division of the 3d corps, and the night was passed in throwing up defences of logs and earth along the whole of the new line.

It was a bad night for both sides. Commands were groping in the dark to find the positions assigned them, and struggling groups were wandering around in search of their commands. Alarms were frequent. Intermittent flashes of musketry burst out and threw a glare over the forest, and the guns from Fairview opened at intervals. The unpleasantness of the situation was intensified by a midnight attack from the direction of Hazel Grove by Sickles with two brigades, designed to drive Lane from his position and occupy the Plank road. In making his attack Sickles formed Ward's and Hayman's brigades in echelon, one behind the other, each company marching in column of fours, at deploying intervals, with fixed bayonets, and under orders not to fire until the Plank road was reached. When the column was put in motion it penetrated the interval between the

respective lines, and the right struck the centre of Williams' division while the left ran into the right of Lane's brigade. Receiving a cross fire from friend and foe, despite orders to the contrary, the advancing column opened fire, and dashed through the darkness at whatever might be in its front. Lane's left was not heavily engaged, but on his right he had difficulty in beating off two successive attacks. Slocum says that not being informed of Sickles' proposed attack, on hearing the firing he supposed the enemy was advancing on Williams' division, and he at once opened fire on them with his artillery, and Williams fired upon all lines that made their appearance in his front. The attack accomplished no results. Bigelow quotes from a private letter of General Williams written at the time this account of the night. "A tremendous roll of musketry fire, mingled with yellings and shoutings almost diabolical and infernal opened the conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time my infantry and artillery kept silent, and in the intervals of musketry, I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men from stampeding. In the meantime Sickles' artillery opened fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and inhuman yellings and curses redoubled. All at once Berry's division crossing the road on our right opened in heavy volleys, and Knipe commanding my right brigade next to the road on the south followed suit. Best began to thunder with his thirty odd pieces. In front and on the flank shell and shot and bullets were poured into the woods, which were evidently crowded with rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. Human language can give no idea of such a scene,—such an infernal and yet sublime combination of sound and flame and smoke and dreadful yells of rage, of triumph or of defiance."

At 6 A. M., May 3d, Jackson's three divisions, now under command of Stuart, renewed the attack. The night had been spent by the Federals in strengthening the first line of works, which in front of Fairview stretched squarely across the road, and in erecting barricades behind these. The Federal centre was held by Williams' and Berry's divisions. Pender and Thomas

north of the road stormed and carried two lines of works and assailed a third where a long and desperate struggle ensued. Being subjected to a severe artillery fire, they gave ground and fell back upon the captured works where they waited for reinforcements. One of Pender's regiments advancing beyond the brigade captured Brigadier General Hays and staff of the Union army. Lane and McGowan with a part of Heth's brigade under Brockenbrough, on the south of the road likewise charged the works in their front in the face of the fire from the 38 guns at Fairview, and after a determined fight were able to seize and hold the works for some time, until McGowan's right flank becoming exposed, they were compelled to retire. Archer on the extreme right in charging forward inclined to the right, which left a gap between McGowan and himself. Pressing on he struck the rear of Birney's division leaving Hazel Grove, and attacked Graham's brigade inflicting severe loss, capturing a number of prisoners and a battery and opening the way to Hazel Grove. Hazel Grove proved to be the key to the situation. It jutted out beyond the contour of the Federal line, and Sickles wanted to hold it: but Hooker on looking over the field at daylight decided it was untenable, and directed Sickles to move to Fairview and occupy a new line of intrenchments extending across the Plank road in rear of Fairview, the front line occupying the artillery breastworks. A similar experience fell to Sickles at Gettysburg when he was ordered by Meade to withdraw from the peach orchard because his right flank was too far in advance.

In the meantime Perry's brigade of Anderson's division which had remained with Lee, was put in motion before daylight to gain ground to its left, and if possible get in touch with Stuart. Posey's brigade which had spent the night in the neighborhood of the Furnace was directed to do likewise, and finding nothing in its way it proceeded in the direction of Hazel Grove. Mahone and Wright also endeavored to gain ground to the left and conform to these movements, but the character of the country made any alignment impossible, and none of the four brigades were in touch with each other.

As Lane and McGowan advanced, they lost touch and moved without support on either flank. McGowan struck Hayman's brigade while the latter was changing position and threw it into greater disorder, after which it encountered Mott's and Ruger's brigades, and after a fierce fight was itself thrown back upon its starting point.

Lane supported by Brockenbrough, with Pender on his left attacked the centre of the Federal line at the Plank road, where the 3d Maryland was overwhelmed and a number of prisoners and a section of artillery captured while firing charges of canister. The 115th Pennsylvania was ordered to take the place of the Maryland regiment, but refused to budge from its tracks. The 5th and 8th New Jersey came to the rescue and a desperate fight ensued with great loss to both sides. There was charge and counter-charge. The ground was won and lost, and won again. Pender reinforced, attacked the left of Berry's division held by the 1st Massachusetts supported by the 11th New Jersey, and Berry regarding his position critical sent to Hooker for aid. Shortly afterward he was killed crossing the road, and Carr succeeded to the command. The two regiments were both badly shattered and compelled to fall back and reform in rear of the artillery at Fairview, while Franklin's brigade was rushed to the front in their stead. The remainder of Carr's line gave way from left to right as Pender and Thomas in succession fell upon its flank. French's division with some accessions from Hancock came to its rescue and formed obliquely to the Plank road. Lane's brigade which had suffered severely was compelled to retire and reform after the loss of one-third its strength. Mott's and Ruger's success, and French's advance made it a stand off fight, and Stuart ordered up his second line. Colston put in two brigades on either side of the road, but to meet a pressure on the right shifted Paxton to the south of the road, just in time to meet the Federal attack which was sweeping everything before it. Colston describes it as a critical moment. McGowan's and Pender's troops had exhausted their ammunition and were hugging their breastworks. One of the fiercest battles of the day followed. Paxton was killed, and also Garnett commanding

Jones' brigade. For a time the tide of battle fluctuated. Colston's three brigades made several distinct charges with varying success, but finally held fast to the ground gained. On the north side of the road Nichols' Louisiana brigade became hotly engaged, and support had to be extended from the south side. Its ammunition was finally exhausted and it was being forced back, when Colquitt's brigade rendered timely assistance enabling it to hold its ground.

Up to this time the Confederate artillery had been of little use, although several Napoleon guns posted by Jones on the Plank road were used with effect upon the works at Fairview. When Archer opened the way to Hazel Grove, Pegram was sent with his batteries to occupy that ground and was speedily joined by Huger with his batteries. These guns were brought to bear upon Geary's lines to the east, and upon Fairview and the Federal lines to the north. Carter's and McIntosh's battalions also took positions upon the high ground in the vicinity, and an effective and concentrated fire was kept up which contributed largely to determine the fortunes of the day.

The battle still hung fire and Rodes' division was called into action. O'Neill's and Iverson's brigades were put in on the north side of the road and Ramseur's and Dole's on the south, Colquitt had already been called to Nichols' assistance. Two of O'Neill's regiments advancing to the attack became separated from the brigade and obliquing to the right, met the enemy's fire from behind barricades on the south side of the road and not more than two hundred yards distant from the works at Fairview. Pender thereupon advanced a portion of his and Iverson's lines and the barricades were abandoned. Whereupon Hall leading the 5th and 26th Alabama regiments and the 23d North Carolina carried the heights and planted their colors on the works, Colonel Garvin falling on the inside. The colors were subsequently captured and again recaptured. The remainder of Rodes' line meeting with a repulse and failing to sustain Hall, he was compelled to retreat. A second line of battle was then formed and another attack ordered moving parallel with the road, and the heights were gained a second time, and a second time given up because of a repulse on the left.

Ramseur and Doles on the south side of the road passed over the first and second Confederate lines, and immediately became furiously engaged. Doles deflecting to the right passed up a ravine behind the graveyard, and came out upon the field nearly opposite the Chancellor house, driving the enemy out of his entrenchments and pressing him back upon the batteries at Fairview, capturing a number of prisoners and several guns which had been abandoned. During the movement Doles came in contact with Slocum's left who was changing position. Finding his flank and rear open to Slocum he withdrew. Ramseur after pushing to the front and repulsing several assaults, found himself exposed to an enfilade fire, and was forced to go back. The 30th North Carolina on his right in the meantime, struck Graham's brigade in flank and took several hundred prisoners.

The Federals still held their position in a ravine on Ramseur's right preventing his further advance, and his line was successfully retired by Colonels Grimes and Cox, the latter remaining on the field though wounded in five or six places.

While the Confederate lines at the Plank road were generally perpendicular to it, such was not always the case. Christie commanding the 23d North Carolina had his left swung forward almost parallel with the road, while Hall and the 5th Alabama on the south side had is right swung violently back. Confronting these were Berdan's sharpshooters and the 122d Pennsylvania.

At 9 A. M. the Federal lines had considerably shifted. In support of the centre two brigades under Franklin and Meagher had been drawn from Hancock. Geary found his line untenable after the occupation of Hazel Grove, and he formed a new line at right angles with the former, the right resting near the Chancellor house. In making the change he came in contact with Doles, and Graham brought up against Ramseur. On the north side Iverson was in contact with French, and Col. I. M. Williams commanding Nichols' brigade with his left refused was confronted by Tyler's brigade. Sickles about this time retired to Chancellorsville, forming in three lines on Hancock's right, with his batteries between Fairview and Chancellorsville.

Both sides had now fought to a frazzle, and were thoroughly exhausted. Both had displayed with a few exceptions the most determined courage and obstinacy. No more desperate fighting was ever done over such a length of time. The ground was covered with the slain, and in some places the woods had taken fire, and the ground was hot to stand on. The Federal artillery after the Confederates got in position was badly smashed. Slocum mentions that two of his battery commanders were killed, sixty-three cannoneers killed or wounded, and eighty horses shot in harness.

But it was now becoming apparent that the Federals were playing a losing game. As their lines became contracted they were more exposed to the destructive fire of the Confederate artillery. Hooker gave orders to retire. Hancock described his situation as fighting in opposite directions, one line faced Fredericksburg, the other towards Gordonsville, the enemy's lines being half a mile apart, and projectiles from his artillery from front and rear passing over both his lines, while they were enfiladed by other pieces in different positions. The battery at the right of the Chancellor house had lost all its officers and cannoneers and horses, and had to be moved by hand by details from the infantry. Covering the retirement of Sickles and Slocum, Hancock left the field at 10 A. M. and moving half a mile to the rear, established a new line occupying the left of a salient toward the Chancellor house. Anderson who had been steadily pressing forward was now able to join hands with Stuart, and when that was effected a general advance was ordered. Wright's brigade was the first to emerge upon the plains of Chancellorsville, and he was quickly followed by the remainder of Anderson's and Stuart's troops, McLaws at the same time moving up along the Plank road.

When General Lee rode into the open to greet his victorious troops he received a tumultuous ovation which must have stirred his soul. The troops were wild with excitement and success. The past with its horrors was forgotten, and they knew only the delirium of victory. The welkin rang with shouts and cheers, and the war-worn veterans almost wept for joy.

The victory was won at a fearful sacrifice. The list of killed and wounded in Jackson's three divisions was reported at 6,872: that in the 2d, 3d, 11th and 12th Federal army corps including the missing, at 11,168. The battle on either side was fought in a disjointed way. When success was achieved at one point, support was lacking to make it good, and there was a general want of concert. This was due in large measure to the character of the ground, and the difficulty of seeing and knowing how things were going. General Stuart was subjected to some criticism for the manner in which the troops were handled, which caused him to address General Lee on the subject, but the latter thought it did not require investigation. In his official report he says of Stuart, "He conducted the operations on the left with distinguished capacity and vigor, stimulating and cheering the troops by the example of his own coolness and daring."

General Hooker's new position was in the shape of an obtuse angle, each leg of which touched a bank of the river in rear. Couch and Howe were on the left leg, Meade and Reynolds on the right, with Sickles at the Salient, and Slocum in the rear.

General Lee immediately made disposition to renew the attack and formed his lines along the Plank road, Colston in the centre with Anderson and McLaws to his right, and Rodes and Heth to his left. Hooker's forces were estimated to be 75,000 men with 246 pieces of artillery, Lee's at 34,000 with 132 pieces of artillery. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, Lee's confidence in his troops now flushed with victory, was such that he determined on another attack.

When General Hooker appeared before a Committee on the Conduct of the War, describing the army of Northern Virginia, he paid it this tribute: "That army has by discipline alone acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed in my judgment in ancient or modern times. We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies."

It was at this juncture that General Lee received a message from Early that Sedgwick had captured Fredericksburg, and

was approaching in his rear on the Plank road. He immediately directed McLaws to move with the brigades of Kershaw and Mahone to meet him. The three remaining brigades of McLaws' followed soon after. Meanwhile the attack on Hooker was suspended. Hooker received numerous dispatches during the day of Sedgwick's movement, and was informed at one P. M. that he was on the Plank road at Guest's house, but he preferred to sit tight.

Let us now turn to Sedgwick and Early. Early it will be remembered was holding the old line of entrenchments at Fredericksburg, from the river above the town to Hamilton's Crossing, a distance of 6 4-10 miles. Besides his own division, he had Barksdale's brigade in the town, and Wilcox's brigade at Bank's ford, making altogether about 11,500 men. During the forenoon of the 2d, Early was instructed by General Chilton of Lee's staff to move to Chancellorsville with all his force, except a small body left for observation, and except the reserve artillery, which was to be sent to the rear to Chesterfield. Early and Pendleton who was in charge of the artillery were much disconcerted, and suggested that such a move would invite an advance from the enemy, but Chilton insisted, and the orders were being carried out, when Early received a letter from General Lee, saying, he feared his wishes had been misunderstood, and leaving the matter to Early's discretion. The column was faced about and the old positions resumed by 11 P. M., with the exception of some artillery which had gotten too far to be recalled. During the night of May 2d, Sedgwick received orders to cross the river and join Hooker at Chancellorsville at daylight on the 3d. Sedgwick however was on the south side, and as a strict compliance with the order would have required him to cross twice, he wisely determined to march up the south side of the river. By 2 A. M. he had reached the outskirts of the town, and found the Confederates in their old position on Marye's Hill. Gibbon at Falmouth had been directed to cross the river and seize the town. The Massachusetts troops who undertook this, were the same who had done so in the previous December, and they were opposed by the same Mississippi troops.

After some resistance the crossing was effected and Barksdale retired to the heights west of the town, consisting of Willis' and Marye's Hills and the famous stone wall which had proved such a deadly obstacle to Burnside. This stone wall, the remains of which still exist, ran at the base of the hill along the east side of the Telegraph road, where the same on leaving the town turns south. It was about three feet above the road-bed, and the ground in front fell away gradually to low land, through which flowed the tail race of a mill emptying into Hazel Run. The wall accommodated five or six hundred men, though in the previous battle the number was much larger. Behind the wall on the hill was a battery of four guns, and howitzers faced the Plank road and the pike. Barksdale's two remaining regiments and one of Hays' Louisiana were posted in the old entrenchments south of Hazel Run, and in front of Lee's Hill and the Howison house, covering a distance of about a mile. The balance of Hays' brigade occupied 1,000 yards of entrenchments to the north, and when Wilcox arrived, he was still further north at Stansbury's hill facing the canal. Connecting with Barksdale on the south and stretching to Hamilton's Crossing were the brigades of Hoke, Gordon and Smith. Early had on his whole line 42 guns, 28 of which were south of Hazel Run, and 14 north of that point. Sedgwick had 66 guns on the south side of the river and 40 on the north side, including a number of twenty pounder Parrotts, and 4 1-2 inch seige guns. Sedgwick wishing to avoid a direct attack upon Marye's Heights directed Howe with his division to make a turning move to the left, and Gibbons was directed to do the same thing on the right. Howe advanced, but found he would have to cross the ravine of Hazel Run, and expose his flank, which caused him to pause. Gibbon moving to the right found he would have to cross the canal to effect his object. Wilcox at Bank's ford, had been led to believe from indications in his front that the Federal force there was withdrawn, and he determined to move to Chancellorsville, leaving a guard at the ford. He was scarcely in motion when his pickets reported Gibbon's advance on the road between the canal and the river. Gathering up a handful of skirmishers he

delayed the advance until Huger could bring up a section of artillery, which shelled the column forcing it to seek cover. The delay enabled Wilcox to destroy the bridge over the canal which Gibbon was aiming to cross. As the canal was both wide and deep, Gibbon reported the attempt as impracticable, and left Sedgwick no alternative but to attack in front.

The column of attack which began at 10:30 consisted of ten regiments drawn from Newton's and Burnham's divisions. Four of the regiments taking the Plank road, moved in column of fours, and two taking the turnpike, a continuation of the telegraph road where it entered the town, moved in like formation. On the left of these columns where the ground was open four regiments marched in line of battle. The artillery on Marye's Hill seems to have held their fire longer than was prudent, as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed to be effective at short range, but at the distance of three hundred yards the howitzers on the Plank road opened with canister and the column was literally swept away. On the other road the column approached within less than one hundred yards when it too was swept back by cannon and musketry. The columns were rallied and reformed, and a second time were broken and compelled to seek shelter, along with the lines to the left. During an interval which now took place a flag of truce was sent out from the Federal line asking permission to remove the dead, which was granted by the Colonel of the 18th Mississippi. The 17th Massachusetts which had retired for cover behind a board fence had the opportunity while this was going on to see how exceedingly few Confederates there were behind their lines, and when this information became known, another attack was ordered. This time the first line was to be followed by a second at the distance of thirty paces, and that by a third. Conscious of their strength and the weakness of their adversary, the Federal lines now dashed forward and swept over the works with scarcely a pause.

It is estimated that 7,500 Federal troops participated in the assault, and that they outnumbered the Confederates between seven and eight to one. The 18th and part of the 21st Mississippi regiments, and a company of the Washington artillery with

their guns were captured, the loss on the Federal side in killed and wounded being estimated at between one and two thousand. Barksdale realizing his weakness had sent to Hays and Wilcox for assistance, and five regiments were on their way when it was found they were too late. General Newton is quoted as saying, "If there had been 100 more men on Marye's Hill we could not have taken it."

The capture of Marye's Heights split the Confederate force and left the way open to Sedgwick to pursue Early by the Telegraph road running south near Spottsylvania Court House, or to turn west and follow the Plank road. Newton's division was directed on the Plank road, and Brook's was directed to follow. Gibbon returned to Fredericksburg to take possession of the town, and Howe followed Early on the Telegraph road. Barksdale attempted a rally at Lee's Hill, but was compelled to give way. Early hastened to check the pursuit, and when Hays' regiments came round from the Plank road, with these and Gordon's brigade, he established a line at Cox's house 1 3-4 miles further south. Cox's and a little group of dwellings is situated where a road coming from the direction of Salem Church intersects the Telegraph road, and the denizens of the little borough retain a lively tradition of what they regard as one of the battles of the war. Howe could not have considered the pursuit serious as he does not mention it in his report. Wilcox in the meantime when he found that assistance was too late for Barksdale, with admirable judgment moved his command to Salem Church on the Plank road, and anticipating Sedgwick's advance selected a position at the toll house where he determined to make a stand. The battle of Salem Church is regarded as one of the most brilliant engagements of the war. The old brick church with its walls scarred by bullets and shells, and with its gallery and double row of windows, stands a little removed from the road on the south side, in the midst of a clump of trees, and the schoolhouse a few paces beyond. McLaws did not accept Wilcox's position at the toll house, but threw his lines across the road about sixty yards in rear of the Church, with two brigades on either side, and an interval between to be filled by

Wilcox when he retired. When that was done Wilcox posted a company in the Church and one in the schoolhouse with directions to fire from the windows, and one of his regiments he held in reserve. As the Federals advanced from the toll house the ground ascended slightly with open fields on either side until they reached within about two hundred and fifty yards of the Church, where there was a thick wood on the south side extending nearly to the Church. A slight halt was made here and then with three cheers the lines dashed forward. The Confederates held their fire until the line had gotten within about eighty yards, when a terrific volley was discharged causing the line to waver and give way. Bartlett with the second brigade rushed forward with a new line, surrounded the schoolhouse and captured the company in it. Pressing on and striking the 10th Alabama, that was broken and forced back, and victory seemed to be in the grasp of the Federals. But Wilcox quickly hurled his 9th Alabama in reserve upon Bartlett, and a hand to hand fight ensued. Bartlett was unable to hold his ground, and amid yells and confusion was driven back and the schoolhouse recaptured, the captors themselves becoming captives. The pursuit was kept up to the toll house, and a number of prisoners taken. In Semmes' front the battle was fought with equal obstinacy. A number of assaults were repulsed, the 10th and 51st Georgia charging the enemy in support of Wilcox and driving him back to his reserves, a mile distant. Two handsome marble monuments have been erected near the Church by the New Jersey troops engaged in the battle to commemorate the valor of their comrades who fell on the field, and upon the face of one of these is an inscription to the brave Alabamians who opposed them. An instance of generosity and appreciation, as rare as it is noble. McLaws made no effort to hold the ground gained. Had he succeeded in doing so, with the front which he occupied at Salem Church, he could at the toll gate have rested his right on Hazel Run and his left would have reached the river road, with his front covered by a small stream between him and Newton. This would have greatly embarrassed Sedgwick in making his final escape. When General Lee sent McLaws to

the Plank road he informed Early of what he had done, directing him to communicate with McLaws and to move upon Sedgwick's left flank, expressing the hope they would unite and be able to crush him. Early, at the Cox house on the Telegraph road was only about three miles distant from McLaws' right, with a good road running westerly to McLaws' rear, and it was entirely feasible for Early to have carried out this instruction. It would seem he must have heard McLaws' and Sedgwick's guns which engaged in an artillery duel before the fight began in earnest. But General Early was doubtless chagrined over the defeat of the morning, and was anxious to recapture Fredericksburg and Marye's Hill. From the Cox house to Fredericksburg was further than to McLaws, and Fredericksburg itself was of no consequence, except as the high ground upon the west might be of use in shutting Sedgwick off from Bank's ford, and General Early may have had that in his mind, but at any rate he obtained permission from General Lee during the night to move in that direction and retake Fredericksburg. Early accordingly having sent word to McLaws of his intention to attack Marye's Hill the next morning (May 4th) and that he would extend his left so as to connect with him, he threw Hoke's and Hays' brigades across Hazel Run leaving a space of nearly two miles between them and McLaws' right. Gordon, followed by Smith and Barksdale advanced on Marye's Hill which Gordon seized without serious resistance, and a line was formed facing west, Smith on the right on Cemetery Hill, Barksdale on Marye's and Willis' hills to look after the rear, and Gordon along the Plank road, on a line with Hays facing westerly and almost at right angles with Smith. This also put Gordon's back to Barksdale.

Early says he then waited to hear from McLaws and hearing no sound and finding artillery in his front he sent word to McLaws to move. McLaws says he agreed to advance provided Early would first attack, and that he did advance his right, and finding his force insufficient for a front attack withdrew.

It would be uncharitable at this day to impute to McLaws any feeling of pique because of Early's failure to carry out his

first instructions. But his conduct is inconsistent with the fine reputation he bore in the army of Northern Virginia as one of its most tried and experienced division commanders. While this see-sawing was going on McLaws had applied to General Lee for assistance. Lee generously dispatched Anderson's division, leaving himself only Stuart's battered divisions to face at least 75,000 men. In looking at the relative strength of the opposing forces, it is amazing that Hooker did not assume the offensive, and attempt a counter-stroke. Reynold's corps and the larger part of Meade's corps had not been engaged. Howard's corps had had a day to recuperate, and Averill joined him that morning with 4,000 cavalry. Had Hooker any conception of the thinness of Lee's lines, his failure to attack would have been criminal. But then he had not recovered from the injury on the day previous, and he is described as having the appearance of a man in a stupor. It was asserted at the time and afterwards that he was under the influence of liquor, but there does not appear to be any foundation for this charge, and if there had been, there was not wanting among those high in authority and none too friendly sufficient hostility to have made it good.

Anderson under instructions from Lee was engaged in feeling Hooker's left when on the morning of the 4th, he was ordered to proceed with his three remaining regiments and report to McLaws on the Plank road. He arrived at 11 A. M., and at 12 M. was in position between McLaws and Early.

General Lee was not aware up to this time that Reynolds had been transferred from Sedgwick to Hooker, and was under the impression that Sedgwick had two corps with him. Sedgwick on the other hand believed that Early had been reinforced by the arrival of 15,000 fresh troops from Richmond. Sedgwick's lines covered three sides of a rectangle with the open side to the north. Newton's line ran south from a point on the River road east of Bank's ford to a point south of the toll house on the Plank road facing McLaws. Brooks' line ran just south of the Plank road from the toll house to a point beyond Guest's house facing Anderson, and Howe faced Early to the

south and east. General Lee had followed Anderson, and his plan seems to have been that Early should attack Howe's left driving it towards McLaws, while McLaws and Anderson would close in and shut off Sedgwick's escape.

Lee had left Hooker penned up at Chancellorsville with his back to the river at the United States ford. He now had Sedgwick penned up with his only outlet at Bank's ford, and what had never happened before he was superior in numbers. If Sedgwick were pressed he was bound to be crumpled up like the shell of an egg. He was fully alive to the weakness of his position. He looked forward to the coming of night and every hour that passed gave him increased hope. In the meantime the Confederates dallied. From 12 M. to 6 P. M., nothing was done except some minor changes of position. When the advance began no serious resistance was met with except by Gordon and Hays, but there as elsewhere night intervened and the pursuit was abandoned. It must have been a cruel disappointment to General Lee. A report was current at the time in the army that upon his arrival on the ground and during the afternoon he was much disturbed over the failure of his plans, and that he expressed his displeasure in words which bore no uncertain sound.

Newton and Brooks fell back rapidly on Bank's ford where they took position on the heights and in rifle pits, and Howe soon followed. At 11:50 P. M. Sedgwick, unwilling to cross the river without Hooker's permission wrote him, that his army was hemmed in, covered by the guns on the north side of Bank's ford, and asking if he should jeopard its safety by retaining it on the south side. At one A. M., Butterfield replied, to withdraw. At 1:20 Hooker sent an order countermanding the authority to withdraw. When Butterfield's dispatch was received Sedgwick began crossing immediately, and when that from Hooker was received, he replied at 2:30 that nearly all his command was over.

At a council of war held at Hooker's headquarters at midnight of May 4th-5th, all the corps commanders being present except Slocum and Sedgwick, the question was presented whether the army should withdraw or attack. Meade, Reynolds

and Howard voted to attack, Sickles and Couch to withdraw. General Hooker then announced that he would take upon himself the responsibility of withdrawing. Warren was directed to prepare a new and short line of defence, and to secure the army against any attempt to interrupt its passage of the river, and the 5th corps was designated as rear guard. On the morning of the 5th, leaving Early and Barksdale as before at Fredericksburg, General Lee ordered McLaws and Anderson's divisions back to Chancellorsville. Unwilling to be baffled of his prey, and his fighting blood rising to the occasion, he resolved to attack Hooker on both flanks. Anderson and McLaws were put in position on Hooker's left and Stuart on his right, and preparations were made for a daylight attack on the 6th. As the order for attack was about to be given, Pender galloped up to General Lee's headquarters then at Fairview, and announced that his skirmishers on advancing had just discovered that Hooker was gone. Those who were present report that General Lee manifested much disappointment at the announcement, but as he had neither pontoons nor transportation any thought of pursuit was out of the question. The crossing of the river was attended with much difficulty. At midnight the river rose suddenly over the bridges, and one of them had to be taken up to piece out the other. The night was dark and it rained in torrents. General Hunt in charge of the artillery did not think his guns could all be gotten over, and proposed that the movement be suspended for a day, but Hooker refused. The rain served to conceal the movement from the Confederate pickets, and Hooker's refusal to suspend probably saved part of the army from destruction. As a final adieu a lively artillery duel sprung up after daylight between some of the Federal and Confederate artillery, in which each side claimed to have put the other out of commission.

Thus ended the campaign, with the exception of Stoneman, who destroyed some property, and caused a good deal of alarm at Richmond, but whose raid was without material effect upon General Lee's communications, and contributed nothing to the campaign. To the absence of the greater part of the Federal cavalry may be attributed the surprise and destruction of the

11th corps, and as it turned out, its presence would have been more important to Hooker, even than Stuart's to Lee at Gettysburg. The news that Hooker and his army had recrossed the Rappahannock was received at the north with incredulity and consternation, second only to what occurred after the battle of Bull Run. Horace Greely, Editor of the New York Tribune, rushed into his office with the latest telegram in his hand, exclaiming "My God! it is horrible! horrible! Think of it. 130,000 magnificent soldiers cut to pieces by less than 60,000 half starved ragamuffins." These "ragamuffins" were described by a correspondent of the London Times who witnessed the return of Anderson's division on the Plank road on May 5th as, "splashing through the mud, in wild, tumultuous spirits, singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the skin, and burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle."

DAVID GREGG McINTOSH,

Col. of Artillery, C. S. A.

February 23, 1915.

THE FORGED LETTER OF GENERAL LEE.

A Paper read by Professor CHARLES A. GRAVES, of the Law School
of the University of Virginia.

I.

Nearly fifty years ago, on November 26, 1864, the *New York Sun* published a letter, purporting to be by General Robert E. Lee to his son, G. W. Custis Lee, with this heading and introduction:

“PRIVATE LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE.”

“The original of the following private letter from General Lee to his son was found at Arlington House, and is interesting as illustrating a phase in his character.”

This is the forged letter; and as printed in the *Sun*, it is in these words and figures, to-wit:

ARLINGTON HOUSE,
“April 1852.

“My Dear Son: I am just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico. My fine old regiment has been ordered to that distant region, and I must hasten to see that they are properly taken care of. I have but little to add in reply to your letters of March 26, 27 and 28. Your letters breathe a true spirit of frankness; they have given myself and your mother great pleasure. You must study to be frank with the world: frankness is the child of honesty and courage. Say what you mean to do on every occasion, and take it for granted you mean to do right. If a friend asks a favor, you should grant it, if it is reasonable; if not, tell him plainly why you cannot; you will wrong him and wrong yourself by equivocation of any kind. Never do a wrong thing to make a friend or keep one; the man

who requires you to do so is dearly purchased at a sacrifice. Deal kindly, but firmly, with all your classmates; you will find it the policy which wears best. Above all, do not appear to others what you are not. If you have any fault to find with anyone, tell him, not others, of what you complain; there is no more dangerous experiment than that of undertaking to be one thing before a man's face and another behind his back. We should live, act and say nothing to the injury of any one. It is not only best as a matter of principle, but it is the path to peace and honor.

"In regard to duty, let me, in conclusion of this hasty letter, inform you that nearly a hundred years ago there was a day of remarkable gloom and darkness—still known as the dark day—a day when the light of the sun was slowly extinguished as if by an eclipse. The Legislature of Connecticut was in session, and as its members saw the unexpected and unaccountable darkness coming on, they shared in the general awe and terror. It was supposed by many that the last day—the day of judgment—had come. Someone, in the consternation of the hour, moved an adjournment. Then there arose an old Puritan legislator, Devenport of Stamford, and said, that if the last day had come, he desired to be found at his place doing his duty, and, therefore, moved that candles be brought in so that the house could proceed with its duty. There was quietness in that man's mind, the quietness of heavenly wisdom and inflexible willingness to obey present duty. Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language. Do your duty in all things like the old Puritan. You cannot do more, you should never wish to do less. Never let me and your mother wear one gray hair for any lack of duty on your part.

"Your affectionate father,

"R. E. LEE.

"To G. W. CUSTIS LEE."¹

1. I am indebted for a verified copy of the above letter to Mr. E. P. Mitchell, of the Editorial Staff of the *New York Sun*. After stating that the letter is taken from the third column of the editorial page, Mr. Mitchell continues: "From what I have observed of the editorial methods of that time (1864), and considering the place on the page, the

II.

Is it a fact that the above letter is a true copy of a letter written by General R. E. Lee? The *Sun* does not profess to print from the original, which is not produced, nor its absence accounted for. Whoever sent the copy to the *Sun* affirmed that the original had been found at Arlington House, and the *Sun* published the letter on the faith of that statement. This, at least, is the presumption. No one now connected with the *Sun* has any knowledge of the facts.

Without insisting on the rules of evidence, but freely admitting any matter, which, as a basis of inference, is in its nature probatory, let us examine on what grounds the authenticity of the above letter, which we shall hereafter call The Duty Letter, has been questioned. And without inquiry as to the legal burden of proof, let us concede that this letter should be taken as *prima facie* genuine, and that those who deny its authenticity should prove it spurious by a preponderance, at least, of evidence. For this letter has been accepted as genuine by two generations of Americans. In the South, it has been esteemed by many as almost a new gospel; and it has been taught to children with the Bible and the catechism. And when its authenticity is denied, the lovers of Lee (and who is not?) cling to it with a passionate tenacity that is almost pathetic, as if their

manner of exhibition, and the class of matter similarly displayed in the same place on other days, I should personally be slow to assume, without other evidence, that this was the earliest appearance in print of the forged letter. It looks, introduction and all, quite as much like reprint of current matter in other publications as like first hand and previously unedited news."

It is probable that the question here raised will never be settled. It does not seem important. It is certain, I think, that the Richmond (Va.) *Whig* (as to which see *post*) copied The Duty Letter from the *Sun*. It gives no credit to any paper, but prints the letter with precisely the same heading and introduction as the *Sun*. Besides this, the *Whig* prints The Duty Letter *verbatim et literatim* as it appears in the *Sun*, even to reproducing the erroneous spelling Devenport for Davenport, the right name.

At the time of the publication of The Duty Letter, the editor and proprietor of the New York *Sun* was Moses S. Beach. Mr. Charles A. Dana bought and took over the *Sun* in 1868. If the astute Dana had been editor of the *Sun* in 1864, it is probable that the forged letter would not have passed his scrutiny.

loyalty to Lee required loyalty to The Duty Letter.² In the words of Dr. Gamaliel Bradford, Jr., author of *Lee the American*, an appreciative and discriminating psychography of General Lee: "A document so widely known as this (referring to The Duty Letter), and, as I understand it, studied and quoted constantly by thousands, is certainly worthy of being examined with the closest scrutiny. It is as if Washington's Farewell Address, or Lincoln's Gettysburg Speech, were brought into dispute."³

III.

The Duty Letter was published, as has been stated above, in the New York *Sun* on November 26, 1864. On December 2, 1864, it was published in the Richmond (Va.) *Whig*, precisely as printed in the *Sun*, but without being credited to the *Sun*, or to any other paper. And on December 16, 1864 (just two weeks after its appearance in the *Whig*), The Duty Letter was published in the Richmond (Va.) *Sentinel*, with credit to the Philadelphia *Inquirer*.⁴

And now comes a dramatic *denouement* in the history of The Duty Letter. The *Sentinel*, a semi-weekly publication, had printed the letter, with high praise, in its issue of Friday, De-

2. In this connection, it may be permitted the writer to say that, while repudiating The Duty Letter as not written by General Lee, he yields to no one in loyalty to that great name. In the writer's opinion loyalty to Lee requires repudiation of a letter falsely masquerading under his name.

If a personal allusion may be pardoned here, the writer will state that he became a student in Washington College, Lexington, Va., (now Washington and Lee University) in 1865, soon after the accession of General Lee to the Presidency, and received his degree four years later from General Lee's hands. He is, therefore, one of "General Lee's Boys," as the students of that period delighted to call themselves. The last year of General Lee's life (he died in October, 1870), the writer was an assistant professor in Washington College, reporting weekly to General Lee, and receiving his admonition and advice. His connection with Washington and Lee University continued unbroken until 1899, thus covering the whole of the twenty-six years during which General G. W. Custis Lee was President.

3. Letter to the writer, July 22, 1914.

4. This credit is erroneous, as a thorough search (for which I am indebted to Mr. A. Estoclet, of the editorial staff of the *Inquirer*), has failed to discover the letter in that paper. It was no doubt taken by the *Sentinel* from the *Sun* or the *Whig*.

cember 16, 1864.⁵ But in its next issue, Tuesday, December 20, the *Sentinel* confesses that it was imposed on, and denounces the letter as a "Yankee Forgery,"⁶ and prints as its authority a letter, unsigned, but described as "from a source entitled to know." This letter which we shall call the Repudiation Letter, is as follows:

"I have read the published letter, said to have been written by General R. E. Lee. There is nothing about it that can be recognized as genuine by anyone familiar with his style. He never dated any of his letters *Arlington House*. In April, 1852, he never had belonged to any regiment, and could not, therefore, have been about to search for it in New Mexico. He was transferred to the Cavalry in 1855, and had previously been in the Engineer Corps. In the spring of 1852, he was engaged in the construction of the Fort at Sollers Point Flats (near Baltimore), and preparing to go to West Point, as Superintendent of the Military Academy there. He has never been to New Mexico. This plain statement of facts is made to furnish an-

5. The laudatory comment is as follows: "The habit of publishing private letters, without their owners' consent, merely because they have chanced to fall into the hands of some unworthy person, is so much to be condemned that we are always reluctant to treat as public what has thus become so. The following letter we shall be pardoned, we hope, for making an exceptional case. It is so excellent a letter, and so full of admirable sentiments, that every father in the Confederacy will be most happy, if his sons shall consider it as addressed specially to themselves. In the hope that it will be thus received, and thus become universally profitable, we throw ourselves upon the author's indulgence for our readers' pleasure and benefit."

6. The *Sentinel's* confession of imposition is as follows: "We have received the following from a source entitled to know, in reference to the letter imputed to General Lee, which lately appeared in this paper, into which it had been copied from a United States print. It seems that it was a Yankee forgery. In this characteristic act, the Yankees, while illustrating their own depravity, paid the only tribute of which they were capable to General Lee's worth. They knew that to give *vraisemblance* and credibility to the fraud, it was necessary to fill the letter with elevated sentiments, borrowed where they could find them. The defects of style they took care to guard against, by pleading haste of composition. We are often deceived by forgeries of this sort, whether in the manufactured correspondence which is a part of the 'enterprise' of the Northern journalism, or in the clumsy imitations which are occasionally ventured upon by such Confederate newspapers as are willing to copy after such teachers. A glance usually suffices to detect the trick. But in the instance to which we are now referring, in common with many other Confederate journals, we were imposed upon."

other example of the mendacity of our enemies, and how they publish things that are utterly false. There seems to have been no object in this publication but to amuse the people. So far, it is a harmless deception, yet the cause of truth needs this refutation."⁷

This Repudiation Letter, from "a source entitled to know," administers a knock-out blow to The Duty Letter. Unfortunately it lay hidden in the files of the *Sentinel* for nearly half a century, when it was discovered, in 1913, in a search made on my behalf, by Louis K. Gould, Esq., Counselor at Law, of Bridgeport, Connecticut, to whom I am indebted for the discovery of the original publication of The Duty Letter in the *New York Sun*. I can but think that if this Repudiation Letter had been known to the early biographers of General Lee, The Duty Letter would never have attained its vogue and celebrity.

IV.

But who was "the source entitled to know," from whom the *Sentinel* received the Repudiation Letter? Obviously someone very near to General Lee. Never did a letter speak more *ex cathedra*; and every fact stated in it is correct. More than this, whoever wrote this letter had doubtless consulted with General Lee (there was ample time during the two weeks after its first publication in the *Whig*), for who but General Lee would know that he never dated any of his letters "Arlington House" (though his father-in-law, G. W. Parke Custis, did), or that he had never been in New Mexico? And, without authority from General Lee, who would have dared to denounce publicly, as "utterly false," a letter like The Duty Letter, which many still refuse to believe spurious, and esteem worthy of the South's great hero?

7. I am indebted for a copy of The Duty Letter as it appeared in the *Whig* and *Sentinel*, and of the Repudiation Letter as it appeared in the *Sentinel*, to Mr. H. R. McIlwaine, the courteous and efficient Librarian of the Virginia State Library, Richmond, Va. This is only a small part of the cheerful and unremunerated service rendered by the Virginia State Library in my quest for information concerning The Duty Letter, for all of which I owe thanks to Mr. McIlwaine and to his assistants.

General Lee was at Petersburg, only 22 miles from Richmond. He could easily have been consulted, personally or by letter. Can it be believed that this was not done?

But if General Lee did not give his express assent to the Repudiation Letter surely he knew of it, and acquiesced in it. He was an assiduous reader of the newspapers Northern and Southern, as, indeed, was his duty. He was in winter quarters, an hour's ride by rail from Richmond. On December 14, 1864, only two days before the publication of The Duty Letter in the *Sentinel*, and six days before its repudiation in the same paper, General Lee wrote to President Davis: "Everything at this time is quiet in the Departments of Virginia and North Carolina."

Both the *Whig* and the *Sentinel* were small papers; and the Repudiation Letter in the *Sentinel* was accompanied by extended comment. How could General Lee have failed to see The Duty Letter in the *Whig* and *Sentinel*, and its commendation and final repudiation in the *Sentinel*? And if he had overlooked all of these, would they not have been brought to his attention by some member of his staff, or certainly by some member of his family? In December, 1864, Mrs. Lee and her three daughters were residing in Richmond. General Custis Lee was stationed in Richmond. There were other Lees in the vicinity, officers in the Confederate army. How could General Lee have remained ignorant of The Duty Letter, and of its repudiation? And if he knew of the repudiation, and passed it by in silence, did he not acquiesce in the repudiation? And can it not be claimed that The Duty Letter was repudiated by General Lee himself? And this explains why it has always been repudiated by the Lee family.

Another consideration which tends strongly to prove that the "source entitled to know" was so close to General Lee as to be virtually himself, is the conduct of the editor of the *Sentinel* on the receipt of the Repudiation Letter. He had uttered an "exceeding bitter cry," when he found that he was "stung." He knew the "source entitled to know" (though we can only guess), and did not doubt or question. The psychology of this

is impressive. This editor had believed the letter genuine; but when he learned the source of its repudiation, he submits at once, as De Bracy, in *Ivanhoe*, surrenders, "rescue or no rescue," when the name of Richard *Coeur de Lion* is whispered in his ear. And the editor does not imagine, as some now do, that there is hope of escape from the forgery of *The Duty Letter*. Like De Bracy, he surrenders, "rescue or no rescue."

V.

We have now seen that *The Duty Letter* was, on its first appearance in Richmond, repudiated, virtually at least, by the alleged writer. But how as to the person to whom it purported to be written, G. W. Custis Lee? Did he accept it as genuine? Fortunately, he can speak for himself. When, nearly four years ago, I decided to inquire into the authenticity of *The Duty Letter*, I wrote to General Custis Lee, at Ravensworth, and received this reply, dated October 23, 1910:

"General Lee was a member of the Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, until the spring or summer of 1855, when he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Cavalry. The First and Second Regiments of Cavalry were authorized by Act of Congress passed during the winter of 1854-'55, and had no previous existence. The first part of the letter enclosed was not, therefore, written by General Lee.⁸

"As to the rest of the letter as a whole, I have no recollection of it, although the sentiments expressed may have been contained in one or more letters received by me before April, 1852. I was then in my 20th year of age, and had a respectable standing at the U. S. Military Academy. It is probable that the letter in question was compiled from several letters from my father, with such additions and variations as suited the compiler's fancy. The general tenor of the letter is very much in my

8. The *Duty Letter* bears date April 5, 1852, more than three years before General Lee became Lieut. Colonel of the Second Cavalry. The first part of *The Duty Letter* referred to is as follows: "I am just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico. My fine old regiment has been ordered to that distant region, and I must hasten to see that they are properly cared for."

father's style, and is probably taken in part from some of his letters.

(Signed)

"G. W. C. LEE."

It would seem that The Duty Letter, repudiated by both the alleged writer and the addressee, is so discredited, that its spuriousness would be conceded, "without hope of rescue." But this is by no means the case; and we must now examine several theories (or suppositions) upon which its substantial genuineness is by some still maintained. These theories I shall call (1) The Wrong Date Theory; (2) The Editorial Emendation Theory, and (3) The Compilation Theory. Let us examine them in their order.

VI.

I. THE WRONG DATE THEORY.

This is the theory of several valued correspondents; and at first blush it seems plausible. The date of The Duty Letter, it will be remembered, is "April 5, 1852," three years before General Lee became Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Cavalry. He could not, therefore, at that time, have written the first two sentences.

But may not "April 5, 1852," it is asked by those who espouse The Wrong Date Theory, be an error of General Lee, or of the copyist, or of the printer? Should not the date be changed to some other time which will fit the facts? Is it not more reasonable, they ask, that there should be an error in the date of The Duty Letter, than that the first two sentences, assuming the date to be correct, should contain so glaring an anachronism, so egregious a blunder? And they insist, when General Custis Lee declares, after showing the mistake in the first two sentences, "The first part of the letter enclosed was not, therefore, written by General Lee," that this means no more than that it was not written by General Lee *at the date on the face of the letter*. General Custis Lee may not have thought

of the possibility of an erroneous date; and his statement must be confined to the time when the letter bears date.⁹

The answer to this theory of wrong date is furnished by the facts. Change the date of *The Duty Letter* to whatever time you please, and the first two sentences are still impossible. They affirm two things: (1) "I am just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico"; and (2) "My fine old regiment has been ordered to that distant region, and I must hasten to see that they are properly taken care of." So the new date must satisfy two conditions, which must concur and co-exist. viz: (1) General Lee must be at home, in the act of leaving, in haste, for New Mexico, and (2) his fine old regiment must recently (this is clearly implied) have been ordered to New Mexico. But as General Lee was never in New Mexico, nor was the Second Cavalry ever ordered to New Mexico,¹⁰ let us change "New Mexico," as written in *The Duty Letter*, to Texas, treating "New Mexico," as a slip of the pen, when Texas was meant. Such heterophemy is totally unlike General Lee, but let it be supposed as a concession for the sake of the argument.

When, then, did General Lee, after he became Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Cavalry, leave home (Arlington) to join his regiment in Texas? Only twice, once in February, 1856, and again in February, 1860. This is shown, not only by the records in the office of the Adjutant-General at Washington, but also appears conclusively from General Lee's letters and Memorandum Book covering the period from 1855, when the Second

9. It is suggested by some who contend for *The Wrong Date Theory*, that, besides changing the date of *The Duty Letter* to fit the facts, the name of the addressee may also, if necessary, be changed. Instead of "G. W. Custis Lee" as the addressee, as was printed in the *Sun*, why, they argue, may not this be a mistake for "W. H. Fitzhugh Lee" (often called "Rooney" Lee), General Lee's second son, the letter being written to him, at a later date, while he was a student at Harvard University? But as is shown in the text, no date can be found which will reconcile the statements in the first two sentences of *The Duty Letter* with the actual facts, and this is equally true whether the letter be supposed to have been written to the addressee, "G. W. Custis Lee," or to his brother, W. H. Fitzhugh Lee, or to anybody else.

10. "In reply to your letter of the 24th instant, I have the honor to inform you that the Second Cavalry did not serve in New Mexico at any time prior to the Civil War." Letter to the writer, from the Adjutant-General's office, dated July 27, 1914.

Cavalry was organized, until early in 1861.¹¹ The only years, then, to which the date of The Duty Letter, April 5, 1852, can be changed, with any possibility of satisfying the two conditions stated above, are 1856 and 1860. Let us examine these years separately.¹²

(I.) THE YEAR 1856.

On November 21, 1855, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, who had been absent from his regiment, at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley, as a member of a Court-Martial, records in his Memorandum Book, that he arrived at Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, Missouri (where the Second Cavalry had rendezvoused), and "Found no orders for my future movements. The Regiment gone to Texas."¹³ Here, then, was Lieutenant-Colonel Lee's chance, according to the first two sentences of The Duty Letter, to hasten to Texas, join his "fine old regiment," and see that the men "are properly taken care of." But on November 24, 1855, the Memorandum Book contains this entry: "Left St. Louis for Texas to join my regiment. Shipped my baggage to New Orleans. *Decided to take Arlington on my way.*" (Italics mine.)

To Texas, from St. Louis, by way of Arlington, was certainly a roundabout route; and does not exhibit such haste on the part of Lieutenant-Colonel Lee to join his regiment, and see that the men were properly taken care of, as The Duty Letter

11. I have had access to these letters and to the Memorandum Book, through the kindness of Colonel Robert E. Lee, of Ravensworth. The Memorandum Book is really a diary, with almost daily records of General Lee's movements.

12. It may be remarked here that to preserve the integrity of the body of The Duty Letter it is necessary, not only to change the year 1852, to some other year, but also to change the month from April to February, as both in 1856 and in 1860 General Lee left for Texas in February. But this change encounters an obstacle in the third sentence of The Duty Letter, where General Lee is made to say, "I have but little to add in reply to your letters of March 26, 27 and 28." For if the date be changed to February, in any year, how can General Lee in that month reply to letters received by him as late as the latter part of March?

13. "It appears from the records of this office that the Second United States Cavalry left Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, for Texas, October 27, 1855, Lieut. Colonel Lee being absent on Court Martial duty at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." Letter to the writer, August 22, 1913, from the Adjutant-General's office, Washington, D. C.

seems to call for. The fabricator of that letter sets too high a standard of duty. Perhaps Lieutenant-Colonel Lee reflected that the Colonel of the regiment, Albert Sidney Johnston, an adopted son of Texas, and familiar (as Lieutenant-Colonel Lee was not) with the climate and conditions in Texas, could be relied on to see that the men were properly taken care of.

Be this as it may, the Second Cavalry, after many hardships (recorded in Colonel William Preston Johnston's *Life of his father*),¹⁴ arrived at its destination, Fort Mason, Texas, on January 14, 1856, having left Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, for Texas, October 27, 1855, as we have seen. And when did Lieutenant-Colonel Lee leave Arlington for Texas? He had reported to the Adjutant-General, in Washington, on November 28, 1855, and was by him authorized to delay his journey to Texas.¹⁵ His Memorandum Book records, on February 12, 1856, "left Alexandria on my way to Texas to rejoin my regiment." He was detained, however, by business connected with the estate of his father-in-law, G. W. Parke Custis; and on February 20, 1856, the record is: "At 3 P. M., continue my journey to Texas." This time he did not stop, and on March 25, 1856, he records that he arrived at Fort Mason, Texas, and reported to his Colonel, Albert Sidney Johnston.

In the face of the above facts, to what time in the year 1856 can the date of The Duty Letter be changed so that Lieutenant-Colonel Lee could have written: "I am just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico (Texas). My fine old regiment has been ordered to that distant region, and I must hasten to see that they are properly taken care of." When he did leave home for Texas, on February 20, 1856, his regiment had been there since January 14, 1856, more than a month. It had been ordered to Texas, October 27, 1855, nearly four months before Lieutenant-Colonel Lee started on his journey "to that distant region." Now change the date of The Duty Letter to February 20, 1856, and though Lieutenant-Colonel Lee was "in the act of leaving home for New Mexico (Texas)," it would be absurd

¹⁴. See "Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," chapter 12, pp. 187-189.

¹⁵. Letter to the writer from the Adjutant-General, August 28, 1913.

for him to write "my fine old regiment has been ordered to that distant region," as if the order had just been given, and that he "must hasten to see that they are properly taken care of." These words might have been written by him at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, on November 21, 1855, when he records in his Memorandum Book, "The Regiment gone to Texas"; but if he wrote them then, he must have changed his mind when he "determined to take Arlington on my way," and did not join his regiment until March 25, 1856. Besides, The Duty Letter is dated "Arlington House," and declares that he is "in the act of leaving home." Must this be changed as well as the date of the letter?

Another objection to the year 1856 is that the letter is addressed to "G. W. Custis Lee," and in it he is advised: "Deal kindly, but firmly, with all your classmates." But what "classmates" did Custis Lee have in 1856, nearly two years after his graduation from West Point, in June, 1854? He was, in 1856, in the Corps of Engineers, and might have messmates, but surely not classmates. Besides, in 1856, Custis Lee, a man grown, having graduated first in his class at West Point, where he was Adjutant of the Corps, a young man of the highest character, would hardly receive from his father such a letter as The Duty Letter. But, in 1856, W. H. Fitzhugh Lee was a student at Harvard, and had classmates, and it has been suggested that the letter was written to him. But while this would explain the word "classmates," it does not reconcile the first two sentences of The Duty Letter with the known facts. Besides, the letter was addressed to "G. W. Custis Lee," not to W. H. Fitzhugh Lee. Is it possible that General Lee would not only give a wrong date to his letter, but would also address it to the wrong son? And when all this is done, the first two sentences still remain impossible. And if, to save General Lee from such blundering, it is suggested that some copyist made these mistakes, this seems incredible. And if it is suggested that General Lee's letter was correct, as he wrote it, but that some one intentionally changed it, the reply is, with what conceivable motive?

(2.) THE YEAR 1860.

It was in 1860, as has been stated, that General Lee returned for the second time to join his regiment in Texas. On February 10, 1860, his Memorandum Book records: "At 6 A. M. left Arlington and its dear inhabitants for Texas." On February 20, 1860, he records that he assumed command of the Department of Texas.¹⁶

That the year 1860 cannot satisfy the conditions necessary in order to retain the first two sentences of The Duty Letter is manifest. What has been said as to the year 1856 is applicable *a fortiori*, to the year 1860. At that time Lieutenant-Colonel Lee's "fine old regiment" had been in Texas more than four years. He would hardly say in 1860 that the regiment "has been ordered to New Mexico (Texas), and I must hasten to see that they are properly taken care of."

In 1860, Custis Lee had been assigned to the "Engineer Bureau" in Washington. W. H. F. Lee had resigned from the Army, was married, and was living, a farmer, at the "White House," New Kent County, Virginia. Neither of them had "classmates." Both of them had reached such maturity of life and character as to render the admonitions of The Duty Letter hardly necessary or appropriate.

But there was still another son, Robert E. Lee, Jr., (now

16. On February 9, 1860, General Lee records in his Memorandum Book: "Received general orders, assigning me to duty according to my Brevet rank, and directing me to assume command of the Department of Texas." General Lee received the brevet rank of Colonel, September 13, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct, in the battle of Chapultepec, Mexico. (Letter to the writer from the Adjutant-General, July 27, 1914). But he was still Lieut.-Colonel in the Second Cavalry, when, in 1860 he returned to Texas.

In his letter of resignation from the United States Army, April 20, 1861, General Lee wrote to the Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War: "I have the honor to tender the resignation of my command as Colonel of the First Regiment of Cavalry." The explanation is that shortly before Virginia seceded General Lee was commissioned Colonel of the First Cavalry, succeeding Colonel E. V. Sumner, who was made Brigadier-General. But events moved so rapidly that General Lee never assumed command of the First Cavalry. (Letter to the writer from the Adjutant-General).

Captain Lee, of Romancoke),¹⁷ then a youth of sixteen, and away from home at boarding school. Why, it has been asked, may not the letter have been written to Robert E. Lee, Jr.? Those who "catch at straws" point out that in 1860, General Lee could properly have said "my fine old regiment," a description inapplicable in 1856, to raw recruits just ordered to Texas. Besides, it is argued, might not the Second Cavalry have been ordered in 1860 to go *from Texas to New Mexico*, "that distant region," thus escaping the change in the letter of "New Mexico" to Texas? But this gun is spiked at once by a letter to the writer from the Adjutant-General, July 27, 1914 (already quoted): "I have the honor to inform you that the Second Cavalry did not serve in New Mexico, at any time prior to the Civil War." And as to the suggestion that The Duty Letter was written to Robert E. Lee, Jr., who, in 1860, had "classmates," and was at an age to expect parental advice, Captain Lee, in a letter to the writer, July 29, 1914, says: "I am positive that no such letter was ever written to me, before, during, or since the war."¹⁸

17. Since this paper was read before the State Bar Association, and while it is being revised for publication, the death of Captain Lee is announced. He passed away, after a lingering illness, on October 19, 1914. No braver or more chivalric man ever lived, and his death is lamented by his surviving comrades of the war, and by a host of friends. His "Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee" exhibits the most ideal relations between a father and son to be found in literature.

The surviving descendants of General Robert E. Lee are Miss Mary Custis Lee, his eldest daughter; Colonel Robert E. Lee and Dr. George Bolling Lee, his grandsons, sons of General W. H. Fitzhugh (Rooney) Lee; and Misses Anne Carter Lee and Mary Custis Lee, his granddaughters, daughters of Captain Robert E. Lee.

18. We have seen that General Lee left Arlington to join his regiment in Texas twice only, viz.: on February 20, 1856, and February 10, 1860. This is shown conclusively by his letters and Memorandum Book. He returned to Arlington November 11, 1857, called home by the death of his father-in-law, G. W. Parke Custis, which occurred on October 21, 1857.

It is stated by several of General Lee's biographers that after coming home in the fall of 1857, he returned soon after to his regiment, and was at home again on a second furlough when John Brown's Raid (which he suppressed) occurred in October, 1859. That this is error is shown not only by General Lee's letters and Memorandum Book, covering fully the period from 1857 to 1861, but by the records of the War Department. In a letter to the writer, July 24, 1914, the Adjutant-General says: "According to the records, General Lee left San Antonio, Texas, October 24, 1857, on leave. He rejoined there, February 20, 1860, and assumed command of the Department of Texas on that date. Dur-

VII.

2. THE EDITORIAL EMENDATION THEORY.

This is the theory advanced by Mr. Montgomery Wright, of Washington, D. C. In a letter to the *New York Sun*, printed February 25, 1913,¹⁹ Mr. Wright shows, for the same reasons which are given in the Repudiation Letter, of December 20, 1864, and in the letter of General Custis Lee, October 23, 1910, that General Lee could not, in 1852, have written the first two sentences of The Duty Letter.²⁰ But he adds: "General Lee's

ing his absence from Texas, 1857 to 1860, his leave was extended several times, and in the meantime he was engaged at various times on special duty—as a member of a court of inquiry at West Point in 1858, member of an equipment board in 1859, and on detached duty at Harper's Ferry in November-December, 1859." General Lee's Memorandum Book shows that he was ordered to Harper's Ferry, October 17, 1859.

19. The letter of Mr. Montgomery Wright, above referred to, is noteworthy as the first publication, now extant, since the Repudiation Letter in the *Richmond (Va.) Sentinel* in 1864, in which the anachronism in the first two sentences of The Duty Letter was pointed out as casting doubt on its authenticity. But the Repudiation Letter was forgotten after the war until found by Mr. L. K. Gould, in May, 1913, and is now republished for the first time in this paper. The letter of General Custis Lee to the writer, dated October 23, 1910, showing that General R. E. Lee did not write the first two sentences in The Duty Letter, for the identical reasons given by Mr. Wright, is published for the first time in this paper. Dr. J. William Jones, as far back as 1874, in his "Personal Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee," pronounced The Duty Letter "undoubtedly spurious"; but no reasons were given by him in this book, nor in his second book, "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," published in 1906. But some time between 1874 and 1904 Dr. Jones did give reasons for his denial of the genuineness of The Duty Letter, in a published article, which the writer has not been able to find. See as to this a fuller statement hereafter.

20. The occasion for Mr. Wright's letter to the *Sun* was the publication of The Duty Letter in that paper, on February 22, 1913, soon after the death of General Custis Lee. The Duty Letter was sent to the *Sun* by Mr. Robert E. Kelly, now of Jersey City, N. J., but a native of New Orleans, La. Soon after The Duty Letter appeared in the *Sun*, it was copied by the *Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch*, the *Boston Transcript*, and no doubt by other papers. Mr. Kelly states that it was published in the *New Orleans Picayune*, as far back as October 22, 1872, about one year after its first publication after the war, in 1871, in John Esten Cooke's "Life of General R. E. Lee." Between the dates 1871 and 1913, The Duty Letter has continued to appear, from time to time, in the public press, printed with high commendation, but with communications questioning its authenticity following hard on its publication.

As showing the intensity of feeling in the South in respect to The Duty Letter, I venture to copy, without permission, a few lines from

letter to his son is too valuable to have its authenticity cast in doubt by historical mistakes that seem to have been introduced by some one attempting to edit the letter." And he adds: "As Custis Lee was a cadet on April 5, 1852, there appears no probability of an error in the date of the letter."

This theory, then, retaining both the date of the letter and the addressee, justifies the reference to "classmates"; and by the omission of the first two sentences corrects the anachronism of General Lee's leaving home to join his "fine old regiment" three years before it came into existence. Undoubtedly, this theory is the most favorable to the genuineness of The Duty Letter, and it deserves careful consideration. The difficulties in the way of its adoption are as follows:

(1). It seems an easy mode of avoiding anachronism—the rock on which literary impostures are usually wrecked—to resort to the heroic treatment of expunging the anachronism as itself a forgery, and this with no other evidence than the fact of anachronism. Assuming that whoever sent the copy of The Duty Letter to the *New York Sun* had the original letter in his possession, why should he wish to "queer" it, by adding the first two sentences, and that with utter disregard of well-known facts? The genuine letter, if there was one, began, no doubt, with some kind of introduction. If something preceded the third sentence: "I have but little to add in reply to your letters of March 26, 27, and 28," why not leave it as General Lee wrote it, instead of substituting something else? And if nothing preceded the third sentence, was not that sentence a sufficient in-

a letter dated June 5, 1913, from Mr. Robert E. Kelly, to whom I am much indebted for assistance in my researches *in re* The Duty Letter. After stating that the letter was sent to him—a mere lad at a boarding school—by his father in 1873, he says: "Ever since that now far-off time of my happy boyhood that letter has been to me and mine a *vade mecum*, friend and philosopher." And he adds: "You can never know, or even remotely feel, the acute and deep chagrin and bitter disappointment which pierced my innermost soul when I saw a doubt cast on the authenticity of that which I had so revered and held sacred for so many years."

Assuredly one assumes a great responsibility when he dares to disturb such sentiments as these. But to the writer it has seemed due to General Lee's memory to settle, if possible, before death destroyed the testimony of witnesses, the doubt that overhung The Duty Letter, and to prevent the recurrence of disputes as to its authenticity.

roduction? The same questions may be asked as to what took place in the office of the New York *Sun*, supposing the "editing" to have been done there. Editing implies design. An editor may correct errors, expunge objectionable matter, shorten what is too long to print in full. But why should the editor of the *Sun*, any more than the sender of the copy of The Duty Letter, think it necessary to substitute his own introduction (and what an introduction!) for what General Lee had already written; or to supply an introduction which General Lee did not write—being himself, in either case, guilty of literary forgery? It is simply inconceivable. It is far easier to believe that the whole letter is a forgery, for which, as we shall see, plausible motives can be suggested, than to believe that the first two sentences are a forgery, for whose fabrication it is impossible to suggest any motive whatever. The first answer, then, to "The Editorial Emendation Theory" is that it rests upon a gratuitous assumption, so incredible as to be negligible.

(2.) But conceding, for the sake of argument merely, that the first two sentences of The Duty Letter should be stricken out, as added in "editing," will this remove all the difficulties which render its authenticity doubtful? I think it can be shown, without the first two sentences, that The Duty Letter is a forgery. The reasons are as follows:

(a.) Neither the original of The Duty Letter, nor any copy of it (General Lee copied, in his own hand, many of his letters), has been found among the papers of General Lee. The *Sun* printed from a copy. It did not profess to have the original.

(b.) General Custis Lee does not remember that he ever received such a letter. Could he forget it, when half of it was devoted to the striking anecdote of the "Dark Day," and the devotion to duty of the "old Puritan"—matters which would impress the imagination, and sink deep in the memory, of a brilliant young cadet, not yet twenty-one? And the occasion when he wrote to his father *three letters on three successive days*, could he forget that?

(c.) Shortly after its publication in Richmond, in December, 1864, The Duty Letter was publicly repudiated and pro-

nounced a forgery. This repudiation was, no doubt, either authorized, or acquiesced in, by General Lee. And this repudiation was not merely of the first two sentences; it was a repudiation of the whole letter. The writer of the Repudiation Letter—the “source entitled to know”—declares: “There is nothing in it that can be recognized as genuine by any one familiar with his (General Lee’s) style.” He also speaks of “the mendacity of our enemies, and how they publish things that are utterly false.” Plainly this is a repudiation of the whole letter, and not of the first two sentences only. And General Lee suffered it to pass without contradiction!

(d.) The style of the disputed letter differs from that of General Lee. This is asserted, unequivocally, by the “source entitled to know,” as stated above. How near this “source” must have been to General Lee is manifest when we reflect that in 1864 none of General Lee’s private letters had been published; and within the Confederate lines there was no free access to General Lee’s private correspondence—such as was permitted at Arlington.

But opinions may differ as to a writer’s style, even among those familiar with it. Many of General Lee’s private letters social and domestic, have now been published, and have been studied critically by students of the Lee literature. As to his style, then, and its resemblance to that of *The Duty Letter*, let us call experts of the highest authority. And for once the experts do not differ in opinion.

Captain W. Gordon McCabe, who is recognized authority on all matters pertaining to General Lee, says:²¹ “The moment I read the Lee letter, years ago, I knew it was spurious, quite apart from the first sentence (first two sentences). I am very familiar with Lee’s letters (published and unpublished), and the whole style of this letter is foreign to him. Lee no more wrote that letter (whether we consider it from an objective or subjective point of view) than did the Apostle Paul.”

Professor Edward S. Joynes, a member of General Lee’s faculty at Washington College (now Washington and Lee Uni-

21. Letter to the writer, dated June 1, 1913.

versity), whose knowledge of English and ability to use it are unsurpassed in the South, writes:²² "Style is something so subtle, and varies so much with the mood of the writer, that it is difficult to say, generally, whether such or such a writing is or is not in the style of a given man. I should say, with Custis Lee, that this writing (Duty Letter) is a fair imitation of General Lee's style—that is, of his mode of thought and expression. Yet, somehow—I cannot say exactly how—it seems to me not like him. The story of the old Puritan is not like him. I doubt if any similar passage can be found in his writings. And the very sentence, 'Duty,' etc., does not sound like him; for General Lee thought or cared little about 'words.' He would hardly have said: 'Duty is the sublimest *word*.' Yet all this is conjectural; for style is too subtle a thing to be positively identified."

The third expert is Dr. Gamaliel Bradford, Jr., whose remarkable book, "Lee the American," has already been referred to. In a letter to the writer, dated July 22, 1914, Dr. Bradford says: "With my present knowledge on the subject, it would ill become me to differ from such experts as Colonel McCabe and Professor Joynes, and on the whole my impression agrees with theirs in doubting the genuineness of the whole letter, though I frankly confess that, had I not been rendered suspicious by external circumstances, I do not know whether any such doubt would have occurred to me. In other words, the forgery, if it is one, is executed with surprising cleverness. The error, if there is an error, consists in slightly exaggerating General Lee's habits of thought and expression, so that it is extremely difficult to determine where the genuine begins, and the spurious ends. . . . Still, it does seem to me that something in the tone of the moralizing of the suspected letter is a little more strained, a little more formal, than is ordinary in other letters (of General Lee). The sermonizing (in other letters) is not generally so sustained or keyed to such an elaborate pitch. Especially, I cannot quite reconcile myself to the anec-

22. Letter to the writer, July 14, 1914. Dr. Joynes is now Professor Emeritus of the University of South Carolina.

dote which constitutes the last paragraph. Yet it is in that paragraph that the often quoted phrase (Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language) occurs. . . . But did he say, 'Duty is the sublimest word in the language? I would give a great deal to know, and that is why I am so much interested in the authenticity of this letter.'

In an earlier letter to the writer, dated July 13, 1913, Dr. Bradford says: "The sublimest word passage, however, seems to me decidedly characteristic (of Lee), both positively and negatively; for I should not myself be ready to say that duty was the sublimest word in our language. As for the remainder of the forged letter, I could never feel that the somewhat melodramatic conclusion was quite like Lee." And in a letter published in the *Boston Transcript*, February 28, 1913, Dr. Bradford says of The Duty Letter: "I suppose that, in spite of all protest, this document *which rather libels Lee in its excess of preachmen* will go down to future generations with the Cherry Tree Story of Washington."

In addition to the expert testimony, unfavorable to the authenticity of The Duty Letter from the standpoint of its style, I now desire to call attention to some specific objections based on its contents.

(a.) It is dated from "Arlington House, April 5, 1852," and represents General Lee as "just in the act of leaving home." At that time General Lee's home was in Baltimore, not at Arlington. He removed to West Point, as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy, on September 1, 1852. He remained at West Point until April 3, 1855, when he closed his connection with the Military Academy. On April 2, 1855, he wrote to Albert Sidney Johnston, Colonel of the Second Cavalry, Louisville, Ky., and stated, "my address will be Arlington, near Alexandria." All of the above facts are shown by General Lee's letters.

(b.) The Duty Letter is dated from "Arlington House." In no undisputed letter by General Lee does he write "Arlington House." Usually he wrote "Arlington, Virginia," but sometimes added "near Alexandria," as in the letter to Colonel Johns-

ton above; or "Arlington, Washington City, D. C., or "Arlington, Washington City P. O.," but never "Arlington House."²³

(c.) Passing by the first two sentences, with their bald blunders which have been sufficiently exposed, the third sentence is remarkable. General Lee is made to say, "I have but little to add in reply to your letters of March 26, 27 and 28." Is it probable that Custis Lee, a cadet at West Point, would write to his father on three successive days? Further comment on this sentence will be made in the sequel.

(d.) In genuine letters, General Lee's style is severely plain. He does not use metaphors or superlatives. But the writer of The Duty Letter says: "Your letters breathe a true spirit of frankness"; "Frankness is the child of honesty and courage"; "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," which has been commented on above by Dr. Joynes.

(e.) In genuine letters, General Lee's grammar and syntax, though not always faultless, are free from gross errors. But in The Duty Letter (waiving a mistake in the second sentence) he is made to say, "myself and your mother," "me and your mother," for which cannot be pleaded Cardinal Wolsey's excuse for "*Ego et Rex meus*," which so offended Henry VIII. And then there is the extraordinary sentence: "We should live, act, and say nothing to the injury of another." *Live* nothing to the injury of another! *Act* nothing to the injury of another! Shade of Lindley Murray!

(f) The story of the old Puritan, which awakens the suspicion of both Dr. Joynes and Dr. Bradford, is found in "Barber's Historical Connecticut Collections," a purely local book giving an account of the counties, towns and cities of that State, the first edition of which was published in 1838.²⁴

23. See the Repudiation Letter, *ante*, from a "source entitled to know." In a letter to the writer, Miss Mary Custis Lee declares that General Lee never wrote "Arlington House," but that his father-in-law, G. W. P. Custis, did. The writer has scrutinized many letters, published and unpublished, of General Lee, and has never seen "Arlington House" save in the disputed Duty Letter.

24. The Old Puritan anecdote, as given in Barber, page 403, is as follows:

"The 19th of May, 1780, was a remarkable dark day. Candles were lighted in many houses; the birds were silent and disappeared, and the

There is no evidence that General Lee knew of this anecdote. He does not mention it in any undisputed letter, and I cannot learn that he ever alluded to it in his family.

In *The Duty Letter*, General Lee is made to introduce the Old Puritan in this rather pompous manner: "As to duty (which had not been mentioned before and seems lugged in here to lead up to the anecdote), I *must now inform you*," etc. He then proceeds to expand and embellish the anecdote far beyond the few lines in *Barber*, and in a way which Dr. Bradford describes as "somewhat melodramatic." Surely this is not our Lee! *Quantum mutatus ab illo!*

While some of the above objections may seem trivial, we should not forget the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence. Everything, great and small, points in the same direction—to the forgery of *The Duty Letter*. Circumstantial evidence may be likened to the strands of a rope. A single strand may be easily broken; but many strands, woven into a cable, will hold a battleship at anchor.

VIII.

3. THE COMPILATION THEORY.

This third theory concerning *The Duty Letter* concedes that the letter as such, is a forgery, i. e., that General Lee never, at any time, to anybody, wrote the letter printed in the *New York Sun* on November 26, 1864. But it is suggested that the forger, having access to genuine letters of General Lee, made use of

fowls retired to roost. The legislature of Connecticut was then in session at Hartford. A very general opinion prevailed that the day of judgment was at hand. The House of Representatives, being unable to transact their business, adjourned. A proposal to adjourn the Council was under consideration. When the opinion of Colonel Davenport was asked, he answered, 'I am against an adjournment. The day of judgment is either approaching, or it is not. If it is not, there is no cause for an adjournment: if it is, I choose to be found doing my duty. I wish, therefore, that candles may be brought.'

Whittier's poem entitled "Abraham Davenport" (the Old Puritan) was first published in 1866, two years after *The Duty Letter* appeared in the *New York Sun*. It is probable that Whittier saw this publication, and that his poem was suggested by it.

their contents in fabricating the spurious letter, and that some of its sentences are taken from such genuine letters.

Thus General Custis Lee, in the letter already given, says: "It is probable that the letter in question was compiled from several letters from my father, with such additions and variations as suited the compiler's fancy." And Captain McCabe says: "I have always regarded the letter as a sort of 'cento' of odds and ends (badly put together) from Lee's genuine letters."

The same view is taken by Dr. Jones, who declares that The Duty Letter is "the product of some ingenious newspaper correspondent, who got at Arlington a number of General Lee's letters, and taking extracts from several, manufactured one to his taste."—"Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," p. 436.

On the other hand, Captain R. E. Lee, in a letter to the writer, dated January 18, 1911, says: "There are many phrases which do not sound to me like my father." (This was written after Captain Lee had published his "Recollections and Letters" in 1904). And he adds: "I cannot conceive of the motives of anyone making up this letter from several others. If so, where are those letters he made it up from."

This challenge of Captain Lee to The Compilation Theory—"If so, where are the letters he made it up from?"—has never been accepted, and his question remains unanswered, and will so remain unless letters of General Lee, not now known, shall hereafter be discovered. The Duty Letter consists of but two topics, Frankness and Duty, with the extraordinary sentence, "We should live, act, and say nothing to the injury of another," sandwiched between them. There are two letters, as we shall see later (which may have been in the hand of the forger) that suggest these topics, and whose style is imitated; but the treatment of the topics, and the language used, is wholly different from The Duty Letter. In other words, while the subjects are the same, the predicates are not. To this extent only does there seem to be foundation for The Compilation Theory; and this explanation of the contents, in part at least, of The Duty Letter,

though suggested by General Custis Lee and Captain McCabe, and affirmed by Dr. Jones, must, I think, be rejected.²⁵

IX.

We have now seen the evidence tending to show that General Lee did not write *The Duty Letter*; and with this, perhaps, the discussion might close. But the question presses, if General Lee did not write *The Duty Letter*, who did? Somebody wrote it. What was his motive?

This is the region of conjecture, but I believe proper inferences from known facts will disclose both the forger and his motive.

The Duty Letter was published, as has been stated, in the *New York Sun*, November 26, 1864, with this introduction, written by the forger, or else by the editor on information supplied by him: "The original of the following private letter, from General Lee to his son, was found at Arlington House, and is interesting as illustrating a phase in his character." Now, it is rare that a lie is all a lie; usually it has some basis of truth. In this case, while no letter of General Lee was "found at Arlington House" of which *The Duty Letter* was a true copy, yet letters of General Lee were found there which suggested the literary imposture (for that is all it was), furnished the topics discussed, and served as models of General Lee's sententious and aphoristic style, otherwise unknown to the fabricator. This assumes (1)

25. It is manifest that the objections to the genuineness of the residue of *The Duty Letter* (after rejecting the first two sentences as "not written by General Lee") which have been stated in discussing *The Editorial Emendation Theory*, apply equally to *The Compilation Theory*, and need not be repeated here.

It may be remarked that Dr. Jones who in his "Personal Reminiscences," published in 1874, pronounced (p. 133) *The Duty Letter* "unquestionably spurious," (with the statement, however, that the *Duty Sentence* "did occur in a letter to his son"), in his second book, "Life and Letters," published in 1906, adopts (p. 436) *The Compilation Theory* to the fullest extent. (See the extract quoted above). It is probable that before publishing the second book he had written to General Custis Lee, and received an answer similar to that to the writer from which the above quotation is made. This is indicated by the close resemblance between the expression "as suited the compiler's fancy," in General Lee's letter to the writer, and the expression "to his taste," used by Dr. Jones.

that such genuine letters were left at Arlington, accessible to all comers, and (2) that they contained allusions, at least, to the two topics, Frankness and Duty, treated of in *The Duty Letter*. We shall now show that both assumptions are true.

1. I have before me the dates of a number of letters written to G. W. Custis Lee by General Lee, which were taken from Arlington, during the war, and which have since been returned to General Custis Lee, or to Miss Mary Lee, General Lee's oldest daughter. They were all written in the years 1851 and 1852, some of them very near to the date of the forged letter, April 5, 1852.²⁶

As recently as July 11, 1913, Mr. W. H. Hawkins, of Springfield, Massachusetts, returned to Miss Mary Lee four letters found by him, during the war, at Arlington. He gave this account of finding these letters, in a communication to the *Times-Dispatch*, offering to return them: "I found these letters on the walk, leading from the front to the rear, along one side of the Lee mansion, at Arlington, when my regiment was stationed in that vicinity, in the Spring of 1863." These letters were dated in 1851 and 1852; and one of them from General Lee to Custis Lee, was dated February 1, 1852, about two months before the date of the forged letter.²⁷

26. In the years 1851 and 1852, Custis Lee was a cadet at West Point. He entered the Academy in 1850, and graduated in 1854. The letters received by him, while a cadet, were, no doubt, brought to Arlington, and left there when, at the opening of the war, he resigned his commission and came South. The dates of these letters, so close to that of the forged letter, April 5, 1852, is a strong argument that this is the true date of *The Duty Letter*, and that *The Wrong Date Theory* is untenable.

27. I am indebted to Miss Mary Lee (letter to the writer August 10, 1913,) for this account of the letter by General Lee to Custis Lee, dated "Baltimore, February 1, 1852:" "He was then anticipating the return of Custis from West Point, on his furlough; but though he was stimulating him to be No. 1 in his class, (which he was), the word *Duty* was not mentioned." This stimulating Custis to be No. 1 in his class is the burden of several other letters by General Lee to him, written about this time.

It has been suggested that the original of *The Duty Letter* may be in existence, and may yet be returned to the Lee family. The same may be suggested of some letter containing the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language." But the evidence is so strong

2. Among the letters left at Arlington, and since returned to the Lee family, there are two which refer to the topics of The Duty Letter, and which may have been used by the forger.

(1). Letter dated Baltimore, May 4, 1851, from General Lee to Custis Lee, then a cadet at West Point. This letter is printed on pages 71-74, of Dr. J. William Jones' second book on General Lee, published in 1906, entitled "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee." The time at which this letter was first printed, and other circumstances, indicate that it is one of those left at Arlington, and afterwards recovered by the Lee family, but the fact cannot be fully established by external evidence. But the internal evidence points strongly to its use by the forger, as supplying the topics—Frankness and Duty—discussed in The Duty Letter.²⁸

that The Duty Letter is spurious, that any letter now produced purporting to be its original, and to be in General Lee's handwriting, should be closely scrutinized, as probably itself a forgery. As to the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," it is, of course, not impossible that he wrote it in some other letter, and that the letter may yet be returned. But after fifty years, if the intense interest in the authenticity of this sentence has not caused its production, it is most improbable that a letter containing it will yet be found. Like old Montaigne, one may say of this: "I believe in no miracles outside of the Scriptures."

28. The first two paragraphs of this letter (all that were used by the forger, the remainder of the letter, a long one, being filled up with personal and domestic matters), are as follows:

Baltimore, May 4, 1851.

"My Dearest Son:

"Your letter of the 27th ultimo, which I duly received, has given me more pleasure than any that I now recollect having ever received. It has assured me of the confidence you feel in my love and affection, and with what frankness and candor you open to me all your thoughts.

"So long as I meet with such return from my children, and see them strive to respond to my wishes, and exertions, for their good and happiness I can meet with calmness and unconcern all else the world may have in store for me. I cannot express my pleasure at hearing you declare your determination to shake off the listless fit that has seized upon you, and to arouse all your faculties into activity and exertion. The determination is alone wanting to accomplish the wish. At times the temptation to relax will be hard upon you, but will grow feebler and more feeble by constant resistance. The full play of your young and growing powers, the daily exercise of all your energies, the consciousness of acquiring knowledge, and the pleasure of knowing your efforts to do your duty, will bring you a delight and gratification far surpassing all that idleness and selfishness can give. Try it fairly and take your own experience. I know it will confirm you in your present

Comparing The Duty Letter with the first two paragraphs of the letter of May, 1851, as printed in the footnote, it will be seen that in both letters the "frankness" of Custis Lee is commended (in The Duty Letter a homily is written on "frankness"). In both letters reference is made to Custis Lee's fellow-students, though in The Duty Letter they are called "classmates," and in the other "cadet friends." In both letters there is a reference to duty. In The Duty Letter the old Puritan anecdote is introduced, with comments which Dr. Bradford thinks "somewhat melodramatic"; in the other letter, General Lee says: "Your efforts to do your duty will bring you delight and gratification far surpassing all that idleness and selfishness can give." But the genuine letter ignores the "Old Puritan"; and the sentence about duty is in plain words, omitting the bold figure: "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language."²⁹

resolve to 'try and do your best,' and if that does not recompense for your devotion and labor, you will find it in the happiness which brings to father and mother, brothers and sisters, and all your friends. I do not think you lack either energy or ambition. Hitherto you have not felt the incentive to call them forth. 'Content to do well,' you have not tried 'to do better.' The latter will as assuredly follow the effort as the former. Every man has ambition. The young soldier especially feels it. Honor and fame are all that he aspires to. But he cannot reach either by volition alone, and he sometimes shrinks from the trials necessary to accomplish them. Let this never be your case. Keep them constantly before you and firmly pursue them. They will at last be won. I am very much pleased at the interest taken by the cadets in your success. Surely it requires on your part a corresponding return. They desire to see you *strive* at least, to gratify their wishes. Prove yourself worthy of their affection. Hold yourself above every mean action. Be strictly honorable in every act, and be not ashamed to *do right*. Acknowledge right to be your aim and strive to reach it. I feel so much obliged to you for the candid avowal of all your feelings. Between us two let there be no concealment. I may give you advice and encouragement and you will give me pleasure."

It is a remarkable fact that since the publication of this letter by Dr. Jones, it has disappeared, and cannot be found either among the papers of General Lee or among those of Dr. Jones. It cannot, therefore, be known whether Dr. Jones printed from a copy, or from the original. If there were both original and copy (frequently the case with General Lee's letters), then one or the other may have been left at Arlington, and used by the forger. In this case it would not be necessary to suppose that the letter was returned to the Lee family.

29. While the topics in The Duty Letter and in the letter of May 4, 1851, are the same, the language used and the treatment of the topics differ. There is, however, one parallelism of expression which attracts attention. In The Duty Letter, General Lee is made to say, "Take it

(2). Letter dated January 12, 1852, by General Lee to Custis Lee. This is a letter of congratulation on Custis Lee's becoming a Corporal in the Cadet Corps.

It is certain that this letter was found at Arlington during the war and was returned to General Custis Lee some years ago. A brief extract will show how it rings the changes on duty: "Do your duty honestly and faithfully, without favor and without partiality. Do not seek to report, but let it be seen that though it gives you pain, still you must do your duty. That this duty is equal. Never more or less rigid, but always the same, and your duty. The same as regards your dearest friend or worst enemy. You will thus gain esteem and affection, and not dislike or hatred. The just are always loved and never hated." It will be observed how close the date of the letter, January 12, 1852, is to that of The Duty Letter. Also that it is an excellent example of General Lee's style in his familiar letters to his children.

X.

But admitting that the forger, who connects himself with Arlington in what he wrote to the *New York Sun*, might have had access to letters of General Lee, disclosing his style, and suggesting the topics of The Duty Letter, the question of *motive* remains to be considered. One may borrow the "livery of Heaven to serve the Devil in," but why falsely assume the livery of Heaven to inculcate duty and teach morality? It has been said that one capable of feeling that "Duty is the sublimest word in our language," would hardly be capable, while penning that sentence, of committing a breach of duty by perpetrating a forgery. This seems paradoxical; but I think the explanation is plain, when we approach The Duty Letter from the right angle.

The key to the solution of the problem is found by remembering that The Duty Letter should not be taken too seriously. It is not forgery in a legal sense (such a letter could not be);

for granted that you mean to do right"; while in the other letter he says, "Acknowledge right to be your aim, and strive to reach it." What significance, if any, attaches to this parallelism is left to the reader's judgment.

it is not a crime, but only a literary imposture, by way of imitation of another's style and sentiments, of which there are numerous instances. One of the recognized motives for such imposture is *fun*—the pleasure of a practical joke, mere mental diversion, without malice, or the desire to injure any one. It may serve to while away an idle hour, as a test of one's power of imitation.³⁰

The reference to Arlington in the forged letter points to that place as the scene of the concoction of the forged letter; and the "old Puritan" anecdote, from the local history of Connecticut, indicates someone from that State as the villain in the play. Not a newspaper correspondent, as Dr. Jones suggests—such "copy" would not be expected from a war correspondent—but rather some bright young graduate from Yale, a soldier in the Federal Army, and now in camp at Arlington. Here time hangs heavy on his hands. To relieve *ennui*, he examines the letters of General Lee scattered around, and among them the two referred to above as suggesting the forged letter. He is struck by their sententious, didactic style (General Lee, himself, has spoken of his "old habit of giving advice"); and the thought occurs to him that it would be easy of imitation. He is familiar with literary impostures, but probably, as yet, the thought of publication has not occurred to him.

With the letter of May 4, 1851, as the cue, he begins with, "Your letters breathe a true spirit of frankness," and writes the paragraph on that topic—commonplace enough—but still in imitation of the style of Lee. But what next? He sees that both letters speak of duty, and he recalls the anecdote of the "Old Puritan" from the local history of his own State. He tells the story, and his comment on it concludes the letters. As he re-reads the letter, and recalls that General Lee is known as the great exemplar of devotion to duty, he smiles as he thinks that

30. "The motives of the literary forger are commonly mixed, but they may perhaps be analyzed roughly into piety, greed, 'push,' and *love of fun*. Occasionally it has happened that forgeries begun for the mere sake of *exerting the imitative faculty*, and of raising a laugh against the learned, have been persevered with in earnest." Andrew Lang's "Books and Bookmen," pp. 16, 17. See also J. A. Farrar's "Literary Forgeries," p. 1.

he has made Lee of Arlington sit at the feet of Davenport of Stamford, that he has made the Virginia Cavalier learn duty from the Connecticut Puritan!

And now he falls in love with his imitation—and especially with the old Puritan story unknown as yet outside of Connecticut—and the thought of newspaper publication occurs to him. Could he deceive a paper like the *New York Sun*, and add one more to the long list of literary impostures? He decides to try. But now comes the rub. It was easy to follow the model letters as to style and topics, and address the forged letter to G. W. Custis Lee, at a date near that of the model letters when he was a cadet at West Point. But how begin the letter? In the pretended copy sent to the *Sun*, the original not being produced, there must be an introduction, and that introduction must have *vraisemblance*, or success will be impossible. He knows that General Lee resigned his commission as Colonel of a Cavalry regiment, when on his State's secession, he left the service of the United States for that of his native Virginia. He also knows that for some years prior to the war he had been stationed somewhere in the distant Southwest. He knows that the letter must be short (it is said that Shakespeare killed Mercutio because he could not sustain the character any longer), and so he decides to represent the letter as "hasty." But why haste? Because General Lee is in the act of leaving home to join his regiment just ordered somewhere, from Texas to New Mexico, probably. Hence the first two sentences. He knew that he was weak on his facts; but he hoped that this introduction would be "a good enough Morgan until after the election." And so it proved. Though he "missed with both barrels"—as to time and place, was not the *New York Sun* deceived, and also the *Whig*, and the *Sentinel*? Doubtless he expected detection ultimately, but this would be a part of the fun. What is the good of a practical joke if its victim is never the wiser?

But he was not content with the first two sentences of the introduction. He adds a third, which for a long time was a puzzle to me—the fact stated is so unnecessary, and so improbable. It is this: "I have but little to add in reply to your letters

of March 26, 27, and 28." Custis Lee writes to his father on three successive days, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, instead of waiting till Sunday, the regulation day for filial correspondence! Custis Lee, a cadet at West Point, and then and always chary of letter-writing. And his father is pleased to receive the three letters—such dutiful behavior! And this, though at this time he was urging Custis to strain every nerve to stand at the head of his class. And although General Lee had already answered the three letters once ("I have but little to *add* in reply"), he proceeds to answer them a second time! And while in haste, because just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico, he writes what sounds like a leisurely disquisition on morals, and the proper conduct of life!

To explain the mystery of the three letters it has been suggested that Custis Lee was in some trouble, and was seeking his father's help. But General Lee's reply does not indicate this. And the Adjutant of West Point declares³¹ that, at the date of The Duty Letter, April 2, 1852, "The records of the Military Academy reveal nothing, not even a report, that might cause this cadet (G. W. Custis Lee) discontent; nor is his name mentioned in any of the letters sent or received at these headquarters at that time."

What, then, is the explanation of the three letters? Simply this—the fabricator knew that it would seem strange if General Lee, about to leave home for a long absence, should write a letter to his son containing nothing but "preachment," and an anecdote brought from a sufficient distance as a text for more preachment. What father would write such a letter under such circumstances? It was a characteristic of General Lee (and the full text of the model letters shows it), to write all the news. His letters are full of personals about the family and friends. In his "Recollections and Letters" (p. 206) Captain Lee says of his father: "To the members of his family who were away he wrote regularly, and was their best correspondent on home matters, telling in his charming way all the sayings and doings of the household and the neighbors."

31. Letter to the writer, September 26, 1913.

The fabricator of The Duty Letter was a bright young fellow (though a little weak on his English, as is the case with a good many college graduates), and he saw that the total absence of personal allusions might arouse suspicion, and lead to discovery of the forgery. But how venture on personals? Ignorance and blunders would surely betray him. In this dilemma he resorted to the ingenious device of pretending that the forged letter was a *second reply* to letters already once answered. And he makes General Lee refer to the receipt of *three* letters to explain the need of a second reply. Doubtless he was aware how extraordinary, not to say preposterous, three letters on three successive days, by a young man to his father, would appear to anyone who had ever been a student or a cadet; but again he reflected that this sentence, too, would be "a good enough Morgan until after the election"—and the event so proved.

It has been objected, however, that this explanation of the genesis of the forged letter fails, in that it does not take account of the war, and the bitter feeling between the North and the South. Why, it is asked, should a Northern man, a "warrior in arms" against General Lee, fabricate a letter so much to his credit, thus giving aid and comfort to the South? But how else could the fabricator impersonate Lee, with any hope that his imposture would be successful? North and South, General Lee was already recognized as "a noble figure, lofty and patriotic"—a man who "reverenced his conscience as his King," and ever gave ear to Duty, that "Stern Daughter of the Voice of God." There was no bitterness against General Lee in the North (as there was against Jefferson Davis). Is it inconceivable that such a letter should be written in the name of Lee by a Federal soldier, when we know that the New York *Sun*, in 1864, had the courage and magnanimity to publish it (believing it genuine), and to scatter it broadcast through the North? The *Sun*, however, did not forget to remind its readers that the letter "*illustrated one phase of Lee's character.*" (Italics mine.) There might be others not so amiable.

And now our inquiry into the authenticity of this famous Duty Letter is ended. Was ever a genuine letter enmeshed in

such a network of suspicious circumstances—all pointing one way, and that way forgery! The evidence is not only consistent with forgery, but inconsistent with any other hypothesis. It is said that the letter is "mysterious." So it is mysterious, more than mysterious, utterly bewildering, indeed, if we assume it to be genuine. But on the hypothesis of forgery, all is clear. This is the clue to the labyrinth, this the master-key that unlocks all doors. I indict The Duty Letter as guilty of literary forgery. And I believe that, taking into consideration the cumulative effect of all the evidence, there can be but one verdict—guilty as indicted. And this beyond any reasonable doubt.

XI.

But, assuming now that The Duty Letter as a whole is a literary forgery, the question may still be asked, Is it not possible that the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language" may be saved? Take away all the rest, but leave us this! May not this sentence have occurred in a genuine letter of Lee, where it was found by the forger and transferred to The Duty Letter? In other words, may not The Compilation Theory, to this extent, at least, be true? The Duty Sentence is now so associated with General Lee, is so universally taken as the keynote of his character, that to deny its authenticity seems almost sacrilegious. Even Gamaliel Bradford, who does not admire The Duty Letter as a whole, declares of the Duty Sentence: "I would give a great deal to be assured that it is a genuine utterance of Lee."

This theory of repudiation of The Duty Letter as a whole, with the acceptance, nevertheless, of the Duty Sentence as genuine, has the support of no less an authority than Dr. J. William Jones, one of the earliest and best-known biographers of General Lee. Thus in Jones' "Personal Reminiscences of General R. E. Lee," published in 1874, it is said (p. 133): "The letter which has been so widely published, purporting to have been written by General Lee at Arlington to his son Custis at West Point, is unquestionably spurious. But the expression, 'Duty is the sub-

limest word in the English [should be 'our'] language,' did occur in a letter to his son." And this positive affirmation, both as to the spuriousness of The Duty Letter, and the genuineness of the Duty Sentence, is repeated by Dr. Jones in "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," published in 1906. (See page 436).

It is a remarkable fact that neither in his first book concerning General Lee, published in 1874, nor in the second, published in 1906, thirty-two years later, does Dr. Jones give any reason, whatever, for pronouncing The Duty Letter "unquestionably spurious," or any authority for his emphatic statement that the expression, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," "did occur in a letter to his son." And yet he must have known, when he published his second book, that many had refused to accept his *ipse dixit* as to the spuriousness of The Duty Letter; and that those who relied on his assurance of the genuineness of the Duty Sentence, yet longed "to make assurance doubly sure" by being told when the letter containing this precious sentence was written, to which son (General Lee had three sons), and with what context. On all these matters, in both his books, Dr. Jones is as silent as the grave.³²

32. As to the statement that The Duty Letter is "unquestionably spurious," Dr. Jones, I am informed by both Captain R. E. Lee, Jr., and Captain W. Gordon McCabe, published a letter giving his reasons for pronouncing it a forgery. Captain Lee (letter to the writer, January 18, 1911), says that the article was exhaustive, and caused him to exclude The Duty Letter from his "Recollections and Letters." Captain McCabe (letter to the writer, January 27, 1911), says: "I quite forget his (Dr. Jones') line of argument to prove the spuriousness of the letter, but I suppose it was the obvious one, as indicated in General Custis Lee's letter."

Neither Captain Lee nor Captain McCabe recalled when or where Dr. Jones' letter was published, but Captain McCabe thought, probably, in the Richmond *Dispatch*. The time of publication must have been prior to 1904, when Captain Lee's book was published, for he omitted The Duty Letter because of Dr. Jones' article.

For more than three years I have used every means in my power to discover Dr. Jones' letter, but without success. It cannot be found among his papers, nor in his scrap-books. For very great kindness in making search for the lost letter among Dr. Jones' papers and scrap-books, I am indebted to his four sons, Rev. Carter Helm Jones, D. D., of Seattle, Wash.; Rev. Howard Lee Jones, D. D., President of Coker College, Hartsville, S. C.; Rev. M. Ashby Jones, D. D., Augusta, Ga., and Rev. E. Pendleton Jones, D. D., of Newberry, S. C.

The Southern Historical Papers and The Confederate Veteran have been carefully searched. Also the Richmond *Dispatch* from 1887 to 1903,

But the question presses, on what authority (he must have had some authority, real or supposed), does Dr. Jones affirm that the expression, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," "did occur in a letter by General Lee to his son." If Dr. Jones had in his possession a letter by General Lee containing this sentence, who can doubt that he would have printed it in full. If he had any definite knowledge as to such a letter, would he not have given the date, or at least the name of the son to whom it was written?

Neither the widow of Dr. Jones (who is still living), nor any one of his four sons can throw any light on the problem, beyond this statement of one of them:³³ "I know that my father always said that the quotation, 'Duty is the sublimest word in the English language,' was not written in a letter to General Custis Lee, but was written to another son, on another occasion. I have never been able to find that letter." But to what son, and on what occasion? All the papers of Dr. Jones have been searched in vain. All the letters of General Lee have been scrutinized by half a dozen persons³⁴ (by some of them with especial reference to the Duty Sentence); but no one encountered

inclusive. During this period, the *Dispatch* was considered more likely to contain the Jones letter than the *Richmond Times*, since Captain Lee, who read the *Dispatch*, saw the letter, and the writer, who read the *Times*, did not see it.

Presumably, Dr. Jones did not know of the publication of The Duty Letter in the *New York Sun*, nor of its publication in the *Richmond Whig* and *Sentinel*, and its repudiation in the *Sentinel*. This is to be inferred from the fact that Captain McCabe, who saw the Jones letter, did not know, thereafter, that The Duty Letter had been published in the *Whig* (Letter to the writer, June 1, 1913), and presumably was unaware of the other publications above referred to.

It is inexplicable that after writing such a letter, prior to 1904, Dr. Jones in his second book, published in 1906, should not have referred to it (even in a footnote), but satisfied himself with his former *ipse dixit*, with no further explanation than the conjecture (already quoted) that The Duty Letter is "the product of some ingenious newspaper correspondent, who got at Arlington a number of General Lee's letters; and taking extracts from several manufactured one to his taste"—thus adopting The Compilation Theory.

33. Letter of Rev. E. Pendleton Jones, D. D., to the writer, June 16, 1913.

34. The letters of General Lee to his son, W. H. Fitzhugh Lee, were carefully examined, at my request, by his widow, and by his eldest son, Colonel Robert E. Lee, of Ravensworth.

the word "sublime," or "sublimest," in connection with duty. No living member of the Lee family has any knowledge on the subject.

As the matter is important, and it seems impossible to obtain any further evidence concerning it, I venture to offer a conjecture as to the authority on which Dr. Jones made his statement (repeated in the same words thirty-two years later) that the Duty Sentence "did occur in a letter by General Lee to his son." In both of Dr. Jones' books this statement follows immediately after the equally positive assertion that The Duty Letter is "unquestionably spurious." For neither of these statements is any authority given. This suggests that the authority for both was the same, and that, for some reason, Dr. Jones preferred not to give it, and to let the statements rest on his own *ipse dixit*.

My conjecture (I cannot call it more) is that Dr. Jones' authority was Mrs. Mary Custis Lee, widow of General Lee. Dr. Jones' first book, "Personal Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee," was written soon after General Lee's death; and in the preface he says, "Mrs. Lee did me the kindness to read carefully, and very warmly approve, my manuscript." And on page 287 he gives an instance of Mrs. Lee's comment on what he had written.

Now, I think it almost certain that this manuscript, when submitted to Mrs. Lee, contained The Duty Letter,³⁵ and that it was Mrs. Lee who told Dr. Jones that this letter was "unquestionably spurious." That she was right has been, I think, demonstrated. But Dr. Jones, while accepting her statement as to the spuriousness of the letter as a whole (probably based on the authority of General Lee), lamented, no doubt, the loss of the sentence: "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language." And Mrs. Lee may have consoled him by saying she thought General Lee had written this sentence in another letter to one of his sons. Or she may have said (mistakenly, as I believe), that General Lee did write a letter containing the Duty Sentence "to one of his sons."

35. The Duty Letter, omitting the first four sentences, was printed, accompanied by eulogistic comment, in John Esten Cooke's "Life of General Robert E. Lee," which was published in 1871—the year after General Lee's death.

If Mrs. Lee's conversation, as above supposed, was really the source of Dr. Jones' assertion concerning the Duty Sentence, this would explain the strange indefiniteness of the phrase "to his son"; and the positiveness of his statement, for which he was unwilling to give Mrs. Lee as his authority. But every lawyer knows the danger of such evidence. Dr. Jones may not have remembered Mrs. Lee's precise words. He may not have understood her correctly, and may have taken her words more strongly than she intended. It is not likely that Mrs. Lee would have declared that General Lee *did* write such a sentence, unless she had more definite knowledge than is indicated by the vague description, "to his son."³⁶

XII.

But apart from Dr. Jones' assertion (whatever may have been its authority), the question recurs: May not General Lee have written the Duty Sentence, in some letter, to somebody? Undoubtedly he may have done so; and so may Stonewall Jackson or Jefferson Davis; and so may any other man of high character and devotion to duty. It is, of course, impossible to prove a negative. But it must be remembered that when The Duty

36. It should be borne in mind that the suggestion above that Dr. Jones had, or supposed he had, the authority of Mrs. Lee for his statement, twice repeated, that General Lee did write the Duty Sentence "to his son," is mere surmise, without a particle of evidence to sustain it. This statement of Dr. Jones, in its emphatic form, is the unsolved mystery connected with The Duty Letter.

Dr. Jones was an honest, sincere man (the writer knew him for many years), and he would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. But what was the ground of his belief? It is astonishing, considering the importance attached to the Duty Sentence, that no one ever wrote (so far as I know) to Dr. Jones, demanding that he publish the reasons for his assertion. That he did not give them in his lost letter, proving by exhaustive argument that the remainder of The Duty Letter was spurious, is indicated by the fact that he did not vouchsafe any reasons in his second book (published in 1906, a few years before his death), but contented himself with the former statement—"in a letter to his son."

We have, however, the authority of his son, Rev. Dr. E. Pendleton Jones, for the statement (already quoted): "I know that my father always said that the quotation, 'Duty is the sublimest word in the English language,' was not written in a letter to General Custis Lee, but was written to another son, on another occasion. *I have never been able to find that letter.*" (*Italics mine.*)

Letter is proved a forgery, the Duty Sentence shares its fate, unless it can be found elsewhere in General Lee's writings. But this has not been done. General Lee speaks often of duty, but always in plain, unadorned language. Why suppose that, on this occasion, he changed his style, and employed rhetoric and the superlative? The burden of proof rests heavily on those, who conceding The Duty Letter to be a forgery, would, nevertheless, save the Duty Sentence. Up to the present time, not a scintilla of evidence, if we except Dr. Jones' *ipse dixit*, has been produced even tending to prove that General Lee ever wrote the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language."³⁷

"My father always said." So Dr. Jones did discuss the Duty Sentence with his sons. But why make such a mystery of it? Why not say to what son (General W. H. F. Lee was no doubt meant), instead of "to his son"? And why not tell his own sons where the letter could be found, if he knew; and (if not, on what authority he had asserted its existence? What is the meaning of it all? To the writer it is bewildering. It would seem probable, if Mrs. Lee was the authority, that she requested that her name be not used; and that Dr. Jones kept faith with her to the end.

37. At the conclusion of the discussion of the authenticity of The Duty Letter, inquiry may be made as to the mode in which it has been dealt with by General Lee's biographers. Some of them, notably General Fithugh Lee, in his "General Lee," published in 1894, and Captain Robert E. Lee, in "Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee," published in 1904, have ignored The Duty Letter, not mentioning it, nor giving any reasons for its omission. Why Captain Lee omitted The Duty Letter we now know from his letter to the writer, quoted from on a former page. Presumably, General Fithugh Lee omitted it for the same reason, viz: doubt as to its genuineness.

On the other hand, the only biographer of General Lee who has printed The Duty Letter in full is Edmund Jennings Lee, M. D., in his "Lee of Virginia," published in 1895, a genealogy of the Lee family, with which he was connected. He pronounces The Duty Letter (p. 432) "a grand letter," in blissful ignorance, apparently, that it had been declared by Dr. Jones, as far back as 1874, "unquestionably spurious." Whether he was ignorant of this condemnation, or chose to ignore it because Dr. Jones gave no reasons, we have no means of knowing.

Other biographers of General Lee who have noticed The Duty Letter have merely referred to it, or printed it in part only; and, with the exception of Dr. Bradford and Dr. Thomas Nelson Page, with no intimation that its genuineness had been questioned. Dr. Bradford, in his "Lee the American," published in 1912, follows Dr. Jones, both as to the spuriousness of The Duty Letter as a whole (p. 211) and the genuineness of the Duty Sentence (p. 47). Dr. Page, in his "Robert E. Lee, Man and Soldier," published in 1911, after summarizing the first three sentences of The Duty Letter, printed the remainder in his text, but appended a footnote as follows (p. 35): "It is said that this letter

XIII.

Assuming, as I think we must, that the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," cannot be attributed to General Lee, our regret for its loss may be lessened by two reflections, one that the association of sublimity with duty would not have been original with General Lee, (as certainly it was not original with the fabricator of The Duty Letter); and the other that we have undisputed language of General Lee that more than compensates for the loss of the Duty Sentence. With these two reflections, this paper will be brought to an end.

1. Long before General Lee could have written, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," the German phil-

as a whole, was made up by a clever newspaper man out of parts of different letters by Lee." But Dr. Page does not explain why the authenticity of the letter as a whole is doubtful, nor the reasons why it is said that the letter was "made up of parts of different letters by Lee."

The biographers who print The Duty Letter in part, but with no intimation that it is not genuine, are John Esten Cooke, General A. L. Long, and Rev. Henry A. White, D. D.

In Cooke's "Life of General R. E. Lee," published in 1871 (three years before Dr. Jones' first book), The Duty Letter is published with high praise (p. 38), but omitting, without any indication of the fact, not only the date of the letter, but the first four sentences. Why this was done must be left to conjecture. Probably the letter was taken from the *Whig* or *Sentinel*, and the biographer adopted, seeing the anachronism, The Wrong Date Theory, or The Editorial Emendation Theory, but without taking his readers into his confidence.

General Long, in his "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee," published in 1886, printed The Duty Letter (p. 464) precisely as it is found in John Esten Cooke's biography, which he no doubt followed. He ignores Dr. Jones' condemnation of The Duty Letter as spurious, and says of it that it is "full of aphoristic wisdom, and breathes a high sense of duty and honor."

Dr. White, in his "Robert E. Lee and the Southern Confederacy," published in 1898, quotes extracts from The Duty Letter, omitting the date and the first four sentences. He also omits the address to "G. W. Custis Lee." His introduction to the extracts is as follows (p. 49): "Lee's character breathes in the following injunctions to his son, written about the time that the father began service with the Second Cavalry." This indicates that Dr. White adopted The Erroneous Date Theory, and possibly the theory that the letter was written to General W. H. F. Lee; but like John Esten Cooke, he does not take his readers into his confidence.

It must be remembered that the biographers of General Lee did not have all the facts which are disclosed in this paper. It is not surprising that students of the life of General Lee have refused to take as final Dr. Jones' condemnation, without reasons, of The Duty Letter, and have clung to it, and to the Duty Sentence.

osopher, Lavater, had said:³⁸ "He who can at all times sacrifice pleasure to duty, approaches sublimity." And nearly a century ago, the English essayist, De Quincey, had written: "It is an impressive truth that sometimes, in the very lowest forms of duty, less than which would mark a man as a villain, there is, nevertheless, the sublimest ascent of self-sacrifice."

2. And now what words of General Lee can compensate us for the loss of the cherished sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language"?

Soon after General Lee's death there was found in his army satchel, which had not been opened since the war, a sheet of paper on which he had written these noble words, which fall on the ear with the solemn tones, and majestic roll, of some great cathedral organ:

"There is a true glory, and a true honor; the glory of duty done, the honor of integrity of principle."

These words were written during that dreadful winter in the trenches at Petersburg, when Lee, like a wounded lion at bay, confronted Grant for the last time. He must have seen the shadow of the black pall of Appomattox already creeping over the doomed Confederacy; and he must have felt that soon he would be called on, in his own person, to exemplify the truth of his words: "Human virtue should be equal to human calamity."

In this hour of failure, in this wreck of a nation's hopes, General Lee asked himself what would be the verdict of history on the Lost Cause; and on those who loved it, and fought for it to the bitter end. And he found comfort and courage in the words which have been quoted, which are worthy to be inscribed on his monument, and to the world's epitaph on the Southern Confederacy, and on its heroic defenders. And these words of General Lee come as his benison to all who nobly strive for the right as they see it, whether in peace or in war, whether in victory or in defeat:

"THERE IS A TRUE GLORY AND A TRUE HONOR; THE GLORY OF DUTY DONE, THE HONOR OF INTEGRITY OF PRINCIPLE."

38. Aphorisms on Man (ed. 1793) by Johann Caspar Lavater.

EDITOR'S NOTE.

THE FORGED "DUTY LETTER" OF GENERAL LEE.

Professor Charles A. Graves, at the meeting above mentioned [Virginia State Bar Association, held at the White Sulphur Springs on August 4-6, 1915], "clinched the nail" which had been securely driven by his admirable article on the forged letter of General Lee, in which occurred the sentence, "Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language," delivered at the 1914 meeting of the Association. The Association gladly gave him permission to print as a part of the proceedings of the 1915 meeting additional evidence establishing the forgery. This evidence consisted of a letter from Rev. J. William Jones, D. D., to the *University Monthly*, New York, of March, 1872, showing that the internal evidence of the letter itself proved it to be a forgery and that the entire Lee family so regarded it. In addition to this a trenchant editorial from the *Richmond Examiner* of December 17, 1864—worthy of the pen of the great John M. Daniel, though probably written by John Mitchel—showed up the inconsistencies of the author of this spurious epistle and how unworthy its "schoolmaster platitudes" were of our great Commander.

Why such a letter was ever forged is one of the mysteries of the case. And yet to us it seems that the "milk in the cocoanut" is to be easily found in the fact that the letter concludes with a high encomium upon the character of the "Old Puritan." To have this come from General Lee in the dark days of the war—to forge a tribute from this prince of Cavaliers to the dour Puritan, when Cavalier and Puritan were struggling upon the field of battle—this was the sole object, in our opinion, of the forger. His effort succeeded for awhile, but Professor Graves has thoroughly and completely made out his case, and this letter goes down to future generations with "forgery" stamped upon it as plainly as the word used to be burnt into the very fibre of forged bank notes.

(From The Richmond *Examiner*, Saturday Morning,
December 17, 1864.)

A forged letter, signed "R. E. Lee," and purporting to have been written to G. W. Custis Lee on 5th April, 1852, is published in newspapers all over the North. That is nothing: but when the production is reprinted in Richmond papers, with a certain awful reverence, and the sons of Confederate fathers are solemnly conjured to take to heart the Yankee scribbler's trash as addressed to each of them individually by his own father, the thing becomes too stupid. It is enough for General Lee to be a great Captain; there is no need to present him also as the model father, the great common parent of us all, upon the credit of a Philadelphia journalist's dull forgery to fill up a corner of his paper.

Forgery, indeed, has become one large branch of industry with our Northern brethren; it has risen almost to the dignity of a fine art; but, like the other arts and sciences, is only regarded and employed by that accomplished people with a view to making it pay. By each performance of this kind there is always something to be gained; and they never practice as amateurs. If they produce, for example, an official letter from our Secretary of the Navy, it is to impose on a court of justice in England, and procure a judgment against Confederate rams. If they invent a correspondence between French shipbuilders and Confederate agents, it is to stimulate the French Government to interfere with our cruisers. If they forge letters said to have been taken from our dead soldiers on the field, expressing their private opinion that "the Confederacy has about gone up," it is to inspire their own people with more implicit confidence in the Government. When they turn out a letter from General Lee, it is first to give a special interest to that newspaper which has had the good fortune to get hold of an original letter of the Confederate General, "found at Arlington House"; and second, to show that this great and wise Virginian, when he would set before his son an exemplar of virtue and "heavenly wisdom," had to go for this exemplar to Connecticut, of all places in the world!

The poor wretch who forged the epistle in question had never so much as seen a letter of General Lee; or he would have known that the proprietor of Arlington never dated from "Arlington House." The scribbler also was quite unacquainted with the life and actions of the man he presumed to counterfeit: he makes him talk in 1852, of "my fine old regiment," whereas he had no regiment whatsoever, young or old; and it further happens that in April, 1852, he was not at Arlington at all.

It would not be worth while to brand this absurd forgery so as to discredit it in the eyes of the Yankee nation (who are welcome to believe what they choose) if there were not people in this country dull enough to believe it, and disseminate it, and congratulate General Lee and his son, and all other men's sons, on the happy revelation of so precious a monument of wisdom. There may be persons who opine—for there is no disputing about tastes—that the choicest topics for a parent's letter to his son are scraps from "Poor Richard"; or who hold that the most sublime of all human compositions are those sentences which school-masters have written for ages in their pupil's copy-books: "Frankness is the child of honesty and courage"; "You will wrong yourself by equivocation of any kind"; "Do not appear to others what you are not"; "Deal kindly, but firmly, with your classmates"; especially that admirable "Poor Richard" maxim—"Never do a wrong thing to make a friend; the man who requires you to do so is dearly purchased at a sacrifice"; such is the entire staple web and woof of General Lee's pretended letter; and indeed it is singular that the writer could leave off without adding, "Never pay too dear for your whistle"—"Never send a boy to mill; nor bolt the door with a boiled carrot." The main point of the production, however, at which the psuedo-father was in a hurry to arrive, was the story of the admirable "old Puritan Legislator" of Connecticut, who, when the day of judgment arrived, and the Legislature of that intelligent community was about to adjourn in honor of the event, moved, on the contrary, to order candles, so that the Judge might find them at their duty. That is the crown and climax of "heavenly wisdom"; there is the example which all fathers

should exhort their sons to follow when another day of judgment comes round! "Do you duty, like the old Puritan," exclaims the pseudo-parent in closing his letter, "You cannot do more."

The real General Lee, no doubt, is too busy to trouble himself with such silly inventions, and has no time to contradict them; but this is not the first pretended letter "picked up at Arlington House"; it may not be the last; and Virginian newspapers ought to be careful of his fame, even in the smallest matters, and not suffer a Yankee's parts of speech to be fathered upon him.

(The Richmond *Times*, Wednesday, December 19, 1900, p. 8.)

THE LETTER SPURIOUS.

DR. J. WILLIAM JONES MAKES OUT A GOOD CASE FOR HIS SIDE.

Editor of The Times:

SIR,—I see that you have recently reproduced a letter which went the rounds of the papers during the "War between the States," and has been published in several books, purporting to be from Colonel R. E. Lee at Arlington, to his son Custis, at West Point.

I published in the *University Monthly*, New York, in March, 1872, the following article which, I think, shows conclusively that the letter is spurious:

GENERAL LEE'S LETTER TO HIS SON.

"The famous letter purporting to be from General Lee, at Arlington, to his son Custis, at West Point, is unmistakably spurious. This letter, which is published in the November number of the *University Monthly*, has long passed current as giving the key-note of the life of the great chieftain.

"It has been very extensively copied, and appears in a number of books about the war. It seems a pity to spoil all that

has been written about it; and yet we have the highest authority for saying that General Lee never wrote, and his son never received, any such letter.

"Its history is simply this: In the early days of the war it was published in the Northern papers purporting to be a letter found by a Federal soldier at Arlington.

"Being republished in the South, it attracted the attention of the Lee family, and the General stated that he 'did not remember writing it, and did not think that he did' (a very strong denial for him), while his son (General Custis Lee) was confident that he 'had never received it.' Upon these statements, the Richmond *Examiner* denied its authenticity, and criticised, with some severity, its style.

"But the letter itself bears internal evidence of being spurious. It is headed 'Arlington House', whereas General Lee and his family were always careful to write simply 'Arlington,' to distinguish their beautiful home from 'Arlington House.'

"It is dated 'April 5th, 1852.' Now at this date, General Lee was not at Arlington, but was at West Point in the discharge of his duties as Superintendent of the Military Academy, where he could have seen his son, and have given him proper advice, without the necessity of writing.

"The letter makes General Lee say: 'I am just in the act of leaving home for New Mexico. My fine old regiment has been ordered to that remote region, and I must hasten to see that the men are properly taken care of,' when he really did not leave West Point until 1855—three years after the date of this letter. The regiment—the famous Second Cavalry—was not organized until 1855, and while he might well call a corps 'fine' which numbered among its officers such men as Albert Sydney Johnston, R. E. Lee, Wm. J. Hardee, Earl Van Dorn, Kirby Smith, Hood, Field, Cosby, Major Fitz. Lee, Geo. H. Thomas, Johnson, Palmer, and Stoneman, he would hardly have spoken of it as 'old several years after—certainly not three years before—its organization'.

"Besides, there are other parts of the letter—especially the story of the old Puritan legislator, which are not written at all

in General Lee's style, and which we might conclude, a priori, he did not write.

"The Lee family are so entirely persuaded that the letter is spurious, that Mrs. Lee made special request that it should not go into the forthcoming 'Lee Memorial'—saying that she wanted nothing in that volume which is not 'strictly authentic'.

"But the expression, 'Duty is the sublimest word in our language' did occur in a letter (at a different date) from General Lee to his son, and other sentences of this letter were probably used by him at different times.

"The true origin of the letter then, seems to be that some ingenious correspondent took a number of General Lee's letters to his son (found at Arlington) and manufactured this one, which has been so successfully palmed off on the public.

"But although he did not write this, General Lee did write letters as noble in sentiment, and even more felicitous in expression. Indeed, he was a model letter writer.

"We have had the privilege of looking over some loose sheets found after his death, in General Lee's army-satchel, along with his parole and other papers—with which he had evidently amused a leisure hour in camp.

"There were quotations from the Psalms, and from select authors, with comments of his own, and some fine specimens of his chaste, simple style. On one sheet was written, in his well-known, characteristic chirography, the following, which we deem well worthy of a place in the columns of the *University Monthly*: 'The warmest instincts of every man's soul declare the glory of the soldier's death. It is more appropriate to the Christian than to the Greek to sing:

Glorious his fate and envied his lot,
Who for his country fights and for it dies.
There is a true glory and a true honor.
The glory of duty done; the honor of integrity of principle.'

"And certain in his own pure life he beautifully exemplified this noble sentiment, and has left an example of devotion

to duty which cannot be too frequently held up for the study and imitation of the youth of the country."

This may be a matter of small moment, but I am sure that *The Times* desires to be entirely accurate, especially in all historical matters. I remember that Mrs. Mary Custis Lee, who did me the kindness to read the MS. of my "Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of R. E. Lee," and gave me very valuable material, and practical suggestions concerning it, said in a reference to this letter, which I had put in my original MS: "It is a very good letter, and we have not thought it worth while to publicly deny its authenticity, but General Lee did not write it, and I want nothing to go into your book which is not perfectly authentic."

In the same spirit, I take the liberty of sending *The Times* this communication.

J. WM. JONES.

Chapel Hill, N. C., December 12, 1900.

STONEWALL JACKSON.

Address of William A. Anderson Upon the Laying of the Corner-Stone of the Equestrian Statue of Stonewall Jackson in Richmond, Virginia, on June 3, 1915, at the Request of the Stonewall Jackson Monument Association.

I desire, in simple language, to speak briefly of the great and good man whom the statue to be erected here is to commemorate.

Simplicity of speech becomes any remarks about one whose simplicity of character was so marked a feature of his greatness.

Nor will, nor need the truth be colored in his eulogy.

Extravagance of statement would rather detract from than add to his moral and intellectual stature.

There have been many delineations of the character of Stonewall Jackson—some true to nature and to the facts, some so exaggerated in one direction as to be fanciful, and some so distorted in another direction as to make him appear grotesque.

To those who knew him best in peace, to his family, his pastor, his servants, his friends, and the poor; to those who knew him best in war, the members of his staff, the officers who served under or with him, and were thrown intimately with him, in camp, on the march, and upon the field of battle; to the soldiers of his brigade, division, and army, who, through two years of tremendous effort and glorious achievement, bivouacked,

NOTE.—The maker of this address lived in the town of Lexington as a college student for three sessions before the Confederate War, and knew there, then, some of Major Jackson's most intimate friends and acquaintances; saw him hundreds of times during that period, and knew him personally as a youth of from 15 to 18 would know a man of from 34 to 37; served under General Jackson as a soldier in Company I, 4th Va. Infantry (Stonewall Brigade), until the battle of Manassas, in which Mr. Anderson received a wound which disabled him for life; has known

marched, and fought under his command; to the faultless chieftain to whose exalted character, transcendent abilities, and well-nigh unerring judgment he yielded the utmost devotion of his great soul, Robert E. Lee, who returned that affection and confidence in unstinted measure; to none of these was Stonewall Jackson ever grotesque.

Whatever his peculiarities, and he had some which were marked, they were no more than idiosyncrasies which are sometimes the companions of genius and of great natures, and no more impaired the dignity and true greatness of the man than does the foam upon the limpid waters of the rapidly moving river lessen its usefulness or its loveliness as it flows in matchless beauty to the sea.

We learn from his biographers that from his childhood and on through his boyhood and youth he exhibited those qualities of courage, indomitable strength of will, self-respecting decision of character, truthfulness, frankness, unfaltering faith, and a high sense of honor, which characterized his conduct throughout his adult life, and were afterwards illustrated upon fields of action which his genius has made immortal.

From his very boyhood his life was dominated by a sense of duty to others and duty to himself. From those early years he was animated by a supreme purpose "to make himself the very greatest of which he was capable," and he placed no very circumscribed limits upon those capabilities.

Some notion of his extraordinary self-discipline and of the ideals which then actuated him is afforded by the admirable code of maxims and rules of conduct which, while a cadet at West Point, he compiled for his own guidance.

Of these maxims the following was conspicuous and most characteristic:

more or less intimately a large number of soldiers and officers who served under General Jackson in 1861, 1862, and 1863; has lived in Lexington most of the time since 1866; and has learned from personal acquaintance and observation and from soldiers and citizens, residing in Lexington and elsewhere, the facts as to the characteristics of this extraordinary man, and as to the estimate in which he was held by his neighbors, friends, comrades in arms, and the soldiers whom he commanded.

"You may be whatever you resolve to be."

In harmony with this maxim he, after his success at West Point had been assured, wrote to a friend that *"one could always do what he willed to accomplish."*

He was as remarkable as a boy as he was as a youth and as a man.

Although, while an infant, deprived of the loving care and protection of both of his parents, and left penniless and dependent upon the generosity of relatives upon whom he had no special claim and upon his own efforts and resources, he ever rose superior to the conditions of adverse fortune, and, with an amazing confidence, encountered and surmounted obstacles at which a less courageous nature would have been appalled.

The brave struggle which he made to master the course of study and training at West Point, for the acquisition of which he was exceedingly poorly prepared, the distinguished success which by dint of hard, persistent, and unremitting effort, and conscientious attention to duty he achieved there, all of this valuable training and discipline and attainment were not only evidence of the superior moral and intellectual character of the man, but served to develop and strengthen those traits and qualities which constitute the elements of true greatness.

As has been repeatedly said of him: "The boy was father to the man"; and so those who knew his previous history must have been in some measure prepared for the distinguished career of the young officer in the Mexican War and the recognition which was accorded by his commanding officers to his conspicuous courage, skill, and meritorious conduct in that service; so that, entering the United States Army at the beginning of General Scott's marvelous Mexican campaign as a second lieutenant, he had been raised by three successive promotions to major by brevet.

HE ROSE RAPIDLY TO FAME

Indeed, as has been recorded of him:

"No other officer in the whole army in Mexico was promoted so often for meritorious conduct or made so great a stride in rank." (Dabney's Life of Stonewall Jackson, page 51.)

His courage, capacity, and valuable and efficient services in that war were repeatedly and conspicuously commended in the reports of his superior officers, as, for instance, by Captain (afterwards Major-General) J. B. Magruder in his report upon the battle of Chapultepec, in which he refers to young Jackson in the following terms:

"If devotion, industry, talent, and gallantry are the highest qualities of a soldier, then he is entitled to the distinction which their possession confers."

Such was the distinction which Jackson had attained when he came to Lexington to serve as a professor in the Virginia Military Institute.

The principal facts as to his career as a cadet and as an officer in the army were well known to the superintendent and officers and members of the Board of Visitors of the Institute, to members of the corps of cadets, and to the people of Lexington generally, of which community he was a citizen and resident during most of the decade preceding the War between the States.

The manly form, soldierly bearing, earnest but kindly countenance, and gentle manners of this modest and dutiful citizen were familiar to the people of that community as he daily walked about their streets or to and from the Virginia Military Institute from and to his home in the town.

Though he did not possess the graces of a Bayard or a Sidney, he was by no means ungainly or unattractive in his appearance, his bearing, or his address.

On the contrary, his was the presence, the manner, and the countenance to inspire confidence and command esteem.

It is true that he was not a graceful horseback rider, but

there was hardly a better rider in the army, as any who saw the security with which he sat his horse when rapidly riding along the cheering ranks of its soldiers, or when hasting to reach some important engagement or point of observation, will attest.

It was impossible to see him as he daily went about his duties without being impressed with the fact that his was no ordinary personality and he no ordinary man.

There was something in his expression of countenance, and his mien, which indicated that behind that plain and kindly exterior there was a tremendous reserve force.

Though few, if any, then dreamed that he possessed the quickness and grasp of intellect, the supreme capacity for leadership, and the genius for war which he afterwards exhibited, there were those who knew him well who placed a very high estimate upon his capacity and who believed that if he ever was given opportunity to serve his country in war his career would be illustrious.

He was, in those piping times of peace, recognized at Lexington as, and was sometimes characterized as being, "a born soldier." The time came in a few years when he was considered by his old friends and neighbors in that community, as he was afterwards aptly designated by his Scotch admirers across the sea, "a heavenborn soldier."

As indicating the estimation in which Jackson's capacity and abilities as a soldier and a commander in war was held, in 1861, by those who knew him, it is only needed to recall that when Governor Letcher, who was a citizen of Lexington and knew Jackson well, came to select an officer to command the post of Harper's Ferry, then regarded as second in importance to none in the then theater of war, he selected Major Jackson for that responsible command in preference to several officers of higher rank in the military service of the State, including one or more major-generals and brigadier-generals.

In fact, there was already a major-general and at least one brigadier at Harper's Ferry when, in May, 1861, Major, or, as was his advanced rank by cotemporaneous promotion, Colonel, T. J. Jackson, was, on the nomination of Virginia's great War

Governor, with the approval of his advisory Council and upon the confirmation of the sovereign convention of the Commonwealth, placed in supreme command of the largest army, which had at that time been marshaled in the State at the most important post upon her military frontier.

It is a farther significant fact that the Council upon whose advice Major Jackson was chosen for this responsible position consisted of General Francis H. Smith, the Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute; Commodore Matthew F. Maury, John J. Allen, the presiding Justice of Virginia's highest Court; and Lieutenant-Governor Robert L. Montague.

General Smith was, of course, intimately acquainted with Major Jackson's character, talents, and record, as was also Judge Allen, who was for many years a citizen, resident, and distinguished representative of Clarksburg and of Harrison County, in Northwestern Virginia, the home county of Stonewall Jackson and his family.

While Jackson's career, character, and talents were well known to a great number of people in and out of Virginia in 1861, there were doubtless many intelligent people, citizens of the State, who knew little or nothing of his merits, for it is narrated that when his nomination as colonel in command of the army and the post at Harper's Ferry came up in the Convention for confirmation, some member inquired:

"Who is this Major Jackson to whom it is proposed to commit this responsible post?"

To which inquiry Samuel McDowell Moore, a distinguished delegate to the Convention from Rockbridge, who was a neighbor of Major Jackson and knew him well, made this now historic reply:

"I will tell you who Major Jackson is. He is a man who, if you order him to hold a post, will never leave it alive, to be occupied by the enemy."

And Jackson's appointment was instantly confirmed.

And now the civilized world knows what manner of man Major Jackson was, for within two years he wrote his name across the heavens.

JACKSON'S PLACE IN HISTORY

While Jackson was startling the world by his victories, and still more since death untimely closed his great career, the question has been raised as to what is and what will be his place in history. Eminent soldiers, students, and some of them makers of history, have given this inquiry careful consideration, and have assigned to Jackson very high rank among the great captains of the world. Colonel Henderson, the accomplished English soldier, the author of that admirable "Life of Jackson" which is used as a text-book in some of the foremost military schools of the world, one of the most intelligent and competent of military critics, gives his answer to this question in the following language, which is so just and so true that we may safely adopt it as our own:

"So far as his opportunities had permitted, he had shown himself in no way inferior to the greatest generals of the century—Wellington, Napoleon, and Lee. That Jackson was equal to the highest demands of strategy his deeds and conceptions show; that he was equal to the task of handling a large army on the field of battle must be left to conjecture; but throughout the whole of his soldier's life he was never entrusted with any detached mission which he failed to execute with complete success.

"No general made fewer mistakes. No general so persistently outwitted his opponents. No general better understood the use of ground or the value of time. No general was more highly endowed with courage, both physical and moral, and none ever secured to a greater degree the trust and affection of his troops."

And then this impartial and accurate historian crowns his just tribute to Jackson as a military chieftain with the following splendid eulogy upon him as a man :

“And yet, so upright was his life, so profound his faith, so exquisite his tenderness, that Jackson’s many victories are almost his least claim to be ranked among the world’s true heroes.”

An affirmative answer to any question as to Jackson’s supreme ability as a commander of armies must be deduced from the tremendous facts thus forcibly grouped by Colonel Henderson.

A similar conclusion would be inferred from a significant statement made by another distinguished and impartial military critic, Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor, who, in a paper upon “Stonewall Jackson and the Valley Campaign of 1862” published in the *North American Review* in 1878, says :

“What limit to set to his ability I know not, for he was ever superior to occasion.”

Again and again in his military career, notably in his Valley Campaign, in the campaign and battles of Second Manassas, in the campaign and battle of Sharpsburg, and in the campaign and battle of Chancellorsville, he exhibited a personal and physical prowess which was never surpassed by any of the great captains and born leaders of men in all the campaigns and battles of history. Not by Napoleon, nor Cromwell, nor Gustavus Adolphus, nor yet by Caesar, nor indeed by Hannibal, nor even by Alexander, the Great Macedonian, whose physical and personal prowess, surpassing the courage of ordinary mortals, have been the marvel of mankind through more than twenty-two centuries.

It is difficult to compare Jackson with the other great captains of history, for he was so different from most of them. The equal of any in moral and physical courage, he was vastly su-

perior to some in his exalted moral and Christian character and in the pure ideals which dominated his life.

With him, as a very part of his being, was his trust in God; his religion, which was not only a principle, but an essential principle of his nature.

Faith in the unseen and eternal was far more potential with him than his faith in anything visible or temporal.

His religion was the greatest thing in the universe to him, as it was the most powerful influence in his life.

It is doubtful whether a more sincerely devout man ever lived.

And yet in all of his religion there was nothing of cant, nor sanctimoniousness, nor gloom, nothing of bigotry or acerbity, but the utmost charity and deference for the faiths and convictions of others.

His goodness and greatness need not be gauged by the qualities or measures of other men to demonstrate his merit.

Where he differs from the great commanders of other ages it is generally in particulars in which he is superior to them.

At all events, we are content with him as he is, and would not, if we could, exchange him for any who have been mentioned in comparison with him.

There is a name which we may mention lovingly along with his, but not in contrast—the name of that majestic leader and born king of men, Robert E. Lee, to whom Stonewall Jackson cheerfully yielded the precedence.

United as they were in their lives, diverse as they were in their transcendent genius, kindred as they were in the unselfishness of their ambition, the nobility of their ideals, the righteousness of their conduct, the purity of their motives, and the greatness of their souls, each the complement and the supplement of the other, and each generously recognizing the abilities and the merits of the other, we, their followers, can make no comparison of their goodness and greatness.

We can only yield to each the sincere homage of our admiration and affection.

If we are asked: "What was the secret of Jackson's hold upon and command over the affections and cheerful obedience of his soldiers?" the answer, which will be confirmed by any who served under him and knew him well in war, is, that he won the confidence and love of his soldiers by his intelligent attention to providing for the wants, and, as far as consistent with the arduous service which he exacted of them, for the comfort and welfare of his soldiers; by his sharing with them any hardships which he called upon them to endure; by the sleepless, tireless, and sometimes fierce and inexorable energy with which he conducted the movements which he directed against the enemy, and by the skilful and brilliant strategy with which he outgeneraled his opponents and surprised both friend and foe. A very brief service under him convinced his soldiers that "Old Jack knew what he was about" and was a consummate Master of the Art of War.

But it was upon the field of battle that he made the deepest impression upon his men. There was then that in his presence, his personality, and his bearing, a lighting up of his countenance with a glorious enthusiasm that seemed to almost transfigure his usually placid features, which inspired his soldiers with something of his own heroic and indomitable purpose to triumph. He then seemed to be the very incarnation of righteous and glorious war.

It was, in no small measure, the inspiration of his potential personality which impelled the brigade which was honored by his leadership and affections to deeds of valor which have enshrined its name in history with that of its immortal commander, and given the "Stonewall Brigade" some right to live through coming ages along with the Macedonian Phalanx of Alexander, the Tenth Legion of Caesar, the Paladins of Charlemagne, the Ironsides of Cromwell, and the Old Guard of Napoleon.

No one can carefully study the story of Jackson's life, as sweetly told by his devoted wife, or by his friend and comrade in arms, Rev. Doctor and Major R. L. Dabney, or as graph-

ically and more fully narrated by Colonel Henderson, his greatest biographer, without being impressed with two facts in reference to his mental characteristics:

First, that his intellectual development and growth were steady, gradual, and persistent from his youth onwards, and were very marked during the last years of his life, and particularly after he entered upon his service in the War between the States. Both the extent and the ratio of his mental growth were apparently greatly accelerated during those two years of incessant occupation and great responsibility.

Like Cromwell, and other men whose marvelous abilities have been first shown after they had reached the prime of manhood, Jackson seems, until the occasion for their exhibition arose, slow in manifesting some of the extraordinary talents with which he was endowed, chiefly, doubtless, because the occasion for their display had not sooner arisen. One thing is certain, namely, that in the last two crowded years of his life he manifested a wonderful vigor, capacity, and quickness of intellect, of the existence of which few, if any, of his acquaintances had any conception before his entrance upon that war. With some, the circumstance that some of these powers were not exhibited by him in equal measure during his previous career has been taken as evidence that they never existed. But the proof that he was, in 1861, 1862, and 1863, a man of extraordinary ability and of unquestioned genius are overwhelming.

Second: Another well-authenticated fact in reference to his mental phenomena, is, that his mind acted with greatly increased rapidity, activity, and power upon the battlefield. When confronted with great danger and charged with the great responsibility of directing the movements of troops under fire, he seemed to be given an almost supernal ken; his mind, under the stimulus of the excitement and peril of the conflict, apparently acted with calmness and coolness, and yet with the celerity of lightning and the certainty and precision of a rifle ball driven straight to its mark.

It was not so much that his warrior spirit, his *gaudium certaminis*, under such conditions transformed the ordinarily

staid and quiet gentleman into the very soul incarnate of war, as that the incentives and stimulus of such a martial occasion aroused his faculties and intensified and developed talents and aptitudes which were already existent but somewhat dormant in his nature.

These powers of observation, of reasoning from known facts, quickly comprehending a situation and promptly deciding upon a course of conduct, were notably developed in Jackson by every occasion for their exercise; and as the war advanced his mentality and his capacity for efficient service were steadily strengthened and increased, so that he was a stronger and a more capable man in May, 1863, than he could have been in May, 1862, or in 1861.

Accordingly, it is probably true that some of the inadequate estimates which have been placed upon Jackson's mental capacity have been based upon a misconception or a too superficial study of the facts as to his intellectual traits and attainments.

Although Jackson's life was ended before he knew whether the cause for which he fought would be crowned with success or be overwhelmed in disaster and defeat, and before he had reached the zenith of his powers, that life was by no means a failure.

No, it was, beyond the capacity of human language to define, a glorious success.

Rising, as he did, superior to circumstance and to temporary conditions, his life has been a priceless heritage to his countrymen and to mankind.

The example which he gave the world of self-sacrificing devotion to principle and to country, of loyal obedience to duty, and unquestioning faith in God, the unsurpassed manifestations of courage which he exhibited, and the radiance with which his genius illumined the fields of his triumphs, compel the admiration alike of friend and foe, and constitute a part of the patrimony of glory, not of Virginia and the Confederate South alone, but of the American people and the human race.

These are the unspoken lessons of his life; but there comes

to us from the grave that solemn injunction expressed by him in those words, which must go ringing down the centuries, and, I trust, be remembered by his countrymen whenever there may be the temptation to sacrifice honor to ease, or liberty to safety:

“What is life without honor?

“Degradation is worse than death.

“We must think of the living and of those who are to come after us, and see that by God’s blessing we transmit to them the freedom we have ourselves inherited.”

And so, in the coming generations and ages, may the statue of our beloved commander, which shall be erected here, be a perpetual reminder of the precious lessons of his life; and may Virginians be ever so obedient to the heavenly vision that in time of stress and trial, when the well being, the virtue, and the liberties of their country shall be imperilled, some future heroic soldier of righteousness will point his countrymen to the figure of Jackson, as it will forever stand out from the pages of history, and again utter that now immortal rallying cry:

“Look! there stands Jackson like a stone wall!

“Rally behind the Virginians!”

STONEWALL JACKSON IN CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

By the Late Colonel A. R. BOTELER.

It will be remembered by those who are familiar with the history of military operations in the Valley of Virginia during the late Civil War that the Battle of Winchester, which was so successfully fought by Stonewall Jackson, on Sunday, the 25th of May, 1862, not only forced the Federal general, Banks, to seek safety for himself and followers beyond the Potomac and, in his precipitate flight, to abandon an immense amount of valuable stores of every description, but that it, likewise, caused such uneasiness among the authorities at Washington as to lead them to countermand their orders to McDowell, who at that time had an army of 40,000 men at Fredericksburg, with which to reinforce McClellan in front of Richmond, but, who, instead of doing that, was required to detach a portion of his command to the defense of the Federal capital, and with another part of it, consisting of 20,000 men, to march across the Blue Ridge to Front Royal for the purpose of intercepting the victorious Confederates. So that Jackson, by one and the same blow, effectually disposed of the force under Banks, furnished his own command with a superabundance of much-needed supplies, practically neutralized the fine army of McDowell and indefinitely postponed the plans of McClellan for the reduction of Richmond. But in securing these advantages, while he had diminished the dangers that threatened the Confederate capital, he had at the same time increased the perils of his own position, for the Federal government, as already intimated, being thoroughly frightened by his successes and supposing that his purpose was to advance on Washington, promptly put in motion all the available means in its power to check his progress and, if possible, to "crush or capture" his command. Two armies were, therefore, hastened forward from different directions to intercept him, and two

others, within striking distance, were preparing to co-operate with them, so that he was menaced on every side by bodies of troops, the aggregate of whose effective force was more than three times greater than his own, and was, besides, encumbered with 3,000 prisoners and the vast accumulation of captured stores, which were then in Winchester. But, notwithstanding these embarrassing circumstances, he calmly pursued the even tenor of his way, and with characteristic pertinacity continued to carry out his original plan of keeping the Federal government in a state of anxious apprehension for the safety of its capital.

Consequently, after having allowed his little army two days' rest, he moved forward from Winchester on Wednesday, May 28th, by way of Summit Point to Charlestown, in the adjoining county of Jefferson, near which place some of the scattered fragments of Bank's army, reinforced with fresh troops from Harper's Ferry, had taken position, who, however, were speedily dislodged and put to flight by the "Stonewall Brigade," under Winder, which was in advance, and which next day pushed on to Halltown, a small hamlet, three miles west of Harper's Ferry, the rest of the Confederate forces following leisurely in the same direction. So that on May 30th the most of Jackson's troops were at Halltown, twenty-eight miles beyond Winchester, while the Second Virginia Regiment had been sent across the Shenandoah to occupy Loudoun Heights, on the Virginia side of the Potomac, east of Harper's Ferry.

With this preliminary explanation it will be seen what was the state of affairs with Jackson on Friday, the fifth day after the battle of Winchester, and to one unacquainted with the genius of the man and with his purpose on this particular occasion, it would appear that he had wasted much precious time in securing the fruits of his victory, and had, likewise, by his last movements, placed himself no less needlessly than recklessly in a position from which it would be almost impossible for him to extricate himself. But the objects he had in view were too important to be neglected, notwithstanding the risks he encountered in their accomplishment, and being fully aware of the increasing dangers that surrounded him, he not only resolved, but

felt himself to be competent to cope with and overcome them, as I shall now proceed to relate.

JACKSON'S PLANS.

Early in the afternoon of the Friday above mentioned, May 30th, the general and his staff—of which I was then a member—were on a hill near Halltown, to the right of the turnpike, where one of our batteries was engaged in an artillery duel with some heavy guns of the enemy that were posted on an eminence in the direction of Bolivar Heights. After noting for some time the effects of the firing he dismounted from the old sorrel—his favorite war horse—and seating himself on the ground at the foot of a large tree, immediately in rear of the battery, he presently assumed a more recumbent attitude and went to sleep.

As he laid there on his back with his arms folded over his breast, his feet crossed like those of a crusader's effigy and his head turned aside sufficiently to show his face in profile, I could not resist the temptation to make a sketch of him and was busily engaged with my pencil when, on looking up, I met his eyes fixed full upon me. Extending his hand for the drawing, he said with a smile: "Let me see what you have been doing there," and on my handing him the sketch he remarked: "My hardest tasks at West Point were the drawing lessons, and I never could do anything in that line to satisfy myself," "or, indeed," he added, laughingly, "anybody else."

"But, colonel," he continued, after a pause, "I have some harder work than this for you to do, and if you'll sit down here, now, I'll tell you what it is."

HIS KNOWLEDGE OF McDOWELL.

On placing myself by his side, he said: "I want you to go to Richmond for me. I must have reinforcements. You can explain to them down there what the situation is here. Get as many men as can be spared, and I'd like you, if you please, to go as soon as you can." After expressing to him my readiness to go at once and to do what I could to have his force increased.

I said: "But you must first tell me, general, what is the situation here." Whereupon he informed me of McDowell's movement, how he was transferring a large portion of his army from Fredericksburg to the Valley, by way of Manassas Gap, to cut him off; how Fremont, with 15,000 men, was marching from the direction of Romney to effect a junction with McDowell; how Banks had some 4,000 or 5,000 at Willamsport ready to recross the river, and how Saxton had 7,000 more at Harper's Ferry, who were being reinforced by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and were prepared to co-operate with the rest of the Federal forces who were closing in around him.

"McDowell and Fremont," said he, "are probably aiming to effect a junction at Strasburg, so as to head us off from the upper valley, and are both nearer to it now than we are; consequently, no time is to be lost. You can say to them in Richmond that I'll send on the prisoners, secure most, if not all of the captured property, and with God's blessing will be able to baffle the enemy's plans here with my present force, but that it will have to be increased as soon thereafter as possible. You may tell them, too, that if my command can be gotten up to 40,000 men a movement may be made beyond the Potomac, which will soon raise the siege of Richmond and transfer this campaign from the banks of the James to those of the Susquehanna."

AFTER REINFORCEMENTS.

He then told me to go Charlestown, where I would find a railroad train ready at the station, with the engine fired up; to detach all the cars but one; to take that and proceed without delay to Winchester, where his quartermaster, Major Harmon, would furnish me with transportation to Staunton, and that I could leave my horse in charge of the assistant quartermaster at Charlestown, to be sent with the troops that evening. Thus instructed, I stood not on the order of my going, but went at once; and, although I rode rapidly, I had hardly reached the railroad station at Charlestown before Jackson himself came galloping up with his assistant adjutant, the gallant and accomplished "Sandy" Pendleton, who was subsequently killed in bat-

tle at Fisher's Hill; the general having suddenly come to the conclusion after I had left him at Halltown to go by rail to Winchester in advance of his army, which, meanwhile, having been ordered back, was making one of those wonderful marches through the mud and rain that had already won for it the sobriquet of "Jackson's foot cavalry." As soon as we took our places in the car, putting his arm on the back of the seat before him as a rest for his head, he fell into a sleep which lasted all the way to Winchester with but one interruption—that was near Summit Point, when, seeing a horseman galloping across the fields towards us, whom I made out with my glass to be a Confederate cavalryman, I awakened him that he might order the train to stop, as I supposed the approaching horseman to be a messenger with information. My supposition was correct, for it was a courier with a dispatch, who, as he reined up the side of the car and handed the paper into its window, informed us of the defeat of Colonel Connor, of the Twelfth Georgia, at Front Royal, showing that McDowell's advance was already within twelve miles of Strasburg, while Jackson's was upwards of forty miles north of it, Strasburg being eighteen miles south of Winchester on the line of Jackson's retreat, and the important point towards which both the Federals and Confederates were now converging. The general, having glanced at the dispatch, tore it up, and dropping the fragments on the floor of the car, said to the conductor: "Go on, sir, if you please," and resumed his slumbers.

AN AGREEABLE DELAY.

We reached Winchester at dusk in a heavy rain storm, and, on arriving at the general's headquarters, which were in the Taylor Hotel, he told me that, as he had concluded to forward certain important papers by me to Richmond, which would take two or three hours to prepare, I would not be able to get off as soon as I expected. I was very glad to know this, as more time was thereby given me to spend with my only son, a youth in his teens, who had received two severe wounds in the battle of the previous Sunday and was then lying disabled at the house of a

friend in Winchester, where, by the way, on hastening to see him, I had the unexpected happiness to find my wife also, who had managed, with much difficulty, to reach there two days before. The exigencies of the times had prevented our meeting for many months previously, and our brief interview by the bedside of our wounded son was the only we had for more than a year thereafter. Truly war, under any circumstances and in any shape, is a sad disturber of domestic life. In its best aspects it is a deplorable calamity to any country. But, when it comes in that direct of forms—in the hideous guise of a fratricidal civil war—raging in the region of one's own residence, with its debasing system of social espionage and ex parte criminations, alienating communities and separating friends, filling the hearts of families with anxieties and dread, desolating their fair fields and destroying their happy homes, even over the defenseless heads of women and children, the horrors of that calamity, to say nothing of its sanguinary features, are enhanced a hundred-fold, and no people of the South experienced them in greater degree or endured them with more heroic and uncomplaining fortitude than those whose fate it was to live during the late war in the lower Valley of Virginia, within a radius of forty miles around the battle-scarred town of Winchester. Especially may this be said of those "ministering angels," the mothers and daughters of that historic valley, where the most delicately nurtured and refined ladies of the land were ever found among the foremost in all good works, and never weary in well-doing for the sick and suffering soldiers of both sections throughout the whole of that sad and sanguinary episode of our country's history.

JACKSON'S TODDY.

Having lingered to the last allowable moment with the members of my family "hereinbefore mentioned"—as the legal documents would term them—it was after 10 o'clock at night when I returned to headquarters for final instructions, and before going to the general's room I ordered two whiskey toddies to be brought up after me. When they appeared, I offered one of the glasses to Jackson, but he drew back, saying:

"No, no, colonel, you must excuse me; I never drink intoxicating liquors."

"I know that, general," said I, "but though you habitually abstain, as I do myself, from everything of the sort, there are occasions, and this one of them, when a stimulant will do us both good, otherwise I would neither take it myself nor offer it to you. So you must make an exception to your general rule and join me in a toddy to-night."

He again shook his head, but, nevertheless, took the tumbler and began to sip its contents. Presently putting it on the table after having but partly emptied it, he said:

"Colonel, do you know why I habitually abstain from intoxicating drinks?" And, on my replying in the negative, he continued:

"Why, sir, because I like the taste of them, and when I discovered that to be the case I made up my mind at once to do without them altogether."

HELP ASKED FROM RICHMOND.

After this characteristic reason for his temperate habits, he handed me the documents I was to take to Richmond, together with a memorandum of other matters to be attended to there, whereupon, bidding him good-by, I left his room and was soon on the road to Staunton, realizing the discomforts of a midnight ride in the rain, with nothing but the "darkness visible." When I arrived at Staunton, learning that a portion of the Central Railroad between Gordonsville and Richmond had, a day or two before, been torn up by the enemy and that I would, therefore, be obliged to turn off at Charlottesville for Lynchburg, so as to take the Southside Railroad, which would keep me a day or two longer on the route, I telegraphed to the Confederate Secretary of War as follows:

"Jackson in a critical position. Send him all the help you can spare. Am on my way to explain situation, but the Central Railroad being cut, cannot reach you until day after to-morrow."

OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.

On getting to Richmond by the roundabout way I had to go, it was a great gratification to find that the authorities there immediately upon the receipt of my dispatch, had telegraphed to North Carolina for additional troops and that General Lawton with several thousand men, was already en route to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, his advance passing by rail through Richmond the day after my arrival there. In the meantime Jackson with his little army of 15,000 men, was making good his promise to send forward the prisoners, captured property, etc., and at the same time not only to baffle the converging armies that were seeking to surround him, but also to beat them in detail. The masterly movements by which these results were accomplished have been so fully and faithfully described by others, and especially by Colonel Allan, in his admirable paper on "Jackson's Valley Campaign," published in the Philadelphia Weekly Times of November 30, 1878, that I shall not attempt to detail them here, contenting myself with a mere outline of their more salient features to preserve the continuity of my narrative.

Leaving Winchester on Saturday morning, May 31, he made a forced march that day with the main body of his troops as far as Strasburg, his line, including prisoners, a large park of artillery and 1,500 wagons, being nearly twelve miles long. At Strasburg he went into camp to rest his men, who, since the previous afternoon, had come fifty miles, and also to wait for Winder, who had been left behind with the Stonewall Brigade to cover the retreat and recall the Second Virginia Regiment, which had been sent to Loudown Heights, and which, by the way, marched that Saturday evening from across Shenandoah to a point beyond Newtown, making more than thirty-five miles without rations, over muddy roads, amidst a succession of showers that drenched its members to the skin. Jackson's position was now directly between that of the two hostile armies which had been sent to "crush or capture" him; Fremont, with a force numerically equal to his own, being but five miles to the

west of him, and Shields within twelve to the east, with a full division, supported by McDowell with two other divisions. But though 36,000 men were thus upon his flanks within striking distance of him and two other armies, under Banks and Saxton, were following his rear, he halted for twenty-four hours at Strasburg.

Standing there like a hunted stag at bay defying his pursuers, he presented so bold a front to them that Fremont paused in his advance near Wardensville, and Shields came no further than Front Royal; though the former had telegraphed to Washington that he would certainly occupy Strasburg by Saturday, 31st, and the latter had boasted that, with the division sent forward under him by McDowell, to seize the same strategic point, he would be able to "clean out the Valley." Both were puzzled by the celerity of Jackson's movements, and, apparently, deterred by his audacity. While there had been nothing in the previous career of either Shields or Fremont to justify the suspicion that they were deficient in gallantry and dash they certainly, on this occasion, seemed to be like the cat in the adage, "letting I would wait on I dare not," for they remained at a convenient distance from Strasburg all the while that Jackson was resting his troops there and securing a safe passage for his prisoners and trains.

A MASTERLY RETREAT.

On Sunday morning, June 1, in order to observe the movements of Fremont, a small force was sent out toward Wardensville, which was attacked by the Federal advance. But General Ewell going to the support of the Confederates with his division, drove the enemy back into the mountain gorge from which he had emerged, and Jackson that evening, with his forces refreshed and his rear guard closed up, slowly resumed his retreat, which seemed more like a triumphal march in the bearing of his men, as well as in the superabundant amount of his "spoila opima belli." During that night the Federal cavalry attacked the Confederate rear guard, throwing it into some confusion, but were soon repulsed with the loss of several prisoners, from

whom it was ascertained that Shields, instead of attempting to unite with Fremont, had wasted two days at Front Royal, marching and countermarching on different roads, and finally was marching southward toward Luray in the Page Valley, which is parallel with the main Valley of Virginia, up which Jackson was retiring. Penetrating his purpose to cross the Massanutton Mountain, which separates the two valleys, so as to intercept him at New Market, Jackson had the White House and Columbia bridges over the Shenandoah, in the Page Valley, destroyed, which, as the river was swollen by recent rains, effectually prevented Shields, who had no pontoon train, from coming over to the western side of it, and, consequently, from crossing the mountains to co-operate with Fremont.

ASHBY'S LAST DAYS.

“To the heroic Ashby was now entrusted the responsibility of protecting the Confederate rear,” and he was, as usual, indefatigable in the discharge of his allotted duty. Indeed, his proverbial daring was never more conspicuously displayed than in this campaign, which was destined to be the last of his brief and brilliant career, for poor fellow, he was killed in battle on the following Friday, June 6, and Virginia never lost a purer citizen, a braver soldier or more devoted son. He was a very dear friend of mine, I got him his first gun and last commission, the little English Blakely with which the gallant Chew did such signal service under him, and the brigadiership he received ten days only before his death. Some idea may be formed of his arduous duties from an incidental remark made to me in one of his last letters that in twenty-eight successive days he had had no less than thirty fights. As the incidents of the retreat became each day more numerous and exciting they cannot, of course, be specified in the limited space allowed for this article. Suffice it, therefore, to say that they culminated in those two crowning events by which Jackson effectually disposed of his antagonists in both the valleys—the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, in the former of which, fought June 8, Fremont was defeated,

and in the battle fought on the following day, June 9, Shields shared the same fate.

EFFECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

This closed Jackson's Valley campaign of '62, in which according to Major Dabney, his biographer and chief of staff, "within forty days he had marched 400 miles, fought four pitched battles, defeating four separate armies, with numerous combats and skirmishes, sent to the rear 3,500 prisoners, killed and wounded a still larger number of the enemy and defeated or neutralized forces three times as numerous as his own upon his proper theater of war, besides the corps of McDowell, which was rendered inactive at Fredericksburg by fear of his prowess;" in addition to which he had at the same time thwarted the plans of McClellan at Richmond and made those of Lee there practicable; all of which was done at a loss of not more than 1,500 men and with an army of only as many thousand. So it was no wonder that I found him in fine spirits when, on my return from Richmond, just after the battle of Port Republic, I rejoined him at his bivouac in Brown's Gap, on the Blue Ridge, from which, on the 12th of June, we descended before dawn to the plains of Mount Meridian on the Middle Fork of the Shenandoah, having our headquarters near Wier's Cave.

FRANK TALK BY JACKSON.

On Friday, June 13, the day after we came down from Brown's Gap, in expressing to me his pleasure at the success of my mission for more troops, he took occasion to remark that he would be glad if I would return to Richmond and make a formal application to the government to increase his command to 40,000 men, in order that he might carry into effect the movement he had mentioned to me at Halltown. "By that means," said he, "Richmond can be relieved and the campaign transferred to Pennsylvania." In the course of the conversation I asked him what he would have done if Shields and Fremont had united

their forces at Strasburg so as to have prevented his retreat up the Valley? To which he promptly replied: "I should have fallen back into Maryland for reinforcements." Then recurring to the subject which seemed uppermost in his mind, he told me that in making the proposed counter-movement northward he would advance toward the Potomac along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, making his march secret as much as possible, and by rapidly crossing the mountain at the most available gap, he could, by getting in the rear of Banks (who had returned to Winchester), readily dispose of him, and thereby open up the road to Western Maryland and Pennsylvania by way of Williamsport, etc. Ordinarily, Jackson was exceedingly reticent in regard to his plans and purposes, but on this occasion he spoke without reserve and was more communicative than I ever knew him to be. Our conversation occurred after dinner, and in concluding it, he asked when it would suit me to go again to Richmond and make the application he desired. I told him in reply I would go at once; would ride that evening over to Staunton, which was some fifteen miles from our encampment, and take the cars next morning for the Confederate capital. This seemed to be satisfactory to him, so I proceeded forthwith to prepare for the journey. Arriving at Richmond the next evening after office hours, I lost no time in seeing the Secretary of War at his residence. He referred me to President Davis, who, in turn, told me to submit the matter to General Lee, whereupon, late as it was, I procured a horse and rode out to the commanding general's headquarters on the lines below Richmond.

General Lee had not yet retired for the night, and after listening to what I had to say, with the kindly courtesy which so eminently characterized his intercourse with every one, replied by asking me a question I was not prepared to answer.

"Colonel," said he, "don't you think General Jackson had better come down here first and help me to drive these troublesome people away from before Richmond?"

"I think," said I, "that it would be very presumptuous in me, general, to answer that question, as it would be hazarding an opinion upon an important military movement which I don't feel competent to give."

"Nevertheless," he replied, "I'd like to know your opinion."

"Well, if I answer your question at all," said I, "it must be in the negative."

"Why so?" he asked.

"Because," I replied, "if you bring our Valley boys down here at this season among the pestilential swamps of the Chickahominy the change from their pure mountain air to this miasmatic atmosphere will kill them off faster than the Federals have been doing."

"That will depend upon the time they'd have to stay here," said he. "Have you any other reason to offer?"

"Yes," I answered, "and it's that Jackson has been doing so well with an independent command that it seems a pity not to let him have his own way, and then, too," I added, "bringing him here, general, will be—to use a homely phrase—putting all your eggs in one basket."

"I see," said he, with a laugh, "that you appreciate General Jackson as highly as I myself do, and it is because of my appreciation of him that I wish to have him here."

JACKSON'S PLAN NOT FOLLOWED.

Then, changing the conversation, he asked me a number of questions about the condition of the army in the Valley, the recent battles there, crop prospects, etc. So seeing there was no chance of getting his assent to Jackson's proposition and that there were other plans in contemplation, I forebore to press the matter further. When I arose to take leave he inquired how long I expected to be in Richmond; and, on telling him two or three days, he said: "Come and see me again before you go back; I may have a communication to send by you to General Jackson." Having business at the departments, which detained me in town a day longer than I had anticipated, I was not ready to return to Jackson until Thursday morning, June 19, and on the evening before my departure I had another interview with General Lee, in accordance with his request, during which, referring to our former conversation he said: * * *

NOTES OF INTRODUCTION.

At Gordonsville I left the train in order to send the foregoing dispatches to Major Dabney, who at that time was Jackson's chief of staff, and who, by the general's order, had remained behind at Charlottesville, the rest of the staff, with the exception of Colonel Jackson, the general's cousin, and myself, having been sent on duty at other points along the line of march from the Valley. In consequence of a groundless rumor which met us at Gordonsville, that the enemy was approaching that place from the Rappahannock, Jackson himself stopped there with a part of Lawton's Brigade until the following evening, and on the morning of the 20th, Friday, he gave me the following orders, as I find them entered in my note book from his dictation, viz:

June 20, 1862. Go to Charlottesville, see the superintendent Central Railroad, Mr. Whitcomb, and have the troops forwarded in the following order, to-wit:

1. General Whiting's Division.
2. Remaining part of Lawton's Brigade—to stop at Gordonsville.
3. Jackson's Brigade— Martin, Taliaferro, Fulkerson, etc.
4. General Winder's Brigade.

All the above troops except Lawton's to proceed to Louisa Courthouse.

The troops coming on foot will continue marching until the cars are ready to take them up at the nearest depot.

Wagons of the troops gone by the cars will march in their proper place until those in front have gone into camp; then, taking advantage of the night, they will proceed.

The troops to march so as not to be distressed, say some fifteen miles per day.

Note. The general requests that the cars continue to run constantly and carefully until tomorrow midnight, as he does not wish them to run on Sunday.

Mem. Inquire of Mr. Whitcomb the capacity of the cars.

Have the commanders instructed to divide off their men so as to put them on board the trains as solidly as possible, with their baggage. Let there be details of men to put on the baggage and have the troops to go in the cars ready by the track so that there may be no confusion or delay.

Let there be one four-horse wagon to every hundred men present for duty and two additional wagons to a regiment.

See to the condition of the baggage cars or trains and have them to move forward with no more than that complement of baggage; each regiment, of course, having its ordnance wagon and ambulances apart from the above.

Let there be no delay in having the above complied with, and have arrangements made in camp according to above instructions for such troops as are to come on cars.

"Give the generals compliments to General Ewell and tell him that he is at Gordonsville."

"The movement proposed by General Jackson will have to be postponed for reasons which I have already communicated to him, and of which you will soon be apprised." He then handed me a letter to give to the general, and in doing so suggested that as I was going up in the morning I had better stop at Charlottesville and wait for orders there. Of course, I asked no questions, though naturally curious to know what would probably be the character of my orders and why I was to wait for them in Charlottesville. But when I got there at noon the next day, I found the town in a fever of excitement, with a cordon of pickets posted around, preventing all egress from the place, and was told that, at least, a dozen trains of empty cars had passed through some hours before to the Valley. I had, therefore, no difficulty in divining what was in the wind, and that "great events were on the gale."

BOUND FOR THE CHICKAHOMINY.

Presently the scream of an engine announced an approaching train, and as it came thundering up to the station I saw, as I expected, it was filled with troops, who not only fully occupied

the interior of the cars, but likewise their roofs, and, in fact, seemed to cover them all over like clusters of bees. The train paused but a minute or two at the station. As it "slowed up" I recognized Jackson, who was seated in a postal car next to the tender, and who, as I approached him, said in his quick, sententious way:

"Glad to see you, jump in!" at the same time extending his hand to assist me in clambering up at the side door.

"Got a pencil?" he asked.

"Yes," I replied.

"Paper?"

"Yes."

"Then, sit down please," he said, "and write as I shall dictate to you."

From a little, old, brown-covered note book now lying before me I copy the following memoranda as I then wrote them in it at Jackson's dictation. I give them here to illustrate the method by which his army was transferred from the Valley to co-operate with the forces of General Lee in the famous "seven days' battle around Richmond" in which McClellan was so signally defeated.

EXTRACTS FROM NOTEBOOK.

June 19, 1862—Memoranda—On reaching Gordonsville telegraph to Major Dabney at Charlottesville (care of Mr. Hoge, or in his absence, of General Ewell) the following dispatches, viz:

1. Telegraph General Robinson to send Second Regiment Cavalry, Colonel Mumford, to vicinity of Port Republic to await orders and to reply when it will be there.
2. Telegraph Colonel Crutchfield to forward a battery of artillery to General Lawton.
3. Organize at once the corps of signal men under Vermillion, selecting six to ten additional men. Have their flags made.

4. Tell Major Harmon to have eighteen additional battle flags for infantry made at once.
5. Answer above when received.

FURTHER MEMORANDA.

After giving my personal attention to the foregoing instructions in Charlottesville, which detained me there the night of the 20th, I returned the next day, by the general's order, to Gordonsville, where I received by telegraph from him at Frederick Hall the following additional instructions:

"June 21, Gordonsville. Mem: Let Lawton's troops that come from Charlottesville this morning proceed to Louisa Courthouse.

"Send back empty trains to take up Lawton's troops that are marching on the way.

"At Louisa Courthouse let the cars take up Ewell's troops and send back empty cars for those troops of Ewell that are yet marching.

"Telegraph as trains arrive.

"Communicate with Colonel Jackson."

The method by which this important movement of Jackson's troops from the Valley was accomplished—as may be inferred, if not fully understood, from the foregoing instructions—was by having his army stores, artillery and baggage forwarded by the burden trains and by causing the empty passenger trains to proceed to the rear of his line of march (which was chosen near the railroad), and take up the hindmost brigades, they, in a couple of hours, were carried the distance of a whole day's march. In this way, by Saturday night, nearly the whole command, with its impedimenta, was transferred without difficulty or delay to Fredericks Hall, a station on the Central Railroad, fifty miles from Richmond, where it rested on Sunday, and whence, on the following day, June 23, it took up its line of march across the country towards Ashland, on the Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, within twelve miles of Richmond, arriving there on the evening of the 25th.

AN ENGLISH LORD'S OPINION.

Meanwhile I received instructions to proceed to Louisa Courthouse and establish a line of couriers from that place to Charlottesville, which I mention as an additional illustration of Jackson's foresight and sagacity in providing for possible contingencies. Although at first I saw no occasion for couriers between the two points in question where we had telegraph stations, the necessity for them became abundantly apparent when I learned a few hours after the line was established, that it had been surreptitiously cut by some secret enemy and no further reliance could be placed on them for the transmission of orders and intelligence.

Leaving Louisa Courthouse on horseback Wednesday morning June 25, I next morning reached Ashland, where I found Governor Letcher and a substantial dinner, which was all the more enjoyable from my not having had anything to eat since the previous noon. While taking a post-prandial smoke at Ashland two tired looking youths came up to me from across the fields on foot, the foremost of whom introduced himself as Mr. Carroll, of Baltimore, and presented his friend, Lord St. Muir, of England. They had run the blockade to see something of the war on our side, with which they heartily sympathized. I introduced them to the Governor, who, that afternoon, took them as his guests to Richmond, where, during the following week, they had ample opportunities to gratify their curiosity, for his lordship told me afterwards he had witnessed some of the Seven Days' Battles. "Then you saw some hot fighting?" said I. "Yes," he replied; "it was rather warmish!" The same evening, Thursday, June 26th, I rejoined General Jackson near Hundley's Corner, where we laid on our arms that night, vainly trying to sleep amid the angry mutterings of the coming storm of battle, which next day burst upon us and raged with such unexampled violence for seven successive days around the city of Richmond.

WHAT JACKSON THOUGHT OF LEE.

As it is no part of my purpose to attempt a description of that terrible series of Titanic struggles between the forces of Lee and McClellan, which terminated in the latter's strategic "change of base" to the shelter of his ships, I omit all mention of the various exciting incidents and sanguinary scenes through which we passed during the eventful days of their occurrence and come down to the quiet week that followed them, when we were encamped at Westover, in sight of the defeated Federals at Harrison's Landing. One evening during that brief interval of rest Jackson called me into his tent and, on my taking a seat, said in a tone of considerable excitement:

"Do you know that we are losing valuable time here?"

"How so?" I asked.

"Why, by repeating the blunder we made after the battle of Manassas, in allowing the enemy leisure to recover from his defeat and ourselves to suffer by inaction——" "Yes," he continued, with increasing excitement, "we are wasting precious time and energies in this malarious region that can be much better employed elsewhere, and I want to talk with you about it."

He then went on to tell me it was evident McClellan's army was thoroughly beaten; that it would have to be reinforced and reorganized before it could become effective in the field; that, therefore, so far as it was concerned, the safety of Richmond was assured; that the movement northward which he had previously advised should be made without further delay; that he wanted me again to bring the matter to President Davis's attention, and that in doing so to tell the President it was not from any self-seeking he was so persistent in urging the movement, as he was entirely willing to follow any leader in making it whom he might think proper to designate. I then remarked: "What is the use of my going to Mr. Davis, as he'll probably refer me again to General Lee? So why don't you yourself speak to General Lee upon the subject?"

"I have already done so," he replied.

"Well, what does he say?" I asked.

"He says nothing," was Jackson's answer, but he quietly added: "Don't think I complain of his silence; he doubtless has good reasons for it."

"Then," said I, more for the purpose of soliciting his opinion than to intimate any of my own, "then you don't think that General Lee is slow in making up his mind?"

"Slow!" he exclaimed, with sudden energy, "by no means, colonel; on the contrary, his perception is as quick and unerring as his judgment is infallible. But with the vast responsibilities now resting on him, he is perfectly right in withholding a hasty expression of his opinions and purposes." Then, after a pause, he added: "So great is my confidence in General Lee that I am willing to follow him blindfolded. But I fear he is unable to give me a definite answer now because of influences at Richmond, where, perhaps, the matter has been mentioned by him and may be under consideration. I, therefore, want you to see the President and urge the importance of prompt action."

BACK IN RICHMOND.

So it was arranged I should next day go up to Richmond and for the third time represent Jackson's views to the administration in regard to the movement he was so anxious to make.

When early on the following morning I was about to start the general suggested that as Mr. Davis would probably be anxious to know the exact position of the enemy I had better first accompany General Whiting and himself on a reconnoissance they intended to make for that purpose, so as to see for myself where they were and what they were doing.

Accordingly, we three rode off by ourselves toward the Federal outposts, and, leaving our horses hidden in the woods, managed to get behind a fence overgrown with bushes, along which we cautiously crept across a large field, keeping ourselves concealed from the enemy's pickets, whom we could plainly see within hailing distance at the extremity of the adjoining field, until we finally reached a knoll, from which we had a fine view of the Federal encampment.

While making, by means of our glasses, such observations as we could from our "coigne of vantage," a large balloon suddenly loomed up before us, which seemed to hang almost over our heads

Like a huge hawk in mid-air poised,
To pounce upon his prey,

so we deemed it prudent to retrace our steps before we were discovered. This little scouting expedition made it late in the morning before I left for Richmond, and I remember that my twenty-five miles' ride there was, by all odds, the hottest and most exhausting that I've ever had before or since.

The next day I saw Mr. Davis, said all that was necessary upon the object of my interview, and soon thereafter had the satisfaction of accompanying Jackson to a more congenial climate and in more active fields of duty.

THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY YARD AT CHARLOTTE, N. C., 1862-1865.

NOTE.—This article appeared in the *Charlotte News*, June 5, 1910—immediately after the unveiling of the Navy Yard Marker. Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, visited the site of the Charlotte Navy Yard in May, 1914—and this has aroused a new and wider interest in its history.

VIOLET G. ALEXANDER.

The great development of historic activity in North Carolina during the last few years has been accompanied by the ripening of a taste for historical research and for the collection of matter bearing on county, as well as State and national history; and with this desire to preserve our county and State history has come the patriotic desire to mark historic places within our own borders, so that strangers and guests in each succeeding generation may know the patriotism, courage, bravery and true worth of North Carolina's sons and daughters, from the Colonial, Revolutionary and Confederate periods, even down to the present day.

Much of Mecklenburg's and Charlotte's splendid Colonial and Revolutionary history has been preserved and some of her historic places of those days have been marked, but her part in the Southern Confederacy, when our sons and daughters were one united people in their sacrifice, heroism, bravery and courage, has not received the recognition due her—so the Stonewall Jackson Chapter, U. D. C., through the interest of one of its members, Miss Violet G. Alexander, has turned its attention to the history of the Charlotte Navy Yard, and has marked with an appropriate iron marker the site of the Confederate Navy Yard, which was established in Charlotte in the spring of 1862

and operated until 1865. The iron marker placed by the Stonewall Jackson Chapter, U. D. C., is a navy shield surrounded by sea anchors with this inscription in gold letters on a black background:

"CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY YARD,
CHARLOTTE, N. C.,
1862-1865."

This marker is placed on the corner of the brick building of the S. A. L. freight depot, on East Trade street, as this is the site of the former Navy Yard. The tablet was designed by a committee appointed by the U. D. C., composed of Miss Violet Alexander and Mrs. B. D. Heath, and it was cast and placed by the Mecklenburg Iron Works, J. Frank Wilkes, manager. The tablet was unveiled by the Stonewall Jackson U. D. C. on June 3, 1910, which is President Jefferson Davis' birthday—a day of special veneration and observance in the South. Mrs. Stonewall Jackson, life-president of the Chapter, graced the occasion with her presence, and large numbers of veterans of the Mecklenburg Camp of Confederate Veterans, the Stonewall Jackson Chapter, U. D. C., Chapter of Children of Confederacy, as well as many patriotic citizens, were present. A splendid program was provided; Hon. E. R. Preston made an appropriate and patriotic speech; "Dixie," and other loved Southern songs were sung, and prayer and the benediction were said.

Miss Violet Alexander, as chairman of the committee appointed by the U. D. C. to mark the site of the Confederate Navy Yard, deemed it advisable to give at this time to the general public a complete account of the Confederate Navy Yard at Charlotte. In compiling the article, she received much valuable aid from many who lived in Charlotte during that period, and some of whom were associated with the Navy Yard during its operation in Charlotte.

Mr. H. Ashton Ramsay, formerly officer in charge of the Navy Yard, with his residence in Charlotte from 1862 to 1865, now (1910) contracting manager of the American Bridge Company of New York, with headquarters in Baltimore, Md., has furnished the following:

"Early in May, 1862, it was determined to evacuate Norfolk, and in order to save some of the tools and machinery and to continue to manufacture ordnance for the navy, a number of the machines, tools, such as lathes, planing machines, and one small steam hammer, were hurriedly shipped to Charlotte, N. C., and Commander John M. Brooke, who was at that time chief of the ordnance bureau in Richmond (afterwards transferred to the army with rank of colonel, and after the war was a professor at the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, Va., where he died) had assigned to him the United States mint property on West Trade street, and a lot located on and bounded by the railroad tracks of what was then known as the North Carolina Central Railroad, and close to the station used by the S. C. Railroad; this latter lot extended about 3,000 feet on the line of the railroad and faced on a side street parallel with the railroad about 1,000 feet. On this lot there was a small building, which had been occupied as a machine shop, and my recollection is, that the property was purchased from Capt. John Wilkes.

"Capt. R. L. Page, afterward General Page, was placed in command of the works, and had his headquarters, and also his residence, at the U. S. Mint on West Trade street, where his family lived during his administration of the affairs of the Navy Yard.

"Shortly after the machinery referred to had been forwarded to Charlotte, N. C., the 'Merrimac-Virginia,' which had been guarding the approaches to Norfolk, Va., had to be destroyed, together with other Confederate property at Norfolk, and Capt. Catesby Jones and the writer (H. Ashton Ramsay), who was chief engineer of the 'Virginia,' were ordered to Charlotte, N. C., in connection with constructing the ordnance works. Subsequently General Page was transferred to the army and ordered to the command of Fort Morgan, near Mobile, Ala., and Capt. Jones was ordered to ordnance works at Selma, Ala., leaving the writer (H. Ashton Ramsay) in command of the naval station at Charlotte, N. C.

"A number of large, frame structures were erected on the property acquired, including a gun-carriage shop, a laboratory

and a torpedo shop, and a large forge shop, where the largest steam hammer in the South was built, and where propeller shafting was forged for all the Confederate iron-clads; 'The Virginia No. II' at Richmond; 'The Albemarle,' which successfully rammed and destroyed several United States gun boats in the Roanoke river; the gun boats built in Charleston and Savannah; the iron-clads 'Tennessee,' 'Mobile' and other iron-clads built at New Orleans; in fact, none of the vessels could have been constructed had it not been for the works at Charlotte. Rifles, solid shot, shell and torpedoes were manufactured at these works in Charlotte and supplied the batteries of all the vessels and shore batteries manned by the Confederate navy.

"In the last six months of the war, when General Stoneman burnt Salisbury, N. C., and was expected to advance on Charlotte, the writer (Ramsay), then in command, was furnished with 300 muskets and directed to form a battalion of three (3) companies from the employes of the naval works and to ship as many of the naval stores and smaller tools as possible on railroad cars to Lincolnton, N. C. and to hold the battalion in readiness to receive orders from General Beauregard, to whom this battalion had been assigned.

"After the burning of Columbia, S. C., by General Sherman, he advanced toward Charlotte as far as Chester, S. C., but in the meantime the remnant of General Hood's army crossed over the country and came into Charlotte over the railroad bridge across the Catawba river, which we were instructed to plank over so the train could cross. Gen. Johnston then assumed command of all the forces concentrated at Charlotte and immediately transported his troops eastward and confronted General Sherman at Bentonville, where the last battle was fought and the enemy checked for the first time since the capture of Atlanta, Ga. Soon after this, President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet came to Charlotte, N. C., and for a few days Charlotte was the capital of the Confederacy.

"Mr. Davis and his cabinet started from Charlotte soon after the surrender of General Lee, towards Washington, Ga., under the escort of General Wheeler's cavalry and one company

of the navy yard battalion under Capt. Tabb, the other companies remaining to garrison Charlotte, and were surrendered together with the rest of General Johnston's army when the army capitulated at Greensboro, N. C., April, 1865.

"You will note by above that Charlotte, although several times menaced by hostile forces, and at one time the central focus of the Confederacy, was never actually captured by the enemy, their forces not coming into Charlotte until after the surrender at Greensboro."

(Signed) A. ASHTON RAMSAY,

"Late Chief Engineer, C. S. N. and Lieut.-Colonel C. S. A.

"Baltimore, Md., March 1910."

Miss Alexander was unable to obtain data concerning Commander John M. Brooke, referred to by Capt. Ramsay. Mrs. John Wilkes, one of Charlotte's most patriotic and beloved women, at Miss Alexander's request prepared the following sketch of the Charlotte Navy Yard. This article was read by Mrs. Wilkes before the U. D. C., of which she was one time historian, in April, 1910. A manuscript copy is filed with the U. D. C. Chapter, and it appeared in the *Charlotte Observer* and the *Charlotte News*, April 3, 1910.

Mrs. Wilkes' article reads as follows:

"The Confederate Navy Yard
in Charlotte, N. C.

1862.

1865.

"As the existence of a navy yard in Charlotte, N. C., has been doubted and derided, it is well to tell its story while there are some persons surviving who know of it and worked in it. I have found a number of workmen and persons, whose memory has aided mine, and here give a true history of the Charlotte Navy Yard.

"Soon after the fight between 'The Monitor' and 'The Merrimac,' it became apparent to the Confederate government that

it would not be possible to hold Norfolk, Va., and the United States navy would soon take possession of the fort and navy yard. So naval officers were sent to the interior in the spring of 1862 to select a site to which all the valuable movable property in the navy yard would be taken. They came along the only railroad then far enough inland to be safe, and reached Charlotte, N. C., on their mission. Both the officers, Capt. W. D. Murdaugh and I think Capt. Wm. Parker, were old friends of my husband, Capt. John Wilkes, during his fourteen years' service in the United States navy (1841-1854) and of course he met and welcomed them.

"On talking about their request he showed them a place he had recently purchased, lying about 600 feet along the railroad, with 100 feet frontage on East Trade street. This they thought exactly suited to the purpose, far enough inland to be safe from attack by sea and lying on the only railroad which connected Richmond with the Southern States of the Confederacy. So the Confederate government bought the property on promise to pay for it.

"A large quantity of material and coke ovens, foundry and machine shops were erected. A wooden landing stage was built from the yard to the railroad for convenience in loading and unloading. This was carried as far as the back of the brick building on East Trade street, near College street, to facilitate the movement of naval stores, and was then and for many years afterward called 'The Navy Yard wharf.' Subsequently it gave the name to all the cotton districts about College street, which has always been known even to this day as 'The Wharf,' an enduring reminder of the navy yard in Charlotte.

"No large guns were cast there, according to the testimony of Capt. Ashton Ramsay, who now lives in Baltimore, and who has given us much information on the subject. He told of a large trip-hammer, which was part of the machinery brought from Norfolk, and which was a great curiosity here. I well remember Capt. Wilkes taking me to see it work. With one blow it flattened a mass of iron, and the next the ponderous mass came down so gently as only to crack an egg placed under it.

"Many workmen came with the machinery from Norfolk, and their families are still with us. Some of the names I recall:

"B. N. Presson, R. Culpepper, R. W. Grimes, H. W. Tatum and many others. Other men of this vicinity entered the yard—Martin Frazier, Thomas Roberts, John Garibaldi, John Abernathy, John Rigler and many more.

"When the navy became a thing of the past, many of these staunch and good men entered Capt. Wilkes' service in the Mecklenburg Iron Works, where they remained until death, or infirmity terminated their labors forty years afterward. It was a subject of great gratification to Capt. Wilkes that his workmen were so long in his service. Many of the above list, as well as some excellent colored men, were with him until their death, and no strikes or discontent ever disturbed their cordial relations.

"One small gun was brought from Norfolk and passed with other material to the Mecklenburg Iron Works. For many years it was used in the celebrations and parades, but fearing it might burst and injure some one, Capt. Wilkes had it broken up.

"When Richmond was taken by the Federal army, Mrs. Jefferson Davis and her family were in Charlotte, the house on North Brevard street (northeast corner) and East Fifth street, having been rented for her use. When the news reached here the authorities prepared to remove the specie from the treasury and other valuables sent here for safe keeping. Mrs. Davis insisted on accompanying the train with her children and her niece. The men at the navy yard were formed into a company as marines, armed and equipped as well as could be, and ordered out to guard the treasure train. Capt. Wm. Parker was in command. Just before they left he brought his old sword to me, asking me to keep it for him, and it still hangs in my hall.

"The train went by rail to Chester, S. C., and then took up the march for the West. Forty-two (42) wagons with fifty-five (55) men on guard, carried the specie. Mrs. Davis and family and the government officials were in carriages and on horseback. They marched as far as Cokesville, a village beyond Augusta,

Ga., and then were ordered back to Newberry, S. C., where the iron-bound boxes of specie were put in bank. It was a cold, rainy night, and Mr. W. S. Culpepper recalls with pleasure a gracious act of Mrs. Davis. He, a young fellow of 17 or 18 years, was detailed as guard at the door of a little church where her family was spending the night. Mrs. Davis came to the door, bringing him a glass of wine, saying he must be cold and wet, and this was all she could do for him.

"The next day the officials wanted to pay off the 55 men of the guard with pennies, but, remembering the weary tramp back to Charlotte, the men declined the offer and never received any pay for their labor.

"A few days later, in April, 1865, President Davis and his cabinet came to Charlotte and for a few days this was the capital of the Confederate States. One of the last declarations and cabinet meeting was held in the building now occupied by the *Charlotte Observer*, then the bank, and some of their last acts were sealed and signed there.

"After the news of President Lincoln's assassination was received the government broke up and the officers dispersed. President Davis set out to overtake his family and the sequel is historic.

"The navy yard was abandoned and when the Federal forces marched into Charlotte, it was taken possession of by the United States government as was the mint and all the stores of the Confederacy.

"Later, Captain Wilkes was permitted to repurchase his own property (the Confederacy never having paid him for its use) at a reasonable rate. There he established the Mecklenburg Iron Works, which occupied the site for 10 years, from April, 1865 to April 1875. The last castings were made there on the day of our big fire, April 12th, 1875.

(Signed) "JANE RENWICK WILKES.

"March, 1910."

(Mrs. John Wilkes.)

Mr. P. P. Zimmerman, of the Mecklenburg Iron Works, a life-time resident of Charlotte, and one of her most honored

citizens, gave Miss Alexander invaluable aid in her researches for data and furnished her with the following list of men who came to Charlotte with the removal of the naval works from Norfolk. Mrs. Wilkes has made mention of some of them and paid a fine tribute to their sterling worth and fine loyalty. The list of names given by Mr. Zimmerman is as follows:

Ruben Culpepper.	T. J. Roake, Jr.
W. E. Culpepper.	Robert Culpepper.
Henry W. Tatum.	R. M. Grimes.
Joshua Sykes.	B. M. Presson.
Cornelius Myers.	Thomas Dwyer.
William Myers.	George Dougherty.
Washington Bright.	Jerry Nicholson.
Cope Smith.	Hugh Smith.
Edward Lewis.	Henry Brown.
Isaac Sumner.	Henry Tucker.
John Davis.	Henry Goodwin.
James Lloyd.	Elias Guy.
Clay Guy.	Henry Tabb.
Augustus Tabb.	John Thomas.
Andrew Hoffennagle.	John W. Owens.
James Recketts.	Augustus Recketts.
George W. Thompson, Sr.	George W. Thomas, Jr.
Thomas Winfields.	Columbus Walker.
Charles L. Walker.	Joshua Hopkins.
Michael Holey.	George W. Gleason, Sr.
George W. Gleason, Jr.	James Peed.
Thomas Peed.	John Howards.
Willoughby Butt.	Marcellus Thurma.
A. Brewer.	G. J. Rooke, Sr.

Unfortunately, it has been impossible to secure a complete roster of the men who came to Charlotte with the naval works, and who served here from 1862 to 1865, part of that time as members of the three companies of marines. Mr. Zimmerman recalls the names of 51 men, all skilled workmen, who came to Charlotte from Norfolk in 1862. There were many others of

whom we have no record, who either died, returned to Norfolk after the war, or moved elsewhere; as we learn from Capt. H. Ashton Ramsey that he was in command of three (3) companies organized from the men of this navy yard.

Capt. Wm. B. Taylor, formerly city tax collector, and one of Charlotte's best known veterans, a member of the Mecklenburg Camp of Confederate Veterans, tells us that Thomas Dwyer, who came to Charlotte from Norfolk with the navy yard men, invented a machine for turning a perfect sphere, a cannon ball or shell. It was the first successful invention of its kind and was used in the Charlotte navy yard. This valuable invention was confiscated by the United States government and put into use in the United States navy yards, no credit or remuneration ever being given to the Southern inventor.

Capt. H. Aston Ramsey was the officer in charge of the navy yard and Mr. Peters was in charge of the naval store, located at the corner of East Trade street and South College street, convenient to the navy yard. Captain Richard L. Page was the commandant in charge of the entire station, with his official residence at the United States mint, on West Trade street, the latter building having been seized by the Confederate forces and was held by them until the end of the war. Here resided with Captain Page, his niece, Miss Edmonia Neilson, who is still living, at present a resident of Norfolk. Miss Alexander had much correspondence with Miss Neilson, regarding her residence in Charlotte, and she recalled those stormy days most distinctly, and gave many interesting and exciting episodes. She is indebted to Miss Neilson for the following valuable quotation from "The Confederate States Naval History," by Prof. J. Thomas Scharf, A. M., L.L. D., who says:

"General Page entered the United States Navy as a midshipman in 1824. He served the United States Navy until 1861, then a Virginian by birth, he cast his lot with the Confederacy and entered the Confederate States Navy, June 10th, 1861, with commission of commander, acting as ordnance officer of the Norfolk Navy Yard until the evacuation of that place by the Confederates. After the evacuation of Norfolk, Com-

mander Page was promoted to the rank of captain, and with the machinery and men removed from the Norfolk shops, established the ordnance and construction depot at Charlotte, N. C., which, under his administration, became of inestimable value to the Confederacy."

Miss Alexander has in her possession a wooden anchor and also a wooden cup, which were turned in the wood-working department of Charlotte Navy Yard and presented by Captain Page to her aunt, Miss M. Sophie Alexander, on one occasion when he was showing a party of ladies through the navy yard. The naval officers stationed in Charlotte from 1862-1865, were highly educated and cultured men, and they, with their families, received much social attention from the residents of the town.

The present owners of this historic naval site, the S. A. L. Railroad, were communicated with and permission was asked by the Stonewall Jackson Chapter, U. D. C., to place the marker. The following reply was received:

"I have no objection to the Stonewall Jackson Chapter, U. D. C., erecting an iron tablet either at our freight depot building, at Charlotte, N. C., or in the yard near the sidewalk, referred to in your letter, the understanding being that should the property ever pass out of the hands of the Seaboard Air Line Railway, that your Chapter have the privilege of removing the marker, if so desired.

"Before putting it up I would suggest that you take the matter up with our Charlotte agent, Mr. W. S. Bradley.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) "C. H. Hix,
"V.-P. & G. M., S. A. L. Ry.

"Portsmouth, Va., March 24, 1910."

Mr. W. S. Bradley, Charlotte agent of the S. A. L. Railway, kindly acquiesced and assisted the U. D. C. in locating the marker on the northwest corner of the large brick building

of the S. A. L. freight depot, facing East Trade street. It is frequently visited by strangers in our city who, for the first time, have heard of the Charlotte Navy Yard—thus the marker is serving its purpose of preserving history and instructing our youth and visitors in the remarkable fact, which is strangely unique, that our inland “Queen City” had a navy yard from 1862-1865.

Compiled and written by VIOLET G. ALEXANDER.

Charlotte, N. C., June 3, 1910.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

**Gen. Alfred M. Scales' Address Before the Association of the Virginia
Division of the Army of Northern Virginia,
November 1, 1883.**

Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends and Comrades:

We meet to-night to re-light our camp fires, to fight our battles over again, to renew the friendships formed in the hour of trial, and for the still nobler purpose of perpetuating the high deeds and sacred memories of our fallen comrades. I am deeply sensible of the occasion, and if I fall below its just demands, you will doubtless extend to me that indulgence which is always given to sincere effort and earnest purpose.

I speak to-night of Fredericksburg. I shall necessarily repeat much that has been said in the official and other reports, by men who were on the spot and witnessed what they wrote; sometimes, when it suits my purpose better, using the identical language.

General Joseph E. Johnston, after distinguished services at Manassas, Williamsburg and Seven Pines, fell painfully wounded at Fair Oaks, on the 1st day of June, 1862. He had deservedly secured the confidence and affection of the country, as well as of his own soldiers, and his fall, though temporary, cast a shadow of gloom over the Confederacy. The emergency was pressing—McClellan was by degrees approaching Richmond. General R. E. Lee, by an order of the President, assumed the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 3d day of June, 1862. The battles of Mechanicsville, of the Chickahominy, of Savage Station, of Frazier's Farm and Malvern Hill, had been fought and Lee and Jackson, and the Army of Northern Virginia, had become immortal. McClellan, with an army of 156,838 men—115,102 of which were efficient, well organized, well equipped

and confident, had been hurled back, broken and shattered to take shelter under their gun boats, and Richmond, the devoted capital of the Confederacy, around which so many hearts clustered, invoking upon her the protection of the patriot's God, was again free. The Confederates did not number more than 100,000 men. The theatre of war was changed; Cedar Run, Second Manassas, and Ox Hill, had shed new lustre upon Southern genius and Southern valor. The Confederacy was again triumphant, and Pope, with headquarters in the saddle, had been driven hopeless and helpless to a safe refuge under the very walls of Washington, never more, so far as I am advised, to meet a rebel foe. He was not wounded; he did not die; but he was translated to look after the Indians on the plains.

Between the 25th of August and the 2d of September, 1862, the Confederates had lost, between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, 9,112 men in killed, wounded and missing, including Ewell, Field, Taliaferro and Trimble, seriously wounded. The Federal losses were 30,000 men, 8 generals slain, 7,000 prisoners, 2,000 wounded in the hands of the Confederates, 30 pieces of cannon, more than 20,000 rifles, many ensigns, and an immense quantity of war material in the hands of General Lee. without estimating the vast amount destroyed by Jackson at Manassas. Again the theatre of war was changed; Harpers Ferry was captured, Maryland was invaded, and Sharpsburg was fought, and McClellan claimed the victory. Is the claim well founded? We are content with the facts.

Lee had about 35,000 fighting men, and of this number the troops of Jackson, MacLaws and Walker, in all 14,000 men, were not on the ground when the battle commenced. McClellan had about 87,000 well fed, well clothed, and well equipped men. The Confederate loss was 8,790 killed and wounded. The Federal loss was 12,469 killed and wounded, and among them 13 general officers. McClellan made the attack with the view to overwhelm and destroy Lee's army, and was repulsed. On the night of the 17th of September, 1862, after the battle was ended, the Confederate general held the same position that he had in the morning. On the 18th of September, his position was un-

changed, awaiting a renewal of the attack. McClellan dared not risk another encounter, but waited for re-inforcements. On the night of the 18th, Lee crossed the Potomac, and by 11 o'clock on the 19th of September, his whole army was in Virginia, carrying with him all the provisions, and everything of value obtained in Maryland. He carried with him also, the immense fruits resulting from the capture of Harpers Ferry, to wit: 11,000 prisoners, and 73 cannons, 13,000 rifles and other arms, 200 wagons of stores, ammunition, &c.—our loss was almost nothing. The invasion of Maryland was terminated. Lee was checked and had to return to Virginia. McClellan was repulsed all along the line; 35,255 men held their position all the day of the 17th and all the next day, against 87,000 men, and McClellan himself confesses: "I found that my loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack the next day." McClellan had attacked an army scarce one-third of his own, and been repulsed with a loss one-third greater than his adversary; if such was a victory for the Northern Army let them enjoy it. A feeble attempt at pursuit was made by Porter's corps, which had been held in reserve; he reached the river after the Confederates had crossed, he threw a large force across the river, and captured four cannon, but he was, in turn, driven back by Hill into the river, losing 200 prisoners and sustaining a loss, in the aggregate, of 3,000 men against a Confederate loss of 261 men.

Since the 25th of June, the Army of Northern Virginia had marched over 280 miles, often without shoes, with half rations, and badly clad; had fought twelve pitched battles, and many conflicts; had met and defeated three armies, inflicting upon the enemy a loss of 76,000 men, of whom 30,000 were prisoners, taking 155 guns, 70,000 rifles, and taking and destroying near a million dollars worth of war material, provisions, &c., &c. Lee retired with his brave but wearied men to Winchester. They needed clothes and shoes—they required wholesome food and enough of it. Such an exhibition of courage, calm and steady, of patriotism that burned all the brighter in their sacrifices and sufferings, had excited the admiration of Europe, and made a page in the world's history the most brilliant and the

most honorable. They thought not of their privations, they marched and fought, and their step was the prouder and their arms the stronger and their hearts the bolder as they remembered that these sacrifices were the price to be paid for equal rights under the Constitution. They are now in the far-famed Valley of Virginia, which fed both armies, but whose people were so true to their South-land that, though greatly impoverished, always, even to the end, cheerfully divided with the Southern soldier what they had left. The air was pure, food was abundant, the naked were clothed and shod, and the rest of the soldier was sweet. The army was recruited in strength, health, hope and numbers.

In a few days 30,000 men had been added to the army of Northern Virginia. McClellan was in front. His army, too, after so many severe conflicts and losses, needed rest, and he was in no haste to begin again hostilities. But McClellan was not suffered to remain long inactive. Richmond must be destroyed, and he was forced to move in that direction. On October 6th, McClellan had received a telegram from Lincoln embracing the following order: "Cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him southward." He determined to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and place himself between Lee and Richmond.

On the 26th of October the Federal army commenced to cross the Potomac at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry, and by the 2d of November the entire army was on the Southern side. Lee was still in the Shenandoah Valley. As soon as he learned of the movement of McClellan he at once divined its purpose, broke up his camp on the banks of the Opequan, and moved on a paralled line with the enemy. A division from Longstreet was sent to Upperville to be near and watch the movements of the enemy. Jackson was between Berryville and Charlestown, to guard the passes of the mountain, as well as the route to Harper's Ferry. It became evident by the last of October that the Federal forces were marching in the direction of Warrenton, and Lee at once ordered Longstreet with his entire corps to Culpeper Court House, which he reached on the 3d of November. Jackson was still at Millwood, but sent one

division east of the Blue Ridge. The Federals, by degrees, were concentrating at Warrenton.

This was the position of the two armies. While Lee was anxiously and carefully watching the developments of the coming campaign, a sensation was produced on both sides of the Potomac by the recall of McClellan, and the appointment as chief in command of his army conferred on Burnside. McClellan was the ablest officer that ever was in charge of the Army of the Potomac—perhaps the ablest, as a whole, developed by the war on the Northern side, with, it may be, one exception, Gen. Thomas, if, indeed, he was an exception; on this point, to say the least, intelligent sentiment is much divided. In addition to his ability as an officer, his character as a man was unexceptionable. He fully recognized the alleged object of the war, and, in the prosecution of it, he was high-toned, honorable, and humane. When asked by Mr. Lincoln his views as to the conduct of the war he replied:

“This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjection of any State in any event; it should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neithre confiscations of property, political executions, territorial organizations of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. * * * All private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military uses should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes. * * * A system of policy like this, and pervaded by the influences of christianity and freedom; would receive the support of all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign states, and it might be humbly hoped commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.”

Such a recognition of the claims of humanity, national law and religion, to say nothing of the constitution, in a fierce civil war, will be handed down to remote generations as worthy of all

honor, shining the more conspicuously because it had no counterpart among the other officers of the United States in all that war. It found a counterpart in the uniform conduct of General Lee, and voiced itself in the general order issued by him to regulate the conduct of his troops as he advanced through Maryland into Pennsylvania to Gettysburg. Hear him! "The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property that has marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with them, but is subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army and destructive of the ends of our present movement. It must be remembered that we make war *only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without covering ourselves with shame in the eyes of all whose abhorance has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain.*"

These two men had written their names high and indelibly as warriors on the roll of fame. The one, McClellan, on his side had no superior, the other, General Lee, had no equal on either side. They now add to their well earned fame, sentiments worthy of the highest humanity and the best civilization of mankind. McClellan was removed. Words such as these awakened no response in the hearts of those who directed the war at Washington. He fell a victim to his noble sentiments, and the petty political jealousies and personal envy of his own administration.

Lee's sentiments were in perfect harmony with his life. He was honored more each day, as each day developed some new feature of greatness and goodness which excited the admiration of mankind, and bound to him in ties, that death could not sever, the personal affection of each and all of his soldiers. After the fights around Richmond, there was not a good man in the army that would not have gladly put in jeopardy his own

life to preserve that of his leader. I remember well the effect of this order upon the army; they knew what he did was right, but I am sure I am in the bounds of truth when I say that it not only commanded the approval, but excited the pride of the army, and there was not one heart that did not inwardly feel that he was as good as he was great. It was obeyed almost literally; each man felt that his personal honor and the good name of Lee and his country were involved in it, and the public sentiment of the army frowned down any effort at disobedience.

But in contemplation of Lee I forgot myself and my task. I cannot paint the portrait, I must leave that to other and better artists. It has been done and will be done again. I have seen him in the storm of battle, in the hour of victory, when a nation sung his praises, and in the day of defeat, when no man blamed. I have seen him in the last days of the Confederacy when his grand army, the victors in so many battles, diminished in numbers, despondent in spirits and almost without hope, was in a steady and constant process of disintegration, night after night, hundreds of the best men would desert because they believed the cause was hopeless, and I have conferred with him as to the remedy. In all this he was the same quiet, dignified, lofty imperturbable self sacrificing soldier, without an enemy, without a rival. In all that illustrious army of Confederate officers—who in love of country and proud ambition carved their names in deathless deeds upon the escutcheon of the Confederacy—there was not one that envied Lee, not one that would have detracted the tithe of a hair from his fame. Whoever was second in this war, Robert E. Lee was and is and ever will be, by universal consent of soldiers, civilians at home and abroad, without a peer.

The same order, as we have seen, that removed McClellan appointed Gen'l Burnside commander of the Army of the Potomac. He had the greatest admiration for McClellan, and assumed a command which he had before declined with reluctance and distrust of his abilities. He was a good man, a good soldier, but without genius. His plan of the coming campaign, in his own

language, was that he would march upon Richmond via Fredericksburg, cross the river promptly, and take possession of the heights south of Fredericksburg, which were afterwards held by the Confederates, before Lee could possibly concentrate his forces to interfere with the crossing, or check his onward march after he crossed to Richmond. He was prevented by the delay in his pontoons to reach him. A council of war was then held as to where the army should cross. It was first determined to cross at Skinker's Neck, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg, but the demonstration in that direction concentrated the Confederate forces there, and that was abandoned; he then determined to cross at Fredericksburg, first, as he said, because the enemy did not expect it—next, because he felt that this was the place to fight the most decisive battle, because if he divided their forces by piercing their line at one or two points, separating the wings, then a vigorous attack with the whole army would break them in pieces. This plan was submitted to the President and approved by him. It was opposed by Halleck at first, but he became acquiescent, and it was adopted.

Sumner's command reached Falmouth, on the north side of the river, and a little above Fredericksburg, on the 17th of November, 1862. On the next day General Franklin placed his whole command at Stafford Court-House, ten miles northeast of Fredericksburg, near Acquia Creek, a tributary of the Potomac. General Hooker's command was concentrated at Hartwood, about ten miles northwest of Fredericksburg, on the 19th. The cavalry were in the rear, covering the fords of the Rappahannock higher up the stream. On the 15th of November Lee sent a Mississippi regiment of infantry and Lewis' Light Battery to reinforce the small garrison at Fredericksburg, consisting at that time of the Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry, under Col. Ball. On the 17th, the day that Sumner arrived, the Confederate chieftain, ever vigilant, sent Longstreet, with McLaws and Ransom's divisions of infantry, W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, and Lane's rifle battery, to the town, which they reached on the 20th following. Up to this time everything pointed to Fredericksburg as the place for the concentration of the Federal troops;

but Lee, anxious to remove all doubt, and to make no mistake, directed Stuart to cross the Rappahannock. This he did, in the face of the enemy, on the morning of the 18th, and reached Warrenton just after the departure of the enemy's column.

The information thus gained confirmed all the previous indications that General Burnside was moving on Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 19th the remainder of Longstreet's corps marched for that point. As we have already seen, the advance of Sumner reached Falmouth on the 17th, and made an effort to cross the river, according to report of General Lee, but was driven back by Colonel Ball with the Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry, four companies of Mississippi infantry, and Lewis' Light Battery. This is denied by Lossing in a note to his history of the civil war, in which he intimates that General Lee intentionally misrepresented the facts. The point is not very material, and will not add to or detract much from either side. The mistake, if mistake it be, is sufficiently explained in the attack made by Sumner's artillery on his arrival upon the Confederates on the south side of the river. This assault was made for some purpose, and it is not easy to see the purpose, unless it was in accord with Burnside's declared plan of crossing the *river promptly* and taking possession of the hills south of Fredericksburg while he was able. This view is confirmed by the facts, as conceded, that Sumner himself wished to cross, and was only prevented, as is alleged, by the order of Burnside. It does not definitely appear, assuming he had such an order, when it was given, whether before or after his attack. If before, then his conduct, if not in disobedience of the spirit of the order, was wanton and without an object; if after, then it would seem he was preparing to cross and do what it was understood General Burnside expected to do; but finding more troops and a more vigorous resistance than he expected, he held the north bank of the river until further communication with the commanding general.

A correspondent of the Philadelphia *Enquirer*, writing from Falmouth on the 18th of November, 1862, says that "five Mississippi regiments and Major Crutchfield's rebel cavalry brigade, it is reported on good authority, are here to *dispute our crossing*."

Again he says, "the rebels on yesterday destroyed a scow in the river to *prevent our crossing*," nor does he anywhere intimate that the crossing was delayed for a moment. All these circumstances together justify the conclusion that the Confederates expected them to cross, that they were to cross, and would have crossed but for the vigorous resistance offered. This correspondent of the *Enquirer* evidently believed it, the Confederate commander believed it, and doubtless so reported it to General Lee. However the facts may be there is no man on either side with any knowledge of the history of the war and its leaders who, with a proper self-respect, will intimate that General Lee had for any purpose intentionally uttered an untruth. (Page 198, *Rebellion Record*, vol. 5, 1862-1863.)

The question arises, Why did not Sumner cross? Lee himself admits that he could not prevent it finally, except at too great a sacrifice, and his only object was to delay it until his troops could be concentrated. That concentration must take place on the heights south of Fredericksburg, and when once occupied by Lee's whole force, it would be almost impossible to dislodge him. Why, then, did not General Burnside cross when it was practicable and seize these heights? The question is more easily asked than answered, and, I imagine, can't be answered satisfactorily upon any correct military principle.

On the 21st, Sumner summoned the corporate authorities of Fredericksburg to surrender by 5 P. M., and threatened, in case of refusal, to bombard the city at 9 o'clock next morning. A storm was raging at the time of the summons. The same correspondent of the *Philadelphia Enquirer* says: "On the 18th very few men are to be seen in the city, but there are an abundance of women and children, and that during the silencing of the Confederate batteries on the 17th, the utmost consternation prevailed among the inhabitants. The children seemed very much frightened." No power on the Confederate side could prevent the execution of Sumner's threatened bombardment; the city was exposed to the guns off Stafford's Heights, and these were beyond the reach of the Confederate batteries. General Lee informed the city authorities, while he would not occupy

the place for military purposes, he would not allow the enemy to do so, and directed them to remove the women and children as rapidly as possible. The bombardment did not take place—it is to be regretted that the threat, under all the circumstances, was ever made. In view of the threatened collision between the two armies, General Lee advised the evacuation of the city, and nearly the entire population left, and, as General Lee in his reports says, without a murmur. This was but another evidence of the high devotion of the people of the South to their cause, and though the blows fell most frequently, and the loss more heavily upon Virginia, because she was the battle-ground, yet all the States showed the same endurance and determination, and the people everywhere manifested a spirit of devotion and sacrifice which said to the world, our cause is holy, and its objects priceless. I witnessed, in part, the evacuation of Fredericksburg; I know something of the sufferings and heroism of that devoted people. It was a sad spectacle; the weather was inclement, the ground was frozen, women and children, the aged, infirm, sick and destitute, without food and thinly clad, without homes or shelter, formed in the mournful procession that went out from Fredericksburg; to seek food they knew not where, to find shelter nowhere save under heaven's canopy. Mothers could be seen with one child at the breast, while others followed, led with naked feet upon the frozen ground. Their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons were in battle array and could not help them. It was a sad, sad picture, and told of the horrors of war, and will tell to the last generation what the Confederate women and non-combatants did and were ready to suffer for their country. There were no murmurs, no protest, but many a God bless you, from suffering and pallid lips, greeted the soldiers as they passed, and as we well knew, many a silent prayer went up from pious hearts to the God of battles to protect their countrymen, to drive back the ruthless invaders, and again restore their husbands, sons and brothers to their homes and loved ones. Such women, if necessary to the cause, would themselves have lighted the brands to reduce to ashes their homes, and the brave soldier boys who witnessed their devotion, then and there determined to hurl back, with God's blessing, the foe

or die. That prayer was answered; thousands of the enemy bit the dust to rise no more; thousands lived in agony and pain, and the remainder were driven back weary, wounded and sore, to the shelter of their guns on the north side of the Rappahannock. Wherever patriotism is honored, and heroism admired, let this be told in memory of the women of Fredericksburg. There should be in the old town, on the banks of the Rappahannock, a plain white marble monument to the memory of these brave women, and upon this let there be inscribed the memorable words of Lee: "History presents no instance of a people exhibiting a purer and more unselfish patriotism; they cheerfully incurred great hardship and privations, and surrendered their homes and property to destruction, rather than yield them into the hands of their enemies." I saw Fredericksburg afterwards; the city was sacked and many a home was in ashes; some of these women were there, and as they sat among its ruins as it were, in the very ashes of their desolation, they thanked God for their victory. When Burnside's army first began to move, Jackson, in pursuance of his instructions, crossed the Blue Ridge and placed himself near Orange Court House, to enable him more promptly to co-operate with Longstreet. Lee always had his troops well in hand, and seldom, if ever, made a mistake. Sometimes they were a little slow in their movements, but the fault was not his. He had time, place and circumstances well considered, and one move followed another as effect followed cause. He had no haphazard campaigns, no accidents, all was methodically and regularly done.

It has been said that the distance between Longstreet, at Culpeper, and Jackson, in the valley, was too great, and that McClellan could have crushed either one or the other, but with such an army as Lee had—always greatly inferior in numbers to the adversary—he was obliged to risk much. His enterprise and success under disadvantages showed his genius, and in this as in all cases, he had considered all the chances and made the right provision, and hence, Jackson was at the right spot at the right time. Longstreet's corps was on the left. The range of hills left the river about 550 yards above Fredericksburg; Anderson's division rested on the river, and those of McLaws, Hood and

Pickett on his right, in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries on Marye's and Willis' hill, at the foot of which Cobb's brigade of McLaws' division, and the 24th N. C. of Ransom's brigade were stationed, protected by a stone wall. The immediate care of this part of line was committed to Gen. Ransom.

The Washington artillery, under Col. Walton, were posted on the crest of Marye's hill, and the heights to the right and left were held by part of the reserve artillery. Col. E. P. Alexander's battalion and the division batteries of Anderson, Ransom and McLaws, A. P. Hill, of Jackson's corps, was in position between Hood's right and Hamilton's crossing, on the railroad. The brigades of Pender, Lane and Archer, in front line, occupied the edge of the woods. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, with fourteen pieces of artillery, was posted near the right, supported by the 35th and 40th Virginia regiments of Field's brigade, under Col. Brockenbrough. Lane's brigade was in advance of the general line, and held the woods which here projected into the open ground. Thomas' brigade was stationed behind, the interval between Lane and Pender and Gregg in rear of that, between Lane and Archer. These two brigades, with the 47th Virginia regiment and 22d Virginia battalion of Field's brigade, constituted Hill's reserve. Early and Talliaferro composed Jackson's second line, D. H. Hill his reserve. His artillery was posted along the line so as to command the open ground in front. Gen. Stuart, with his brigade of cavalry and his horse artillery occupied the plain on Jackson's right, extending to Massaponax creek.

About 2 A. M., on the 11th of December, the Federals commenced preparation to throw their bridges across the river, opposite Fredericksburg, and about a mile and a quarter below the mouth of Deep Run. For sixteen hours Barksdale, with two Mississippi regiments, 17th and 18th, assisted by the 8th Florida of Anderson's division, repelled all efforts of Burnside to lay his bridges; two Northern regiments were reported to have lost in the effort, 150 men; in a few minutes 150 pieces of artillery opened upon the town; this did not drive the brave Missis-

sippians from their positions nor accomplish their purpose of laying the bridges. The bombardment was unnecessary and useless. Barksdale was finally withdrawn at the proper time, and three regiments were thrown across into the town, and the bridges were laid. On the 11th of December the entire army had crossed except Hooker's 5th corps. Lee was in a strong position on a ridge that ran from the river, diminishing in height to near Hamilton's crossing, and there held the wooded heights in front of the railroad. On the morning of the 13th the two armies confronted each other; a heavy fog enveloped the field; neither army was visible to the other; a hemisphere hung in breathless suspense upon the result; on the one side it was a war of conquest for the sake, as was alleged, of the Union; on the other it was a war in defence of homes, altars and firesides, in defence of the constitution, the keystone of the Union, which guaranteed the equality of States and the protection of private property.

On the Federal side, according to their own estimate, there were 113,000 men who answered at roll-call on the morning of the 13th of December as present for duty. On the Southern side the whole force, according to the most reliable statements, did not exceed 78,228 men. On the left, Gen. Franklin had under him more than half of Burnside's entire army. On the right, at and near Fredericksburg, Gen. Sumner had the remainder, except Hooker's 5th corps, which was held in reserve on the north bank of the river to support the right or left, and to press in case either command succeeded. Notwithstanding the advantages of position on the side of the South, the great disparity of forces in favor of the North made the conflict doubtful. Gen. Lee, in view of this, had authorized all the archives and valuables at Richmond of the Confederacy to be packed and in readiness for removal. The sun, as it were, veiled its face as if to shut out the slaughter and carnage which was soon to commence between brethren of the same race and the same country. The batteries from Stafford's Heights early in the day opened on Longstreet's position. About nine o'clock, or a little after, the fog partly lifted in the valley, and dense masses

are seen moving in line of battle against A. P. Hill, of Jackson's corps. This force, under Meade, consisted of his division, Gibbons on his right with Doubleday in reserve. The young and gallant Pelham, of Stuart's horse artillery, with one section opened an enfilade fire upon the line which arrested its progress. Four batteries were turned upon him besides two others from Stafford's hills. For hours not less than thirty Federal cannon strove to silence him, but strove in vain. Never before was his skill and daring more conspicuous than to-day. Gen. Lee exclaimed, "it is inspiring to see such glorious courage in one so young."

General Jackson said with a Pelham on either flank, I could vanquish the world. He afterwards gave up his young life at the battle of Kellysville, near Culpeper Court House, at the age of 22, then in command of all the horse artillery. No more need be said. Lee and Jackson have written his history, and it lives forever. He was withdrawn by Stuart. The enemy extended his left down the Port Royal road, and all his batteries with vigor opened upon Jackson's line, eliciting no response. Meade with his infantry moved forward, joined battle all along the line, and attempted to seize position occupied by Lt.-Col. Walker. Walker reserved his fire until they had approached within less than 800 yards, and then opened fire with such destructive effect as to cause them to break and retreat in confusion. At 1 o'clock P. M., the main attack on the right was made by a heavy cannonade, under cover of which three compact lines of infantry advanced against Hill's front. Archer and Lane received this attack. The work was fierce and bloody, and the portion of the enemy's line in their front met a bloody repulse, but by some mischance, which has never been explained, there was an interval of about 600 yards between the right of Lane and the left of Archer. When Lane was assigned his position, which was some distance in front of Gen. Hill's first line, as occupied by Pender's brigade, and in front of several batteries, he soon discovered this interval, and knowing its danger, used his best efforts to have it closed, but in the confusion of the coming battle, it was omitted. The

enemy, with nine regiments, pierced this interval to Lane's right, while a heavy force advanced to attack in his front. Thus assaulted in front and in flank, this gallant brigade of North Carolinians nobly maintained their ground, until the two regiments, 28th and 37th, had not only exhausted their ammunition, but such as could be obtained from their dead and wounded comrades, collected and handed them by their officers; when these two regiments had ceased firing for want of ammunition, the enemy in column doubled on the center, bore down in mass upon the brigade and it was forced to fall back, but did so in good order. Gen. Thomas, with his gallant Georgia brigade, came to Lane's assistance, and with the aid of the 18th and 7th regiments of Lane's on his left drove back the enemy and chased him to his original position. It has been said that this temporary success of the enemy was induced by the giving away in Lane's brigade of a regiment of North Carolina conscripts. This is untrue. There were no conscript regiments as such, and no troops could have behaved more gallantly, under the circumstances, than those attached to these regiments. Gen. Lee recognizes their gallantry in his report, when he says that attacked in front and flank, after a brave and obstinate resistance, the brigade gave way. Gen. Lane says, of his conscripts, "I cannot refrain from making special allusion to our conscripts, many of whom were under fire for the first time. They proved themselves worthy of a brigade that had borne itself well in all the battles of the last eight months, from Fredericksburg to Petersburg." In the meantime a large force had penetrated the interval as far as Hill's reserve, and encountered Gregg's brigade. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and mistaking the enemy for our own troops, Orr's rifles of this brigade were thrown into momentary confusion, and Gen. Gregg, while attempting to rally them, fell mortally wounded.

Hon. Wm. C. Oates, 3d Alabama District, then a captain, afterwards a colonel of the 15th Alabama, which, with the 12th and 21st Georgia and 21st North Carolina, formed Trimble's brigade, then commanded by Col. Robt. F. Hoke, told me that when this brigade, the 22d and 47th Virginia regiments of Col.

Brockenbrough's command, and two others, Lawton under Atkinson, and Early under Walker, all of Early's division, rushed with a yell upon the enemy, as they advanced he saw Gen. Gregg, and as they swept by him, driving the enemy before them, the old hero, unable to speak, unable to stand alone, raised himself to his full height by a small tree, and, with cap in hand, waived them forward. It seemed that he had heard them as he lay mortally wounded and speechless, and as the fires of his patriotism dying out with the wasting energies of life were rekindled by the shouts of his comrades, he raised himself, cheered them on and died. Wolf, when told, as he lay wounded and dying, that the enemy fled, said, "I die contented." Gregg, with the rebel shout in his ears, which told him that a disaster had been converted into a victory, died in exultation.

This brigade, led by the dashing Hoke, seconded by the gallant Oates, who afterwards lost his arm before Richmond, swept everything before them, and as the Federals ran and massed in front of the 21st N. C., the "Tar Heels," says Col. Oates, mowed them down in files, and that charge made Hoke brigadier general, though it nearly cost him his life. His horse was stricken down by a shell; this threw Hoke, leaving one foot in the stirrup. The horse recovered and ran, dragging him some distance, until he was rescued by Col. Oates and his men.

Gregg's brigade, consisting of four regiments and one company of rifles, were under Col. Hamilton, and joined in the repulse of the enemy. Lawton's brigade, under Col. Atkinson, first encountered the enemy, followed on the right and left by Trimble and Hoke and Early under Col. Walker. Talliafero's division moved forward at the same time on Early's left, and his right regiment, the 2d Va., belonging to Paxton's brigade, joined in the attack. The enemy was pressed back to the line of the railroad embankment. They were here reinforced by Gibbons and Doubleday, but Hoke and Atkinson charged again and drove them back across the plains to their guns, inflicting great slaughter and capturing many prisoners. In this charge

Col. Atkinson was severely wounded, and Capt. Lawton, the brigade adjutant, mortally wounded while gallantly leading his brigade. The attack on Hill's left was repulsed by the artillery on that part of the line which, in its turn, was assaulted by a furious cannonade from 24 guns. One brigade of the enemy moved up Deep Run, sheltered by its banks from our batteries, and surprised the flank of Pender's picket line, capturing an officer and 15 men of the 16th North Carolina regiment, but it was charged by the 16th N. C., of Pender's brigade, under the gallant Colonel McElroy, 57th N. C., under Col. Godwin, and 54th N. C., under Col. McDowell, of Hood's division, and driven back, the 57th leading and the others following in support. These two last regiments were under fire for the first time. The repulse on the right was decisive, and was not renewed, but the batteries and the sharpshooters kept up a brisk firing at intervals during the whole evening. Pender's brigade was placed in position on Friday morning early, on the extreme left of the division, where they had no shelter, not a log, or a tree, or an embankment, from the artillery of the enemy. Friday was taken up by skirmishing, and now and then a slight artillery duel.

There is no severer test of the mettle of troops than to be placed thus under a hot and deadly fire without protection and in a state of inaction. On Saturday, from early morn until late in the evening, this brigade had been exposed to a most destructive fire of shell, solid shot, and musketry. The artillery fire, at many times during the day, exceeded anything I ever saw, unless, perhaps, at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg. A spectator of the scene has, in words beyond my power, described it: "Such a scene at once terrific and sublime, mortal eye never rested upon before, unless it be the bombardment of Sebastopol by the combined batteries of France and England; never was there a more fearful manifestation of the hate and fury of man. The roar of hundreds of pieces of artillery, the bright jets of issuing flame, the screaming, hissing, shrieking projectiles, the wreaths of smoke as shell after shell burst into the still air, the savage crash of shattered forest, formed a scene likely to sink

forever into the memory of all who witnessed it, but utterly defying verbal delineation. A direct and infolding fire swept each battery upon either side, as it was unmasked, volley replied to volley, crash succeeded crash, until the eye lost all power of distinguishing the lines of combatants, and the plain seemed a lake of fire, a seething lake of molten lead covered over by incarnate fiends drunk with fury and revenge." Solid shot, partly spent, rolled in our front and across the line, to our rear in great numbers, reminding one of the incessant action of balls on a billiard table when handled by a skillful player. Added to this was the incessant annoyance from the enemy's skirmishers. Pender sent out a few companies under Captain Cole to drive them back, and protect the batteries, which he did with great gallantry. During the evening General Pender was wounded by a spent ball, and was forced to retire to the hospital; the command of the brigade developed upon me in his absence, and that of the regiment upon Colonel Joseph Hyman; but he returned as soon as his wounds were dressed, and at his request I aided him in command of the brigade during the balance of the day. During the evening Lieutenant Sheppard, the aid of Pender, was killed while gallantly endeavoring to rally some troops, not our own, on our right (who had broken)—a son of the Hon. A. H. Sheppard, for many years a distinguished member of Congress from North Carolina; his death was worthy of his parentage, worthy of a soldier, and worthy of the cause.

General Pender was a West Point graduate, was among the first to resign after the secession of North Carolina, and offered his services to his State. He was very soon made Colonel of the 3rd, afterwards known as the 13th North Carolina, regiment. He was a very young man and yet had under him prominent and influential civilians, who were used to command and unused to obey, and restive and rebellious against military rule, and yet in two months or less time, he had made of it one of the best drilled, best disciplined and most efficient regiments of the service. Such merit could not be long concealed, and he was soon promoted to the colonelcy of a war regiment,

and went immediately into active service in the field. He was promoted for gallantry and skill on the field to brigadier, and then to major-general in less time than twelve months. His last promotion was at the battle of Chancellorsville. He was wounded at Gettysburg, by the cap of a shell, in the thigh. We went to Staunton together, both wounded, in his ambulance; he suffered intensely on the way. We parted at Staunton to meet no more. His physician advised amputation; he sunk under the operation, and died, and thus fell one of the brightest, if not the most promising young officer of the Confederate Army. He was young and handsome, brave and skillful, prompt to decide and yet when decided, more prompt to execute. He was known, admired and trusted by his superior officers, beyond any of his age in the service; he was adored by his troops, and next to Jackson, there was perhaps no greater loss to the Army of Northern Virginia. The higher his promotion, the better fitted he seemed for his position; he was my comrade, my commander, my intimate personal friend. I must even here pause to render this feeble tribute to his memory and drop a tear on his untimely death.

As we have already shown, Longstreet's corps occupied the left of the Confederate line in the order mentioned. About 11 A. M., French, having massed his troops under cover of the houses in Fredericksburg, moved forward to seize Marye's and Willis' Heights. General Ransom, who was in immediate charge of this part of these hills, ordered Cooke's North Carolina brigade to occupy the crest, which they did in fine style. He placed his own, except the 24th North Carolina, a short distance in the rear. The 24th North Carolina was in the ditch on the left, and on a prolongation of line occupied by Cobb's brigade, which occupied the telegraph road in front of the crests protected by a stone wall. The artillery on Staffords Heights opened upon our batteries to protect the advance of their infantry. Our batteries could not reach them efficiently, and therefore were directed solely against the heavy lines of infantry as they advanced to the attack. They were driven back with great slaughter by the Washington artillery, and a well directed

fire from Cobb's and Cook's brigades. Their loss was scarcely less than fifty per cent. Hancock, with his division, resumed the attack and was driven back with a loss of 2,013 out of 5,600 men, in the wildest confusion, by the same brigades. In this attack two regiments of Cook's brigade, the 46th under Colonel Hall, and the 27th, were badly exposed and suffered much as they were thrown into the road on a prolongation of Cobb's brigade, without rifle pits or any protection.

According to General Ransom, it was in this their assault that General Thomas R. Cobb, a distinguished civilian, statesman and soldier, was killed at the head of his troops, and at the same instant Brigadier-General Cooke was seriously wounded and taken from the field. Upon the death of General Cobb, which was universally lamented throughout the Confederacy, General Kershaw was ordered to reinforce General Ransom, which he did with two regiments, 2nd South Carolina, Colonel Kennedy, and 85th Cavalry, Captain Starkhouse, numbering about 700 men, and took command of the position in the telegraph road. Again did the troops under Sturgis and Getty, of the 9th Corps, renew the assault; but with the fresh troops by which Ransom had been reinforced, they were literally, says General Ransom, swept from the earth. The enemy, still not satisfied, with a pluck and desperation worthy of a better fate, gathered up the scattered fragments of the five divisions that had, each in his turn, been repulsed, made yet another assault; this too, like all the others, melted away before the pitiless storm of musketry and artillery which poured out its fury from the stone wall and the crest of Marye's Heights.

Kemper was ordered to report to General Ransom, and reinforced him with two of his regiments, including the 24th North Carolina. The Washington Artillery, under Colonel Walton, who had done splendid service and suffered much, was here relieved by a portion of Alexander's battalion. Burnside, receiving the particulars of this last repulse, ordered General Hooker to cross the river with the 5th corps, which had been, up to this time, in reserve, and "take the crest." Night approached; Hooker had learned the result of all the assaults so

far, and endeavored to dissuade Burnside from it; but he was now desperate and obstinate, and insisted upon the order. Humphrey's division was selected for the sacrifice, and as a preparation for the advance, a heavy cannonade was ordered upon our lines, and continued with great fury until after sundown. The division then moved forward, apparently relying upon the bayonet. But why waste words? It did not get within bayonet distance, probably not more than 80 or 100 yards; the repulse was overwhelming; out of 4,000 men they lost 1,700.

Here fought Ransom, Cooke, Kershaw, Cobb, Kemper, Colonel Alexander, Colonel Walton, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and Louisiana. They stood side by side, supported and sustained by each other. There were no laggards, no stragglers; every man was in his place, and every man a soldier; and what was said of one State may be said of all who fought on the right or left on that memorable day. Six times did the foe, with great heroism, rush to the assault within 100 yards of the foot of the heights, and six times were they repulsed with bloody slaughter. If the battle raged furiously on our right, it was still more terrific and bloody on our left. The women and children of Fredericksburg, with all their sufferings, were terribly avenged, and the enemy *sorely* punished. On the 14th the Confederate troops were in line ready for the attack, which everything indicated would be renewed.

The Federals were also in line, but nothing was done during the day, save a fire at intervals from Stafford's hills on the Southern lines. The 15th passed in the same way. On the night of the 15th a storm of wind and rain raged most furiously; under cover of this Burnside returned to the North side of the Rappahannock, and the battle was over. 113,000 Federal soldiers under fire had been actually engaged with the vast artillery on both sides of the river, except a part that could not be used, which was left in the streets of Fredericksburg. Lee had an army of 78,000 (according to Palfrey and President Davis), of which only about 20,000 were engaged. The Federals lost 13,771 in killed and wounded and prisoners, 9,000 stand of arms and a large quantity of ammunition which had been left

in Fredericksburg. Gen. Lee says of Cobb and Gregg, we have again to deplore the loss of two of the noblest citizens, and the army of two of its bravest and most distinguished soldiers." Gen. Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that all of his men were under artillery fire, and about half of them at different times were formed into columns of attack. His reply to the question as to the cause of his failure was: "It was found impossible to get the men to the works. The enemy's fire was too hot for them." Gen. Franklin, August 19, 1862, before the Senate committee said, "I fought the whole strength of my command as far as possible, and at the same time keep open my connection with the river." This battle was as fatal to the highest officers in command as it had been to the common soldier. Franklin was relieved because he could not perform impossibilities. Sumner, from disgust, resigned and died soon afterwards at the age of 72, and Burnside, in a short time, had to give way to Hooker, and resigned. Hooker was in his turn destroyed and forced to resign after the next fight. The rage and disappointment at the North knew no bounds; it gave way after some days to the consoling thought that Burnside, under cover of the storm, had escaped north side of the river, and was not annihilated. In the South there was unusual satisfaction, that so much had been done, tinged with a color of disappointment that the victory had not been more fruitful.

On the eve of the memorable 13th, as heretofore mentioned, just before dusk, I was with Gen. Pender, at his request, assisting in the command of his brigade. The firing had ceased, the work of the day, whether good or bad, had been done. The soldiers were eating their evening meal in contemplation of rest and sleep so necessary and sweet to the soldier, after two days of intense excitement and watchfulness, exposure and severe conflict. Courier rode up and handed to Gen. Pender an order from Gen. Jackson, through A. P. Hill. He read and re-read it, with a grave and anxious face, and handed it to me. It was in substance to hold his brigade in readiness to advance at near dusk (naming the hour), in connection with the whole

line upon the enemy. This order was issued, and though there was some disappointment manifested, there was no grumbling among the troops, but all prepared with alacrity for the movement. Pender and I disrussed the order—he in the light of his military education, and I in the light of its common sense and practicability. We both agreed that the order was injudicious and hazardous. In an hour it was countermanded and we slept. It has been said time and again that such a movement on the night of the 13th or on the 14th should have been made. This is not justified by the facts or circumstances in the case. Lee had but one army and if lost could not be replaced; a night attack was most hazardous; confusion and uncertainty would inevitably attend it, and the result might be disastrous. What had been done, had been done at so little loss to us, that we could form no idea of the damage, immense though it was, to the enemy. There were at least in our front 100,000 men, and at least 200 pieces of artillery, and most of them on Stafford's heights on the North side of the river beyond the reach of our guns. We did not know that so many of their troops had been actually engaged or the extent of their demoralization. The Federal government had determined upon a vigorous campaign against Richmond. There was murmuring by reason of the many disastrous failures, and their people demanded it. To this end McClellan, who was regarded as too slow, was removed and Burnside substituted. These facts, together with many other circumstances, indicated that the onward movement would not be abandoned, and that the attack would be renewed. Lee's position was almost impregnable, an assault by the Federals on the 14th, similar to the one of the 13th, promised well for the destruction of their army with comparatively little damage to us. Gen. Lee wisely determined to await further developments. On the night of the 13th, General Longstreet's line was strengthened by works and reinforced by troops in front, so that by next morning he says that he could have beaten back the world if attacked over the same ground. There were changes made also in Jackson's line, and the weaker parts reinforced. By 10 o'clock on the 14th, Gen. Longstreet, in a letter written at

my request, says that it became evident that the attack would not be renewed by Burnside, and that Gen. Lee himself then considered the question of making an assault.

The attack was not made and the entire army, so far as I am advised, at the time endorsed General Lee's action. After the enemy had retired from our front and sheltered themselves at the river an attack on our part would have renewed the fight of the 13th with the positions of the two armies reversed, and the chances greatly in favor of the Federals. General Jackson, as shown by the above mentioned, order determined on the evening of the 13th to make a forward movement, and to make it at a late hour, so that if it failed, he should be able, under cover of the night, to withdraw his troops. This movement was attempted on a part of his line, and was placed in charge of General Early; but as Jackson says himself in his report, the first gun had hardly moved forward from the woods a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened and "so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned."

This should settle, and forever, the question as to Jackson's opinion and action in regard to attacking and "pushing the enemy into the river."

The troops engaged and the losses by States at Fredericksburg, were as follows:

				Lost killed and wounded
North Carolina had	32	regiments.....		1,521
Georgia	" 28	" 1 battery, 1 legion..	1,069
Virginia	" 25	" 1 "	365
Mississippi	" 7	"		65
Alabama	" 9	"		70
South Carolina	" 11	" 1 rifles.....		531
Tennessee	" 3	"		154
Louisiana	" 10	"		77
Texas	" 2	"		6
Florida	" 2	"		45

RECAPITULATION.

North Carolina lost 1,522 out of 32 regiments.

Georgia " 1,069 out of 28 regiments, 1 battery, 1 legion.

All others " 1,313 out of 69 regiments, 1 rifles

With such victories as Fredericksburg, with those that preceded and those that followed, and so many of them, it would seem that our success should have been assured; we failed. The President of the late Confederacy has been much censured and an effort made to throw a portion of the responsibility of the failure on him. I seek not to inflame the bitterness of the past; I enter into no personal contests; I know *no man*, and seek only to vindicate the truth of history as I understand it. That Mr. Davis had his faults none will deny; that he made mistakes all will concede. Who is so perfect as to be exempt from human fallibility? But that he was justly responsible in any part for our failure, or that his administration by any act of commission or omission on his part hastened the catastrophe, will not, in my judgment, be sustained by the facts. He brought to the cause of the Confederacy a very high order of ability, an indomitable will, a sincere purpose, and an intense patriotism. The success of the cause was the great end of his administration, and to this he sacredly gave his talents, his strength and power. Could personal sacrifices have promoted it, he would have spurned the costs. Could death itself have accomplished it, he would at any time have gladly welcomed it. He may safely leave his vindication to the impartial historian. Had his cause been successful he would have ranked with the first patriots and the best statesmen of the world. I watched him during the war, when the adversities and misfortunes of our cause were rested upon his head; I saw his patience and heroism; though reviled and persecuted he answered not again, preferring unjust censure to a vindication at the expense of the harmony of the country. I saw him as he stood by the cause, until all else had forsaken it; I heard him as he stood etaoïn shrdluuHg else had forsaken; I heard the slanders uttered by his enemies in his capture; I saw him in case-mate No. 2 at Fortress Monroe, when arrested for treason, and it was declared in all the passion and fanaticism of the hour, that treason must be made odious; I saw him torn inhumanly from wife and child, and denied even the privilege of correspondence; I saw him, when to heap indignity upon cruelty, they outraged the civilization

of the times by putting him in chains, though so enfeebled by age and disease as to make his escape impossible; I heard his cry of pain and indignation when, in the name of national humanity and national honor, he protested against the wicked outrage; I felt the sympathy of his surgeon as he witnessed the crying shame and disgrace, and heard him saying: "that it was a trial more severe than had ever been inflicted in modern times upon one who had enjoyed such eminence." He was but the vicarious sufferer for the people he loved and had so faithfully served.

I have seen him since, an *unpardoned rebel*, without the privileges of the humblest citizen, in a land he had illustriously served as a statesman and heroically defended as a soldier with his blood. In all this there was no manifestation of weakness, no retracton of principle, no surrender of manhood. Eighteen years of disability and isolation have passed. He is now an old man, and stands upon the verge of the grave, and will die as he has lived, a patriot and hero. Grand old man. Grander still in the disabilities and isolation, which environ you in the land you love, twenty millions of hearts to-day invoke upon you and yours heaven's richest blessings, and generations yet unborn will be taught to cherish thy memory.

No, we were overwhelmed by numbers. The contest degenerated into a war of friction and waste. They could lose two to one and yet be greatly superior to us in numbers. The immigrants from the Old World, in countless numbers, were rushed to the front to supply the places made vacant by wounds, desertion and death.

Grant, in his campaign, but continued the policy inaugurated early in the war, of accomplishing, by a wearing out process, what he could not accomplish by skill or prowess. We yielded to overwhelming numbers; we fell commanding the respect of our enemies and the admiration of the balance of mankind. Richmond was the objective point of every movement. For this Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and all the battles of the Army of the Potomac were fought. For this Sherman marched through Georgia to the sea, leaving in hi swake burning cities,

ruined homes, and a desolate land. Richmond was the object. Virginia, for the most part, was the battleground. She bared her bosom to the storm, and for four long years breasted its fury, yet she faltered not; "but by her example proved that though her soil might be overrun, the spirit of her people was invincible." She lost nothing of her ancient renown. She gave Washington and Lee to the first Revolution. She gave seven Presidents to the Union. She gave Scott and Taylor to the Mexican war, and she gave Lee and Jackson, Ewell, Stuart, and A. P. Hill, among the dead, and Joe Johnston and Jubal Early, and a host of others, among the living, to the Confederacy. She gave, in the day of her wealth and power, an empire to the National Government, and in the day of her exhaustion and weakness, by the action of the same government, her territory was forcibly divided and a State carved out of it. But she still lives, and is to-day an empire within herself, the mother of heroes and States and statesmen, as well, the admiration of her sister States and the pride of her own people. God bless the noble old commonwealth! Richmond fell, then fell Virginia, and then the Confederacy.

My comrades, nearly eighteen years have passed since peace was declared. Of those who survived the war, a large number have, year by year, fallen into their graves; year by year time is tracing its indelible impressions upon us all. Many have grown gray, all of us fallen into the sere and yellow leaf, and we too must soon go the way of all the earth. While we live to us is committed the sacred duty of keeping green the graves, and to preserve unsullied the memories of the dead. While one of us may remain, let him(if need be, like old mortality, devote himself to the pious task of renewing and preserving the records and chiselling deeper in the marble, inscriptions that tell of deeds that must not die, and let me urge you, if it be necessary to this end, to teach your children the names of the battles, the names of the heroes, as far as it can be done, and the graves of the unknown martyrs. Let them take up the sacred task where we leave it, and let them so teach their children's children to the latest generation.

Let Yankee Doodle and Dixie stand side by side; they were both inspired by the love of liberty. Let Manassas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, King's Mountain and Yorktown live on the same sacred page of our history, for they were alike struggles in the cause of freedom and the rights of men. We were successful, that proves nothing as to the right; the principle is unchanged, impartial history will vindicate us, and to that tribunal we commit the Lost Cause.

There is no conflict in all this with our duty to the Union. It is the duty of every citizen to honor it in peace and defend it in war, and I am sure none will respond to these duties of the citizens with more alacrity or faithfulness than the battle scarred veterans who followed Lee and Jackson, and their descendants.

BATTLE OF SECOND MANASSAS, INCLUDING OX HILL.

**Extracts from the War Record of James M. Garnett, late Captain and
Ordnance Officer of Grimes' (formerly Rhodes') Division,
Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, C. S. A.**

I have never written a full account of the Second Battle of Manassas, but in Volume 2 of my (M. S.) "*Papers and Reviews*" there will be found reviews of Vols. I and II of "*Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts*," contributed to the *Richmond Times* of February 23 and March 1, 1896, Vol. I treating of the "Campaigns of Virginia, 1861-62," and Vol. II of "The Virginia Campaign of 1862 under General Pope." These volumes well deserve publication, and are of great interest to the military student. I have no other copies of these reviews except the ones above mentioned, but in Volume 2 of my M. S. "*Papers and Reviews*" will be found my descriptions of the battles of Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas. From the latter and my personal recollections, I shall write here an account of the Second Manassas as far as I was in it. I have written previously an account of Cedar Mountain.

"After spending the night in the woods above the old unfinished railroad cut, not far from Dudley Mills, we awoke next morning much refreshed, but hungry, as our feast at Manassas did not last long. We waited for Longstreet all day of the 28th, but heard nothing of him. Nor did we see anything of the Yankees until the afternoon, when skirmishing began on our right, and soon both of our divisions, Jackson's and Ewell's, were ordered in. Our division was now commanded by Gen. Wm. B. Taliaferro and our brigade by Col. W. H. S. Baylor, of the Fifth Virginia regiment. General Jackson having no staff officer with him, and seeing me (that formerly

served on his staff), directed me to bring up Gen. A. P. Hill. I inquired where I should find him, and he simply replied, "Over in that direction," pointing with his hand. If I had known then what I learned afterwards, that Gen. A. P. Hill had switched from Manassas to Centreville and was then probably on the old Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike, somewhere between Centreville and Gainesville, I might have found him, but I did not know, and General Jackson did not tell me, so I rode around the country all the afternoon to no purpose. If I had not been sent off I should have gone in with our brigade (Stonewall) and might have been killed, as poor Col. Hoff, Thirty-third Virginia, was, for King's Division, the attacked party, put up a very stiff fight, and did not draw off until after dark. General Taliaferro was wounded, and so was Gen. Ewell, who lost his leg, and I think that considerably affected his future efficiency as a general. When I returned, the fight was over, and we had to mourn many killed and wounded in our brigade, especially in the Washington College company, the "Liberty Hall Volunteers," of the Fourth Virginia Regiment.

Next morning (August 29th) we continued our bivouac in the woods, our division (now commanded by Gen. Starke, of the Louisiana brigade) occupying the right of the line of battle, Ewell's, now Lawton's, division, next and A. P. Hill's on the left. We bore the brunt of this day's battle, which did not begin with our division until about 2 P. M., or later, although the battle is called the battle of Groveton, which was beyond our right. It was this afternoon, I think, that we charged through the woods in front of us to relieve Hill's troops and reached the open field on the farther side, but soon returned to our position, for there was no intention of bringing on a general engagement until Longstreet arrived. He came by twelve o'clock, some say earlier, although Pope would not believe it, but, as usual, it took a long time to get ready, and he wasn't in it until late that evening, when Hood's division drove back Hatch's, and we awaited the next day.

A large quantity of artillery was massed on a hill between the two corps, under Col. Stephen D. Lee, and it did good service next day in repulsing the attacks made on us, for it had

an enfilade fire, and it was well handled. The artillery of our corps was handled Col. Stapleton Crutchfield.

SECOND MANASSAS.

With no tents and no cooking, we were up early on Saturday morning, August 30th, and our brigade (Stonewall), Col. Baylor commanding, took position in the edge of the woods above the railroad cut, which was here some fifteen or twenty feet deep. The ground sloped in either direction, right and left; and Col. Bradley T. Johnson, commanding the second brigade of Jackson's division, was on our right beyond the railroad cut, but was later transferred to our left; then came the third brigade, Col. Taliaferro's, and beyond him the fourth, the Louisiana brigade, Gen. Starke's, who now commanded our division. As we moved to our position we heard occasional firing on our left and front; thinking it from stragglers firing off their guns, as stragglers will do, Col. Baylor said to me: "Ride over there and stop that firing." I rode down the road leading to Sudley Mills, and when directly opposite the firing, I turned off to the right through the thick woods, rode towards the firing, when, all of a sudden, I was accosted: "Halt there! halt!" I looked up, and to my surprise, along the old railroad cut in the woods, about twenty or thirty yards in front of me, was ranged a line of Yankee skirmishers, who had quietly stolen up and were popping at everything they could indistinctly see passing along the road, ambulances and such like. For a moment the thought passed through my mind, had I not better halt, but visions of a Yankee prison loomed up, and I prepared to trust to my horse's heels, as I turned at once and as I did so, the branches of the trees knocked off my fine hat—the only remains of the Manassas plunder, and as there was no time to stop, that hat was irretrievably lost. Now came the forethought. When I got out on the road, I pulled out my old cap from the saddle-pockets, as I didn't like to report to Col. Baylor bareheaded, and I quickly rejoined the brigade. I reported to the Colonel that I couldn't stop that firing, and informed him from what it proceeded. A. P. Hill, on our left, soon sent forward some men, and the

Yankee skirmishers departed. I think their stealing up was due to the temporary withdrawal of Hill's men to cook rations, but no harm was done, and the cut was soon in our possession again. Of course these skirmishers "popped" at me as I rode back, but the woods were thick and my horse fleet, so I got back unharmed. I mourned over *that hat*, and my old cap had to do duty again for that campaign.

We had a good position on the hill, but could not cross the cut without moving to the right or left, so it was a barrier to both sides. We lay there all the morning, and I think it was about midday when the enemy advanced on us, Fitz John Porter's corps, as we afterwards learned. They came up in good order, and as those opposite us reached the fence on top of the railroad cut, they lay down and commenced firing. I recollect distinctly seeing their flag held up against the fence. Between the woods and the cut there was a small open space in front of us, and Col. Baylor, flagstaff in hand, Nat Burwell, sergeant-major of the Second Virginia Regiment, and some others went out into the open space, and were soon killed. It was a rash exposure of themselves, for neither the Yankees nor we could cross the railroad cut at that point. I remained in the edge of the woods and had plenty of company, for I recollect seeing Capt. Raleigh Colston, later Lieutenant-Colonel of the Second Virginia, Maj. Williams, of the Fifth Virginia, and others near me. The woods were full of men and officers. Presently I felt a sting in the meat part of my left thigh, and clapped my hand to the place, thinking I was wounded. I was on foot holding my horse's bridle. But on examination it proved to be only a sting, although there were two holes in my clothes. Not long afterward John Baldwin, sergeant-major of the Thirty-third Virginia, whom I knew very well, came to me and said in an excited tone: "Mr. Garnett, for God's sake, can't you bring us some reinforcements?" I told him that I would try, so I rode off to the left in the woods to where Gen. Starke was, and reported our situation. He replied that he had no troops that he could send, but directed me to ride back to Gen. A. P. Hill, who had some troops in reserve. As I went back, I met Pender's brigade marching through the woods, and when I reported what Gen.

Starke said, Gen. Hill replied "I have just a brigade (Pender's), but I'll send another." But when I returned to our position, the whole line had moved forward. Pender's brigade proved to be sufficient for present needs, and our men had charged through the woods and across the open field beyond. The hill just in front of us was covered with dead men, and to our left. The Irish battalion of the second brigade had fought with stones after their ammunition gave out, and it is credibly stated that my friend and old college-mate, Lewis Randolph, a lieutenant in the Irish battalion (First Virginia battalion), killed a Yankee with a large stone. Our artillery on the hill to our right had taken Porter's men in flank as they advanced, and broken the force of the attack. Longstreet's corps had moved forward in a body, and soon we had them "on the run." The battle lasted all the afternoon, and by dark we had driven the enemy across Bull Run, a little more daylight and we should have had an even more complete victory.

We spent the night on the field, fully a mile in advance of our position during the day. We had to mourn the loss of many gallant men, our brigade commander, Col. Baylor, in particular. He was a fine man and a fine officer. His death left Col. Grigsby, of the Twenty-seventh Virginia, the gallant Grigsby, who knew no fear, in command of the brigade, the fourth commander that the brigade had during the campaign, two, Winder and Baylor, having been killed in action.

OX HILL.

The next day was rainy and sloppy, but Gen. Lee wanted to flank Pope again, so off we started that afternoon, reaching Little River turnpike, which was through Fairfax Courthouse, by night. Next morning we kept on down the turnpike, our division bringing up the rear, A. P. Hill leading, and Lawton being second. Pope had been reinforced at Centreville, and expected that we should soon be after him, which expectation was soon gratified. This fight, Ox Hill, was chiefly A. P. Hill's, but we were "in it" late in the evening, although some of the books don't give us credit for being there. Generals Kearny and

Stevens were killed in front of A. P. Hill, and Lawton fought on his left. We marched on down the turnpike (south) and turned to the right at the road leading across the turnpike on top of the hill beyond the Chantilly house. We took position in line of battle in the woods on our extreme left not far from the turnpike. We lay down in the woods for some time, awaiting whatever might turn up, having thrown out skirmishers. I recollect riding to the fence in our front of the woods, and seeing the Yankee skirmishers in the field beyond. At nearly dark we were suddenly roused by a volley from both sides, which caused each side to retire rapidly. Our men, however, soon rallied. I picked up a flag that had been dropped in the sudden encounter, and rode along our line to see where it belonged. Two regiments were without flags. I first rode to Capt. Raleigh Colston, commanding the Second Virginia regiment, and asked if it was his flag. He replied, "No, sir; I left mine back with the wagon-train." I then went to Maj. Williams, commanding the Fifth Virginia, and asked him. He looked over his regiment and replied: "Well, I reckon it must be." I presented it to him to return to his color-bearer. We never saw anything more of the enemy, so they were worse scared than we were.

The men were so tired and nervous from continual marching and fighting that the pop of a cap would start them off, but they would soon rally. We withdrew after dark and bivouacked for the night. This closed the Second Manassas campaign and we got ready to cross the Potomac.

THE CHARACTER AND SERVICES OF THE CONFEDERATE SOLDIER.

**Address by Captain John Lamb before R. E. Lee Camp,
December 12, 1913.**

A brave Confederate soldier said to me a few days ago that he was tired of hearing about the war. A well-educated young woman, to whom I offered a fine address on Gettysburg, from the Federal viewpoint, expressed the same view, but said she might read it when she had finished a certain piece of embroidery that was then occupying her time.

How far these two opinions find lodgment in the minds of our citizens we cannot well decide.

The members of this camp certainly deserve all praise for their noble efforts in preserving the true history of the unfortunate but heroic conflict of fifty years ago. The collection of these portraits of the distinguished actors in that struggle is a labor of love that will be appreciated more and more as the years come and go.

You may be certain that 100 years from now men will be studying these characters and the campaigns in which they figured. They will know more of the details of the battles in which these old soldiers were engaged than we know now. If some of the members of this camp will interest themselves in having the battlefields around Richmond properly marked they will be rendering good service to their State and city. So much by way of suggestion and for "the good of the camp."

For a short time permit me to invite your attention to the character and services of the Confederate soldier in war and peace.

The war was brought to our doors. We had to fight or "yield ourselves and all we were, cowering slaves forever."

•

Permit me to remind you that as an honorable death in an individual is preferable to an ignoble life, so in nations we find that war is the foundation of many of the high virtues and faculties of men; while nations that practice too long the arts of peace become enfeebled and oftentimes corrupt. Peace and the virtues of civil life do not always flourish together. We, too, often find peace and selfishness; peace and corruption; peace and death. It can be clearly shown that the heroic periods in the world's history have been the fruits of war. We point you to Rome and Athens, in ancient times; to France, England and America in modern. What were the compensations to us of our own War Between the States?

It helped to educate a body of citizen soldiery, who were to teach mankind a needed lesson, that human endurance could equal human misfortune. Our people were thoroughly aroused and rushed into the army from all ranks of society. They were citizen soldiers; homogenous, united, patriotic to a degree. The army contained every class of believers, from the bishop to the neophyte—students of divinity—Sunday School teachers, deacons, vestrymen, class leaders, exhorters, men from all denominations of Christians in the land. This constituted a tremendous moral force, supplying men brave enough to face the dangers nature shrinks from, and humane enough to treat with courtesy and kindness any foe temporarily in their power.

To the citizen of the Old World our conflict was a subject of intense interest and wonder. The transformation of citizens into soldiers surprised, if it did not alarm them. The skill displayed in the preparation of war material, the revolutionizing of naval warfare in Hampton Roads, the steady valor of many battlefields, convinced them that the American soldier of twelve months was not inferior to the European soldier of twelve years. The atrocities of one side shocked them immensely, while the patient endurance of hardship, and all manner of provocation by a people whom they had been taught to look upon as tyrannical and effeminate, by reasons of their peculiar institutions, filled them with the greatest admiration.

A leading public journal of the world thus describes the

impression made on the European men touching the attitude of the Southern people:

"The people of the Confederate States have made themselves famous. If the renown of brilliant courage, stern devotion to a cause, and military achievements, almost without parallel, can compensate men for toil and privations, then the countrymen of Lee and Jackson may be consoled amid their sufferings." Again we read:

"The details of that extraordinary national effort which has led to the repulsion and almost to the destruction of an invading force of more than half a million men will then become known to the world."

Such were a few of the compliments which the Confederate soldier wrung from the press of Europe. They could be multiplied if the scope of this paper permitted. Only soldiers brave in battle and generous in victory could have provoked such praise from people who regarded them from the first with suspicion and prejudice.

The conduct of the war and the bravery and chivalry of the Southern soldier soon impressed the thoughtful men of the North as well as those of the Old World.

Rev. Dr. Bellows, of New York, at a Unitarian convention held in the midst of the war, said in part:

"How far race and climate, independent or servile institutions, may have produced the Southern chivalric spirit and manner I will not here consider, but one may as well deny the small feet and hands of that people as deny a certain inherited habit of command; a contempt of life in defense of honor or class; a talent for political life, and an easy control of inferiors." After declaring that this Southern spirit was not external and flashing heroism, but real, and had made itself felt in Congress, in the social life at Washington, and in England and France, this gifted divine said:

"This spirit shows itself in the war; in the orders and proclamation of the generals; in the messages of the rebel Congress, and the essential good breeding and humanity, contrary to a diligently encouraged public impression, with which it not seldom divides its medical stores, and gives our sick and

wounded as favorable care as it is able to extend to its own. It exceeds at this moment in the possession of ambulance corps." Further on Dr. Bellows makes this significant observation:

"The war must have increased the respect felt by the North for the South, its miraculous resources, the bravery of its troops, their patience under hardship, and their unshrinking firmness in the desperate position they have assumed; the wonderful success with which they have extemporized manufactories and munitions of war, and kept themselves in relation with the world, in spite of our magnificent blockade. The elasticity with which they have risen from defeat and the courage they have shown in threatening again and again our capital, and soon our interior, cannot fail to stir an unwilling admiration and respect."

The home influences and academic training of the boys of the South, during these two wonderful decades of our history, 1840-1860, will furnish a key to the story of the Confederate soldier's wonderful achievements in war as well as his unexampled success when defeat challenged him to a greater degree of courage, patience and endurance.

To their everlasting honor stands the fact that in their march through the enemy's country they left behind them no ruined homes, no private houses burned, no families cruelly robbed. They were, with one solitary exception, and that perhaps a righteous reprisal, careful with fire, and they were never known to borrow jewels of gold and silver with no thought of returning the same. They divided their last morsel of food and the last drop of water with the hungry and thirsty prisoners that they captured by the thousand. With the rarest exception, they never cherished bitterness and ill feeling for the rank and file of the men they met in deadly combat.

They were soldiers from necessity, not choice, and only fought, as their Revolutionary sires did, for home and liberty. They knew then, and know now, that they were absolutely right in their contentions. The last one will die with the proud satisfaction that impartial history will pronounce judgment in their favor, and rank them as the most heroic and least selfish of all

who, in the tide of time, have fought for their homes and fire-sides.

Historians on two continents are giving the Confederate soldier full credit for the honesty of his convictions, and the courage with which he defended them.

In due time they will tell of his achievements in peace that were not surpassed by his exploits in war. Worn out by the victories he had won over superior numbers, he yielded to those and the resources of the world, that supplied the men and material that at last compassed his defeat.

The territory that he defended with unsurpassed valor, containing one-third of our population, has for years contributed 40 per cent. of our exports to foreign lands. But for the cotton crop, produced on his land and through his enterprise, there would be no balance of trade in our favor. Receiving no pension, save a pittance from the Commonwealth that has been despoiled by war and robbed by Reconstruction laws, he has, with the toil and enterprise of himself and the sons sprung from his loins, furnished from his taxable values fully one-third of the revenue that has gone to pension the survivors of the Federal army, and the widows of those who sleep in the well-kept cemeteries of the nation. The principles for which he contends are recognized everywhere as the underlying fundamental principles of government to-day.

He sees one of his own comrades, the Chief Justice of the United States, and one of his associates, an ex-Confederate. The legislative branch of government is in control of the men and their sons who are in sympathy with him. Under no other form of government could such a situation obtain. The safety of the nation is the safety of the States.

No summary, however brief, of the record and services of the Confederate would be complete without mention of the part he has played in helping shape the legislation of this country for the past forty years. In the Fifty-fifth, Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Congresses there were thirty-two ex-Confederate soldiers in the House and sixteen in the Senate. The constructive legislation they initiated and enacted into law has been of incalculable benefit to the nation, while the undesirable legislation

they prevented has gone far to preserve the equilibrium in our dual form of government.

When the Panama Canal is completed it will be no less a monument to the skill and genius of the American engineers than to the patient and untiring efforts of Senator Morgan, of Alabama. It would be a pleasant task to name many others in both houses, who through long and faithful service, have inscribed their names on the roll of fame, high among the civic heroes of this age. Your own State furnishes one whose memory is tenderly revered by every Confederate soldier, whose name will be for many years a household word in very many homes in Virginia. Major Daniel's fame as an orator will not rest primarily on the Confederate addresses he delivered, although more than one of these has long since taken rank as American classics.

His many able and eloquent speeches on constitutional questions, particularly those on the force bill and the anti-option bill, will ever rank him among the most profound lawyers and able statesmen of his day.

Senator Lodge, of Massachusetts, in closing his eulogy on Senator Daniel, said: "The Civil War brought many tragedies to North and South alike. None greater, certainly, than the division of Virginia. To a State with such a history, with such memories and traditions, there was a peculiar cruelty in such a fate. Virginia alone, among the States, has so suffered. Other wounds have healed. The land that was rent in twain is one again. The old friendships and affections are once more warm and strong as they were at the beginning. But the wound which the war dealt to Virginia can never be healed. There, and there alone, the past cannot be restored. One bows to the inevitable, but as a lover of my country and my country's past, I have felt a deep pride in the history of Virginia, in which I, as an American, had a right to share, and I have always sorrowed that an inexorable destiny had severed that land where so many brave and shining memories were garnered up. That thought was often in my mind as I looked at Senator Daniel in this chamber. Not only did he fitly and highly represent the great past with all its memories and traditions, but he also rep-

resented the tragedy, as great as the history, which had fallen upon Virginia. To the cause in which she believed she had given her all, even a part of herself, and the maimed soldier with scars which command the admiration of the world, finely typified his great State in her sorrows and her losses, as in her glories and her pride."

Confederate soldiers may well comfort themselves with the thought that each passing year sees the enmities of the past giving way for kinder feelings for them and more dispassionate judgments touching their great leaders in the War Between the States. This feeling has been voiced in Congress often during the past decade, notably in the Sixty-second Congress by two well-known representatives of great ability. The former Speaker of the House, Mr. Cannon, speaking on the Lincoln Memorial, said in part: "There are certain great characters that will dwell in the history of the country: first, Washington; second, Lincoln; third, Lee, a great man, a great general, who did his duty from his patriotic standpoint; fourth, Jefferson Davis, a great man, performing a great service for a proposed new republic as he saw his duty."

A hundred years from now the ordinary reader will recall this period, and there will be in the mouths of the school children the names of Washington, Lincoln, Grant, Lee and Jefferson Davis, but you will have to search the Congressional Record and the encyclopedias to find out about the balance of us, who have been Speakers, ex-Speakers, members of Congress, etc. Take Mr. Cannon, for instance, they will say: "It does appear that there was a man from Illinois by the name of Cannon, but I don't know much about him. There was another member by the name of Cannon in Congress from Utah, and it was said that he had seven wives."

On the same subject, Mr. Mann, of Illinois, said: "Mr. Speaker: It is now nearly half a century since the Civil War closed and Abraham Lincoln passed beyond. There has been a lapse of time which ought to permit us to survey the situation with little bias, and little passion. I have put the Civil War behind me, a great conflict that was probably inevitable. There were patriots on both sides, gallant men in opposition.

but the question of the Union was settled with the end of the war, and no one now would re-open the controverted question so bitterly contested before and during the war. I think we can well afford to do that which shows that the country is again a reunited country with the passions of war passed by, if not forgotten. I would erect a memorial to Abraham Lincoln on the father side of the Potomac River, across the river from the home of R. E. Lee, atnd the burial place of both Union and Confederate soldiers, and then I would erect a memorial bridge across the Potomac River, joining the ten Confederate States with the Union; aye, Mr. Speaker, joining the memory of Abraham Lincoln with the memories and respect for Lee; aye, Mr. Speaker, I would go farther—in the course of years, not far distant. I would construct a roadway from Washington to Mt. Vernon, and from Mt. Vernon to Richmond, and at the other end of that roadway have the government of the United States construct a memorial to Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States.”

A Virginia Representative in Congress congratulated these two distinguished statesmen on their remarks, and suggested that, most likely, had they made them ten years before the result would have been their retirement to private life.

There was one striking characteristic of the Confederate soldiers that some day will furnish a theme for song and story. Time will not permit its discussion to-night, nor is your speaker the man to do the subject full justice.

Let some able divine consult the books of Drs. Bennett and Doggett; the letters of John A. Broaddus and other chaplains of the Confederate States of America. He will find facts from which to draw a picture of faith and trust and loyalty, such as the world has not seen since Cromwell's army established the English Commonwealth.

This faith was the result of the teachings and prayers of the noblest women who ever graced God's green earth. Their unshaken faith in the Confederate cause, upheld, sustained and prolonged the unequal conflict, while their patient waiting and watching at their homes, providing for and teaching their children, and praying for the absent fathers and brothers, furnishes

the most striking example of self-sacrifice and devotion to duty this world has ever seen.

Were these women praying against the fiat of the Almighty? If America had to suffer the penalty of violated law, were their husbands and brothers sinners above all others? Can't we learn to discard the old superstition that heaven is revealed in the immediate results of trial by combat." The Christian civilization of the first three centuries went down in the darkness of medieval times. Paul was beheaded and Nero crowned, and Christ crucified. Turn the pages of history, and you will find "truth on the scaffold and wrong on the throne."

The cheerfulness of the Confederate soldier stood out in bold relief, almost to the close of the unequal conflict. No wonder that it abated, to a degree, around Petersburg. No wonder at the desertions there, greater perhaps than in all the years before. The plainest man in the ranks could see that the end had come. The letters from home telling of suffering and want were heart-rending. A Northern lady, during the reunion at Gettysburg, remarked on the cheerfulness of the men in gray, saying their step was more elastic and their manner so different from the men in blue. One of the most cheerful men in this city can be seen any day on the grounds of the Soldiers' Home, with a book under his arm and humming a favorite tune. Another, totally blind, walks steadily through the grounds with a pleasant word for all he meets.

The game of "setback," that many apparently enjoy, must be a constant reminder of the setbacks they have received both in war and peace. Surely the representatives of the people of this Commonwealth in the Legislature this winter will follow the suggestions of the Norfolk camp, seconded by Petersburg and this camp, and contribute to the further comfort of these men, as well as many of their comrades scattered through Virginia, from her ocean-laved shores to her mountain tops, the aged and invalid and helpless survivors of the hosts that made the name and fame of the Army of Northern Virginia, whose deeds of valor will live in song and story while the sky has a star or the ocean a tide. There cannot be over 18,000 of these soldiers in the State. There are only 1,400 in the cities and

counties that form this congressional district. Largely over half of these do not need and would not accept any assistance.

If need be, other appropriations can be delayed. These men are falling more rapidly than their comrades fell in battle. They will not need human assistance long, for soon they will be with the angels, and walking the streets of the new Jerusalem. While building monuments to the dead and strewing their graves each springtime with flowers let us give comfort and cheer to those who still linger in this vale of tears.

You may be sure that the noble women of the South

“Shall love to teach their children
Of our heroes who are dead,
Of the battle scars they carried,
Marching to a soldier's tread;
Of their loyal hearts so tender.
All aglow in truth's array,
And the many recollections
Of the boys who wore the gray.”

HON. JUDAH P. BENJAMIN.

By RABBI CALISCH.

An oil portrait of Mr. Benjamin was presented by members of the Jefferson Club to Lee Camp No. 1, C. V., Richmond, Va., at the meeting of Lee Camp, on November 20th, 1902. The address of presentation was made by Rabbi E. N. Calisch, as follows:

Rabbi Calisch began by saying that it is quite impossible to estimate the influence that any one individual exercises upon his community or upon the common human progress. It is not always necessarily true that those who occupy the most conspicuous positions are the most effective factors in human history or progress. Often the most decisive conflict is fought unheralded and in silence. Among those who fought in this silent and unheralded battle of brains, and not of brawn, was one who gave to the South in her hour of sorest need the power of a mighty intellect, the loyalty of a loving heart, the generous meed of a devoted and self-sacrificing service, one who because of the worth and efficiency of this service earned the sobriquet of the "Brains of the Confederacy," the one whose portrait he had the honor to present, Judah Philip Benjamin.

The rabbi then gave a sketch of the life of Mr. Benjamin, touching upon his birth, his early years, his legal triumphs, his success in the United States Senate, to which he was elected from Louisiana in 1852, and was the first Jew to occupy a seat in the chamber, his work in the Cabinet of the Confederacy, his flight to England, his triumphs again at the English bar, his honor and his death in Paris May, 1884.

This was the life of Judah P. Benjamin. This sketch of it, cursory and incomplete as it is, tells plainly what the man was.

His struggles, his achievements, his conduct during prosperity and adversity, give eloquent testimony to his magnificent mentality, his tireless energy, his indomitable courage, his unvarying loyalty to the South. His mental faculties were of the massive and majestic order, possessing solidity, strength and exhaustless power. But because titanic his intellect was by no means slow or heavy. He was quick and keen in debate, skillful and incisive in repartee, active and accurate in those legal and forensic tourneys in which his professional and civic duties called him to participate. Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, who was his constant opponent, paid high tribute to his ability, and declared him the ablest and most eloquent man in the Senate. And those were days when the Senate of the United States was an august body, and ability and eloquence characteristic of its deliberations.

His mind was constituted to deal with large things. He loved to plead causes, and though he could, when necessity demanded, play with consummate skill upon logical premises and twist them to suit his case, yet he could not "reduce his mind to a level with those speciosities" that are often resorted to to twist a verdict from a jury. His capacity for work was apparently inexhaustible. He would often labor from 8 A. M. till 2 and 3 of the following morning. President Davis recognized this capacity, and gave him much work that did not belong to his department. It was said that he was the only officer in the Cabinet who could fill any other man's place.

Mr. Benjamin's success and his eloquence were the fruit of his tremendous mental power more than of any special physical grace or gift. In figure he was short and inclined to be stout. In feature, while not typically, he was distinguishably Jewish. His eyes, hair and beard were dark, the face round and the lips full. His voice was silvery and resonant when he poured forth the flow of logic, rhetoric superb diction, scholarly research and invincible argument that characterized his addresses. We can easily understand how he gained his triumphs in the forum and at the bar. It is said that this richness and perfection of style he evinced in the most unimportant documents. He did not write a note even for a servant to fetch an umbrella that was

not a model of diction and rhetoric. While not given to levity or jocular he was a most genial and agreeable companion. Mr. Harrison (in *Century Magazine*, November, 1883) says that on that memorable retreat of President Davis and his Cabinet and officers, "as long as he (Benjamin) remained with us, his cheery, good humor and his readiness to adapt himself to the requirement of all emergencies made him a most agreeable comrade."

This cheery courage and readiness to adapt himself to the requirements of all emergencies stood him in good stead in the bitter hours that followed that retreat. When he came to London he was a destitute fugitive, a man of the comparatively advanced age of fifty-five years, had much to learn and much to unlearn, for American law while founded on English, yet diverges from it in many ways and differs in many technicalities of practice. But he set to work with that characteristic, tireless energy, and not only did he overcome these disadvantages, but he coped with the elite of the English bar, and repeated in England the legal triumphs he had won in America. He won the enviable position of Queen's Counsellor. He published not long after his admission to the English bar a work on the sale of property known as "Benjamin on Sales," which is today yet one of the standard authorities in law, as much so as Blackstone's Commentaries.

On his service to the Confederacy but few words need be said. No history of that lost, lamented, yet much loved cause can fail to recognize his work. He won by that work recognition, even from opponents, as the "Brain of the Confederacy." He was to the government at Richmond what Lee was to the army in the field. He gave to it all he had, the full powers of his magnificent intellect, the great force of his untiring energy, his fortune and his all. He carried over sea with him his love of the Southland, to whose memory he was loyal to his last breath and to whose sufferers he never failed to give succor when again his labors had brought him to bask in the sunshine of prosperity.

The speaker then referred to Mr. Benjamin's labors in behalf of the South while in the Senate, of his eloquent and convincing defense, first of Louisiana in particular, and of the South in general. He referred also to Mr. Benjamin's retirement from

the Senate, depicting that memorable and impressive scene, and quoting from the latter's farewell speech. He then continued:

With these words Judah P. Benjamin passed out of the chamber of the American Senate to cast his fortunes with the Southland, to have his heart beat high with hers in the earlier days of her victories, to suffer and sorrow with her when the never-to-be-forgotten days of her distress and desolation drew on, and finally falling with her into the ruin of her catastrophe, to end his days in a foreign land, heaped with new honors, it is true, but loyal unto her with his very last breath.

It is the portrait of this distinguished gentleman, advocate, scholar and statesman that I have the honor to present to you, sir, for Lee Camp of Confederate Veterans. It is with peculiar pride and pleasure that I do so. I stand here in the name of the Jewish community of this city, some of whose members have given the means whereby this presentation is made possible. We do this for the reason that we feel we are honoring ourselves in thus honoring a coreligionist. Judah P. Benjamin was born of Jewish parents and reared as a Jewish child. I have not been able to discover if he was an observing Jew or not. But this I know, had he been a traitor we would have had to bear the ignominy of his wrong doing—but as he was a hero, a statesman, a gentleman and a patriot, we claim the privilege of sharing in the reflection of his glory.

The speaker then paid a glowing tribute to the Jewish Confederate soldier, saying that he stood for two things, his love for the Southland and the vindication of his people. Consciously or not Judah P. Benjamin stood for these two things too, and most nobly helped to achieve them. The cause for which he consciously fought was destined by the God of battles not to be won. But the inspiration of his own life, its energy and courage, its remarkable triumphs, even in defeat, its high souled honor and its noble fortitude will remain an inspiration as long as men will have minds to remember and hearts to understand.

HON. JUDAH P. BENJAMIN.

Speech of Judge George L. Christian, Receiving a Portrait of Mr Benjamin for Lee Camp, U. C. V., Richmond, Va.

Ladies and Gentlemen, and Comrades:

When I was first asked by the honorable chairman of your portrait committee to perform the duty of receiving this portrait for the Camp, I unhesitatingly declined. In doing this I believe you know, it was from no lack of disposition on my part, to serve this Camp, or the generous donors of this gift. But my declination was based solely upon two grounds, (1) I have no time for preparation for this occasion, and (2), I have so often appeared before the Camp on similar occasions, that I feel satisfied the Camp must be tired of hearing my voice from this rostrum. I frankly gave to your chairman these excellent reasons for declining, and they seemed satisfactory to him at the time. A few weeks later, he came again, conveying the somewhat gratifying information, that the donors of the gift insisted that I should take part in these proceedings, and saying, indeed, that they would not consent that any other person should fill the place assigned by them to me.

I again hesitated, as your chairman knows; but when I reflected, that the men and women who make this contribution to this gallery, are not only among my truest and best friends, but are also among the most useful and enterprising citizens of this city, and that some of them were among the most gallant and loyal supporters of the Confederate cause, I could not hesitate longer to consent to contribute my humble mite to aid them in their noble and patriotic endeavor. I reflected, too, that mine was a subordinate part in this performance, and knowing, as I did, that the gifted and eloquent gentleman, to

whom was assigned the "laboring oar," would say *all* that need be said about the illustrious subject of this portrait, I gave my consent to act the minor part in these interesting exercises.

As I have said, on a former occasion, to me, the most interesting and impressive services that take place in this historic city from year to year, and from time to time, are those performed by the patriotic women of the Hollywood, Oakwood, and Hebrew Memorial Associations, in making their annual pilgrimages, to deck with the flowers of each recurring spring the graves of the immortal and heroic Confederate dead, and the meeting of these remnants of the Confederate armies gathering here from time to time, to adorn these graves, with the representative soldiers and statesmen of the "storm cradled" but meteoric, and ever glorious Confederacy.

"Ah realm of tombs, but let her live
Thus blossom to the end of time,
No nation rose so white and fair,
None fell so pure of crime."

No better evidence of the justice of the Confederate cause can be found, in my opinion, thru the fact of the unanimity of its supporters, in the South, from '61 to '65, and the fact that these supporters were confined to no class, creed or condition of our people. But Jews and Gentile, great and small, high and low, within the limits of the seceded States were enlisted almost as one man on the side of the defense of their homes and firesides, which was the embodiment of the real principle underlying the Confederate cause, and the further fact that although that cause went down in defeat more than a third of a century ago, its memories and its principles are still engraven on our hearts.

Among the Jews, easily the most distinguished and conspicuous, as he was one of the most remarkable men, not only of his race but of every other, was Judah Phillips Benjamin, of Louisiana. Of all reputations attained by men of intellect and learning, that of the great lawyer is the most ephemeral. Many of us, when the name of the greatest man of his age

is mentioned, only remember, that Lord Francis Bacon was driven from the Woolsack for accepting bribes from the writers, and are ignorant, or forget the great ability exhibited by him in the prosecution of the Earl of Essex, for treason, or the splendid opinions delivered by him as the Lord Chancellor of England. One great reason why the reputation of the great lawyer, practically dies with him, arises from the fact, that comparatively few are witnesses of his great exploits, in the arguments and conduct of his cases; and fewer still, are interested in the results of these displays.

The career of Mr. Benjamin is, however, unique in the fact, that although, not a citizen of one, and scarcely a citizen of the other, he easily attained the highest rank at the Bar of the two greatest English speaking nations of the earth, and he attained these by reason of his even worth and work and talents, and without any of these fortuitous helps by which men often climb to eminence. He did it, too, without resorting to those expedients of such doubtful propriety of "blowing his own horn" in the press, by which so many reputations are made and as frequently marred, in these days. Mr. Benjamin not only never resorted to these methods, but he had a habit of destroying his letters, and other memoranda, which might conduce to the enlargement of his great reputation. When Mr. Benjamin first came to the Bar, he at once familiarized himself with the decisions of his adopted State, Louisiana, by making a complete and most useful digest of those decisions. He very soon attained the highest rank at that Bar, and was so successful, that he soon retired therefrom, with wealth, and became a planter. In this calling too he met with great success, as far as his efforts and talents could condense to success. But all his accumulations on the farm were destroyed by one of the disastrous floods, to which that country was then subject, and he was thus forced to again return to the Bar. In 1847 he was sent to California as a Commissioner of the Federal Government, with a retainer of \$25,000, to straighten out some of the tangled land titles in that State. In 1852 he was elected to the U. S. Senate from Louisiana, and was re-elected in 1857. Mr. Charles Sumner said of him, that he was the most

accomplished and consummate orator in the country. It was said by a leading English paper that his speech in defence of Louisiana's right to secede "sent an electric thrill throughout the civilized world." Sir George Cornwall Lewis said to Lord Sherbrooke, "Have you read Benjamin's speech? It is better than our Benjamin (meaning Disraeli) could have done." He could hardly have paid Benjamin a higher compliment. One or two extracts from this speech will convince the most sceptical of the great powers of its author, and that Sumner was right in his estimate of him.

It was claimed by the Republicans, that whatever right to withdraw from the Union the thirteen original States might have, that those States included in the Louisiana Purchase, could claim and exercise no such right, since those States were purchased with the money and were consequently the property of the Federal Government. In this contention, Mr. Benjamin replied in part, as follows. He said: "I shall not pause to comment on this repulsive dogma of a party which asserts the right of property in free born white men, in order to reach its cherished object of destroying the right of property in slave born black men—still less shall I detain the Senate, in pointing out how shadowy the distinction between the condition of the servile African and that to which the white freemen of my State would be reduced, if it indeed be true that they are bound to this government by ties that cannot be legitimately dissolved without the consent of that very majority which wields its powers for their oppression. I simply deny the fact on which the argument is founded. I deny that the province of Louisiana, or the people of Louisiana, were ever conveyed to the United States for a price, as property that could be bought or sold." And he then went on to prove his assertion by the terms of the grant, and then said, "The rights of Louisiana, as a sovereign State, are those of Virginia, no more and no less. Let those who deny her right to resume delegated powers, successfully refute the claim of Virginia to the same right, in spite of her express reservation made and notified to her sister States when she consented to enter the Union; and, sir, permit me to say, that, of all the causes that justify the action of the

Southern States, I know none of greater gravity and more alarming magnitude, than that now developed, of the right of secession. A pretension so monstrous as that which perverts a restricted agency constituted by sovereign States, for common purposes, into the unlimited despotism of the majority, and denies all legitimate escape from such despotism, when powers not delegated are usurped, converts the whole constitutional fabric into the secure abode of lawless tyranny, and degrades sovereign States into provincial dependencies." After showing, in a conclusive way, that the right of secession did exist, and that that right was first threatened by Massachusetts, and the other New England States, 'in answer to the contention that such a right would make the Constitution "a rope of sand," he said:

"But, sir, if the fact were otherwise, if all the teachings of experience were reversed—better, far better, a rope of sand, aye, the flimsiest gossamer that ever glistened in the morning dew, than chains of iron and shackles of steel; better the wildest anarchy, with the hope, the chance, of an hour's inspiration of glorious breath of freedom, than ages of hopeless bondage and oppression, to which our enemies would reduce us."

In answer to the cry of "rebellion," so flippantly raised by the Republicans, he said: "Rebellion! the very word is a confession, an avowal of tyranny, outrage and oppression. It is taken from the despot's code, and has no terror for others than slavish souls. When, sir, did millions of people, as a single man, rise in organized, deliberate, unimpassioned rebellion, against justice, truth and honor?"

In answer to the cry of traitors and treason, so freely indulged in by the Republicans, he said:

"Traitors! Treason! Ay, sir, the people of the South imitate and glory in just such treason as glowed in the soul of Hampden; just such treason as leaped in living flame from the impassioned lips of Henry; just such treason as encircles with a sacred halo the undying name of Washington."

You have been told of his great services to the Confederacy, being a member of its Cabinet from its birth to its untimely end. Dr. Cary says of him: "During the, &c.," p. 139.

Cooper DeLeon says of him, p. 34: "The Attorney General, &c.," p. 34.

The intended slur, contained in the concluding lines of the reference from DeLeon, are not justified by anything that I can find in the history of this most remarkable man, and eminent lawyer and statesman. On the contrary, the honors he achieved, both as a lawyer and statesman in this country, and especially the position attained at the English Bar, I think, fully attest the contrary. On his enforced retirement, on account of failing health, from the English Bar, the celebrities of that Bench and Bar gave him a complimentary dinner at which the Attorney General, the Lord Chancellor, and the Lord Chief Justice, vied with each other in showering compliments upon him, not only as to his accomplishments and ability as a lawyer, but also as to his integrity and worth as a man. The Lord Chief Justice, in the course of his speech, said:

"He came among us as a foreigner, in mature life, with great known celebrity, yet he has told us how he was received, and he knows that from no member of the profession, high or low, was there ever one spark of jealousy at the unrivalled success which he so speedily attained both on Circuit and in Westminster Hall. He knows that we are all proud of him. He knows that with a unanimity, remarkable even in this generous profession, Bench and Bar have met to-night with enthusiastic cordiality to do him honor. I am told by a learned friend of mine, older than myself, and who knows everything, that forty years ago some similar honor was intended for, though, as it happened, it could not be actually received by Story. Forty years have elapsed, and we pay such an honor to one more distinguished than Story."

"Approbation from Sir Hubert is praise indeed."

When Mr. Benjamin went to England, he had lost practically all he had in the wreck of the Confederacy. The civil law being in force in Louisiana, he had to become a law student again, to become acquainted with the common law, and thus fit himself for admission to the English Bar. This he bravely set to work to do, maintaining himself in the meantime by one contribution a week to one of the great London

papers, for each of which he received \$25. His powers of labor and of acquisition were simply immense, and in an incredibly short time, and by a special dispensation, he was granted admission to the Bar. His success was immediate. He began his career in England, as he had done when first coming to the Bar in Louisiana, by writing a law-book, and "Benjamin on Sales of Personal Property," first published in 1868, has run through numerous editions, both in England and in this country, is now the standard work on this subject, and is regarded as a classic in the law, almost immediately on its appearance. A distinguished English Judge directed the Bailiff of his court to see that a copy was kept always by his side.

Whilst, as we have intimated, Mr. Benjamin was a great lawyer in every department of the profession, his powers were best displayed in arguing legal and constitutional questions before the courts, and not in the cross-examination of witnesses and general conduct of cases at *misi prin*. He, therefore, soon abandoned this part of the practice, and confined his labors to the argument of cases before the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and Court of Appeals. His special *forte* was in the statement of his case. It is said that on one occasion, when he was opposed to Mr. Reverdy Johnson in the Supreme Court of the U. S., after he had stated his case, one of the judges whispered to another, that the "Jew from Louisiana had stated Mr. Johnson out of court." He was less fortunate, however, on a subsequent occasion in the House of Lords, for when he stated a proposition the Lord Chancellor said, *sotto voce*, "Nonsense." Whereupon Mr. Benjamin quietly gathered up his papers and left the room. The next day the Lord Chancellor apologized, saying he had done what he ought not to have done. It is said he was not afraid of anything, and would not, for a moment, tolerate any treatment which smacked of an insult, no matter from what source it came. As an evidence of this, on one occasion Mr. Jefferson Davis, on the floor of the Senate, said something which Mr. Benjamin construed as an indignity, and he promptly sent Mr. Davis a note, demanding satisfaction, or an apology. To show the high character and chivalrous bearing of Mr. Davis, as soon as he saw he was wrong, he sent Benjamin

word that he would apologize the next day on the floor of the Senate, where the offense was given, and he did so. These men were friends the rest of their lives. On another occasion a Senator from Kentucky sneeringly alluded to him as "that Jew from Louisiana." In his reply, Mr. Benjamin retorted, "The gentleman from Kentucky, forgetting his honorable and exalted position, has stooped so low as to assail me on the point of my religious faith. Sneeringly, he calls me a Jew. Well, sir, I am a Jew. But (shaking his finger at the Senator), when his ancestors were herding swine upon the plains of Scandinavia, mine were following the Maccabees to victory."

Many other incidents could be told of this very remarkable man's career, but I have already trespassed too long, and must stop. It will interest you to know that during Mr. Benjamin's stay in Richmond, which, as we have seen, was the whole four years of the war, he resided in house No. 9 West Main street, where Col. Cutshaw resided so long and occupied the same room so long used by our gallant and beloved comrade. During the last days of the Confederacy, he was, for a week, the roommate of that great and good man of God, the late Dr. Moses Drury Hoge. They were warm friends, and I have often heard Dr. Hoge refer to Mr. Benjamin as one of the cleanest and most companionable men he was ever thrown with.

Old Thomas Carlyle, in his "Latter Day Pamphlets," says "Whom doth the King delight to honor? That is the question of questions concerning the King's own honor. Show me the man you honor; I know by that symptom better than by any other, what kind of a man you yourself are. For you show me there what your ideal of manhood is, what kind of man you long inexpressibly to be, and would thank the gods with your whole soul for being if you could."

"Who is to have a statue? means whom shall we consecrate and set apart as one of our sacred men, sacred, that all men may see him; be reminded of him, and, by new examples added to old precepts, be taught what is real worth in man."

And so, my friends and comrades, we gather here from time to time, and place on these walls, in this our Valhalla, the portraits of our leaders, civil and military, in our great struggle

for constitutional freedom. These are our representative men, they are our ideals, the men we consecrate and set apart, and we are content that the world shall judge us, and say what kind of people we were and the character of the principles we espoused and fought for, by the conduct and the characters of the men who represented and led us in that struggle. We invite a comparison between them and the representatives of our *quondam* enemies occupying corresponding positions; we having their portraits upon the walls of fame, Davis on the one side, Lincoln on the other; Benjamin on the one side, Seward on the other; Seddon on the one side, Stanton on the other; Lee on the one side, Grant on the other; Joe Johnston on the one side, Sherman on the other; Stonewall Jackson on the one side, Sheridan on the other; Stuart on the one side, Kilpatrick on the other, and we proudly say to the world, "Look on this picture and then on that," and judge between us.

On behalf of this Camp, I gratefully accept this portrait, not only as a recognition of the worth and services of the great original; but as an expression of the loyalty and devotion of the noble men and women of the Hebrew race, who have done so much to make our beautiful city the representative city of the South.

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

By **Randolph H. McKim**, late 1st Lieutenant and A. D. C. Brig.-Gen.
Geo. H. Steuart's Brigade, Major-Gen. **Edward**
Johnson's Division, **Ewell's Corps**.

I. PRELIMINARY STRATEGY.

On the 12th of June, 1863, Gen. Joe Hooker with his great host of one hundred and thirty thousand men, lay encamped on the Stafford Heights, on the Rappahannock River, opposite Fredericksburg, within sixty miles of the Capital of the Southern Confederacy.

Two weeks later this splendid army under its gallant leader is on Pennsylvania soil marching north to intercept Lee's army, which is moving on Harrisonburg on the Susquehanna River.

Richmond has been relieved: scarcely a Federal soldier remains upon the soil of Virginia; and the burden of war has

Note.—The following is a table of distances which may be useful in studying the campaign:

Gettysburg to Washington	77	miles
Gettysburg to Emmetsburg	10	miles
Gettysburg to Frederick	34	miles
Gettysburg to Rockville	62.7	miles
Gettysburg to Littlestown	10.2	miles
Gettysburg to Westminster	24.3	miles
Gettysburg to Monterey	15	miles
Gettysburg to Waynesboro	22	miles
Gettysburg to Hagerstown	34	miles
Gettysburg to Cashtown	7.7	miles
Gettysburg to Chambersburg	24.5	miles
Gettysburg to McConnellsburg	46	miles
Gettysburg to York	28	miles
Hagerstown to Frederick	25.9	miles
Hagerstown to Washington	69.3	miles
Hagerstown to Boonsboro	10.3	miles

been transferred from that battle-worn State to the shoulders of the State of Pennsylvania.

It is Washington now, not Richmond, which is threatened! Here surely is a great military achievement—and it has been accomplished without fighting a pitched battle, in fact, with insignificant loss to the forces of the Confederate chieftain.

In studying the Gettysburg Campaign I ask you to note this splendid result of Lee's masterful strategy—the great army of General Hooker drawn a hundred and thirty miles north, clear out of Virginia and across the State of Maryland into Pennsylvania,—by the sheer force of strategy.

Observe then that in the primary purpose of this campaign, the relief of Virginia from the presence of war, Lee was successful.

The more it is studied the more is the admiration of the students of war elicited by the skilful manner in which the Confederate army was withdrawn from Hooker's front. A large part of it was marched a hundred miles north to Winchester, Va., in six days and the whole of it was transferred in about two weeks from the Rappahannock River to the Potomac, without the movement being discovered for many days after its inception. As late as June 12th Gen. Hooker wrote Gov. Dix:

"All of Lee's army so far as I know is extended along the Rappahannock from Hamilton's Crossing to Culpeper," (quoted by Thos. Nelson Page, *Life of Lee*, p. 315.)

If we ask how this was achieved the clear answer is, by Lee's skilful strategy, seconded by the adroit handling of his cavalry by his gallant and resourceful Cavalry Chief, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Later we shall see that it was the unfortunate absence of his cavalry which primarily accounts for the comparative failure of the rest of the campaign.

The boldness of Lee in marching his whole army out of Virginia and thus leaving Richmond uncovered, is notable. When Gen. Hooker at last discovered that the Confederate army was on the march for Pennsylvania, he proposed to the Washington authorities an immediate march on Richmond. This was promptly disallowed by Mr. Lincoln and his military adviser, Gen. Halleck. Doubtless Lee's experience had satisfied him that

the safety of Washington would be considered the supreme object to be kept in view, and for this reason he felt no great anxiety for the Confederate Capital in making his march into Pennsylvania.

I cannot proceed to the story of the battle itself without calling your attention to an important feature of Lees' plan of campaign which is apt to be overlooked. I mean his purpose that General Beauregard should be ordered to Culpeper Courthouse, Va., in order to threaten Washington while Gen. Lee himself was marching into Pennsylvania. He believed that an army at that point "even in effigy," as he expressed it, under so famous a leader, would have the effect of retaining a large force for the defence of the capital, and diminishing by so much the strength of the army which would oppose him in Pennsylvania. The government at Richmond, however, was unwilling, or felt itself unable, to carry out this part of Lee's plan, though we now know there were certain brigades which were available for the purpose.

We touch here a fact of moment in forming an estimate of the military capacity of Gen. Lee: I mean that he was never in supreme command of the Confederate armies until a few weeks before the close of the war, when it was too late. Field Marshal Lord Wolseley remarks that for this reason we can never accurately estimate the full measure of Lee's military genius. Strange indeed that this great soldier should have been obliged to submit the plan of his campaign to the President and Secretary of War at Richmond before he could make any arrangements for putting it into operation! And should have been obliged, by their disapproval, to abandon a part of his plan, which was really of great importance for the general result. So good a military critic as Capt. Cecil Battine, of the English army, is of opinion that this proposal, if carried out, might have had a decisive effect upon the issue of the campaign. (See "Crisis of the Confederacy.")

II. THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA—MOVEMENT OF THE CAVALRY.

I come now to consider the second stage of the Gettysburg campaign, the actual invasion of Pennsylvania.

Seldom has an army entered upon a campaign under more hopeful auspices. The victories of Fredericksburg, December, 1862, and of Chancellorsville the following May, had inspired the Army of Northern Virginia with confidence in itself and with renewed faith in the genius of its great commander. It had been strengthened by the return of the two divisions of Longstreet's corps. It had been skilfully reorganized. In a word, it was the finest army Lee had ever commanded, although not the largest; better equipped and armed than ever before; thoroughly disciplined. The organization of the Confederate artillery has been pronounced by distinguished Federal authorities "almost ideal;" although it was far inferior in number of pieces and weight of metal to the artillery of the Union Army. Col. Fiebiger, Professor of Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy, says: "If the differences of the two armies are fairly weighed, the chances of success in the campaign about to be opened, were in favor of General Lee, notwithstanding his numerical inferiority." Gen. Long, of Gen. Lee's staff, says: "The Army of Northern Virginia appeared the best disciplined, the most high spirited and most enthusiastic army on the continent. The successful campaign which this army had recently passed through, inspired it with almost invincible ardour."

Again, he says: "Everything seemed to promise success and the joyful animation with which the men marched north after the movement actually began, and the destination of the army was communicated to them, appeared a true presage of victory."

Gen. Lee himself said: "Never was there such an army; it will go anywhere and do anything if properly led." Upon which Chas. Francis Adams remarks: "This is not an exaggerated statement. I do not believe any more formidable or better organized force was ever set in motion than that which Lee led across the Potomac in 1863. It was essentially an army of fighters, and could be depended upon for any feat of arms in the power of mere mortals to accomplish; they would blench at no danger."

Nevertheless, in spite of these favorable auspices the campaign did not achieve victory. Why then did it fail? If any

experienced soldier had been able to look down from a balloon, or an aeroplane, upon the advancing columns of Lee's army after they had crossed the Potomac, and were moving northward toward the Susquehanna, the reason of the ultimate failure of the campaign would at once have suggested itself. He would have said,—“where is the cavalry that should be marching on the right flank of the army?” And had he, a few days later, turned his eyes eastward and seen Stuart with his 5,000 horsemen marching through Maryland on the right flank of the Federal army, entirely severed from communication with the Confederate army, he could not but have been greatly astonished.

Lee's campaign in the opinion of the best European and American critics suffered from a fundamental error—the absence of the larger part of his cavalry with their skillful and intrepid leader, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. “At Gettysburg,” says Col. G. F. R. Henderson, “you have an instance of this screen, the cavalry, being altogether absent; and I think the difficulties of the General arising from this absence will illustrate how completely the other arms are paralyzed without the aid of the cavalry.”*

Again, he says: “What were the circumstances that thus paralyzed his army, and his own great skill in daring manoeuvres? Why was a flank march, possible in front of Hooker in June, impossible in front of Meade in July? The answer is simple—the absence of the cavalry.”

Major Steele, in his “American Campaigns,” says (p. 362): “Never did Lee so much need ‘the eyes of his army’ that were now wandering on a fool's errand. Without his cavalry, his army was groping in the dark; he was in the enemy's country and could get no information from the people. He did not know where Meade's army was. All he could do was to concentrate his forces and be ready for a blow on either side.”

General Lee's own opinion on the subject is recorded by Gen. Long in his *Memoirs*, (p. 275): “Gen. Lee now exhibited a degree of anxiety and impatience, and expressed regret at the

*Lecture on Battle of Gettysburg, p. 6. See also his “Science of War,” the chapter on Gettysburg.

absence of his cavalry. He said that he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially hampered the movement, and disorganized the campaign."

Here then we have a sufficient reason for the failure of the Gettysburg campaign which had begun so auspiciously: *the major part of Lee's cavalry did him no service whatever during the first week of the invasion.*

But why was it absent? Was Gen. Lee ignorant of the importance of using his cavalry in screening his front, in reconnoitering, and securing information of the movements of the enemy? Such a supposition is absurd. On the other hand, knowing, and realizing as he must have done, the great importance of this use of his cavalry, did he fail to give his chief of cavalry the necessary orders to fulfill this function?

In other words, was Gen. Lee responsible for this fundamental mistake in his campaign? was it his intention to be separated from the bulk of his cavalry in his advance into Pennsylvania? To answer this question I direct your attention to the instructions given by General Lee to General Stuart. He wrote Gen. Ewell that he had instructed Gen. Stuart to "march with three brigades across the Potomac and place himself on your right and in communication with you; keep you advised of the movements of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army." To Gen. Stuart himself Gen. Lee wrote, June 22: "You can move with the other three brigades into Maryland and take position on Ewell's right (Ewell was to march northward June 23d), place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, another by Chambersburg."

This order was repeated in a letter to Gen. Stuart dated June 23d, a part of which I will quote:

Major-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart,
Commanding Cavalry.

General:

* * * I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In other words, after crossing the river you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. * * * I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow, the better. I am

Very respectfully and truly yours,

R. E. LEE,
General.

Thus, in the very last communication received by General Stuart from General Lee the order was emphatically given that as soon as he crossed the river he should place himself on Ewell's right and march with him toward the Susquehanna. The Commanding General indicated Frederick, Md., as Stuart's first objective, and he thought that he had better cross at Shepherdstown; but gave him the option of crossing east of the Blue Ridge and passing around the Federal army if he could "do so without hindrance."

This refers to a suggestion which General Stuart had made, viz: that he should pass through Hopewell or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountains, gain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac.

Now, at the time of this correspondence, Ewell's corps whose right flank Stuart was to guard, was just beginning its march northward from Hagerstown, and General Hooker's army was still in Virginia. General Stuart's plan then contemplated passing round General Hooker's rear *while his army was still south of the Potomac*; and General Lee's conditional authorization contemplated that, and that only. It did not authorize Gen-

eral Stuart to carry out his plan of passing round the enemy's rear after the enemy had transferred his army to the north side of the Potomac. Col. Mosby confirms this view, for he says in his book, p. 212, "the orders contemplated Stuart crossing the Potomac *in advance of both armies.*" Col. Mosby also says "the object was to go by the most direct route to Ewell."*

Now, did General Stuart carry out the above instructions and do these things? The history of the campaign shows that he did *none* of these things; he was not on Ewell's right in the march toward the Susquehanna; he did not guard his flank; he did not keep him advised of the movements of the enemy. But it has been affirmed that General Lee gave Stuart discretion to take the route that he did, viz: to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge and pass by the enemy's rear. I submit that this is a complete misapprehension of the instructions of the Commanding General. In the first place, as just pointed out, his assent to the plan of passing around Hooker's army was given when Hooker's army was in Virginia. He was instructed to cross the Potomac *in advance of Hooker*, he had no permission to pass around Hooker's army after that army had crossed the Potomac. *Only*, it should be observed that General Lee's consent to Stuart's plan was conditional. Here is General Lee's language: "You will be able to judge whether you can pass around their army *without hindrance.*" Now, when Stuart attempted that move he found all the roads obstructed by the columns of Hooker's army moving to cross the Potomac. Was not this a *most serious hindrance?* and did not its existence cancel Lee's conditional permission to cross the Potomac east of the mountains? It follows that Stuart departed from Lee's orders when he crossed east of the mountains and thus cut himself off from the Confederate army. Moreover, General Lee wrote that he should cross the river on the 24th. He did not cross till the night of the 27th. In doing so the gallant Stuart committed a serious error of judgment. Now it is not a pleasant task to point out the responsibility of this splendid officer for the failure of the Gettysburg campaign; but we are confronted

*"Stuart's Cavalry in Gettysburg Campaign," p. 212.

by the alternative of convicting General Lee of a serious and inexcusable error in the plan of his campaign, or recognizing what the facts and the correspondence establish beyond contradiction,—that it was General Stuart, and not General Lee, who committed the error. He failed to keep in view the main object of his expedition, which was to co-operate with Ewell in his march through Maryland to Harrisburg.

The first and most important duty imposed upon the chief of cavalry was subordinated to the secondary and incidental object of damaging General Hooker's communications and making a raid around his army. Colonel Henderson remarks: "in the Gettysburg campaign Stuart forgot for once that to cover the march of the army and to send in timely information, are services of far greater importance than cutting the enemy's communications and harassing his rear." ("Science of War," p. 303).

When General Stuart discovered that the Federal army was moving to cross the Potomac, which it did *three days before he crossed* at Seneca ford, two things should have been considered by him: 1st, that the reason given by Gen. Longstreet for the suggestion that he should pass in the rear of the Federal army (viz: that his passage of the Potomac by Shepherdstown "would disclose our plans") no longer existed; for evidently the enemy had discovered Lee's northward movement and were following him. And 2d, that General Lee's permission to pass around the rear of the Federal army did not apply to the situation now developed when the Federal army had left Virginia. To take that course now, after June 25th, would completely prevent the main object of his expedition, which was to "join the right of the army in Pennsylvania," on its march "towards the Susquehanna." It was also in conflict with Lee's admonition that "the sooner he got over the river after the 24th, the better." His long detour by Fairfax Courthouse delayed his passage of the river until the night of the 27th. So instead of marching with Ewell from the Potomac to the Susquehanna, Ewell made his march and reached Carlisle before General Stuart began to cross the Potomac!

Nor is this all. General Stuart erred in judgment in the

course he took after he brought his 5,000 horsemen across the Potomac on the night of the 27th. Instead of proceeding "with all dispatch" to join Ewell, he stopped to break up the canal, and to intercept and capture canal boats and burn them; he also captured a wagon train and "took it along" on the march of the 28th. This proceeding consumed valuable time that should have been devoted to marching to Ewell. By that time Longstreet was at Chambersburg and Ewell at Carlisle. Was it not Stuart's duty to make all speed to overtake Ewell as three precious days had been lost? And could he do this encumbered by a captured wagon train? He knew that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was marching northward. Then should it not have been his supreme purpose to march day and night and place himself in communication with Ewell, and be at hand to render whatever service he could? He does not seem to have been of that opinion, for he had only gone as far as Westminster by the evening of the 29th, though Westminster is less than 50 miles from the point where he had crossed the Potomac (two days' march for infantry). Had he pressed on the morning of the 28th he could easily have reported to General Early at York (30 miles further) before nightfall of the 29th, or certainly before day-break of the 30th. In that case he would not have made the fruitless march to Carlisle but would have marched with Early on the 30th.

Observe that the march of Stuart's horsemen was seriously impeded by the captured wagon train which he "took along." In his report he says: "If my command had been well closed now, this cavalry column would have been at our mercy; but, owing to the great elongation of the column by reason of the 200 wagons and hilly roads, Hampton was a long way behind and Fitz Lee was not yet heard from on the left."

Again, he says, "our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment." Observe that but for the drag put on General Stuart's column by the captured wagon train he might have marched from Westminster to Gettysburg by Littlestown; for he could have reached Westminster by the morning of the 29th instead of at sundown; and at that earlier hour he probably would not have found the Federal cavalry on that road.

General E. P. Alexander (Memoirs, p. 375) says, "in saving a large number of wagons instead of burning them, and delaying twelve hours to parole his prisoners, instead of bringing along the officers and letting the men go, Stuart committed serious blunders."

He further says (p. 375) that had Stuart's column "here followed the direct road via Littlestown to Gettysburg, only about 16 miles away, it could have reached Gettysburg before 11 A. M. on the 30th, where it would have found itself in good position in front of Lee's army then concentrated at Cashtown." And he adds, further, that in that case "Lee's army would have occupied some strong position between Cashtown and Gettysburg, and the onus of attack would have been on the Federals, as had been the plan of the campaign."

Thus but for his unnecessary, fatal delay he would have been at Littlestown before the Federals, and could have reached Gettysburg by the morning of the 30th. We put then the question plainly: Did General Stuart exert himself with whole hearted energy to carry out the instructions he received, and in the most expeditious manner? In so critical and fateful a movement as the invasion of Pennsylvania, it was supremely important that every officer should carry out the orders of the commander-in-chief with the strictest fidelity and exactness. As a matter of fact Ewell made his march to the Susquehanna, starting on June 23d from Hagerstown, without receiving any aid from General Stuart. That officer was not able to accomplish *any of the things* he was charged to do in connection with Ewell's advance; and he was not able to do so, *first* because he crossed east of the Blue Ridge and passed round Hooker's army when the reason for that line of march no longer existed, and when the circumstances under which he had received permission to do so had completely changed; and *secondly*, because, having crossed the Potomac on the night of the 27th, he did not march as directly and expeditiously as possible to effect a junction with General Ewell. It cannot be supposed that when Lee gave Stuart instructions on the 22d of June, he had any idea that that officer would not report to General Ewell until afternoon of July 2d, the tenth day after.

I will add a remark made by Capt. Cecil Battine, the accomplished military critic already quoted: "Probably it was the want of information due to the lack of cooperating cavalry, which lay at the root of the halting tactics of the Confederate leaders. Thus, every move of the enemy took them by surprise, and inspired them with unnecessary caution at the very moment when boldness would have gained so much." ("Crisis of the Confederacy," p. 195.)

Napoleon's maxim might have been advantageously remembered by Stuart, "An army superior in cavalry will always have the advantage of covering its movements, being well informed of the enemy's movements, and giving battle only when it chooses."*

III. MOVEMENTS OF THE INFANTRY.†

I turn now to the movements of the infantry of Lee's army. Ewell's corps moved northward from Hagerstown on the 23d of June, taking up the line of march for Chambersburg, and Carlisle, with Harrisburg as its objective. It reached Carlisle June 27th. Hill's corps crossed the Potomac on the 24th of June, and marched through Hagerstown and Chambersburg to Fayetteville, where it arrived June 27th. Longstreet crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th of June, and reached Chambersburg on the 27th.

*"Napoleon, as a General," by Count Yorck von Wartenburg, p. 246.

† MISFORTUNES DUE TO ABSENCE OF CAVALRY.

1. Failure to occupy Gettysburg.—(Henderson).
2. Battle of first day and compulsion to fight an offensive battle the second.
3. Failure to pursue and destroy defeated enemy.
4. Flank march not feasible July 2d.—(Henderson).
5. Had Lee known true situation of Union army July 1st, Col. Fiebiger says he could have destroyed the 2d Federal Corps.—(Gettysburg, pp. 132-133).

(The Union army was under orders to move towards York, A. M., June 29th).

Decisive victory possible for Lee had the cavalry done its part in ascertaining the position of the enemy.—(Id.)

The failure of Confederates to profit by their advantages, July 1st, was due to a single cause—defective information, due to the absence of the cavalry.—Id. p. 134.

Here let me call attention to General Lee's Order No. 73, in which he charged his soldiers not to molest private property. "The duties exacted of us," said he, "by civilization and christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. The Commanding General considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army and through it our whole people than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country * * * We make war on armed men and we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of the enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth."

This order of their noble commander was strictly obeyed by the soldiers of the Confederate army. Again and again in this Pennsylvania campaign the citizens told us that we treated them far better than their own soldiers did. I can truly say I did not see a fence rail burned between Hagerstown and Gettysburg. What a contrast was presented in this respect to the armies of Napoleon of whom the historian says, describing one of their campaigns: "The Emperor's army soon took to plundering the country wholesale, considering the vanquished as having no rights worth mentioning." Commenting on this, Count von Wartenburg says, Napoleon "could only reach his highest aims by demanding enormous efforts, and could exact this only by fanning all the passions of his soldiers, and permitting them to satisfy them. He could only conquer the world by abandoning its constituent parts to his instruments as their booty."*

What a sublime contrast to all this is presented by this Southern army of invasion! They performed deeds of arms equal to any achieved by the armies of Napoleon; they made marches as long, as arduous, and as rapid, as any that his soldiers made; they endured hardships far greater than any endured by his army. But they did and endured all these things, not because their commander fanned the passions of his soldiers, and permitted them to satisfy these passions by abandoning the

*"Napoleon as a General" (pp. 310-11, 379).

country and the people to plunder; but because of the pure spirit of patriotism that burned in their breasts. Where indeed in all the records of history shall we find an army that endured what Lee's army endured, and achieved what it achieved, without reward, save the pitiful pay of \$11 Confederate money a month! It is when we contemplate these things that we realize how sublime was the spirit of devotion that animated the private soldiers of the Confederacy.

In this campaign I was attached to the staff of Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Steuart, commanding the Third Brigade of Johnson's Division, Ewell's corps; and I may therefore make brief mention of an expedition under General Steuart to McConnellsburg, Pa., a town situated beyond the Tuscarora mountains which constitute the western boundary of the great Cumberland valley, which runs from Hagerstown to Harrisburg. A glance at the map will show that McConnellsburg is as far west of Hagerstown as Gettysburg is east of it; that its latitude is considerably north of that of Gettysburg, and that, in order to reach it, General Steuart's force had to cross three subsidiary ranges of mountains. From McConnellsburg we marched eastward again, passing through Lowdontown and Chambersburg and Green Valley and Shippensburg to Stowe's Town in order to effect a junction with the rest of Ewell's corps before Carlisle. Day after day, in all weather, this expeditionary force marched 20 miles, sometimes 23 miles, a day. In the nine days previous to the battle of Gettysburg I find that we marched 133, perhaps 138 miles. I mention this in order to make a comparison with some of the famous marches made by the soldiers of Napoleon. Thus a recent historian, already quoted, says that Marshall Davoust traversed 166 miles in 14 days including the fighting of a battle. Again he says (p. 244), "The corps of Lannes and Soult marched in 13 days 152 miles along country roads. Davoust had marched 150 miles in 16 days, partly by most difficult country roads. Thus Napoleon did not after all vanquish his enemies so much by the battles of Ulm and Jena, as by his incredible marches."

The French soldiers of 1805 said: "The Emperor has in-

vented a new method of waging war, he makes use of our legs instead of our bayonets." (Id. p. 79).

Again, the soldiers said to the Emperor (p 326): "You cannot be quite right in your head to lead us about on such roads without any food."

Now a comparison with these records of marches which excite such admiring comment from the historian, shows that Stuart's brigade, in marching 133 miles in 9 days immediately preceding the battle of Gettysburg, considerably surpassed the achievements of Napoleon's soldiers. And, again I say, they were stimulated to these extraordinary exertions not by the expectation of plunder, but by devotion to their heroic chief, and to the sublime cause which he represented.

I have already said that Ewell's objective was the city of Harrisburg. Indeed this was the objective of the whole army. Both General Early, marching through York, and General Hill, crossing the South Mountain and passing through Cashtown, were instructed to cross the Susquehanna and move upon Harrisburg. Up to the evening of the 28th of June, the orders issued by General Lee contemplated the concentration of his whole army at or near Harrisburg, but late that evening intelligence was brought which gave him his first information that Hooker had crossed the Potomac; that he had subsequently been relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac by General Meade; and that that officer, with his whole army, was marching rapidly northward. This occasioned a complete change in Lee's campaign. Orders were at once issued to General Ewell at Carlisle to march southward and by him to Early at York to retrace his steps, marching southwest. The whole army was now to concentrate at or near Cashtown, which is on the eastern breast of the great South Mountain, eight miles west of Gettysburg. Here Lee hoped in a very advantageous position to fight a defensive battle. His three corps under Ewell, Hill and Longstreet were rapidly concentrating at the chosen point.

IV. FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.

Let us now point out that the battle of Gettysburg was begun on the 1st of July without orders from General Lee, and

without his knowledge, and when, in fact, he was himself far away from the field. We have a letter of his dated Greenwood (about 9 miles west of Cashtown, and 17 miles west of Gettysburg), July 1st, 7:30 A. M., in which he gives certain directions to General Imboden, then at Chambersburg; and adds, "my headquarters for the present will be at Cashtown." At that very moment Lieutenant-General Hill was marching, without orders and on his own responsibility, from Cashtown to Gettysburg with his two leading divisions, under Heth and Pender, and his artillery. Thus General Lee's purpose to fight a defensive battle, and to fight it at Cashtown, was frustrated by the unauthorized action of the commander of one of his corps.

General Ewell, marching south from Carlisle for Cashtown, heard the noise of the battle, and turning the head of his column in that direction, came to General Hill's assistance just in time to avert a serious disaster. Soon afterward General Early, marching westward from York, came upon the ground, and threw his division promptly into action. Thus a great battle was joined, without orders, in which about 50,000 men were engaged; about half on the Confederate side and half on the Union side.*

General Lee and his staff, says General Long, were ascending South Mountain on their way from Greenwood to Cashtown, when firing was heard in the direction of Gettysburg. This caused General Lee some uneasiness; he first thought that the firing indicated a cavalry affair of minor importance, but by the time Cashtown had been reached the sound had become heavy and continuous and indicated a severe engagement.

This statement is confirmed by General Pendleton.

I wish to emphasize the fact already stated that General Hill's advance to Gettysburg on the early morning of July 1st was made entirely upon his own responsibility.

*Note.—As to the numbers engaged in the battle of July 1st, General Doubleday testified before the Congressional Committee (I. p. 309), that the two Federal Corps put into the fight not more than 14,000 men "to contend against two immense corps of the enemy, amounting to 60,000 men." What magnifying glasses Federal officers put on when they studied the size of the Confederate forces! Now General Butterfield testified that the First and Eleventh Corps mustered on June 10th, 1863, together 24,000 men, and they had fought no battle since.—(See Southern Historical Society Papers 1877, vol. IV, p. 83).

General E. P. Alexander says, (p. 380): "Lee knew approximately the enemy's position, however, and his own three corps were converging by easy marches upon Cashtown, near which village he proposed to select his ground and await an attack." General Hill in his report says that he sent a courier to General Ewell informing him that he intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in his front. General Alexander says: "Hill's movement to Gettysburg was made on his own motion and with the knowledge that he would find the enemy's cavalry in possession. Ewell was informed of it. Lee's orders were to avoid bringing on an action." (p. 381.)

In reference to the matter just mentioned two statements have been made by officers of Lee's army that demand correction. One is the statement by a staff officer that an interview took place at Cashtown between General Lee and General A. P. Hill on the morning of July 1st, before Hill started for Gettysburg. But as, according to Hill's report, Heth's division started for Gettysburg at 5 A. M., and Hill himself accompanied it; and as General Lee's letter to Imboden of July 1st shows that he was at Greenwood at 7:30 A. M., west of the mountain and nine miles from Cashtown, no such interview could have occurred.

The other is a statement made by one of Hill's division commanders, many years after the battle (General Heth, see Mosby, p. 152), viz: "I sought and found General Lee, saying to the General, 'Rodes is heavily engaged, had I not better attack?' General Lee replied, 'No, I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement today.'" It is impossible that this interview could have occurred. General Lee was at least 12 or 15 miles away when that officer became engaged. He did not arrive on the field until 2:30, when the battle was nearly over. General Early, in his report, states that on June 30th he rode to see

Gen. Fitzhugh Lee estimates as follows: Federals—First Corps, 10,089; Eleventh, 9,893; Buford's Cavalry, 3,000. Total, 22,982. (Life of Lee, p. 271). Confederates—Two-thirds of Ewell's Corps and two-thirds of Hill's—four divisions—26,000. Col. Walter Taylor says the infantry nearly balanced, from 22,000 to 24,000 each. I may add that General Doubleday records the interesting fact that he, with his personal guard of 40 men, fought a whole brigade for twenty minutes, in this battle! Yet General Meade was so unappreciative of his distinguished services that he displaced him from his command at the end of the day.

Ewell near Heidlersburg and "was informed that the object was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received orders to move the next day to that point." Let it be clearly understood then that General Lee gave no orders for Hill's advance to Gettysburg July 1st; that he had no intention to fight a battle there on that day; that he was firm in his purpose to fight a defensive battle, and that General Hill, and not he, was responsible for the battle that occurred on the morning of July 1st.

Thus General Lee's determination to fight a defensive battle and to fight it at Cashtown, which was an ideal position for such a battle, was frustrated by the unauthorized action of his Lieutenant-General. General Hill in his report states that he went to Gettysburg on a reconnoissance—to ascertain whether the enemy was there in force. But Heth had ascertained the day before that the Federals were there. Instead of this Hill put two of his divisions into action with the enemy and sent to Ewell for reinforcements, thus, one might think, doing his best to bring on a general action which General Lee had expressly forbidden. Let it be remembered that we have General Lee's own word that his headquarters were to be at Cashtown, and that we have the word of General Long and General Pendleton for the fact that Lee was still on the west side of the great South Mountain when he heard the firing of Hill's guns.

In view of the facts now stated the dispassionate critic cannot acquit General A. P. Hill of blame in the course which he elected to pursue. Gallant and able and energetic as he was, A. P. Hill displayed the same inconsiderate rashness here that he is said to have exhibited in the seven days battles around Richmond, and again in a subsequent campaign at Bristow Station. His action on this occasion disarranged the plan General Lee was resolved to pursue, and precipitated a great battle which compelled Lee to assume the offensive with an inferior force against the enemy posted in an almost impregnable position.

The gallant, but impulsive Hill, reminds us of Marshall Ney, of whom in one of Napoleon's campaigns, the historian says:

"The Marshal, seeing the opportunity of especial distinction, advanced without orders." When the Emperor received information of this, he was extremely angry at this departure from his instructions, and said, "The Emperor, Marshall, has, in framing his plans, no need of advice, or of any one acting on his own responsibility. No one knows his thoughts. It is their duty to obey."

I will not enter upon a description of the battle of July 1st except to say that it opened unfavorably for General Hill, in the defeat of the brigades of Archer and Davis of Heth's division. General Archer with a large part of his brigade was captured. By the timely arrival of Rodes' division of Ewell's corps about 2 P. M., and subsequently of Early's division, the tide of battle was turned and the Confederates were victorious along the whole line. Fifty thousand men had been engaged in the battle—about equally divided between the contestants. For six hours the battle raged—in the morning favorably to the Federals, but, as already stated, victory ultimately perched upon the Confederate banners; 5,000 prisoners were captured, including two general officers, not counting the wounded, and three pieces of artillery. General Reynolds, esteemed the ablest commander in the Union army, was killed. The Confederate victory was complete, but nothing like as complete as it would have been had a brigade of Stuart's cavalry been present to reap the fruits of victory. As Captain Battine says: the want of a thousand lancers lost the Confederates the chance of destroying two Federal corps and capturing all their guns.

The charge of Gordon's Georgia brigade of Early's division has been thus vividly pictured by Captain Battine: "Without waiting for the artillery to prepare the way, or for the skirmishers to feel for their enemy, the Georgia troops descended on both wings of the Eleventh corps, and with a precision acquired on many battlefields, swiftly and silently moved forward to the assault, without firing a shot. The sight of Jackson's veterans once more threatening to close with them in hand to hand conflict struck a chill to the hearts of the men they had so recently defeated, and who now had to face that long brown line hardly distinguishable from the corn over which it trampled, save for

the fringe of steel glittering above it in the July sun, and for a dozen crimson standards which flaunted defiantly the starry cross of the Confederacy. Like the sickles of a great line of reapers the sharp bayonets came nearer through the red gold of the ripening wheat; then the line disappeared only to emerge a minute later unbroken and unhesitating from the willows which lined the little stream. The sight was too much for the nerves of Barlow's men. Some there were who gallantly stood to be bayoneted near their comrades. Barlow himself and many superior officers fell in the fire which preceded the Southern charge; but the first line was borne back half a mile before it, rallying on its reserves."

And now occurred a disastrous blunder. The victorious Confederates were ordered to halt.

Let me here transcribe the account given by General Gordon himself, who says "the whole of that portion of the Union army in my front was in inextricable confusion, and in flight. * * * The fire upon my men had almost ceased, large bodies of the Union troops were throwing down their arms and surrendering, because in disorganized and confused masses they were wholly powerless to either check the movement or return the firing. As far down the line as my eye could reach the Union troops were in retreat * * * in less than half an hour my troops would have swept up and over those hills, the possession of which was of such important and momentous consequence. It is not surprising that with the full realization of the consequences of a halt I should have refused at first to obey the order. Not until the third or fourth order of the most peremptory character reached me did I obey," (Reminiscences of the Civil War, p. 153.)

General Lee, as I have already stated, did not arrive upon the field until the battle was nearly over. General Long says: "Near the close of the action General Lee reached the field." I myself saw him when he arrived, and watched him while he swept the horizon with his glass. He promptly sent one of his staff, Colonel Walter Taylor, to General Ewell, saying that from the position which he occupied he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization and in great confusion;

that it was only necessary to press those people in order to secure possession of those heights, and if possible he wished him to do this. Colonel Taylor says "General Ewell did not express any objection, but left the impression upon my mind that the order conveyed to him would be executed." (Four Years with Lee, p. 95.)

It was then between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. At least three hours of daylight remained during which Ewell could have executed General Lee's order. He did not execute it, however, although earnestly solicited to do so by General Early, General Gordon and General Trimble. The last named officer was most urgent. "Give me a division," said he, "and I will engage to take that hill." When this was declined he said: "Give me a brigade and I will do it." When this, too, was declined he said: "Give me a good regiment and I will engage to take that hill." When this was declined the gallant Trimble threw down his sword and left General Ewell's headquarters, saying that he would not serve longer under such an officer! He could do this because he had no command, and was acting as a volunteer aid. He participated gallantly in the great charge on the third day of the battle, in command of Pender's division, and was severely wounded and captured.

Here then we find still another of General Lee's lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell, failing at a critical moment to recognize what ought to be done; failing also to carry out the suggestion and conditional order of General Lee himself, although urgently solicited to do so by three of his subordinate generals. Had the advance upon Cemetery Hill been pushed forward promptly that afternoon we now know beyond any possible question that the hill was feebly occupied, and could have been easily taken, and thus Meade would have been compelled to retreat to the line of Pipe's Creek, or else would have been disastrously defeated. General Gordon, in his Reminiscences, tells us that his heart was so burdened by the mistake of that afternoon that he was unable to sleep. Mounting his horse at 2 o'clock in the morning, he rode with one or two staff officers to the red barn in which General Ewell and General Early had their headquarters. He said: "Much of my time

after nightfall had been spent on the front picket line, listening to the busy strokes of Union picks and shovels on the line, to the rumble and the tramp of their troops as they were hurried forward by Union commanders and placed in position. There was, therefore, no difficulty in divining the scene that would break on our view with the coming dawn. I did not hesitate to say to both Ewell and Early that a line of heavy earthworks and guns with infantry ranks behind them, would frown upon us at daylight. I expressed the opinion that even at that hour, 2 o'clock A. M., by a concentrated and vigorous night assault we could carry those heights, and that if we waited until morning it would cost us 10,000 men to take them."

Was it not, indeed, extraordinary blindness to wait at the foot of Cemetery hill for 24 hours while the Federal troops were making their lines impregnable before the Confederate forces were led to the attack? Here then we have to record the failure of still another of General Lee's lieutenants, a fine and gallant soldier. No wonder Colonel McIntosh exclaims in his account of the battle, "A greater military blunder was never committed." There were still three hours of daylight, and Anderson's division was close at hand. (See further facts in Addendum, p. 299.)

V. SECOND DAY.

The first of the three days' battle of Gettysburg had ended in a brilliant success for the Confederates; but it was a costly victory, for it compelled General Lee to accept the alternative of retreating or fighting; fighting on a field where the Federals had every advantage of position; where they must be assaulted at a great disadvantage whether on the right, or the left flank, or in the center. Whoever has visited the field will recognize the great difficulty of a concerted attack by the forces of Lee, and will also recognize that when Meade was attacked on one side of his line he could hurry troops easily and quickly from another part to its succor, because his position was like a horse-shoe, or rather like a fish hook, and he held the interior line. And yet in my opinion General Lee's decision to attack the Federal army the next day was justified by the situation at nightfall of July 1st.

The enemy, to the number of about 25,000, had been defeated with great loss and driven from the field in great disorder; five thousand prisoners had been taken, including several general officers; one corps had been almost annihilated, the finest officer in the Union army had been killed. Lee's army was well concentrated, Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division having bivouacked within four miles of Gettysburg; whereas a large part of the Federal army was still far from the field (and Lee knew it). Moreover the key of the position, Little Round Top, was within Lee's grasp, if at least he might count on his orders being obeyed. General Lee could not foresee that the first corps, then four miles from the field, would not be launched against Little Round Top until 4 P. M. next day, though two of its divisions were in position for attack at sunrise.

A conference was held that evening between Lee and his principal commanders on the left flank, at which it was decided that Longstreet should commence the battle the next day by a forward movement, having as its object the seizing of the commanding position on the enemy's left.

General Early states that he left the conference with the distinct understanding (in which Ewell and Rodes agreed) that Longstreet should make the attack early next morning. General Pendleton, chief of artillery, is on record as saying that Lee told him that night that he had ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise. Hill, in his official report, says: "General Longstreet was to attack the flank of the enemy and sweep down his line." A great deal of controversy has arisen upon this point, but the evidence given by a number of officers of high standing is so strong, that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Longstreet was instructed to make his attack early in the morning. He himself, in his report, acknowledges that he was directed to attack "as early as practicable;" but he excused himself from doing so by saying that "he did not wish to go into battle with one boot off," referring to the fact that one of his divisions (Pickett's) had not arrived on the field.

General Long says that on the evening of July 1st, Lee said to Longstreet and Hill: "Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable." That Lee himself ex-

pected the attack to be made early is certain; he was on the ground at daybreak July 2d, and showed some impatience at Longstreet's failure to attack, saying to one of his officers: "Longstreet is so slow." Captain Poague, of the artillery, in a letter addressed to Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, says that "at 9 A. M., southwest of Big Round Top, I ran across General Lee riding through the woods. He said: 'Have you seen General Longstreet or any of his troops in this neighborhood?' and expressed impatience and disappointment, adding: 'I wonder where Longstreet can be.'" Conclusive proof that Longstreet knew he was expected to attack at an early hour is found in the fact that both Hood and McLaws moved at daybreak and were in position to attack at sunrise.

As to the prospects of success had an attack been made early, the English military critic already referred to says: "There can be no doubt that the opportunity was the brightest the Confederates had made for themselves since they let McClellan escape from the banks of the Chickahominy." "One-third of the Federal army had been severely defeated: the remainder were concentrating with difficulty, by forced marches; a prompt employment of all his available forces would have placed victory within Lee's grasp. The resolution to attack was therefore sound and wise; the failure lay not in the plan but in the faults of execution which were caused to some extent by the want of sympathetic cooperation by the corps commanders."

Colonel Henderson says that at daylight of July 2d there were no more than 40,000 men present on the Union front, and that the Confederate attack should have been made at that hour. Only four of the seven corps of Meade's army were present and two of them had been roughly handled the day before. By 8 o'clock two more had come up, making in all some 55,000 men. Longstreet's course must be pronounced inexplicable and inexcusable. Instead of cheerfully co-operating with the plan of his great leader, he undertook to argue the question; and Henderson says, Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg because he allowed his second in command to argue instead of marching! The statement of Col. Henderson is confirmed by Major Steele in his well known work on American campaigns. He says. (p. 373).

that at 7 A. M. the 6th Corps, and one-third of the 3d, and one-third of the 5th Corps were absent; at 9 A. M. the rest of the 3rd Corps arrived; at 12 M. the rest of the 5th Corps; at 10:30 A. M. the artillery reserves under Hunt came up; not until between 4 and 6 P. M. did the 6th Corps come up, after a continuous march of 34 miles. He also says that Buford's Cavalry had been ordered to Westminster, and thus the left of the line was left uncovered. Longstreet's attack was not made until 4 P. M.,—although his troops began to move about 2 o'clock. Thus his attack was delayed until the whole Federal army had arrived upon the ground and the golden opportunity of winning a great victory was lost.

There is, however, one feature of the drama on that fateful morning of July 2d which baffles all attempts at explanation. General Lee knew, through prisoners (Hist. Papers, 1877, Vol. IV, p. 268), that only a portion of the Federal army occupied the opposite ridge. "It is clear," says Henderson, "that an opportunity presented itself of dealing with the enemy in detail; and the meanest capacity must have grasped the advantage of storming the strong position south of Gettysburg before it should be occupied in overwhelming strength."

Yet he allowed Longstreet to argue against the assault, instead of making an immediate attack. That officer says "he went to Lee at daybreak and renewed his views against making the attack. He seemed resolved however."

But the thing that baffles us is this: Why did not Lee give Longstreet *then* absolute orders to advance to the attack? Hood and McLaws, with their splendid divisions, were in position at sunrise. Why did not Gen. Lee, knowing that every hour of delay was lessening the hope of success, launch those troops to the assault at once, in spite of Longstreet's objection?

It would seem that the mind of the great commander wavered, for he mounted his horse and rode over to confer with Ewell, on the left, to see if a successful attack could be made from that side, "not wishing," says Gen. Fitz. Lee, "to *drive* his right corps commander into battle when he did not want to go." (p. 278).

What a moment of fate it was! Gen. McLaws, sitting on his horse, could see the enemy coming, hour after hour, on to

the battlefield. And he was convinced that if permitted to advance "his command could reach the point indicated by Gen. Lee in half an hour." (Fitz Lee's Life of Lee, p. 279.)*

Major Steele tells us the location of Meade's five corps at 7 A. M. the morning of July 2d. It appears that the First and Eleventh corps were on Cemetery Hill; Wadsworth's division on Culp's Hill; the Twelfth corps on the right of Wadsworth; the Second corps to the left of the Eleventh on Cemetery Ridge. "The Third corps was placed so as to prolong the line to the Round Top on the left." Thus there was *only one corps*, the Third, on Meades' left, to oppose Longstreet's advance had it been promptly made. Buford's cavalry division, which had been posted near Round Top, had been ordered away, and *so the left of the line was left uncovered*. What a magnificent opportunity was thus offered to the Confederates, had Longstreet heartily co-operated with Lee in his purpose to make the attack at an early hour on the 2d! Gen. E. P. Alexander tells us that Longstreet was not *ordered* to attack until 11 A. M. This, although not intended to be such, is a misleading statement. Lee was not in the habit of giving written orders to his Lieutenant-Generals. He plainly indicated to Longstreet, as the testimony overwhelmingly shows, that the attack should be made on the left as early

* Note.—General Long tells us of a conversation he held with General Lee in the evening of July 1st, in which he said to General Lee, "In my opinion it would be best not to wait for Stuart. It is uncertain where he is, or when he will arrive. At present only two or three corps of the enemy's army are up, and it seems best to attack them before they can be greatly strengthened by reinforcements. The cavalry had better be left to take care of itself." Memoirs of R. E. Lee, p. 278.

Hood says he was in front of the heights of Gettysburg soon after daybreak. General Lee was then walking up and down. "He seemed anxious that Longstreet should attack," says Hood. Longstreet said, seating himself near the trunk of a tree by his side, "The General is a little nervous this morning. He wishes we to attack. I do not want to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off,"—Fitz Lee's Life of Lee, p. 279.

McLaws says he was ordered to leave camp at 4 A. M., afterward changed to sunrise; reached G. very early, halted head of his column a few hundred yards of Lee. Conference between L. and Lee, former appeared irritated and angered. Believed he could reach point indicated by Lee in half hour. Saw the enemy coming hour after hour, on to the battlefield. Wilcox went into line on Anderson's right at 9, 7 seven hours after in same woods McLaws formed.—Id. p. 279.

as practicable the next morning. When, however, Longstreet hesitated and objected and argued against it, he was at length compelled to issue a written order, and that was at 11 A. M. Even then victory was possible; but so apathetic was Longstreet that it was 3 P. M. before Hood's division in advance crossed the Emmitsburg road and moved against the enemy; 4 P. M. before he fired a gun. Now it was 4 o'clock before Little Round Top, 670 feet high, the key of the position, was (at the instance of General Warren) occupied by a portion of the Fifth corps. The two brigades ordered to the spot arrived just in time to anticipate Hood's seizing the point.

It must be acknowledged, however, that "Hill and Ewell were also at fault, for they had been ordered to co-operate with Longstreet's battle, but they limited their operations to an ineffective cannonading of the Federal intrenchments in front. Longstreet's attack began at 4; they did not begin their infantry attack until 6 P. M."

This second day's battle has been well described by Major Steele as follows: "On the part of the Confederates, a succession of tardy assaults, unsupported attacks, in which only one division, Pickett's, had not yet reached the field; and three others, Heth's, Pender's and Rodes', and four brigades had scarcely fired a shot. On the part of the Federals, a perfectly well arranged if passive defence in which every imperilled section of the line had been promptly reinforced and every assault of the enemy repulsed." (p. 378).

It seems that among the Confederate leaders that day the coordinating faculty was paralyzed.

This failure of General Longstreet to achieve what was expected of him differs vitally from the failures of Stuart, and Hill, and Ewell. Stuart committed a most serious error of judgment; Hill acted rashly and without orders; Ewell failed to perceive the golden opportunity that presented itself to him to seize Cemetery Hill; but there is no reason to doubt the loyalty of any of these three brave soldiers to their commander. This cannot be said of General Longstreet; he displayed on this occasion an obstinate unwillingness to carry out the wishes of his commander; not only did he fail to move as early as practicable on

the morning of July 2d against the Federal left, but he sought General Lee and objected to his plan and entered into an argument to convince him that it was faulty. General Sorrell, who was his chief of staff, in his account of the battle says that "Longstreet did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief." He made determined objection. General Sorrell, (p. 166), says "he failed to *conceal some anger*," and he continues "there was apparent apathy that lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield." Warm as was General Sorrell's admiration for General Longstreet he cannot conceal his disapprobation at his delay; he says, "On the 2d, quite late, 4 P. M., Longstreet made his long deferred attack on the enemy's left. * * * He gained ground rapidly and almost carried Round Top; but the morning delay was fatal. The enemy had been heavily reinforced while we were pottering around in sullen inactivity. Undoubtedly it was Lee's intention to make the attack in the forenoon, and support it by strong movements of Hill and Ewell." (p. 168).

Had he made an early attack it is absolutely certain that he would have made himself master of the two Round Tops and that would have decided the battle. Had he even attacked promptly after 11 o'clock, when he acknowledges he received a *positive order* to attack, there is every reason to have anticipated success. Even at the late hour when he finally did make his attack, 4 P. M., General Longstreet had an opportunity of seizing Round Top, but refused to embrace it. Scouts reported to General Hood that Round Top was unoccupied and that there were no troops in the rear. This intelligence was corroborated by prisoners. Hood sent three officers in succession to Longstreet to urge that he have permission to make the move on the Federal left, which would give him Round Top, but he doggedly refused, saying that "General Lee had ordered the attack to be made on the Emmitsburg road."

On this Colonel Henderson says: "His summary message to the divisional commander to carry out the original plan at least lays him open to the suspicion that although he was pre-

pared to obey, it was like a machine, and not like an intelligent being." Such conduct is deserving of the severest reprehension.

In endeavoring to defend himself from the criticism which his conduct on that occasion called forth, Longstreet assailed General Lee (after his death) with a rancour which must be resented by every true Confederate soldier. In his book he declares that General Lee made eleven capital mistakes in the battle of Gettysburg! (One mistake General Lee certainly did make at Gettysburg—which however Longstreet does not mention—he did not relieve that officer of his command!) It cannot be denied that Longstreet's writings exhibit excessive self esteem and sheer jealousy. We cannot forget, moreover, that had he obeyed General Lee's orders he would have been at the battle of Chancellorsville with the fine divisions under his command, in which event Hooker's army might have been not defeated as it was, but actually destroyed.

Here let me quote a remarkable passage from the oration of Edward Everett at Gettysburg.

At the dedication of the Cemetery for Federal Soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Mr. Everett, in presence of President Lincoln, said: "And here I cannot but remark on the Providential inaction of the rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daylight on the 2d of July, with the First and Eleventh corps exhausted by battle, the Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and the Second and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. Instead of this, the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool hours of the morning passed, and a considerable part of the afternoon wore away without the slightest aggressive movement on the part of the enemy. Thus time was given half our forces to arrive and take their places in the lines, while the rest of the army enjoyed a much needed half day's repose."

TO SUM UP THE EVENTS OF SECOND DAY.

On the left Early had stormed and taken the works on Cemetery Hill, but, not being supported, had been repulsed.

Further to the south, Hill had stormed another part of Cemetery Hill, with exactly the same experience.

On our extreme right Longstreet had lost the chance of seizing Round Top (755 feet), but had achieved notable success in the Peach Orchard and in Devil's Den, inflicting severe defeat on General Sickles.

On our extreme left in front of Culp's Hill (633 feet in height) a very important success had been achieved by Johnson's division. It is thus described in General Lee's official report, "The troops of General Johnson moved steadily up the steep and rugged acclivity under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his entrenchments, part of which were carried by Steuart's brigade, and a number of prisoners taken." The position thus so hardly won was one of great importance. It was within a few hundred yards of the Baltimore turnpike, which I think it commanded. Its capture was a breach in the enemy's lines through which troops might have been poured and the strong position of Cemetery Hill rendered untenable.*

General Howard, commander of the Eleventh corps, says "The ground was rough and the woods so thick that their generals did not realize until morning what they had gained." Dr. Jacobs says, "This might have proved disastrous to us had it not occurred at so late an hour." And Swinton, the Federal historian, declared, "It was a position which if held by him *would enable him to take Meade's entire line in reverse*" (page

*1. As to the character of these works, they were built of heavy logs with earth piled against them to the thickness of five feet, and abattis in front.

2. "Through the long hours of the night we heard the rumbling of their guns, and thought they were evacuating the hill. The first streak of daylight revealed our mistake. It was scarcely dawn, (the writer of this had just lain down to sleep, after a night in the saddle) when the artillery opened upon us at a range of about five hundred yards, a terrific and galling fire, to which we had no means of replying, as our guns could not be dragged up that steep and rugged ascent."—Letter of R. H. McKim soon after the battle.

355). It is only in keeping with the haphazard character of the whole battle that the capture of a point of such strategic importance should not have been taken advantage of by the Confederates. It remains, however, no less a proud memory for the officers and men of Stuart's brigade that their prowess gained for the Confederate General a position whence Meade's entire line might have been taken in reverse." But if the Confederates did not realize what they had gained, the Federals were fully aware what they had lost. Accordingly they spent the night massing troops and artillery for an effort to regain their works. "During the night," says Swinton, "a powerful artillery was accumulated against the point entered by the enemy." "To one conversant with the ground," says a Federal authority, "it is now apparent why the enemy did not reply. The creeks, the forest, and the steep acclivities made it utterly impossible for him to move his guns, and this circumstance contributed to the weakness of his position and the futility of his occupation of this part of the line.

Sufficient emphasis has not been laid upon the achievement of Stuart's brigade just referred to. It was probably the most important success attained on any part of our line, had our staff officers only recognized the fact. Let it be noted that this position was held by this devoted brigade for about fourteen hours, from 9 o'clock in the evening to 11 the next morning, and the courage and tenacity exhibited by these troops was not surpassed by any unit of Lee's army in that great battle. Professor Jacobs (Federal) says, "The battle raged furiously and was maintained with desperate obstinacy on both sides." He goes on to speak of the terrible slaughter of our men. General Howard says: "I went over the ground five years after the battle, and marks of the struggle were still to be observed. The moss on the rocks was still discolored in hundreds of places where the bullets had struck. The trees as cut off, knocked down, or shivered, were still there; stumps and trees were perforated with holes where leaden balls had since been taken out, and remnants of the rough breastworks still remained. I did not wonder that General Geary, who was in the thickest of this fight, thought the main battle of Gettysburg must have been fought there."

In fact, seven brigades were concentrated in the attack upon Stuart's brigade, and they were supported by a powerful artillery. Whitelaw Reed says, "From four to five there was heavy cannonading from our batteries nearest the contested point * * * the rebels made no reply * * * the musketry crash continued with unparalleled tenacity and vehemence." Bates says, "The batteries began to open again on points along our outer line. They were evidently playing on what had been Slocum's line of yesterday. The rebels then were still in our rifle pits. Presently the batteries on Slocum's Hill opened too, aiming apparently in the same direction."

VI. THIRD DAY.

We come now to the third and last day of the battle.

Count von Wartenburg, in his brilliant work on the campaigns of Napoleon (published in 1902), says: "In the case of Lee we admire much that is Napoleonic in the conception of his plans." Now his determination to pierce the center of Meade's line on the third day was the adoption of one of Napoleon's favorite methods. "The young general, Bonaparte, initiated his brilliant career by piercing the enemy's center: he employed the same method again in 1812 in the most magnificent and well thought out manner, and once more in the opening of the last of all his campaigns. At Austerlitz he ordered Marechal Soult to assail the heights of Praetzen, thus piercing the center of the Austro-Russian army. This gave him the victory. In the same way at Rivoli, he sacrificed his wings in order to decide the issue in the center; and again at Eylau; and yet again at Wagram." In the same way Lee now determined to assail the center of Meade's line, and gave directions to Longstreet to make the assault early next morning.

But the question has been raised "Was Lee justified in expecting success in adopting this Napoleonic method at this center? Was there any reasonable hope of success in the grand assault which he ordered on the third day of the battle?"

In answering this question we may now take into account

the statement made by Major-General Doubleday, who commanded the First corps of Meade's army. He says that "on the night of July 2d the state of affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days the First, Third and Eleventh corps had been almost annihilated; the Fifth corps and a great part of the Second were shattered and only the Sixth corps and the Twelfth were comparatively fresh." (Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, p. 185.)

He also says that Meade "thought it better to retreat with what he had than to run the risk of losing all." (Id.)

We know also from the testimony of General Sickles before the Congressional Committee that at the council of war the night of July 2d, some of the Generals were in favor of a retreat.

General Sorrell, Longstreet's chief of staff, admits in his book that the attack was to be made as soon as possible, and he adds, "the delay in attacking, which undoubtedly hurt us, was apparently caused by his objections made known to the Commander-in-Chief." (p. 171.)

And now we have a repetition of the events of the previous day. Instead of attacking early in the morning Longstreet did not begin his dispositions to attack until 1 P. M. He argued against Lee's plan as he had done the day before; he was completely out of sympathy with his commander. Such was his self-esteem that he believed his judgment superior to that of General Lee. The consequence of this delay was that instead of a simultaneous attack on the enemy's center by Longstreet, and on his right by Ewell and Hill, we have again a series of isolated attacks. In obedience to orders, General Ewell attacked the enemy at sunrise. Meade, not assailed on his left, concentrated an enormous force against Ewell on his right; seven brigades attacked Stuart's one brigade on Culp's Hill; and so before Longstreet had begun to get ready to make his attack on the center, Ewell's attack on the right had been made and defeated.

But this is not all. General Longstreet disobeyed General Lee in another respect; it is an unquestionable fact, supported by testimony from various sources, that Longstreet was directed to put his whole corps into the attack. Indeed he himself ad-

mits it. (See Henderson's Lecture, p. 15.)* The divisions of McLaws and Hood and Pickett were all to be employed. He was to be reinforced moreover by Heth's division, and by two brigades of Pender's division, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned—and General Hill was ordered to afford General Longstreet further assistance if necessary. Instead of this Longstreet sent forward about 12,000 men† only to assail the whole Federal army. They made the assault, those Virginians and North Carolinians, with magnificent gallantry. They pierced the enemy's center, but where were their supports? where were the divisions of McLaws and Hood? Where the brigades Hill was to put in? The answer is,—*idle, looking on, doing nothing!* This devoted column of 42 regiments, possibly 12,000 men assaulted nearly the whole Federal army, while 7-9 of the Confederate army looked on without firing a shot. At the moment of their success they looked back vainly for support; "not a single Confederate bayonet, save in the hands of wounded or retreating men, was between them and the ridge from which they had advanced, 1,200 yards in the rear. Fiercely they struggled to maintain their position, but their courage had been thrown away." (Henderson, p. 16.)

Could there be a more conspicuous illustration of the disregard of Napoleon's maxim that in a decisive attack the last man and the last horse should be thrown in? ‡

And now we have a strange incident to record—Colonel Fremantle, the accomplished English officer, who was present with Longstreet's command during the battle, tells us in his

* "He rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be composed of McLaws and Hood's divisions, reinforced by Pickett's brigades. I thought it would not do."—*Longstreet*.

† This is the estimate of Jesse Bowman Young, a Federal writer, in his valuable book, "The Battle of Gettysburg," published in 1913 by Harper Bros., p. p. 306. He points out that Wilcox's brigade took no part in the assault.

‡ "The staff, as we have seen, seemed utterly incapable, throughout the battle, of bringing the efforts of the larger units into timely co-operation, and at the most important crisis of the whole engagement their failure to insure combination was conspicuous. In the first place there is no doubt that Lee intended that 30,000 men should have been employed instead of 15,000."—(Henderson, p. 18).

book (p. 281) that Longstreet talked to him for a long time about the battle; he said the mistake they had made was in not concentrating the army more and making the attack with 30,000 instead of 15,000 men. That mistake, we now know infallibly, was not made by General Lee, but by General Longstreet himself. Had General Lee really intended to assail the Federal position with so slender a column, he would have been unworthy the command of a great army.

WAS SUCCESS POSSIBLE?

The question has often been discussed, "What would have been the result if Lee's orders had been carried out and this charge of Pickett's division been supported by the troops of McLaws and Hood or those of Hill?"

I am able to throw light on that question from three sources: *First*, by the courtesy of Colonel R. P. Chew, Jackson's chief of horse artillery, I am able to give an opinion expressed by Captain Fitzhugh, who commanded a battery in the Federal army at that point of the line. At the crisis of the charge he was ordered by General Hunt to put in his battery and open on the charging Confederates. He expressed to Colonel Chew astonishment that Pickett's charge had not been supported, saying that he could see large bodies of troops available for this purpose but making no movement in their support. Colonel Chew asked Captain Fitzhugh what in his opinion would have been the result if they had been advanced to Armistead's support. He said they would have pierced the Federal army and certain defeat would have awaited it. "The Federal troops were streaming to the rear and fresh troops thrown into the breach would have decided the battle in favor of the Confederates."

Secondly. Testimony of a Federal artilleryman: On Tuesday, November 11, 1913, at 924 Pennsylvania Avenue, S. E., I had a conversation with W. A. Bobb, who left home at 14 and entered the United States service. He was 16 years old at time of the battle, and served as a private in Battery A, Second corps, United States Army. He was

engaged at the point where Armistead's men broke through the Federal line. He said that the ammunition (of his battery) was almost exhausted; only two or three rounds left. In his opinion, if the charge had been supported, it would have proved disastrous to the Union army. All the artillery would have fallen into our hands. Their horses were nearly all killed or disabled. Their support, a New York regiment, 200 yards in rear, had taken to flight and left them alone.

I give a third testimony from the Federal side on this point.

The late General W. P. Craighill (of the Union army) said that he had often reflected with a feeling of awe on the fact that that great charge on the third day was a wedge that almost split the Union in two. In his opinion, if the charge had been supported, as Lee ordered, it would have wrecked the Union line and given the Confederates a decisive victory.

Thus we have concurrent testimony from a private artilleryman, from the captain of a battery, both at the salient when the shock of the charge broke over, and from a general officer—an accomplished engineer.

I hold therefore in the light of this testimony that our great commander was justified in ordering that grand assault on July 3d, and that had his orders been carried out, as they might and should have been, it would have resulted in a decisive victory.

Mr. Jesse Bowman Young, in his careful, painstaking and valuable study of "The Battle of Gettysburg," says, p. 306, that "there is no evidence on record in the reports of the battle that General Lee had in mind any larger force than this (the 42 regiments mentioned in the text) for the movement, or that orders were issued for any troops at other portions of the line to co-operate simultaneously with this charge, except Stuart's cavalry attack." Mr. Young is only another example of the exceeding tenderness of Federal writers for the reputation of General Longstreet.

Yet General Longstreet, himself, tells us that Lee's plan was "to assault the enemy's left centre by a column composed of McLaws' and Hood's divisions, reinforced by Pickett's brigades." And Young quotes Anderson's orders that Wilcox and

Perry's brigades were to render assistance, and also Wright's and Posy's brigades, but *he received orders from General Longstreet to stop the movement.* (Young, p. 307.)

Strange, is it not, that Colonel Walter H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant General, Colonel Venable, and General Long, of Lee's staff, and General Fitz Lee—to name no more—should testify that it was within their knowledge, that Lee directed that the assaulting column on July 3d, should have been very strongly supported; yet Mr. Jesse Bowman Young says, “and with confidence, having gone over the data in the case,” that Lee had no such intention!

Perhaps any student who may be inclined to accept his conclusion on this point, will reconsider the idea, when he learns that that accomplished English military critic, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, says, that after a careful study of the records, he was convinced that it was Lee's intention that the great charge should have been made by 30,000 men.

But the evidence in the case is conclusive. General Fitzhugh Lee tells us: “Three of General Lee's trusted staff officers—Taylor, Venable, and Long—have recorded that the plan of assault involved an attack by Longstreet's whole corps, supported by one-half of Hill's, or all of it, if he called for it. * * * A consummate master of war, such as Lee was, would not drive *en masse*, a column of 14,000 men * * * to attack an army, of one hundred thousand, and give his entering wedge no support.” —Fitzhugh Lee's *Life of Lee*, p. 289.

There was no serious fighting after the repulse of the great charge on the 3d of July. During the night General Lee withdrew his left wing from Culp's Hill, and the morning of July 4th found his army in line of battle on Seminary Ridge. Here he stood throughout the day ready to receive General Meade, but Meade made no attempt to attack him.*

*Colonel Henderson in his lecture on the Battle of Gettysburg, delivered nearly twenty years after the event, falls into two serious errors. He says, (p. 16), that during the night of July 3d, “slowly followed by his adversary, Lee fell back through the South Mountain passes, and away southward across the Potomac into Virginia.” But in fact Lee did not begin his retreat until the night of July 4th, and did not cross the Potomac until July 13th. On p. 14, he says, of July 3d, “The day opened ominously. As the sun rose, a vigorous attack of

VII. WAS GETTYSBURG A FEDERAL VICTORY?

Light is thrown upon this question by the testimony of several general officers given before the Congressional committee on the conduct of the war in the years 1864-5. Thus General Sickles testified, (Part I. page 302) that "at a council of war held on Friday night, July 3d, there was a pretty strong disposition to retreat." He further testified that the "reason why the enemy was not followed up was on account of differences of opinion whether or not we should ourselves retreat." Again he said, "It was by no means clear in the judgment of the corps commanders, as of the General in command, whether we had won or not."

Major General Butterfield, General Meade's chief of staff, testified, (page 426) that, "on the night of the 4th of July a council of war was held to decide the question, 'Shall we assume the offensive,' and that General Newton, General Sedgwick, General Howard, General Birney, General Pleasanton, General Hays, and General Warren, all voted 'no' to that question."

Major General Birney, (page 367) testified that "at a council of war held on the night of July 4th, the opinion was expressed that Lee was not retreating, but making a flank movement." Several of the council (page 368) voted to retreat, but it was finally decided by a vote of 3 to 5 to wait twenty-four hours before retreating. It was stated that General Meade did not wish to hazard a battle unless certain of victory. However, he intended to be guided by the opinion of his Corps Commanders. As a matter of fact, the Federal army remained at Gettysburg Saturday, Sunday and Monday, July 4th, 5th and 6th (page 369):

the Federals on Culp's Hill, prepared during the night, drove Johnson's Division in panic down the hill." Instead of this there were at least six hours of stern conflict after the sun rose, for possession of Culp's Hill, and when Steuart's brigade of Johnson's Division finally yielded the hill, they marched steadily down without confusion, rout or panic, in spite of their long hours of terrible battle and their immense losses.

Elsewhere in his writings he makes the great mistake of putting the white population of the seceded States at 7,000,000, instead of 5,000,000, which is the figure given in the census.

The lecture referred to is published also in Henderson's "Science of War," Chapter X, pp. 285 seq.

Major-General Hunt (page 453) testified that "on the 3d of July, after the great charge had failed, our troops had been very roughly handled when they were attacked, and for that reason it was not easy to make a counter-attack." He further says that "in his opinion there were good reasons for not attacking Lee that afternoon, July 3d." In a letter written January 12th, 1888, to General Webb, General Hunt says, "General Meade was right in not attempting a counter-attack at any stage of the battle." Major-General Sedgwick, second in command, testified (page 460) that "it was not expedient, in his judgment, to attack Lee after such a charge as this." As to the condition of the Federal army, we may infer what it was from the testimony of Major-General Warren, Chief of Engineers (page 380), "I should have fought on the morning of the 12th of July if I could have got my troops to fight."

This testimony of the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, given under oath, makes it very evident that the officers and men who fought the Army of Northern Virginia those three days of July, 1863, had no idea at the close of the battle that they had gained a victory. General Meade himself, the Commander in Chief, had no contemporaneous delusions on the subject of Gettysburg, as is made manifest by a letter addressed to his wife on the 8th of July, 1863. In it he announced to her his appointment of Brigadier-General in the regular army, which Halleck had forwarded to him, complimenting him on the victory at Gettysburg, and General Meade proceeds, "I send you a document received yesterday afternoon. It will give you pleasure, I know. Preserve it, because the terms in which the General in Chief speaks of the battle are stronger than any I have deemed it proper to use myself. I never claimed a victory, though I stated that Lee was defeated in his efforts to destroy my army." (Life and Letters of General Meade, Volume 2, page 133). This then is the judgment of the man who commanded the Federal army at Gettysburg—he never claimed a victory.

To this let me add an extremely interesting statement found in the diary of Colonel Fremantle, the English soldier already quoted. He says, (page 287 of his narrative) that the "officer

at whose headquarters he was lodged told him that one of the enemy's dispatches had been intercepted, in which the following words occurred: "THE NOBLE BUT UNFORTUNATE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC HAS AGAIN BEEN OBLIGED TO RETREAT BEFORE SUPERIOR NUMBERS."

In a correspondence with the late General Sickles a year or two before his death I told him of this incident, whereupon he wrote that that might be the explanation of what General Slocum, who commanded the Twelfth corps at Gettysburg, used to say to him before his death in a mysterious way, holding up two fingers, "I have a piece of paper about that size that would throw a wonderful light on what happened at Gettysburg, but, as I like to avoid controversy, I shall not publish it, leaving it to my heirs to do so if they choose."

Two other facts should be considered in deciding the question whether the Federal army won a victory at Gettysburg. The first is that Lee offered battle on Seminary Ridge all day of July 4th, but the Federal commander would not accept the gauge. In this connection it is interesting to note that General Butterworth said that he conversed July 4th with a corps commander who had just left General Meade, and that he said, "Meade says he thinks he can hold out here, if they attack him," (page 204). It is pretty clear that General Meade was not of the opinion at that time that the Confederate army had been defeated, and that his solicitude was for the safety of the Army of the Potomac, not for the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. The other fact is that the Army of the Potomac did not dare to attack the Army of Northern Virginia from the 3d of July, 1863, till May, 1864. Had Gettysburg been a Federal victory, this would have been an inexplicable fact.

LEE'S RETREAT.

We come now to General Lee's retreat. What was its cause and what was its character? Having offered battle all of the 4th of July on Seminary Ridge, and the offer having been declined, he took up his march the night of the 4th and the morning of the 5th for Virginia.

General Meade held a council of war near Williamsport on the 12th of July to consider whether he should attack General Lee in his position at Falling Waters. As to this we have the testimony of Major-General Warren, Chief of Engineers, before the Congressional Committee already referred to, (page 381). He said he never saw the principal corps commanders so unanimously in favor of not fighting as on that occasion, and Major General Sedgwick, (already quoted) says, (page 452) that "at a council of war July 12th all but two voted against attacking Lee."

Observe now that Lee's retreat was rendered necessary, not by the condition of his army, but by the necessity of replenishing the ammunition chests, which were all but exhausted (see Colonel Taylor). His retreat was slow and deliberate. He offered battle again for three days at Falling Waters, near Hagerstown, but although Meade had been heavily reinforced, and was strongly urged by Mr. Lincoln to attack and destroy General Lee, who stood at bay with a swollen river in his rear, he, with the assent of his council of war, again decided against making such an attack. It is a great mistake to suppose that the Confederate army was demoralized. I saw a good deal of different commands in the army during those ten days after the battle, and I can testify that they were full of fight and eager for an opportunity to redeem the mistakes made at Gettysburg. At length, on the night of the 13th of July, eleven days after the close of the battle, General Lee recrossed the river in the face of Meade's great army. And he effected his crossing with such success that his entire loss consisted of two guns, a few wagons, and some five hundred exhausted men.

Here let me quote the generous testimony of a Federal officer: "It is difficult to imagine a more discouraging situation than that in which General Lee found himself between July 4th and 14th. Decisively repulsed in battle and compelled to retreat, his communications were suddenly severed by the destruction of his only bridge, and by floods at the fords.

"Yet it is clear that never once through those trying days did the commander or his men show any signs of demoralization. On the contrary, it is certain that they would have welcomed an

attack on their intrenched lines about Falling Waters." ("Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, by Colonel G. J. Fiebeger, p. 139.)

Reviewing the whole campaign, I think it is plain that Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg by the failure of four splendid soldiers upon whom he had been accustomed to rely. His strategy was not at fault (of his tactics perhaps we cannot say as much); the orders issued were correct, and should have resulted in victory. But one thing we are compelled to acknowledge; General Lee did not enforce that prompt and implicit obedience to his will as commander-in-chief which he should have done; and without which success in a great campaign can hardly be achieved. Gettysburg was a drawn battle it is true; a fight in which 68,000 men were pitted against at least 105,000.—We may sum up the results by saying that on the first day the Confederates won a great victory; on the second day they also won two important successes both on Culp's Hill and at the Peach Orchard and in the Devil's Den; on the third day the great attack on the center was repulsed, and also that on Meade's left.

Thus it was on the whole a drawn battle, in which the Federals lost many more in killed, wounded and prisoners than the a defeat. Complete victory was essential to success and although Confederates. But a drawn battle under the circumstances was the Army of Northern Virginia afterwards fought many splendid battles, with magnificent courage, and often with great success, between July, '63, and April, '65, nevertheless the battle of Gettysburg does mark the beginning of the decline of the Confederate hopes.

As we ponder the circumstances of that great battle and note how one after another the omens of success were turned to defeat, through no fault of our great commander, we can only feel that Lee, like Hector of Troy, was fighting against the supernal powers. It was not the will of God that we should succeed. And, when I try to understand the ultimate cause of our failure, I am led to the conclusion that it was not the will of the Great Ruler of events that the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon race on the American continent should be left in the hands of those who were then our enemies. The Southern people were neces-

sary then, they are necessary now for the accomplishment of the designs of Providence. The Lord could not trust the North to fulfill His great purposes on this continent without the aid of the Southern people. Their sanity, their conservatism, their true Americanism were necessary elements in working out the great future of the race in this western land.

In closing let me call attention to the sublime self abnegation of General Lee. When this battle was over he wrote to the President of the Confederacy these words: "*I have no fault to find with anyone but myself.*" Was there ever in all the annals of time a more splendid example of magnanimity than was thus exhibited by our great commander, our peerless leader—ROBERT E. LEE!

ADDENDUM.

GENERAL CRAIGHILL'S TESTIMONY.

Bishop Lucien Lee Kinsolving gives me the following record of a conversation with that officer :

General Wm. P. Craighill's conversation with me was as follows:

"Have you never stood at High Water Mark at Gettysburg and seen how near that wedge came to splitting this country in two parts? Whenever I stand there I catch my breath at the thought of it." When I said that I had heard it stated that there were forces in reserve to support the fierce charge of Pickett, General Craighill replied: "Had that charge been properly supported, as General Lee had planned, it would have gone through. That is my opinion as a military engineer."

November 5, 1915.

Dr. R. H. McKim,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:—

You ask me to write you of my conversation with Captain Fitzhugh of the Federal Artillery, who was in the battle of Gettysburg, and took part at the most critical point in that engagement on the third day.

I met Captain Fitzhugh, whose initials I have forgotten, in Pittsburgh many years ago. He asked me why it was that Pickett's charge was not supported. I told him Mahone's and Posy's brigades were formed, behind where Longstreet was sitting, but for some reason were not sent to the support of the brigades which took part in this famous attack. I then asked him what would have been the result if the two brigades had been thrust into the gap made by Armistead. He said he thought there would have been little resistance, because the men for a quarter of a mile near where Armistead fell, were retiring from the field. He said General Hunt, who commanded the Federal Artillery, sent for him to bring his battery. He rode on in front and when he looked over the field, he said to General Hunt, "If I put my guns in there, I will lose them." General Hunt thereupon ordered him to put them in and take the risk. He said the charge of Pickett's division had completely paralyzed the part of the line near what was known as the "high water mark." He said he put his guns in action, and the Confederate line, for some unaccountable reason, withdrew, retiring to the position from which they had charged. Captain Fitzhugh was an officer in the regular army of the United States.

Yours truly,

R. P. CHEW.

STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT GETTYSBURG.

Major-General Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee, (1866) stated that in his opinion, General Lee's army was about 10,000 or 15,000 larger

than his own. Asked "what was your strength upon that battlefield?" his reply was, "Including all arms of Service, my strength was a little under 100,000 men—about 95,000. I think General Lee had about 90,000 infantry, from 4,000 to 5,000 artillery, and 10,000 cavalry.—I. p. 337.

Major Steele, "American Campaigns," says: "The returns of June 30, 1863, give the strength of the Army of the Potomac as 115,256 officers and men, with 362 guns," (p. 354), and he puts the strength of Lee's army, May 31, 1863, as 76,224 officers and men, and 272 guns. (p. 353).

To these Federal authorities, I add that of Colonel Walter Taylor, of Lee's staff, who puts the strength of Lee's army, May 31, as 74,451 effectives, but shows that its strength was much less on the eve of the campaign one month later, when it was, in his opinion, from 67,000 to 68,000 men. The estimate given above, by General Meade, would not be supported to-day by any competent expert authority.

Major-General Humphreys, who became Chief of Staff on the 9th of July, testified before the Congressional Committee (page 395), "that he thought the enemy's infantry superior in number to the Union infantry," and Major-General Butterfield stated that, in his opinion (page 420), Lee had 91,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 235 pieces of artillery. He also testified that on the 10th of June, General Hooker had 78,245 infantry, and that before the battle additions had been made numbering 7,500 infantry, besides Stannard's brigade. If we estimate this brigade at 2,500, then the Federal infantry under Meade in the battle of Gettysburg should have numbered 88,245 men, not counting the 10,000 men under General French, who were ordered from Harpers Ferry to Frederick, and were under General Meade's command.

THE CONFLICT ON CULP'S HILL.

In a letter written soon after the battle, I said:

"The crest of the hill to the right was still more difficult to approach, and from it the enemy were able to enfilade our whole line. * * * The struggle for the hill now became more and more fierce. The enemy endeavored to drive us out of the works. They attacked us in front and in flank, and opened a terrific cannonading upon us from a battery posted about 500 yards off. * * * On the right and left flank, where our lines were almost perpendicular to the front line, there were no breastworks, and the struggle was very fierce and bloody. Our men maintained their position, however, and received reinforcements." The Third North Carolina was on the right, and suffered most heavily during this part of the battle, so that but a handful were left to participate in the final charge.

"As soon as we were unmasked, a most terrific fire opened upon us, from three directions. In front, on a rising ground heavily wooded, the enemy were posted in two lines behind breastworks, one above the other, so that both lines fired upon us at once. On the left was a piece of woods, from which the enemy's sharpshooters opened a very galling fire, raking our whole line. This decided the failure of our attempt to storm their works, for the regiments on the left first halted (while the right of the line advanced), and then fell back. * * * Still we pressed on. General Steuart, Captain Williamson, and I were all on the right-center, where was the Second Maryland and eight men of the Third North Carolina. Oh! it was a gallant band. We had our sabres drawn, and were cheering on the men, but there was little need of it. Their gallantry did not avail, and their noble blood was spilled

in vain. * * * It was as if the sickle of Death had passed along the line and mown down the noblest and the bravest. Major Goldsborough fell (as we supposed), mortally wounded. That brave officer and noble gentleman, Captain Murray, fell dead. Friends dropped all around me, and lay writhing on the ground. * * * It was more than men could endure, and reluctantly they commenced falling back. Then our task was to prevent a rout, for the brigade was terribly cut up and the men much demoralized. Behind some rocks we rallied the scattered regiments and made a stand. Finally we took our old position behind the breastworks, supported by Daniel's brigade. Here we lay for about an hour under the most furious infantry and artillery fire I have ever experienced, but without much loss." (Extract from a letter describing the battle.) I give it just as I find it, adding that if the tattered battle-flag of the Third North Carolina was followed by only a handful, was because they had already suffered more heavily than any other regiment.

"The end soon came. We were beaten back to the line from which we had advanced with terrible loss in much confusion, but the enemy did not make a counter charge. By the strenuous efforts of the officers of the line and of the staff order was restored, and we reformed in the breastworks from which we had emerged, there to be again exposed to an artillery fire exceeding in violence that of the early morning. It remains only to say that, like Pickett's men later in the day, this single brigade was hurled unsupported against the enemy's works. Daniel's brigade remained in the breastworks during and after the charge, and neither from that command nor from any other had we any support. Of course it is to be presumed that General Daniel acted in obedience to orders. We remained in this breastwork after the charge about an hour before we finally abandoned the Federal entrenchments and retired to the foot of the hill. The Federal historians say we were *driven* from our position. Thus Swinton affirms that "it was carried by a charge of Geary's division." This statement I deny as an eyewitness and sharer in the conflict to the close, and as one of the staff who assisted in carrying out the order withdrawing the troops to the base of the hill. It was down a steep hill in the face of the enemy, and I have a vivid recollection of our apprehensions of the result of such a movement. But it was done, not before a charge of the enemy, but in obedience to orders, and we were not pursued, nor were the works occupied by the Federals until we reached Rock Creek, at the base of the hill.

A few of our men on our left, rather than incur the danger of retiring down the hill under that very heavy fire, remained behind in the entrenchments and gave themselves up. The base of the hill reached, skirmishers were thrown out, and we remained on the west side of Rock Creek till 11:30 P. M., when we retired silently and unmolested. I find the following record in my diary, referring to the time when we retired to the foot of the hill: "New troops were brought on, and fighting continued until now (5 P. M.)." This must refer to picket fighting.

Bates, the Federal historian, thus describes the scene on Culp's Hill:

"What a field was this! For three hours of the previous evening, and seven of the morning, had the most terrible elements of destruction known to modern warfare been wielded with a might and dexterity rarely if ever paralleled. The woods in which the battle had been fought was torn and rent with shells and solid shot, and pierced with

innumerable minnie balls. Trees were broken off and splintered, and that entire forest, where the battle raged most furiously, was, on the following year, leafless, the stately but mute occupants having yielded up their lives with those whom they overshadowed."—Bates' Gettysburg, p. 145.

And speaking of the state of the hill on the fourth, he continues: "We came upon numberless forms, clad in grey, either stark and stiff or else weltering in their blood. * * * Turning whichever way we chose, the eye rested upon human forms lying in all imaginable positions. * * * We were surprised at the accuracy, as well as the bloody results of our fire. It was indeed dreadful to witness."—Id. p. 145.

FAILURE TO SEIZE CEMETERY HILL, JULY 1ST.

In the opinion of Col. Fiebiger and Major Steele, the only opportunity of decisive victory was lost when Ewell failed to seize Cemetery Hill, July 1, P. M. It could have been taken had the Union troops been vigorously pursued. Yet Fiebiger thinks Ewell was probably right (p. 135) in not attacking.

Major Steele: "Possession of Cemetery Hill was decisive of victory." 'Twas an error not to follow up the victory on 1st. That was the only chance to take the Hill. "Thus Lee's only chance of victory was thrown away."

Captain Smith: "Early and Rodes desired Lee to be informed they could go forward and take the hill if they were supported on their right."

General Hancock: "If the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill."

Colonel Batchelder, historian of Gettysburg: "There is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery Hill made within an hour would have been successful; at the end of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, &c., and would have held the positions against any attack from the troops then up. The great mistake of the battle was failure to follow the Union forces and attack them on Cemetery Hill before they could reform.

General Early has written an able and generous, but not convincing defense of his corps commander. He says he has changed his mind as to the probability of success, had Ewell advanced against Cemetery Hill. He even goes so far as to say, "There is nothing in the idea that we lost a great opportunity by not going in, the afternoon of the 1st."—S. Hist. Papers, -1877, Vol. IV, 260.

He urges further, that the possession of the Hill would not have been of any particular value. At best, it would only have thrown Meade back to the line on Pipe Creek, already selected and fortified.

As I have said, I am unable to agree with General Early's later conclusion on this point, but must think Ewell's failure to seize Cemetery Hill, a great error. Nor is this the only error he committed. General Lee desired to move Ewell's corps to the right on the evening of July 1st; but General Ewell pointed out the great importance of seizing Culp's Hill, which dominated Cemetery Hill, and persuaded him to leave his corps on the left, that he might seize that eminence, (So. Hist'l. Papers 1877, Vol. IV, p. 276), which he said he could do, without a fight. And yet he did not seize it, as he might have done, for Geary's troops did not begin to occupy it until 3 A. M. of July 2d; and

the last of William's division was not in position until 8 A. M. (Jesse B. Young's "Battle of Gettysburg," p. 208.)

It is true that Johnson was ordered to venture through the darkness and occupy it. But he reported that it was already occupied by a superior force of the enemy. In fact, it was only a small reconnoitering party. But suppose the report had been true? Why could not General Edward Johnson's division have assaulted it that same evening? The prospect of success *then*, when it could not have been fortified, was far better than it was on the following night when it *was* assaulted after the Federals had made it almost impregnable by strong breast-works.

And, in fact, had it been attacked the evening of July 1st, it would have been captured almost without firing a shot.

Lieutenant Jesse B. Young, in his valuable book, (p. 207), says that Ewell lost a great opportunity in not seizing Culp's Hill that evening.

He was deterred from attack by a *report* that it was occupied, but he was *not* deterred from assaulting it 24 hours later, when he knew it had been skilfully fortified.

Johnson's Division marched round Gettysburg, and was in position before Culp's Hill a little after sundown, on July 1st.

In a letter from General Meade, addressed to G. G. Benedict, Burlington, Vt., and dated Philadelphia, March 16, 1870, Major General Meade says that, in a conversation he had with Lieutenant-General Ewell shortly after the war, that officer "informed me that at four P. M. on the 1st, he had his corps, 20,000 strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee, directing him to assume the defensive, and not to advance; that he sent to General Lee, urging to be permitted to advance with his reserve, but the reply was a reiteration of the previous order." (Life and Letters of General G. G. Meade, Vol. 2, Page 353).

This statement is in conflict with all the evidence in the case. It contradicts Colonel Walter Taylor, and General J. B. Gordon, and other general officers. The fact it alleges is not mentioned by General Ewell in his report of the battle, though it would have completely vindicated his inaction if it had been true. Either General Meade misunderstood General Ewell, or General Ewell's memory (or his own) was at fault.

MERRIMAC AND MONITOR.

Captain W. C. WHITTLE.

Grand Commander and Comrades of the Grand Camp of Confederate Veterans of Virginia:

I have been honored by the Pickett-Buchanan Camp of Confederate Veterans, in being selected to be their spokesman upon this interesting and inspiring occasion, to greet and welcome you as their guests, to our city and section of our grand old Commonwealth of Virginia. I fully appreciate the distinguished honor thus conferred upon me, but for your sakes I wish it had fallen to one better able than I to measure up to the requirements of the occasion. When I was appointed, feeling my insufficiency, I urged them to choose some one else. They were indiscreet enough to decline. Upon which, I consented, saying, "Well, my comrades, I will charge that battery, and if I am repulsed, upon you must rest the responsibility." Thus the honor of welcoming you, upon your Twentieth Annual Reunion, is placed on me, and inspired by the memory of your courage and patriotism in time of war, your patience and fortitude since, I speak as to men who, during all the vicissitudes of life, have been tried and proven, and have never been found lacking in anything going to make up true and loyal manhood and citizenship.

My friends, noble patriots, followers of the immortal Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, you, under God's benign and merciful wisdom, are spared a small remnant of a noble race of men, who with the courage of their convictions, unhesitatingly rushed, at the call of our dear old mother State, Virginia, to meet and battle with the invaders and despoilers of her sacred soil. Your noble deeds have not been surpassed in the annals of history.

We annually assemble, with no rancor in our hearts towards our late foes, but to keep in everlasting remembrance the fact

that we have done our duty in war and in peace; and that those who come after may emulate the courage, loyalty and sacrifice of true patriots. When the question is asked what the followers of Lee and Jackson fought for, let the ringing, unchangeable and ever true response be given, that they fought against invasion and subjugation, and for their wives and children, their dear ones and their homes.

As followers of our immortal Lee, in war, and in compliance with his admonitions after the surrender at Appomattox, for peace, we have had it demonstrated, indisputably, that we have not failed in our duty. This was proved in war, on every battle field, and the phenomenal recuperation of our dear Southland since, proves its truth, in peace.

Our annual reunions are most salutary and peace-giving; they are like the satisfying assurances coming to ships, speaking each other while traversing stormy seas, dark and tempestuous, all aiming for the same port, the "Haven where they would be." It gives an opportunity to verify their position, and to take any course that may be found necessary to secure the desired consummation.

The followers of Lee, I believe, are still following the principles of the greatest human leader that, take him all in all, was ever born in this or any other land; and my dear comrades, his chief and most potent greatness, rested in the fact that in his every thought, word, deed and hope, he was always a consistent and faithful follower of our Blessed Lord Jesus Christ.

Your assembling here now is most auspicious; for, three hundred years ago, the spirit of God moved over the face of the waters, and tabernacled in the minds, hearts and souls of brave men, who took to three frail vessels, which under the guidance and protection of the omniscient and omnipotent God, were safely brought across the Atlantic Ocean, and to our contiguous and historic waters, and established the first permanent English settlement on our continent. Their lives, under God, have hallowed the manhood and purity of our phenomenally great Republic.

In commemoration of this great event, the Jamestown Ter-Centennial Exposition is now being held, and is supported by the best citizens all over our land.

The leaders in this educational and inspiring enterprise, and many of the civic bodies of the City of Norfolk, unite with the Pickett-Buchanan Camp of Confederate Veterans, and the Sons of Confederate Veterans, in receiving you as their guests.

I may well say then, that the time, place and occasion for your meeting are singularly auspicious. I trust, my comrades, that you may, individually and collectively, avail of it to your edification in visiting our neighboring waters, the cradle of our Republic and of Protestantism on our continent.

In this connection, to perpetuate true history, I would state that Hampton Roads, so intimately associated with these historic events, was again made memorable in 1862, when the gallant Confederate Admiral, Franklin Buchanan, for whom our Camp is partly called, on the 8th day of March, 1862, in the transformed and untried iron-clad "Virginia," and a few improvised consorts from James River, boldly steamed down the Elizabeth River, to attack the large Federal Fleet in Hampton Roads. The Confederate vessels mounted 27 guns and the Federal vessels mounted over 200. The first victim of this bold dash, was the U. S. Ship "Cumberland," anchored near Newport News, which was sunk after a heroic defense, by the Virginia's guns, and by ramming with her iron prow.

Next came the U. S. Frigate "Congress," which ran ashore in attempting to escape, and under the Virginia's guns, hoisted the white flag of surrender. When Buchanan sent a small consort to receive the surrender, and rescue the drowning of her crew, his ship and that of the rescuers, were treacherously fired upon by the Federals. By his fusilade, the brave Buchanan was grievously wounded, and several of our officers and men were killed and wounded. Then it was that for this perfidy, he opened fire on the "Congress" with hot shot, set fire to and destroyed her.

The "Virginia" steamed up Elizabeth River to put her wounded Commander under hospital treatment. The brave Catesby ap Roger Jones, the efficient executive officer, succeeded to the command of the Virginia, and on the following day, March 9th, 1862, went down to renew the conflict. The U. S. iron-clad "Monitor" had arrived in Hampton Roads the night

before, and steamed out to meet the Virginia. It was known that the Monitor's guns were heavier than ours. A desperate battle, of some three hours, was fought between these leviathans of marine war, at the expiration of which the "Monitor" withdrew from the conflict, and sought safety in shoal waters, where, from her greater draught, the "Virginia" could not follow. The "Virginia" steamed about, daring her to renew the conflict, but she declined. The Confederate iron-clad went up the Elizabeth River, and was docked, and her prow, injured in sinking the Cumberland, was replaced. When this was done, under the gallant Commodore Josiah Tatnall, who was appointed to command, she steamed down to Hampton Roads, and found the "Monitor" and a heavy Federal fleet bombarding a Confederate battery on Sewall's Point. Tatnall shaped his course for them, and they all, the "Monitor" included, ran for protection under the guns of Fortress Monroe and quietly remained there while Tatnall sent two of his consorts in and captured two Federal supply vessels and towed them to Norfolk, amid cheers from the foreign war-ships in view of this desperate courage.

The "Monitor" could never be induced to fight her victorious adversary again, and had no instrumentality in the "Virginia's" subsequent destruction above Craney Island, by her officers, when Norfolk was evacuated. From this first battle between iron-clad vessels in the world's history, arose the entire revolution in the navies of the whole world.

Again, my comrades and friends, as spokesman of the Pickett-Buchanan Camp of Confederate Veterans, I extend to you a most heartfelt and cordial welcome; a welcome which is also extended to your wives, who have been with you through all the vicissitudes of life; by sympathy, encouraging you, and by their counsels, aiding you in all the trials through which you have passed; and also, to your children, who, trained and encouraged by your noble lives, will be qualified to emulate your illustrious example. Too much can never be said, in praise, of the fortitude and loyalty, in War and Peace, of our Southern women, the purest, the best and noblest of God's creation. May God bless us, my comrades, and make us worthy of their love and their confidence.

AN INTERESTING LETTER FROM COL. HENDERSON.

AN INTERESTING LETTER FROM COLONEL
HENDERSON.

Author of "Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War."

The wellknown criticism of General Longstreet's book by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, of the British Army, was first published in this country by Captain Frederick M. Colston, of Baltimore.

A military friend brought him the October number of the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" which contained this criticism, but anonymously.

General Longstreet's book was then being much discussed, and Captain Colston printed this criticism in a leaflet and distributed it to many military friends.

Among these was Dr. J. William Jones, editor of the Southern Historical Society Papers, and the number of leaflets being exhausted, Dr. Jones asked permission to reprint it and wrote to the editor of the Journal to ask the name of the author, which was given him as Colonel Henderson.

Captain Colston then wrote to Colonel Henderson enclosing a copy of his leaflet with an apology for printing it without his permission, as it was anonymous in the Journal. Colonel Henderson replied in the following letter, which is here published for the first time:

THE STAFF COLLEGE, CAMBERLY, ENGLAND.

June 1st, 1898.

My dear Sir:

I am exceedingly obliged for your very kind letter and enclosures. I am pleased to find that my review on General Longstreet's book is appreciated and found satisfactory by old Con-

federate officers, and the autograph of General Lee I prize very greatly indeed.

My book on Stonewall Jackson will be published in England and America simultaneously about the end of July. I cannot surmise how it will be received in your half or three-quarters of "Anglo-Saxondom." I have tried to do full justice to both sides, and may possibly please neither, but my consolation will be that I have done my best to find out the truth, and my opinions are the result of many years of study of American history and of the Civil War.

I may add that the writing of the book has been the more pleasant by the friends and acquaintances I have made during my researches and by the kind letters and offers of assistance which I have received from soldiers like yourself.

Thanking you once more and hoping that when "Stonewall Jackson" appears that you will give the benefit of your criticism for a possible second edition. I am.

Yours most sincerely,

G. F. R. HENDERSON.

Colonel Henderson lived to see his "Stonewall Jackson" acknowledged to be one of the finest military biographies in existence, but he died before writing the life and campaigns of General Robert E. Lee, which he had undertaken to do, as he died in Assouan, Egypt, in March, 1903.

THE SOUTH IS AMERICAN.

1893—In the October Number of the Arena, Joshua W. Caldwell writes to show that the South is American as much as any other section of the Country.

The fact first to be noticed is that of all the British colonies Virginia was the most English. In blood the Virginians were not more English than the Puritans; but they held to the English forms and methods, social, political and religious, whereas the New Englanders attempted to set up a theocracy which should realize the ideals of the Puritans of old England and of the Covenanters of Scotland. In Virginia institutions were as English as the people.

The Puritan was, from the beginning, a malcontent, a rebel; not so much, however, for political as for religious reasons. Colonial Virginia, upon the contrary, was, except during the short-lived insurrection known as Bacon's Rebellion, constantly upon the most amicable terms with the home country and government.

The Puritan repudiated, as a thing abominable, the Church of England; the Virginians established the church and persecuted dissenters. The Puritan embraced the Commonwealth, and made haste to banish the royal Governor; the Virginian was steadfastly loyal to the Stuarts, invited the banished king to plant his sceptre anew in the virgin soil of his faithful colony, and refused to recognize the Commonwealth until Cromwell's war ships trained their cannon upon his capital.

To the superficial observer, Massachusetts and Virginia may appear to have been essentially unlike. In reality the unlikeness was superficial and beneath it was a likeness which was essential. Their people were of the same race, and had the same conception of liberty and the same love of liberty. In the end,

they two were to lead all the other colonies to the establishment of their common principles.

The Puritans were mainly of the English middle class, and so were the Virginians. It is true that the rich planters dominated Virginia, and that her institutions became, in a measure, aristocratic; but it is to be remembered that the love of liberty has never been confined to any class of Englishmen, and at all events the supply of plain people in Virginia was abundant.

Massachusetts was turbulent, Virginia placid; but when the time came Virginia was as quick as her Northern sister to declare for freedom. When Massachusetts defied England, it was George Washington of Virginia who declared that to aid her he was ready to raise and subsist a regiment at his own expense. If Massachusetts gave Otis, Hancock, Adams, to the good cause, Virginia gave Randolph, Marshall, Madison, Jefferson and Washington. Thus it appears that Virginia, the typical and dominant Southern colony, bore, in the struggle for independence, a part no less trying, no less important, no less honorable than Massachusetts.

John Fiske in an article published in *Harper's Magazine* some years ago declares that of the white population of Virginia at the time of the seven years' war all but two per cent. were English. In the second place, the Scotch-Irish were late comers. When they arrived the colony was already populous, and its institutions definitely and firmly established. As non-conformists, they were by circumstances, as well as by their own inclination, kept apart, in some measure, from their neighbors, and thus possessed the influence which union and concentration always secure. But this could not prevent the natural results of incessant contact with the far more numerous English and practically they were, in the course of time, absorbed and assimilated.

If it had been otherwise, it would have made very little difference. While the Scotch-Irishman had one of the most divergent and complicated genealogies in Europe, he was principally Anglo-Saxon in blood, and had been for centuries under English influences. For nearly 200 years his people had been subjects of the English crown. And in this connection it may be further said that both the Scotch and Irish settlers of North

America shared the political beliefs of their English neighbors. The Anglo-Saxon civilization was not the separate property of the race from which it takes its name. The lowland Scotch and the Irish were and are as much Anglo-Saxon in this respect as the English themselves. In the War of the Revolution the Scotch and the Irish patriots held the same opinions and cherished the same purposes as the English, and fought for them with no less courage and devotion.

The American Revolution implied no change of principles. If it resulted in institutional changes, the new institutions are essentially English in origin and in quality. The establishment of the American republic was an advance in the true line of Anglo-Saxon development, and no part of the country has ever been so thoroughly Anglo-Saxon as the South. Even Mr. Douglas Campbell, who has written an ingenious polemical book to prove that everything good in the North is of Dutch origin, stops with Pennsylvania, contents himself with saying that the South, which was not under Dutch influence, contributed only one principle to the commonwealth and that a borrowed one.

The Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the South has never been overcome. The South has had almost no immigration. Foreigners go to the West and Northwest.

But statistics are more convincing than general statements. In order to show how thoroughly American the population of the Southern States is, I present the following statistics taken fresh from our new census. I confine my attention to the white population.

According to the census of 1890 there were for every 100,000 native-born Americans 17,330 foreign born. The State of New York has in round numbers 4,400,000 native and 1,600,000 foreign born citizens, being 35,000 foreign for every 100,000 native. In Illinois for each 100,000 native born citizens there are 28,200 foreign born; in Michigan, 35,000; in Wisconsin, 44,400; in Minnesota, 56,600; in Montana, 48,400; in North Dakota, 80,400.

When we turn to the Southern States the contrast is impressive. By Southern States I mean Alabama, Arkansas,

Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.

The white population of Tennessee is 1,336,000, and of this number 20,029 are foreign born; that is to say, for each 100,000 native born whites there are 1,500 foreign born. North Carolina is the most American of all the States, having a native-born white population of 1,055,000, and foreign born 3,702, or for each 100,000 native born 370 foreign born. In other Southern States the figures are as follows:

	Native.	Foreign.
Alabama	833,000	15,000
Arkansas	818,000	14,000
Florida	225,000	22,000
Georgia	978,000	12,000
Kentucky	1,600,000	59,000
Mississippi	545,000	8,000
Louisiana	558,000	49,000
South Carolina	462,000	6,000
Texas	1,700,000	152,000
Virginia	1,000,000	18,000
West Virginia	730,000	18,000

I have omitted the odd hundreds; and the total foreign born white population of the South, counting in these hundreds is about 380,000.

A comparison of census reports for 1860, 1870, 1880 and 1890 shows that in none of the Southern States—except Kentucky, with the large city of Louisville, Louisiana, with the large city of New Orleans, and Texas, lying upon the Mexican frontier—has there been any increase of foreign population since 1860. We know that there was none before that time. The white people of the South are almost exclusively the descendants of the Americans of 1775. Upon the other hand, it is safe to say that of the male of voting age in the Northern and Northwestern States not less than fifty per cent. are foreign born, or the sons of foreign born parents.

The white people of the South are not only American—they are, in the main, the descendants of a race which from the

days of Tacitus has been known in the world's history as the exemplar and champion of personal purity, personal independence, and political liberty. For them no life but one of freedom is possible, and I can never believe that the hybrid population of Russians, Poles, Italians, Hungarians which fills so many Northern cities and States, has the same love for our country, the same love of liberty, as have the Anglo-Saxon Southerners, whose fathers have always been free.

The strongest, most concentrated force of Americanism is in the South, and Americanism is the highest form of Anglo-Saxon civilization. There is no part of the globe, except the Kingdom of England, which is so thoroughly Anglo-Saxon as the South.

JUDGE REAGAN'S SPEECH—1897.

After dealing at some length with the question of slavery, Judge Reagan said in the course of his speech:

"Comrades, by the laws of nature I can, at most, be with you but a few years longer, and I feel it to be my duty to you and to posterity to make these statements of the facts of history, which vindicate us against the charge of being either rebels or traitors, and which show that we were not the authors of 'a causeless war, brought about by ambitious leaders' but that our brave men fought and suffered and died, and our holy men of God prayed and our noble women suffered patiently and patriotically all the privations and horrors of a great war, cruelly forced upon us, for the purpose of upholding the constitution and laws of the United States, as preserving the rights of the several States to regulate their own domestic policies, and of protecting the people against spoliation and robbery by a dominant majority, some of whose numbers, because the Holy Bible sanctioned slavery, declared that they wanted an 'anti-slavery Bible and an anti-slavery God,' and who because the constitution of the United States recognized and protected slavery, declared that it was a 'league with hell and a covenant with death.'

"Whatever may have been said in the past in the defense of the institution of slavery, and whatever may now be thought of the means by which it was abolished in this country, the spirit of the present age is against it and it has passed away, and I suppose no one wishes its restoration, if that were practicable. Certainly, I would not restore it if I had the power. I think it better for the black race that they are free, and I am sure it is better for the white race that there are no slaves.

"Some great Macaulay of the future will tell these grand truths to posterity better and more forcibly than I can in this brief address, and will by reference to history, to the sacred

scriptures and to the constitution of the United States, as made by our revolutionary fathers, vindicate the patriotism and the heroic virtues and struggles of our people.

"Now that we are again citizens of the United States, living under the same government and constitutional flag, our late adversaries ought not to desire to degrade us in the eyes of posterity, and if they would be wise and just they should not wish to place our people in history in the position of being unworthy of the rights, liberty and character of citizens of our great and common country.

"And while I have accepted, and do accept, in good faith, the legitimate results of the war, and while I am, and will be as true to my allegiance and duty to our common government as any other citizen can be, I shall insist on my right to tell the truths which show that in that great struggle we were guided and controlled by a sense of duty and by a spirit of patriotism which caused us to stake life, liberty and property in a contest with a greatly superior power rather than basely surrender our rights without a struggle."

Speaking of the women of the Confederacy, Judge Reagan said:

"They gave to the armies their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers with aching hearts, and bade them good-bye with sobs and tears, but they believed the sacrifice was due to their country and her cause. They assumed the care of their homes and of the children and aged. Many of them, who had been reared in ease and luxury, had to engage in all the drudgery of the farm and shop. Many of them worked in the fields to raise the means of feeding their families. Spinning wheels and looms were multiplied where none had been seen before, to enable them to clothe their families and furnish clothing for the loved ones in the army, to whom with messages of love and encouragement they were, whenever they could, sending something to wear or to eat, and like angels of mercy they visited and attended the hospitals with lint and bandages for the wounded and medicine for the sick, and such nourishment as they could for both. And their holy prayers at all times went to the throne of God for the safety of those dear to them and for the success of the Confederate

cause. There was a courage and a moral heroism in their lives superior to that which animated our brave men, for the men were stimulated by the presence of their associates, the hope of applause and by the excitement of battle, while these noble women, in the seclusion and quietude of their homes, were inspired by a moral courage which could come only from God and the love of country. I hope we are to have a battle abbey, and if we should the honor of our Southland demands that at the same place there should be a splendid monument erected to commemorate the constancy, the services and the virtues of the noble women of the Confederacy. And since the war some of our grand and noble women, the widow of President Davis, the widow of Stonewall Jackson and the widow of Col. C. M. Winkler, of Texas, have earned the gratitude of our people by books they have furnished us, containing most valuable contributions to the literature of the war and supplying a feature in it that no man has or could supply.

"To illustrate the character and devotion of the women of the Confederacy, I will repeat a statement made to me during the war by Governor Letcher, of Virginia. He had visited his home in the Shenandoah Valley, and on his return to the State capital called at the house of an old friend who had a large family. He found no one but the good mother at home, and inquired about the balance of the family. She told him that her husband, her husband's father and her ten sons were all in the army. And on his suggestion that she must feel lonesome, having had a large family with her and to be now left alone, her answer was that it was very hard, but that if she had ten more sons they should all go to the army. Can ancient or modern history show a nobler or more unselfish devotion to any cause?"

LECKY ON THE SOUTH.

“The Southern States proclaimed the right of nationalities, demanded their independence and proved their earnestness and their unanimity by arguments that were far more unequivocal than any doubtful plebiscite. For four years they defended their cause on the battlefield with heroic courage against overwhelming odds and at the sacrifice of everything that men most desire. American and indeed European writers are accustomed to speak of the heroism of the American colonies in repudiating imperial taxation and asserting and achieving their independence against all the force of Great Britain. But no one who looks carefully into the history of the American Revolution, who observes the languor, the profound divisions, the frequent pusillanimity, the absence of all strong and unselfish enthusiasm that were displayed in great portions of the revolted colonies and their entire dependence for success on foreign assistance, will doubt that the Southern States in the war of secession exhibited an incomparably higher level of courage, tenacity and self-sacrifice. No nation in the nineteenth century has maintained its nationhood with more courage and unanimity. But it was encountered with an equal tenacity and with far greater resources, and after a sacrifice of life unequalled in any war since the fall of Napoleon, the North succeeded in crushing the revolt and establishing its authority over the vanquished South.”

LOSSES IN THE UNION WAR.

By Dr. Tiebault, in Richmond (Va.) Times.

The United States in enlisted men numbered 2,865,028 against not exceeding 600,000 on the side of the Confederacy.

Dr. C. H. Tibault, Surgeon General of the United Confederate Veterans, addressed a circular to the surviving Confederate Surgeons in view of the reunion in Atlanta, Ga., in which he said::

Let me here briefly and tersely recite a few historic facts, from official data in my possession, of interest to stimulate our further research:

Of the 34 States and Territories only 11 seceded. In these 11 States the men of military age—from 18 to 45 years—numbered 1,064,193, inclusive of lame, halt, blind, etc. On the Union side the same class numbered 4,559,872—over 4 to 1—without estimating the constant accessions from the world at large augmenting monthly the Union side.

With the States of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, and the remainder of the Southern States, the remarkable fact presents that the South itself—the slave States—gave exceeding 300,000 to the Union side—more than half as many soldiers as comprised the entire Confederate army. These facts, derived from the war records, show that there were four armies in the field, each one of which was as large as the entire Confederate army, without including the more than 300,000 contingent from the South.

In numbers the Federal loss was 67,058 killed and 43,012 died of wounds; total, 110,070. Of the Confederates the like total was 74,524. The Confederates had 53,773 killed outright and 194,026 wounded on the field of battle. More than one-

third of the 600,000 Confederates were therefore confided to the Confederate surgeons for battle wounds. For the nineteen months—January, 1862, to July, 1863, inclusive—over 1,000,000 cases of wounds and sickness were entered upon the Confederate field reports and over 400,000 cases of wounds upon the hospital reports. It is estimated that each of the 600,000 Confederates were, on an average, disabled for greater or less periods, by wounds and sickness, about six times during the war. The heroic, untiring, important part thus borne by the skillful Confederate surgeons in maintaining in the field an effective army of unexampled Confederate soldiers must challenge particular attention.

The destruction by fire of the medical and surgical records of the Confederate States, deposited in the Surgeon General's office, in Richmond, Va., in April, 1865, renders the roster of the Medical Corps somewhat imperfect, hence the need of concerted action on the part of the survivors to bridge this hiatus. The official list of the paroled officers and men of the Army of Northern Virginia, surrendered by Gen. R. E. Lee, April 9, 1865, furnished 310 Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons. In my first report, presented at the Richmond reunion, I showed that the medical roster of the Army of Tennessee had been preserved in duplicate. I shall offer in a more detailed report data to prove indisputably important facts resulting to the prisoners of war upon both sides, with the purpose of establishing the death rate responsibility in the premises. It will suffice to mention here that the report of Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, on the 19th of July, 1866, exhibits the fact that of the Federal prisoners in Confederate hands during the war only 22,700 died, while of the Confederate prisoners in Federal hands 26,436 died. This report does not set forth the exact number of prisoners held by each side respectively.

These facts were given more in detail by a subsequent report by Surgeon General Barnes, of the United States Army.

The whole number of Federal prisoners captured by the Confederates and held in Southern prisons from first to last during the war was, in round numbers, 270,000, while the whole number of Confederates captured and held in prisons by the

Federals was in like round numbers only 220,000. From these two reports it appears that, with 50,000 more prisoners in the Southern stockades or other modes of confinement, the deaths were nearly 4,000 less. According to these figures, the per centum of Federal deaths in Southern prisons was under 9, while the per centum of Confederate deaths in Northern prisons was over 12. These mortuary statistics are of no small weight in determining on which side there was the most neglect, cruelty and inhumanity, proclaiming as they do a loss of more than 3 per cent. of Confederates over Federals in prisons, while the Federals had an unstinted command of everything.

There is in my keeping unchallenged evidence to demonstrate that the refusal to exchange prisoners was not due to the Confederate Government.

The policy of the Confederates was established by law. By an act of the Confederate Congress passed soon after the war was inaugurated, it was provided that prisoners of war should have the same rations in quantity and quality as Confederate soldiers in the field. By an act afterward passed, all hospitals for sick and wounded prisoners were put upon the same footing with hospitals for sick and wounded Confederates. This policy was never changed. There was no discrimination in either particular between Federal prisoners and Confederate soldiers. Whatever food or fare the Confederate soldier had, whether good or bad, full or short, the Federal prisoners shared equally with them. Whatever medical attention the sick and wounded Confederate soldiers had, the Federal prisoners in like condition also received. Where the supply of the usual standard medicines was exhausted and could not be replenished in consequence of the action of the Federal Government in holding them to be contraband of war and in preventing their introduction by the blockade and severe penalties, when resort was had to the virtues of the healing herbs of the country as substitutes for more efficient remedial agents, the suffering Federals shared these equally with like suffering Confederates. All Confederate surgeons have more or less valuable data in their keeping. Gather these up at once, comrades, resolve to come to this meeting, and bring them with you. Each separate fact placed with others in a connected

whole will fill in the needed missing links required to perfect the historic part relating to the faithfulness and unfaltering devotion of the Confederate surgeons in the thorough and conscientious performance of their humanitarian professional obligations, regardless of creeds and of nationalities, or whether friends or foemen. The whole number of Confederates surrendered from the 9th of April, 1865, to the 26th day of May, 1865, the date of final surrender, under Gen. E. Kirby Smith, was, according to the muster rolls, a little under 175,000. This embraces quite a number who from disease and wounds were not actually in the field at the time. The whole number of Federal forces then in the field and afterward mustered out of service, as the records show, amounted to in round numbers, 1,000,000.

The total loss in killed and died of wounds in the Franco-German war was 3.1 per cent; that of the Austrians in the war of 1866, 2.6 per cent; that of the Allies in the Crimea, 3.2 per cent. But in our war the hemorrhage was far greater, for the Federals lost 4.7 per cent and the Confederates over 9 per cent., the heaviest loss of any modern army, that fell around its standard.

DR. ANDREWS ON GENERAL LEE.

The *Chicago Times-Herald* says that Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews, president of Brown University, proclaimed Gen. Robert E. Lee the most valiant and most heroic military genius of modern times from the stage of Central Music Hall in a lecture the night of December 6th. "He did not discredit the bravery and valor of the leaders under whom he himself fought," says the *Times-Herald*. "He gave the head of the Confederate army more glory because he had to face killing problems in addition to the ordinary puzzles of the severest fight that history knows. The oration was one of masterful eloquence, delivered by a man built for an orator, with a rolling voice and the presence of a giant. He spoke with the air of powerful and firmest conviction. There were many in the audience who saw readily how he stood before the trustees of his institution last summer and told them he would recall his resignation and become president again, with the understanding that he was to think and act as he had thought and acted or might think or act in the future on matters of public interest. The trustees agreed.

"Dr. Andrews talked in Evanston in the afternoon. His theme there was General William Tecumseh Sherman. He took occasion to give the man who was called crazy at the beginning of the war the honor of executing its culminating features—the march to the sea. He praised General Lee in equal terms at the night lecture, pictured the great intellect of the lost cause as one of the most powerful of all American history. He thought the General carried out the instinct which was born with him—the love for the art of war and the heart to carry on war—inherited from an ancestry which could be traced to one of the fiercest of the companions of William, who sailed away from the shores of Normandy and conquered England.

"General Lee joined the Confederacy because Virginia asked him to," said the doctor. "He was a Virginian. The call of Virginia to any of her sons is the voice of law and duty.

He had the faith of the crusader; his letters would make a guide to holiness. He was always a soldier, never impure in thought or act, never profane or obscene. He did not touch the cup, as did Grant, Hooker or Phil Sheridan, and when he lost a fight it was never said of him that the defeat was due to the habit which makes men's heads into muddles. He was never out-generated by Grant in all the campaign from Rappahannock to James River, never trapped and never caught napping. It usually happened that when the men on our side ordered a march at 5 in the morning they never made more than half the distance between the two armies. Lee had ordered an advance at 4:30.

"I fail to find in the books any such masterful generalship as this hero showed, holding that slim, gray line, half starved, with no prospect of additions, and fighting when his army was too hungry to stand and the rifles were only used as clubs. His courage was sublime. He was as great as Gustavus Adolphus, or Napoleon, or Wellington, or Von Moltke. His cause was not the lost cause so much as is suspected. All that was good in his cause has been grafted into our laws and our constitution. The doctrine of State's rights as now interpreted by the Supreme Court is in exact accordance with his claims on the point. General Lee lost at Gettysburg because the Federal troops had received a new motor of tremendous strength whose power no one knew—General Hancock. He also lost because Meade's men were fighting on Union soil—almost within hearing distance of the prayers of their wives and children for victory. They were at their hearthstones. Men are tigers when wives and families are the inspiration in war.'

"Dr. Andrews blames General Burnside for throwing away the battle of Fredericksburg and General Pope for losing ground because of bombast at the first try for Richmond.

"The summary of his estimate of Lee compared with the Federal generals is that he was as brave, more watchful and doubly skillful, in addition to having his head filled all the time with miseries and disappointments which did not exist on the other side of the line. He concluded by declaring that he was glad the republic is getting into that state of mind where it is beginning to give credit to manhood and valor without regard to section, boundaries or parties."

APPENDIX

HYMN TO ROBERT E. LEE.

O Robert Lee! O Robert Lee!
How shall thy servant speak of thee?
Whom humbly, lowly, and afar,
He followed in the track of War,
 'Twas thine, almost, his soul to save,
 When sunk, well nigh, beneath the wave
 Of Doubt, that fierce his faith assailed,
 And other lights were hid, or failed.
'Twas thy grand life that told me then
That God, indeed, doth dwell with men;
'Twas thine to show His truth and grace,
In bright reflection, on thy face.
 How oft, amid War's fiercest storm,
 I've gazed upon thy noble form;
 And, marking how serene and high
 Thy mien, or how thy gentle sigh
Was breathed o'er corpse of gallant brave,
Who fell near thee, his land to save;—
How oft the thought that thou wast sign
Of Might and Majesty Divine;
 And token, too, of that deep love
 That rules the heart of God above;
 So deep, so wide, embracing all,
 Yet caring for the sparrow's fall.
Prayer now to Heaven is humbly breathed
Sometime, somewhere, to see thee wreathed
In crown of glory, fadeless, bright,
Beyond the stars, in realms of Light.

C. H. Scott.

Lynchburg, Va.

MRS. "STONEWALL" JACKSON.

By James Power Smith, General Jackson's Staff.

Mrs. Mary Anna Jackson, the honored widow of General "Stonewall" Jackson, came to the close of a long, faithful and happy life in her home in Charlotte, N. C., on Wednesday, March 24, 1915.

She was a gentlewoman by birth and nature, a lady of simplicity of character and cheerfulness of spirit, and most amiable and pleasing manner. Modest and unaffected, she was cordial and considerate toward all with whom she came in contact. Small in stature and well rounded in form, she was in striking contrast with the erect and soldierly man whose bride she became in her youth, and whose home and life she made so happy in the few years of married life given to them. She became the wife of Major Jackson of the Virginia Military Institute in 1857. She remembered with amusement that when they were married the bridegroom was asked to promise that he would be an "indulgent husband" and the bride was told to be "an obedient wife," and the vows were kept without a shade of question or hesitation, and to the unmingled happiness of both. The stern and disciplined soldier was gentle indulgence itself, and the happy wife at his side was most happy in the strong-willed, heroic man whom she loved, admired and trusted supremely.

In the trying days of war she came to him whenever in his judgment conditions and duties permitted. During the last winter of his life, when his command was encamped in the Rapahannock Valley, one of his major-generals, an incorrigible old batchelor, complained that there were too many ladies visiting their husbands in the vicinity of the camp, and asked that they

be compelled to withdraw. But the general walked the floor of his headquarters office and said with some heat: "I will do no such thing. I wish that my wife could come to see me."

The first winter of the war Mrs. Jackson spent two or three months with the general in Winchester. And she came again for a week at Hamilton's Crossing, just before the battle of Chancellorsville, and at the last was at his bedside when he "crossed over the river" at the Chandler home at Guineas Station, May 10, 1863.

For more than fifty years she has been a widow, a patient, cheerful, Christian woman, honoring and loving the good and great man who was her husband, submissive to the will of God, faithful to every duty, having her own sickness and her own more painful sorrow, but gentle, steadfast, biding the time when she would find her appointed rest "under the shade of the trees."

It will be a pleasing and abiding memory with the people of Richmond and Virginia that last May, at our earnest solicitation, Mrs. Jackson came to join us in the honor we wished to give to the memory of General Jackson on our "Stonewall" Jackson Memorial Day. Thinking not at all of herself, but only of him, she was as gentle, unaffected and cheerful as we had always known her. More frail in body, showing the traces of her many years, she was uncomplaining, placid in countenance and peaceful in spirit. Happy in the enthusiasm of our hero-worship, she was biding the time when she would enter in through the gates and find those whom by the wise and loving will of her heavenly Father she had lost awhile.

The women of the South have been teaching us that "love makes memory eternal," and with us all the loving memory of this most womanly woman, this widow so greatly widowed, this faithful and fruitful follower of Christ, will endure to the end of our days, and make the world better and our lives sweeter because she was given to us through half a century.

JEWS IN THE CIVIL WAR.

From "Justice to the Jews," by Dr. Madison C. Peters,
page 98.

"It was left for the Civil War to bring out the qualities of the Jew as a genuine soldier, as one whom no terrors could daunt, no dangers intimidate, no sufferings weaken, an automaton of flesh and bone impervious to fatigue and hunger. The Civil War tried the souls of men as well as their bodies, yet the Jew did not shrink. When Lincoln called for volunteers, the sons of Israel rushed to don the Blue and followed the flag to death or victory. Great numbers were also in the ranks of the Confederacy, a fact which stifles the calumny that the Jew when he does fight has no heart in the struggle, but merely fights perfunctorily and with no object in view. For the time being, Judaism was forgotten and the Jew in Blue faced the Jew in Gray with a deadly earnestness, each believing heart and soul in the cause for which he had unsheathed his sword. 'Stonewall' Jackson and Robert E. Lee gallantly fought for the 'Lost Cause,' and though they were defeated, they were not conquered, and of all the brave sons of the South who fought and bled beneath their leadership, none put up a more stubborn fight than the Jewish Confederates."

BOOKS

THE CRISIS OF THE CONFEDERACY—A HISTORY OF GETTYSBURG AND THE WILDERNESS.

BY CECIL BATTINE, CAPTAIN 15TH, THE KING'S HUSSARS.
8vo., 424pp., WITH SIX MAPS—LONGMAN, GREEN & CO.,
LONDON, NEW YORK AND BOMBAY.

It is not surprising that the campaigns and battles of the four years' war between the American States, and the careers of the great leaders on the two sides should attract the attention and be the study of military students and critics in other lands. But it is surprising that foreign students and war critics should give such thorough and careful study to these leaders, and their campaigns as to produce books that are most complete in their comprehension of all the elements of history, and most accurate in detail. Col. Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War," as a narrative of Jackson's campaigns, and a study of the strategy of that military genius, is the most complete and detailed ever written. No American writer has produced so full and thorough a discussion and history of Jackson and his campaigns as this accomplished English officer.

The same may be said of Captain Battine's book. No book to this time has given so comprehensive and so accurate a narrative of the Gettysburg campaign, from the standpoint of the impartial historian. Of Henderson it may be said that he had become convinced of the justice of the cause of the Southern Confederacy, and was an enthusiastic admirer of Stonewall Jackson and of the Southern Soldiery which followed Jackson. But Captain Battine announces no judgment of the righteousness of the contest on either side. There is a well guarded reserve as to his convictions and his sympathies. With an impartiality that is we believe unbroken, he studies with great fairness the whole campaign, from the standpoint of the military student and critic. With the politics of the great conflict he has nothing to do, and

of neither side is he a partisan. It is one of the great values of this book that it is the work of an author who is neither Northern nor Southern, who has not committed himself to a judgment on the great question at issue, and who is here engaged in a just and careful study of the critical period of the war, in the interest of military science.

The book is an octavo volume of over four hundred pages, somewhat compactly printed, and is, therefore, quite a full and substantial volume. Its maps are well prepared, and are, on the whole, quite accurate reproductions of the country as it was in the time of war. It is not at all a complete history of the downfall of the military power of the Southern States, but it aims to be "a concise account of the most critical phase of this great Civil War." There is no attempt to embrace the elements of weakness that existed in finance, in blockade ports, in lack of manufactures, in imperfect transportation, nor is there any outline of the campaigns in the West, and the seizure of the Mississippi River.

But with Gettysburg in view, the author gives a brief account of the campaigns in Virginia from the beginning. And this is done to bring the reader to the crisis of the war at Gettysburg, with an intelligent comprehension of the conditions which there existed, the generals who commanded, and the battalions which were now filled with veteran soldiers, who had passed through long marches and well-fought battles. Chancellorsville is especially studied as the field from which the invasion of Pennsylvania has seemed to many the logical and necessary conclusion. Then the cavalry engagement at Brandy Station is quite fully narrated, and the capture of Winchester by Gen. Ewell, and the defeat of Millroy. With most admirable care, Captain Battine has studied many sources of information, and knows well the books both North and South. He is familiar with the topography of Northern Virginia, and follows the movement of Stuart in Fauquier and Prince William with intelligence, and gives as complete an account of his daring but mistaken ride to the east of Hooker into Pennsylvania as exists in print today.

The great and critical contest at Gettysburg is treated not

as a three days' battle, but correctly as three battles on three successive days. There was to both sides the unexpected battle on Willoughbys' Run, three miles west of the town, with its Confederate success. There was the second battle, when in the afternoon of the second day, Longstreet at last struck the extreme left flank of the Federal army, and defeated Sickles at the Peach Orchard. And there was the third battle, when on the afternoon of the third day, Pickett's column struck the left centre of the enemy's line on the ridge, and, unsupported, fell back, a broken, exhausted wave from the overwhelming numbers holding a strong position. No important part of the struggle is omitted. The condition of the armies on both sides is carefully narrated, the arrivals on the field, the delays, the confusions, the mistakes are told candidly. Many books have been written from many viewpoints, and, no doubt, sincere attempts to do justice to all have been made. But nowhere, we believe, is there so just and impartial a narrative of the struggle around the little Pennsylvania town, on which hung so critically the issues of the whole war, and the turning point of American history.

The author has not failed to see that from the Southern side, the reason for failure at Gettysburg are to be found in a number of facts. There was the unfortunate absence of Stuart and his cavalry, for which he accounts in the weakness of indefinite instructions from the commanding general; the lack of a prompt and vigorous initiative on the part of Gen. Ewell on the evening of the first day; the unsoldierly recalcitration of Gen. Longstreet, and his lack of sympathy with the wishes of Gen. Lee; and yet more pervading and controlling, the loss of Stonewall Jackson. "With the fatal shot which struck down Stonewall Jackson began the series of disastrous events leading to the conquest of the Confederacy."

The author of this book is an educated professional soldier, acquainted with the principles of military science, as taught in the English schools, and as exemplified in all modern warfare. From this standpoint his criticisms are made, and will be regarded, we are confident, with much respect. In his view, the Richmond government erred in not concentrating all possible

force in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, drawing everything possible from the South and West for the strongest aggressive movement. At the sacrifice of some minor interests, the whole strength should have been thrown into a decisive campaign. Again and again, Captain Battine urges that it was a great mistake in tactics that the cavalry was not kept in close operation with the infantry on the field, and pushed in massed columns upon every weakened point. He thinks that on both sides in the American war there was need of a much better staff organization of professionally educated officers, with definite assignments to duty. After crossing the Potomac, the author thinks, instead of going so far afield into Pennsylvania, Gen. Lee should have promptly turned east toward Frederick, and fought the battle near to his communications, and nearer to the enemy's base at Washington. Of Gettysburg, he speaks as distinctly "the soldier's battle;" the Southern patriot soldiers fighting with a courage and sacrifice unparalleled. Their leaders of highest rank did not rise to the occasion, and failed in harmony and concert of action.

We have found it a matter of constant regret that the able and accomplished author of this valuable book has not given in foot-notes references to the authorities on which his narrative is based. He has made an extensive research through the literature of the war. It would have added greatly to the permanent historical value of the book, if he had given the references to reports and personal narratives, with which he evidently has most intelligent acquaintance. We have no reason to question his statistical tables, and believe that they conform in the main with the reports and statements of Generals Hooker, Meade and Humphries, and of the Confederate authorities. But it would have been eminently satisfactory if these sources of information had been given.

A few errors we have noted, that may not be of especial importance, but their correction in another edition may protect the reader from some confusion of thought.

Page 15, 11th line from bottom, should read, "were marching *Southeast*," not "South-west."

Page 50, "were cantoned South and *East*," not "West."

Page 71, "Field Hospital at the *Wilderness*," not at "Dowdall's Tavern."

Page 122, top line, "Robertson's *Confederate* Brigade," not "Federal."

Page 155, top line, "Lee's messenger found Ewell with Early;" Early and his division were at York, quite well to the East.

Captain Battine has done faithful and able work in his book, and it must remain a permanent contribution to the history of the crisis of the Confederacy, the breaking of the wave of the Southern soldier's victory, when it had reached the very crest of the ridge, against which it rose.

J. P. S.

THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY—AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS AND OTHERS.

BY RANDOLPH H. MCKIM, D. D., LL. O., D. C. L., LATE FIRST LIEUTENANT AND A. D. C., THIRD BRIGADE (JACKSON'S LATER EDWARD JOHNSON'S DIVISION, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, AUTHOR OF "A SOLDIER'S RECOLLECTIONS." NEW YORK, NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY, 1912.

The Rev. Dr. McKim has done well to write this little book. It has become of late years too much the tendency to exaggerate the numbers, and to minimize the valor and ability of the Confederate Army, and it is the right and the duty of every surviving Confederate soldier to refute, by all sound arguments, the conclusions reached by General Adams, Colonel Livermore, in his work, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America," and others. General Lee rightly said, in his letter to Gen. Early (p. 70 of Dr. McKim's book), "It will be difficult to get the world to understand the odds against which we fought." Even now, fifty years after the close of the war, it remains difficult, and Gen. Adams calls it a mistake to suppose that the Confederate States were crushed by overwhelming resources and numbers." (Dr. McKim, p. 9 ad fin.) Against this statement I merely place the first paragraph of that immortal "General Order No. 9," which is as true now as when it was first written:

HDQRS, A. N. VA.

Appomattox C. H., April 10, 1865, General Orders No. 9.

"After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources."

Comrades, which will you follow, General Adams or General Lee? To ask this question is to answer it.

I cannot follow Dr. McKim in his examination of Gen. Adam's argument. Suffice it to say that I have read this book *twice* carefully, and I fully endorse Dr. McKim's reasoning, though I must add that I agree with Col. Taylor, Gen. Lee's Adjutant General, who says (McKim, Preface ad fin.), "I regret to have to say that I know of no *reliable data* in support of *any* precise number, and have always realized that it must ever be largely a matter of conjecture on our side."

Dr. McKim gives in his Preface eight main points of his counter-argument, which each one can read for himself, although it will not take more than an hour to read the whole book.

Dr. McKim makes a comparison between the Boers and the Confederates, following and refuting Gen. Adams' assertions; he further comments on "the fundamental error in the argument of Northern writers, sums up the "affirmative evidence in support of our conclusion," drawing evidence from the conscriptions, and supports his views by a quotation from the *New York Tribune* of June 26, 1867, which says, "we judge in all 600,000 different men were in the Confederate ranks during the war."

This is about as near as we can ever get to it, and Dr. McKim supports his view by quotations Col. Wm. F. Fox's "Regimental Losses in the Civil War," who assures us that "no statistics are given that are not warranted by the official records," and these sum up the strength of the *entire Confederate army* as 601,980. But for the Navy we should have gained our independence, and we came very near doing it anyhow on more than one occasion. Let some Northern writer examine the whole record, and give us the results; we can stand them. And let some Southern writer examine those precious muster-rolls, as Dr. McKim calls them, and also give us the results, which no Southern writer has yet been allowed to do.

Dr. McKim further examines "the weak points in General Adams' argument," especially the effect of the conscription, which egregiously failed to bring in the men it was estimated

to bring, especially in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and even in Virginia and North Carolina. (See Livermores' "Numbers and Losses.")

By the end of 1864, a crucial period in the history of the war, General Lee thought that the conscription was *diminishing* rather than *increasing* the strength of his army. The truth was that, towards the close of the war, some were "getting tired of it," and especially of its effect on their families at home, and their ability to support them; while they could barely support themselves on their meagre rations, their meagre wages would not support their families. General Starvation, rather than General Grant, conquered our army. Consult McKim (pp. 34, 35) on the Confederate Conscription and the attitude of certain Governors of States towards it, which made it all the harder to enforce. Confederate patriotism was not equal to resisting Confederate suffering.

Dr. McKim next discusses the exempts and details, and concludes (p. 37), that "even if we admit an enrollment in the Confederate army of 700,000, and reduce our estimates of exemptions and details for special work from 125,000 to 100,000, there remain *apparently* for *service in the field*, only about 600,000 men; and that, I suppose, is what Gen. Cooper and other Southern authorities had in mind." See note at foot of pp. 37, 38, giving, on the authority of Gen. Marcus J. Wright, the numbers engaged on both sides in the six greatest battles of the Army of Northern Virginia, which "are far more consistent with the maximum of 600,000 serving with the colors than with the maximum of 1,200,000." I may add, with respect to these figures, that the present writer, in controversy with a writer in *The Nation* (who afterwards proved to be the late Gen. J. D. Cox), once had occasion to investigate *carefully* the numbers of the "Confederate forces at Sharpsburg" (Antietam), and came to the conclusion that "the estimate of 35,000 or 36,000 Confederates engaged in the battle of Sharpsburg is *avery fair one*." Dr. McKim, on the authority of Gen. Wright, gives it as 35,255. (See my letter of February 2, 1895, in the *Richmond Times* of a few days later.

Dr. McKim follows with a section on "The Military Popu-

lation of the Confederacy," which I heartily commend to the reader. If we make the "*necessary deductions*" on all accounts, we can reduce the figure given as "the fighting army" to 620,000, which is but little more than the number given above. Gen. Adams attempts to support his opinion by figures taken from "The South in the Building of the Nation" (McKim, p. 48), but, says Dr. McKim (p. 52), "it can be shown, I think, beyond contradiction, that the numbers given by the representatives of the various States, which Mr. Adams quotes from "The South," and from other Southern publications are "enormously exaggerated," and he proceeds to show it. The writers are not always accurate, even granting them every disposition to be fair. At this late day, it ought certainly to be possible for Northern and Southern writers to agree as to numbers. Neither side now desires to underrate the fighting ability of the other, but it doesn't stand to reason that any two countries with the respective numbers and resources of the Northern and the Southern States could have expected a different result.

Since this article was written, Gen. Adams has passed away. The writer had the pleasure of meeting him once, at the meeting in Richmond a few years ago of the American Historical Association, of which at that time we were both members, and it was the last time that this writer has attended a meeting of that Association. I should have taken pleasure in discussing this subject at a future meeting, but that meeting must now be adjourned to a future world, in which, I trust, we can discuss the subject amicably at least.

JAMES M. GARNETT.

GEN. ROBERT E. LEE.

GENERAL WADE HAMPTON'S TALK WITH THE GREAT SOLDIER.

The *Charleston News and Courier* of Wednesday published the following letter from Gen Wade Hampton and addressed to the editor of that paper :

"My Dear Sir: In the *News and Courier* of November 10 is an appreciative tribute to General Lee by Mr. Hanckel, which I have read with interest and pleasure, but the writer has fallen into an error which I am able to correct on the authority of General Lee himself. Mr. Hanckel intimates that General Lee felt embarrassed in determining the course he would take when the war between the States took place, but in this he is mistaken. He did not hesitate for a moment, and while, like many of us who followed him, he doubtless regretted the war and doubted the wisdom of it he felt that his duty demanded that he should give his services to his native State, and he never for a moment regretted that he had followed the dictates of duty. He once said that duty was the sublimest word in our language, and if there was ever man whose every action was prompted by a sense of duty he surely was that man.

"Some time after the close of the war I had the pleasure of spending several days with the General at his home in Lexington, and once while discussing the war he said: 'I did only what my duty demanded. I could have taken no other course without dishonor, and if it was all to do over I should act precisely as I did.'

"It was his intention to write a history of the war, but, unfortunately for the South and for the truth of history, death cut short his work. But he had commenced the work, in which he began by speaking of the difference of opinion as to the true construction of the Constitution and how those opposing views

were shown in the Convention of 1787, and he then went on to say 'that those differences in 1861 culminated in blood, but not in treason.'

"If there was any 'treason' pertaining to the war it surely was not on the part of General Lee or of the South.

"WADE HAMPTON.

"Columbia, S. C., Nov. 12, 1900."

The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. Vol. XXIII, No. 2. April, 1915. Published Quarterly by the Virginia Historical Society. \$5.00 per Annum. Single number, \$1.50.

In addition to a number of valuable papers touching Virginia History, this number contains the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Virginia Historical Society, February 25, 1915, with the address of the President, Captain W. Gordon McCabe. Of especial interest in this address are the tributes paid to a number of deceased members, A. Caperton Braxton, Esq., Dr. Wm. Meade Clark, Gen. T. M. Logan and Capt. Robert E. Lee, the youngest son of General Robert E. Lee.

Annual Magazine Subject-Index—1914. A subject-index to a selected list of American and English Periodicals and Society Publications, edited by Frederick Winthrop Paxon. A. B. The Boston Book Company, Boston, 1915.

This is a well made volume of 264 pp., of great value to students and authors. It embraces references to all the matter published in our last issue. Vol. XXXIX, Southern Historical Society Papers.

The Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio—January-March. Vol. X, 1915, No. 1. Cincinnati, Ohio.

Antikvarisk Tidekrift for Sverige—Publication of the Swedish Academy of Early History and Antiquities. Stockholm.

Transactions of the Huguenot Society of South Carolina—No. 20. Incorporated June 21, 1909. Charleston, S. C.

The Bearing of Archaeological and Historical Research upon The New Testament—By the Rev. Parke P. Flournoy, D. D., Gunning Prize. May, 1912. Published by the Victoria Institute, Strand, W. C., London.

The Johns Hopkins University Circulars, For 1914, Numbers 9 and 10. For 1915, Numbers 1, 2 and 3.

Report of the Newberry Library. Chicago—1914.

The Durrett Collection, now in the Library of the University of Chicago. Early newspapers of Virginia, Maryland and Kentucky. There is in the collection, a complete file of The Winchester Gazette, Winchester, Virginia, 1799 to September, 1802. Of the period, 1800 and 1820, there are representations of the Inquirer, Richmond, Va.

The James Stuart Historical Publications—The Harrington Letters. The North Carolina Historical Society. Vol. 13, No. 2.

Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly. October, 1914. Vol. XXIII, No. 4.

INDEX

- Absence of Cavalry, 264
 Adams, John Quincy, 21
 Alexander, Miss Violet G., 183
 Alexander, Gen. E. P., 263
 Anderson, Wm. A., 149
 Andrews, Dr. E. Benjamin, 320
 American, South is, 307
 Artillery at Fredericksburg, 207
 Averill, Gen., 49

 Battle of Fredericksburg, 195
 Benjamin, Judah, 240
 Birney, General, 290
 Boteler, Col. A. R., 162
 Butterfield, Gen., 290

 Calhoun, John C., 10
 Cemetery Hill, 299
 Calisch, Rabbi, 240
 Chancellorsville, 44
 Character of Confederate Soldier, 230
 Charlotte, 183
 Chew, Colonel R. P.
 Christian, Judge G. L., 244
 Craighill, Gen. W. P., 288, 396
 Confederate Principles, 1
 Confederate Navy Yard, 183
 Confederate Soldier, 230
 Crisis of Confederacy, 326
 Culp's Hill, 297

 Daniel, John W., 235
 Davis, Jefferson, 25
 Declaration of Independence, 6
 Duty—The Sublimest Word, 2

 Everett, Edward, 287
 Everett, Lloyd T., 2
 Ewell, Gen. R. S., 273

 Fieberger, Col. C. J., 294
 Fire Bell in the Night, 9
 Forged Letter, 101
 Fredericksburg, 195
 Fremantle, Col., 291

 Garnett, Capt. James M.:
 Second Manassas, 101
 McKim's Statistics, 331
 Gettysburg—Capt. Battine, 326
 Gettysburg—Dr. R. H. McKim, 228

 Hayne, 15
 Henderson, Col. G. F. R., 308
 Hill, Gen. A. P., 270
 Historian, The Ideal, 1
 Hooker, 47
 Hope, James Barron, 1
 Hymn to R. E. Lee, 322

 Ideal Historian, 1
 Invasion of Pennsylvania, 255
 Inaugural of Mr. Davis, 25

 Jackson, Stonewall, 149, 162
 Jackson, Mrs. Stonewall, 323
 Jefferson, Thomas, 15
 Jews in the Confederate Service, 325
 Jones, Dr. J. Wm., 145

 Lamb, Capt. John, 250
 Lee, Gen. Robert E.:
 Jackson's Estimate, 181
 Scales' Estimate, 201
 Andrews' Estimate, 3
 Wade Hampton, 335
 Letter to Stuart, 259
 Order No. 73, 265
 Lecky on the South, 315
 Letcher, Gov. John, 314
 Living Confederate Principles, 2
 Lodge, Senator, 235
 Lord St. Muir, 179
 Longstreet, Gen. James, 285
 Losses in the Civil War, 316

 Madison, James, 7
 Mann, of Illinois, 236
 Meade, Gen., 291
 Merrimac and Monitor, 301
 Moore, S. McDowell, 154

- McClellan, Gen. G. B., 199
McIntosh, Col. D. G., 44
McKim, Dr. R. H., 253, 331
Navy Yard in Charlotte, 183
Ney, Marshall, 270
Numbers at Gettysburg,
268, 269, 275, 276
Numerical Strength, 286, 337
Olive Branches of the South, 26
Ox Hill, 294
Principles, Confederate, 2
Reagan, Judge, 312
Secession and Accession, 11
Second Manassas, 224
Scales, Gen. A. M., 195
Scott, Rev. C. H., 322
South is American, 307
Southern Olive Branches, 25
Statuary Hall, 39
Stuart, Gen. J. E. B.
Stoneman, 51
Stonewall Jackson, 149
Tariff, 9
Taylor, Gen. Richard, 156
Tibault, Dr., 316
Webster, Daniel, 11
Whittle, Capt. W. C., 301
Young, Jesse Boardman, 288

975
5727
v. 40

LAD

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA



3 1262 09719 4285